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Avant-Garde Europe: The Problem of Modernism and the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Enlargement

Abstract: *This paper explores two divergent concepts installed in the EU operational structure – postmodernism and modernism – in relation to the CFSP and enlargement. The research is conducted upon the content analysis method, descriptive method and comparative analysis. The main research intention is to locate the inability of the EU, to achieve internal coherence on a certain international issues, taking into account the clash between the above mentioned concepts. Consequently, this paper locates the problem of modernism as in the EU normative provisions and behavior of its Member States. At the end, it is noted that the concept of avant-garde Europe can be used as a possible solution for future development of the EU in a postmodern direction.*

Keywords: Modernism, Postmodernism, EU, Avant-garde Europe, CFSP, Enlargement

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Introduction

This paper will explore two diametrically opposite concepts installed in the European Union operational system – postmodernism and modernism – in relation to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and enlargement, and thus, will seek to offer some ideas for future advancement of the EU in a postnational and postmodern direction. The main research intention is to locate the inability of the European Union, to achieve internal coherence on a certain international issues, and thus, to ensure single foreign policy, while taking into account the clash between the concepts of modernism and postmodernism. In this research, we will use content analysis method, descriptive method and comparative analysis. Otherwise, this paper seeks to answer the following research questions:

RQ1: What is the true nature of the EU?

RQ2: What determines the efficiency of the EU CFSP and enlargement?

RQ3: What the EU should reform in order to enhance its coherence?

1. The postmodern and postnational structure with a modern core

A Special Advisor at the European Commission and the author of the book *The Breaking of Nations*, Robert Cooper, acknowledged: ‘*what is called ‘modern’ is not so because it is something new – it is in fact very old fashioned – but because it is linked to that great engine of modernization, the nation-state*’.¹ The EU is not a nation-state, and therefore cannot be treated as a modern entity. Contrary to that, the EU is ‘the best example of a postmodern space’.² Consequently, the postmodern state is one that is ‘*more pluralist, more complex, and less centralized than the bureaucratic modern [nation] state*’.³ Whereas, the postmodern foreign policy means clearing with the features of modernity, such as the nation-state, sovereignty, centralization, the use of force, etc. (Table 1). The EU operates in a postmodern world, beyond the nation-state limits, as a *postnational* entity. The postnationalism should be treated as a process that complements and supplements the nation-states performances, based upon the principles of mutual understanding, mu-

¹ S. Van Damme, *The European Union as a Post-modern Security Actor? Defense Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo*, 2008, p. 2, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0013:0045:EN:PDF> (last visited 18.08.2017).

² R. Grajauskas, L. Kasčiūnas, *Modern versus Postmodern Actor of International Relations: Explaining EU–Russia Negotiations on the New Partnership Agreement*, 2009, p. 4, [lfpr.lt/uploads/File/2009-22/Grajauskas_Kasciunas.pdf](http://lfr.lt/uploads/File/2009-22/Grajauskas_Kasciunas.pdf) (last visited 18.08.2017).

³ *Ibidem*, p. 5.

tual openness and networking, oriented towards achieving the transcendental objectives, and thus, transcending the nation-states limits.

Table 1. Modern and postmodern foreign policy

	MODERN FOREIGN POLICY	POSTMODERN FOREIGN POLICY
<i>Means</i>	Military instruments and hard power	Non-military instruments and soft (structural) power
<i>Actors</i>	Sovereign nation-states	Nation-states of contingent sovereignty, international (supranational) organizations, non-governmental actors
<i>Sovereignty</i>	Protective about sovereignty; avoiding mutual verification mechanisms	Less cautious about sovereignty; positive about transferring part of sovereignty to an international regime
<i>Raison d'état</i>	Emphasis on the nation-state and on the defense of national interests (instead of values or norms)	Emphasis on norms and values
<i>Openness</i>	Efforts to minimize dependence on other international actors, as well as to maintain as more self-sufficient the political and the economic life as possible	Open to international cooperation and positive about increasing interdependence (seeing interdependence as a key to security)
<i>Centralization</i>	Substantial state control over the political, economic, and social life; tendencies of centralization	More pluralistic, democratic and decentralized domestically
<i>International law</i>	Skeptical about international law; predisposed to using force in international relations	Attaching great importance to international law (no fear of being bound by international legal norms)


Source: R. Grajauskas, L. Kasčiūnas, *Modern versus Postmodern Actor of International Relations: Explaining EU-Russia Negotiations on the New Partnership Agreement*, 2009, lfpr.lt/uploads/File/2009-22/Grajauskas_Kasciunas.pdf (last visited 18.08.2017).

The postnational structure represents ‘a new mode of integration [based on] *cosmopolitan solidarity*’.⁴ Namely, through the postnational networking, the nation-states are transformed into Member States, taking into account the fact that they surrender (pool or delegate) a part of their sovereignty to the postnational structure. The EU can be treated as a role model of *direct type of postnationalism*, established *directly* by the nation – states (subsequently EU Member States) through their *postnational*

⁴ J. Habermas, *The Postnational Constellation*, Cambridge 2001, p. 57.

networking and shared sovereignty in the interest of the EU as an ultimate postnational structure (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Direct postnationalism



Source: G. Ilik, *Normative power interrupted: the EU, BRICS and the Republic of Macedonia*, “New Balkan Politics” 2013, p. 291.

Postmodern (and postnational) states are ‘generally striving to establish a post-Westphalian order where state sovereignty is constrained through legal developments beyond the nation-state’.⁵ In a post-Westphalian order ‘foreign policy transcends the state-centric view of international relations’.⁶ As a result, the affirmation of norms and values is becoming equally important as the affirmation of national interests. Whereas, the foreign policy in the Westphalian (modern) age, ‘[is] characterized by states as the main actors, by a clear distinction between foreign and domestic politics, by the protection of sovereignty and by the pursuit of national interest, power and *raison d’état*’.⁷ Unlike the modern (Westphalian) concept of national interests (*raison d’état*), we can qualify the EU postnational interests as value interests (*raison de valeur*),⁸

⁵ H. Sjørnsen, *What Kind of Power?* in: *Civilian or Military Power?*, H. Sjørnsen (ed.), Abingdon 2007, p. 2.

⁶ S. Keukeleire, J. McNaughton, *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*, Basingstoke 2008, p. 20.

⁷ R. Grajauskas, L. Kasčiūnas, *Modern versus Postmodern Actor of International Relations: Explaining EU–Russia Negotiations on the New Partnership Agreement*, 2009, p. 4, lfpr.lt/uploads/File/2009-22/Grajauskas_Kasciunas.pdf (last visited 18.08.2017).

⁸ G. Ilik, *EUtopia: The international political power of the EU in the process of ideologization of the Post – American world order*, Bitola 2012, p. 160.

derived from the values stipulated in the EU constitutive treaties. Article 21 of the Lisbon Treaty noted that the EU's actions on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired '*its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the UN Charter and international law*'.⁹ This provision confirms that the EU shall define and pursue its common policies and actions and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to achieve the following objectives: '*(a) safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity; (b) consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law; (c) preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter*'.¹⁰ But, in the interest of achieving of these values (or *raison de valeur*), the question of *coherence* appears as a key issue for the EU, taking into account the mutual commitment of its Member States to support common foreign and security policy '*actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity*' and to '*refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness*'.¹¹

2. The question of coherence

The theorists Joseph Jupille and James A. Caporaso claim that coherence determines whether or not an entity is an actor, because '*[t]o be an actor implies a minimal level of cohesion*'.¹² In that context, I must emphasize that only the states and other forms of political unions similar to them (federation or confederation), naturally possess the coherence understood *in stricto sensu*. Based on this view, the EU nature is quite problematic to define, as the EU often (incoherently) reflects the political views of its Member States, and thus sometimes appearing as an international organization, and while other times as a state. In order to define more ac-

⁹ The Lisbon Treaty, 2008, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0013:0045:EN:PDF> (last visited 18.08.2017).

¹⁰ Ibidem.

¹¹ W. Wessels, F. Bopp, *The Institutional Architecture of CFSP after the Lisbon Treaty – Constitutional breakthrough or challenges ahead?*, Brussels 2008, p. 12.

¹² K. Keisala, *EU as an international actor: Strengthens of the European civilian power*, Tampere 2004, p. 84.

curately the phenomenon of cohesion, the theorists Joseph Jupille and James A. Caporaso noted four different dimensions.

The first dimension is *value cohesion*, which owns inclusive and integrative function, and which ‘refers to the similarity and compatibility of basic goals’.¹³ As the second dimension, Jupille and Caporaso noted *tactical cohesion*, which appears in conditions of disharmonious political views of the Member States within the EU ‘if goals are different but can be made to fit one another’.¹⁴ The third dimension is *procedural cohesion*, which ‘implies some consensus on rules and procedures used to process those issues where conflict arises and, thus, agreement on basic rules by which policies are made’.¹⁵ The fourth dimension is *output cohesion*, which refers to the situation where the Member States of the EU succeed in formulating policies regardless of the level of substantive or procedural agreement.¹⁶ The latter dimension directly implies the ability to articulate foreign policy, which is to provide a unique appearance in the international relations of the particular entity – the EU in this case. Similarly, the significance of this dimension emphasizes the inability of the EU to achieve consistent articulation of a single foreign policy, because of the different political views and preferences of its Member States in certain situations and under certain circumstances.

On that basis, I conclude another dimension of coherence, the *coherence of preferences*, directly connected with the ability of the European Union (and the Member States) to establish a *single* foreign policy based on *setting up transcendental objectives and goals*. This dimension refers to where, when and how to act, primarily taking into account the *EU interests as a whole*, not in fragmentary pieces.

Consequently, the EU leaders must work together, in order ‘to increase [the EU] cohesiveness [...] [And thus to] provide the EU with a distinctive identity’.¹⁷ In that context, the Lisbon Treaty installed the ‘President of the European Council’ and the ‘High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy’ (the ‘High Representative’), in order to provide a minimum opportunity for enhancing the coherence, and thus, to invest in the building of single foreign policy.

By installing the institution of the ‘President of the European Council’, a fixed independent and individual body with a mandate of at least

¹³ Ibidem.

¹⁴ Ibidem.

¹⁵ Ibidem.

¹⁶ Ibidem.

¹⁷ R. Grajauskas, *Federal Europe: A Postmodern Force in International Relations?*, 2011, <http://www.federalist-debate.org/index.php/component/k2/item/63-federal-europe-a-postmodern-force-in-international-relations> (last visited 18.08.2017).

two and a half years and representative prerogatives in conducting the foreign policy have been finally institutionalized. This institution has extraordinary significance in foreign policy and the representation of the EU in international relations. Regarding that, the European Council (EC) as an institution aims to '*identify the Union's strategic interests, determine the objectives of and define general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy, including for matters with defence implications*'.¹⁸ The President of the European Council:

- 1) shall chair the European Council and drive forward its work;
- 2) shall ensure the preparation and continuity of the work of the European Council in cooperation with the President of the Commission, and on the basis of the work of the General Affairs Council;
- 3) shall endeavour to facilitate cohesion and consensus within the European Council;
- 4) shall present a report to the European Parliament after each of the meetings of the European Council.¹⁹

The functioning of this institution aims at providing not only a harmonious and coordinated definition of the strategic and general political guidelines of the EU, but also aims at stimulating effectuation of a coherent and representative implementation of common international political activities. Within its framework, the President of the European Council simultaneously appears as a President of the European Council as well as of a kind of spokesperson of the Union in international relations. In that context, there are two diametrically opposed viewpoints, where the first one treats the President of the European Council as an institution with its coordinating and representative functions, while the other treats him as a strong representative of the Union in international relations, in the role of a 'President of Europe'. The latter viewpoint is particularly characteristic of European federalists and their efforts for transforming the EU into a political union, i.e. into a democratic federation. In addition, Article 15(6) stipulates that the President of the European Council '*shall, at his level and in that capacity, ensure the external representation of the Union on issues concerning its common foreign and security policy, without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy*'.²⁰

According to the Treaty, the High Representative is in charge of organizing and coordinating the work of the Union as regards the CFSP and representing the Union in international relations. This institution is cre-

¹⁸ The Lisbon Treaty, op.cit.

¹⁹ Ibidem.

²⁰ Ibidem.

ated by fusion of the previous institutions: European Commissioner for External Relations and Neighbourhood Policy and High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy of the EU. The purpose of this fusion and rationalization is the fulfilment of the institutional and political conditions for creating an effective EU Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a single foreign policy. The significance of this institution is tremendous because the High Representative of the Union is also responsible for conducting the CFSP as well as the Common Security and Defence Policy. Also, the Treaty has fused the function of the High Representative with that of the Commissioner for External Relations. A solid and monolithic coordination and organization of the international political activities of the Union is to be provided through this fusion of institutions and functions. The High Representative is predicted to preside with the Foreign Affairs Council, and also to take over the role of one of the Vice-presidents of the European Commission, as an institution responsible for setting the general political direction and the international political representativeness of the EU. In that respect, the High Representative is obliged to promote and ensure consensus among the EU Member States, and at the same time to include the different political interests of the Member States in creating the CFSP. With that in mind, the High Representative will need to make efforts for ensuring coherence and consistency in the international political activities of the Union, since he is the one who is responsible *'within the Commission for responsibilities incumbent on it in external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union's external action'*.²¹ By the effectuation of the Lisbon Treaty, the High Representative is enabled to be 'pervasive' in the overall work of its institutions in the field of foreign policy. Both institutions need to synchronize the EU Member States political views in order to bring them in line with the interests and the views of the EU as a whole. But carrying of these tasks by both institutions is not easy, and will not be easy, taking into account the problem of modernism which is installed in the EU operational structure. The EU Member States will not be always willing to work in the interest of the EU, but in most cases, they will follow their national instincts and interests.

3. The problem of modernism

The EU represents community of 28 sovereign and independent nation-states, which through the process of postnational networking, voluntarily decided to pool of their sovereignty. Pooling sovereignty, in practice, means

²¹ Ibidem.

that 'the Member States delegate some of their decision-making powers to the shared institutions they have created, so that decisions on specific matters of joint interest can be made democratically at European level'.²² However, the pooling of Member States sovereignty does not apply to all areas. Namely, in the areas of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and enlargement, decision-making is still based on the *intergovernmental premises*, requiring *unanimous vote* of the EU Member States in the European Council. Or as is stipulated Article 10 B (1) of the Lisbon Treaty: '*Decisions of the European Council on the strategic interests and objectives of the Union shall relate to the common foreign and security policy and to other areas of the external action of the Union [...]. The European Council shall act unanimously on a recommendation from the Council, adopted by the latter under the arrangements laid down for each area*'.²³

Concerning the enlargement, in order to join the EU, the applicant (candidate) country needs to gain a unanimous vote in the European Council, or is stipulated in the Article 49 (Title VI) of the Lisbon Treaty: '*the Applicant State shall address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and after receiving the consent of the European Parliament*'.²⁴ On this basis, we can conclude that the vital, strategic issues of the EU in previous mentioned areas, are still 'in the hands' of EU Member States (nation-states), witnessing for their undisputable national sovereignty and priority of their national interests over the EU postnational interests. Evidently, this situation is *ordinary modern*, considering that the modernism exalts the nation-state and its ontological superiority. The modernism as a theory typically refers to a '*post-traditional, post-medieval historical period, one marked by the move from feudalism (or agrarianism) toward capitalism, industrialization, secularization, rationalization, the nation-state and its constituent institutions and forms of surveillance*'.²⁵ Or as theorist Anthony Giddens stressed: '*[modernism] is associated with a certain range of political institutions, including the nation-state and mass democracy*'.²⁶ (1998, 94). Many theorists of modernism '*focus upon the development of the nation-state system [...] the nation-state system has long participated in that reflexivity characteristic of modernism as a whole*'.²⁷ The modernism is characteristic for Westphalian international order, estab-

²² *How the European Union works. The European Union explained*, Brussels: European Commission, ISBN 978-92-79-29988-9. doi:10.2775/20055, 2013, p. 3.

²³ The Lisbon Treaty, op.cit.

²⁴ Ibidem.

²⁵ C. Barker, *Cultural Studies: Theory and Practice*, London 2005, p. 444.

²⁶ A. Giddens, *Conversations with Anthony Giddens: Making Sense of Modernity*, Stanford, Calif. 1998, p. 94.

²⁷ A. Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, Cambridge 1990, pp. 65–72.

lished with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. The series of peace treaties, ‘which ended the Thirty Years War, attenuated the sway of the Holy Roman Empire over subsidiary domains that were roughly unified by shared language and culture while separated by borders approximating those on the map today. The term scholars later assigned to these autonomous territories was “nation-states”’.²⁸ The Westphalian order brought ‘nationalism to the surface [...] Westphalia also perpetrated the fallacy of absolute national sovereignty’.²⁹

The author Mohammed A. Bamyeh stresses that European nationalism ‘had taught the world that nationalism must be embodied in the state and that each state should ideally stand for a distinct nation in the world’.³⁰ Under the pressures of globalization ‘the nation-states sovereignty was seriously intruded’.³¹ In this sense, the nation-states started, intentionally or unintentionally, to transmit their sovereign prerogatives to newly established global structures (e.g. UN, NATO, etc.), in order to preserve their existence and to achieve a higher, transcendental objectives. This situation caused reflections about the possible new models of nation – state (understood in a modern terms as ‘heroic state’) challenging its meaning and its role in the contemporary global processes.

Consequently, it can be stressed that the EU as a postmodern structure, deeply in itself possesses a *modern core*, which does not allow riding out on the surface its postmodern attributes. This modern core is composed of 28 EU Member States (nation-states), which still invoke their sovereignty in the areas of CFSP and Enlargement policy, not leaving the opportunity for the EU to pursue its own postnational interests and objectives. Consequently, the EU only appears as a *coordinator*, not a chief policy-maker within these areas. Therefore, theorist Malcolm Rifkind emphasized: ‘Europe does not yet have the single coherent world vision, the deep-rooted instincts of a national foreign policy. That is not to the discredit of the European Union. But it is one more reason why we should see [CFSP] as a complement to our national foreign policies, an increasingly robust complement, but not a replacement’.³²

²⁸ S. Talbott, *Monet’s Brandy and Europe’s Fate*, “The Brookings Essay”, 2014, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/essays/2014/monnets-brandy-and-europes-fate> (last visited 18.08.2017).

²⁹ Ibidem.

³⁰ M.A. Bamyeh, *Postnationalism*, 2001, p. 3, http://www.riifs.org/journal/essy_v3no2_bmyeh.htm (last visited 18.08.2017).

³¹ Ibidem.

³² L. Aggestam, *Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Foreign Policy*, University of Stockholm: Department of Political Science, 1999, http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp99_8.htm (last visited 18.08.2017).

In that sense, we will use the name dispute between the Republic of Macedonia and Greece, as a representative paradigm of incoherence and clash between the concepts of modernism and postmodernism in relation to the CFSP and enlargement. Moreover, the enlargement of the European Union ‘is in itself, a form of EU foreign policy [...] [But] taking presumed “national interests” as a starting point for examining possible effects of enlargement on the CFSP may not be satisfactory’.³³

The European Commission officially launched ‘The Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2012–2013’, in order to deal with the key challenges of the EU, ‘maintaining the enlargement and reform momentum, progress in the enlargement countries and the way forward 2012–13, and supporting and assisting the enlargement countries (financial assistance, benefits of closer integration before accession) and conclusions and recommendations’.³⁴ Based on this Strategy, the EU confirmed its determination to enhance its enlargement process, emphasizing the importance of the Western Balkans and the integration of each country from this region in the EU. This Strategy has an overall optimistic and declarative tone in its introduction, wherein the EU mostly confirms the success and significance of its enlargement policy, claiming that: ‘at a time when the EU faces major challenges and significant global uncertainty and gains new momentum for economic, financial and political integration, enlargement policy continues to contribute to peace, security and prosperity on the continent’.³⁵ Through this policy, the EU, since its inception, responded to the ‘legitimate aspiration of the peoples of the [European] continent to be united in a common European endeavor [...] [Stressing that] the enlargement process is a powerful tool to that end’.³⁶ Considering the Republic of Macedonia, the EU Commission stated: ‘[Macedonia] was granted candidate status in 2005. In 2009, the Commission assessed that the country sufficiently met the political criteria and recommended the opening of negotiations’.³⁷ In addition, the EU Commission stressed the importance of a ‘negotiated and mutually acceptable solution, under the auspices of the UN, to

³³ H. Sjørusen, *Enlargement and the Common Foreign and Security Policy: Transforming the EU’s External Policy?*, ARENA, University of Oslo, 1998, https://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-publications/workingpapers/working-papers1998/wp98_18.htm (last visited 18.08.2017).

³⁴ *EU Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2012–2013*, 2012, pp. 4–22, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0600:FIN:EN:PDF> (last visited 18.08.2017).

³⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 22.

³⁶ *Ibidem*.


³⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 13.

the dispute over the name of the country [which] remains essential'.³⁸ Regardless of this suggestion, it is obvious that the problem continues to exist and make trouble for the EU and Macedonia. In this sense, the lack of consensus in the European Council has again blocked the Macedonian accession process. This is because, in order to join the EU, the applicant country needs to gain a *unanimous* vote in the European Council. The abuse of the unanimity principle by Greece, does not allow Macedonia to proceed further on the EU integration path. This kind of behavior by Greece not only prevents Macedonian EU membership, but also blocks the EU enlargement process, and thus, undoubtedly can be treated as 'modern', while taking into account the inability of the EU as postmodern structure to prevent this attitude, and to encourage the Macedonian accession towards the EU. In this context, it can be concluded that the EU appears as a *hostage* of Greek national (-ist) agenda and its *raison d'état*, as opposed to the EU postnational interests and its *raison de valeur*.

There was a similar problem between the Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of Croatia during the EU accession process of the latter, known as a maritime border dispute in the Piran Bay, when Slovenia blocked the negotiation progress of Croatia. However, this border dispute was very quickly resolved, for the benefit of both, which it differs from the name dispute between Macedonia and Greece. These examples, witness for the 'policy of blackmail' during the EU accession process for a particular EU candidate country (e.g. Macedonia and previously Croatia), by a particular neighboring country, at the same time EU Member State (e.g. Greece and Macedonia, Slovenia and Croatia). A similar negative trend, also latently exists in relation between the Republic of Bulgaria (EU Member State) and the Republic of Macedonia (as the EU candidate country) contesting the authentic attributes of Macedonian nation, such as history, language, culture, etc. On this basis, we conclude that the EU is 'stretched' between the modern and postmodern discourse. In this sense, I can identify two crucial problems – the *full sovereignty* of the EU Member States (nation-states) and the *principle of unanimity* – that prevents full flourishing of the EU in a postmodern and postnational sense. Figure 2 presents the EU in three layers, where the Member States appear as a modern core, substantially inconsistent with the EU postmodern discourse, and the principle of unanimity, which appears as a key decision-making obstacle, preventing the EU to formulate *coherent* foreign policy and therefore to achieve its own postnational interests.

³⁸ Ibidem, p. 7.

Figure 2. EU in three layers



Source: own depiction, referring to data collected from the analysis of the EU postmodern discourse.

Under the EU postmodern framework, the question of coherence appears as a crucial factor for achievement of the EU postnational interests. Today, the question of coherence within the CFSP and Enlargement policy is still based on the modern premises (respecting the sovereignty of the EU Member States) and predominantly conditioned by ‘consultation and co-operation’³⁹ and ‘bargaining’ between the EU Member States. Therefore, the EU ‘acts as an umbrella, placing EU Member States under a postmodern framework. When EU countries want to act in a “modern” way, they go on their own. In other words, in those areas where the EU is acting as a single actor, EU’s action is postmodern’.⁴⁰ Starting from that, the EU leaders must to put the EU postnational interests in front of the individual and fragmented national interests of its Member States (that have so far proved destructive). But the process of overcoming the problems is neither easy nor simple.

The next steps of the EU should be directed towards the achievement of *finalité politique*, as a stage of full integration based on postmodern and postnational premises. That will mean ability of the EU to position itself on the international political scene as a global actor, with single foreign policy, determined to achieve its postnational (value) interests, while not taking into account the national agendas of its Member States.


³⁹ L. Aggestam, op.cit.

⁴⁰ R. Grajauskas, op.cit.

4. The European Union integration stages

In its institutional and political development, the European Union has gone through three major integration stages. Each of them is transparently shown on the integration cascade (ladder), also known as ‘ratchet fusion process’.⁴¹ Otherwise, with locating the Lisbon Treaty’s place within the European integration process in mind, we have upgraded this ‘ratchet fusion process’ with the dashed arrow, presented in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Ratchet Fusion Process



Source: W. Wessels, F. Bopp, *The Institutional Architecture of CFSP after the Lisbon Treaty – Constitutional breakthrough or challenges ahead?*, Brussels 2008, p. 6.

Stages shown on the cascade are directly derived from the legitimization basis of the EU, which covers the constitutive treaties that condition its foundation and its institutional and political development. This paper treats the Lisbon Treaty as the current legitimization basis of the EU. Taking into account the ‘ratchet fusion process’, this would mean that the CFSP stipulations of the Lisbon Treaty have provided for: *‘A major step upward towards the “next plateau” of an “integration ladder”, representing a gradual move towards a system with clear supranational elements. This would also mean that the often-claimed coherence of the Union’s external action and its capability to act have been enhanced towards a stronger and more coher-*

⁴¹ W. Wessels, F. Bopp, *op.cit.*, p. 3.

ent international actor with a strengthened identity in the international system and more capabilities to act while internal efficiency and transparency have been enhanced.⁴²

The first stage (plateau I) covers the primordial political integration of the EU Member States (then European Community) as a basis for creating coherence in their political activities, for the purpose of defining and establishing authentic European foreign policy. This stage, generated by initiating and formalizing the European political cooperation (starting with the report from Luxembourg, to the Single European Act), undoubtedly leads to certain progress in terms of political communication and closer political cooperation among the EU Member States. The significance of such political cooperation effectuates a relatively flexible, non-obligatory and voluntary 'system' of interstate decision making, in the sphere of foreign policy and the ability of the European Community for a coherent creation of international political activities. All of that was aimed toward Europe's starting to speak with one voice, instead of speaking in a choir of voices, as was stipulated in the Declaration for European Identity and the Luxemburg Report.

The second stage (plateau II), began by establishing the institutional architecture of the Union through the Maastricht Treaty and up to the Treaty of Nice. This stage is characterized by the final integration of the 'political cooperation' within the structures of the EU, the installation of the three-pillar system, and commitment for further development of the CFSP, as well as the strengthening of intergovernmental decision-making within the area of international activities of the EU. This stage is characterized by existence of the predominant intergovernmentalism in decision-making process, democratic deficit, military underdevelopment, institutional non-transparency, strengthening of the bureaucratism ('eurocracy'), etc.

The third stage (plateau III), represented on the integration ladder as a stage of *finalité politique*, has still not been reached from this perspective, despite the Union 'efforts' to achieve final institutional and political establishment as a global actor. This stage involves a final political unification of the Union, in which it should be transformed into a political union of a federal type. Within it, the Union will have to be able to generate institutional and political architecture, compatible with supranational and communitarian concepts (or the 'Community method'), as well as political expansion and strengthening of the authorities and prerogatives of its institutions, with stressed authority (power) in terms of foreign policy.

⁴² Ibidem, p. 4.

All this implies a change in the decision-making process, from a system of unanimity to a (qualified) majority system, or another flexible decision-making process concerning the CFSP and enlargement.

In that context, it is important to emphasize that the European federalists see extending and fostering as much as possible the *Community method* in various areas of the Union's activities as the only method for increasing coherence within the EU, and as an efficient tool for incremental building of a European democratic federation. Namely, the Community method implies '*pooling of national sovereignty in certain defined respects and the empowerment of supranational institutions to advance and give effect to joint solutions to shared problems*'.⁴³ The Community method should not be confused with the *Monnet method*⁴⁴, which descriptively speaking is a method of 'integration by stealth'.⁴⁵ This method '*consists in pursuing political integration, not by frankly political means, but under the guise of economic integration*'⁴⁶ and it primarily is a product of '*quasi-constitutional principles derived from the founding treaties and from neofunctionalism*'.⁴⁷

Unlike the neofunctionalism, the *federalist* concept requires the adoption of a European constitution as the ultimate democratic asset for establishing a European democratic federation. The establishment of such a European democratic federation, according to the federalists, will be pursued through a *gradual reform* of the existing constitutive treaty, or as MEP Andrew Duff stressed: '*it is obvious that the new European federal constitution will be based largely on the existing EU treaties*'.⁴⁸ This means that the specific nature of the Union will continue to exist, but in enhanced and modified form, which in the future should serve as the legitimization basis for its further political modelling. However, with the 'fall' of the European constitution, the Union was forced to start thinking in an *alternate direction*, in order to find a solution for overcoming the 'post-constitutional' crisis. The Lisbon Treaty in its essence represents a quasi-federal act, because of its confusing, complex and vague content, and also its partly constitutional determination. This Treaty can

⁴³ A. Duff, *Federal Union Now*, London 2011, pp. 2–16, http://www.euromove.org.uk/fileadmin/files_euromove/federal-union-now-book.pdf (last visited 18.08.2017).

⁴⁴ N. Lj. Ilievski, *The concept of political integration: the perspectives of neofunctionalist theory*, "Journal of Liberty and International Affairs", No. 1.1/2015, pp. 38–50.

⁴⁵ M. Giandomenico, *Europe as the would-be world power: The EU at Fifty*, Cambridge 2009, p. 13, http://www.cambridge.org/gb/knowledge/isbn/item2427975/?site_locale=en_GB (last visited 18.08.2017).

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁸ A. Duff, *op.cit.*, p. 5.

be treated as an ‘unfinished business’, trying to introduce distinctive type of federalism without a federation. But what kind of federalism this Treaty promotes? In the text bellow, we will try to present some reflections for future (re)modelling of the EU, taking into account the nexus of modernism and postmodernism in its operational structure, and the immanent need for its political advancement in a postmodern direction. The EU is postmodern product, but tightly chained with its modern core, consisted of 28 sovereign nation – states. Maybe only a few of them (avant-garde), can make a difference in the interest of the EU, and to pull the trigger on its development in a postmodern and postnational direction.

5. Avant-garde Europe: some possibilities for the future

Given the current state of the EU, it can be concluded that the EU Member States are not yet prepared to move beyond their national interests, and invest their energies in the interest of the EU. So, the need for applying of a new integration concept is more than necessary. Because, is more than obvious, that the modern reasoning of the EU Member States gradually destroys the great idea of European unification.

One of the most popular approaches towards the ‘revolutionizing’ of the EU is the concept of *avant-garde* Europe, predominantly promoted by Joschka Fischer, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Jacques Delors, etc. This approach directly derives from the *Kerneuropa* concept (*Core Europe*), meaning that the future of the EU should be established on the scheme of *core* (avant-garde) and *orbit*. The core would need to be founded by those EU Member States who are most prepared and interested in European integration, and the *orbit*, would be constituted only by those EU Member States, who are not prepared, or do not want to involve themselves into a deeper European integration. The *core* Member States would develop single and coherent foreign policy, and thus, playing the role of an *avant-garde* of the European integration. The others would join them when willing or able to do so. *The core will create a federation, and the orbit, an association*. But they will continue to communicate and co-operate between each other, on a certain issues. This concept has many terms and labels, or as authors Funda Tekin and Prof. Dr Wolfgang Wesseles emphasized: ‘*the best-known terms have been “Core Europe”, “avant-garde”, “centre of gravity”, and “directoire”, but these represent only an excerpt from a broad catalogue of such concepts*’.⁴⁹ Although ‘*often used synonymously, these terms imply different*

⁴⁹ F. Tekin, W. Wessels, *Flexibility within Lisbon Treaty: Trademark or empty promise*, “EIPASCOP”, No. 1/2008, p. 1.

forms of integration, with politically very different consequences for the EU and its Member States'.⁵⁰ Considering that, in this paper we will only stress the concept of avant-garde Europe, predominantly based on Joschka Fischer thesis.

As is stated by Joschka Fischer, the '*only possibility is a European avant-garde, a group of EU countries willing and able to advance. The willing and able participate, but the others shall not block progress anymore*'.⁵¹ The avant-garde, will be '*decisive factor in driving forward the integration process, which will finally culminate in a European federation*' (A Core, Avant-garde or Centre of Gravity). This concept should respect the following premises:

1. The centre of gravity should be non-exclusive but open;
2. There should be mechanisms for a co-operation with 'non-centre countries' and means to integrate those willing to participate;
3. Those who are willing to go further should be able to do so; and
4. Those who do not want to go further must not prevent others from doing so.⁵²

The former President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, goes more ahead with his thinking about the avant-garde Europe, urging for establishment of a 'Great Europe'. The 'Great Europe', according to Delors would need to: '*provide its members with an area of active peace, a framework of sustainable development and, lastly, an area of shared values lived out in the diversity of our cultures and our traditions*'.⁵³ In an institutional sense the avant-garde Europe: '*would take the form of a federation of nation-states with its two dimensions: federal, for clarifying powers and responsibilities; national, for ensuring the durability and cohesion of our societies and our nations. This would of course be an application of the healthy principle of subsidiarity. The link with the Great Union would be ensured with the existence of a joint Commission, responsible for coherence between the two entities and for compliance with EU regulations and *acquis communautaire* [and *acquis politique*]. The avant-garde, however, would have its own Council of Ministers and its own Parliament*'.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ N. Ondarza, *Strengthening the Core or Splitting Europe? Prospects and Pitfalls of a Strategy of Differentiated Integration*, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2013, p. 7, http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2013_RP02_orz.pdf (last visited 18.08.2017).

⁵¹ J. Fischer, *Vive l' Avant-Garde!*, ZEIT ONLINE, 2008, <http://www.zeit.de/online/2008/27/joschka-fischer-europa> (last visited 18.08.2017).

⁵² Ibidem.


⁵³ A. Pisca, *European Union: Challenges and Promises of a New Enlargement*, Idea Sourcebooks on Contemporary Controversies, 2004, p. 131.

⁵⁴ Ibidem.

Namely, the ‘center’ (or the ‘core’) Member States ‘*would conclude a new European framework treaty, the nucleus of a constitution of the Federation [...] The Federation would develop its own institutions, establish a government which within the EU should speak with one voice on behalf of the members of the group on as many issues as possible, a strong parliament and a directly elected president*’.⁵⁵ The avant-garde group of Member States is “‘*not elitist*” but rather stands for and allows “‘*reinforced co-operation*””.⁵⁶ The main idea is that the members of a smaller group would be both able and willing to go ahead immediately, while this would not be possible for all. Or as the former German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher emphasized: ‘*no Member State can be forced to go further than it is able or willing to go, but that those who do not want to go any further shall not prevent others from doing so*’.⁵⁷

Considering the current state of the EU, it can be stressed that the future upgrades of the EU should be directed towards the creation of avant-garde Europe (Figure 4), as most possible and logical direction, taking into account the current (internal or external) differences between the EU Member States, and their attitude towards the EU future.

Figure 4. Avant-garde Europe



Source: own depiction, referring to data collected from the analysis of the concept of avant-garde Europe.

⁵⁵ Ibidem, p. 132.

⁵⁶ J. Delors, *An Avant-garde driving the European unification process forward*, Jacques Delors Institute, 2001, p. 3, <http://www.delorsinstitute.eu/011-681-An-Avant-garde-driving-the-European-unification-process-forward.html> (last visited 18.08.2017).

⁵⁷ J. Fischer, *From Confederacy to Federation: Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration*, 2000, p. 9, <http://www.federalunion.org.uk/joschka-fischer-from-confederacy-to-federation-thoughts-on-the-finality-of-european-integration/> (last visited 18.08.2017).

Conclusions

Concerning the first research question (RQ1: What is the true nature of the EU?), it can be concluded that the EU is a structure with postmodern nature, but with modern core, composed of 28 sovereign and independent nation-states with their own national interests, often different from those of the EU. Consequently, the EU appears as a hostage of the national (-ist) attitudes of its Member States, which disables the realization of EU's postmodern and postnational interests. Moreover, the modernism in the EU operational system is cemented by the *principle of unanimity*, which unambiguously disables the EU internal coherence on a certain international issues. So, the EU leaders must start to encourage (through political and legal instruments) Member States in order to behave as a coherent pillar, predetermined to achieve EU postnational interests, while setting aside their national interests.

Taking into account the second research question (RQ2: What determines the efficiency of the EU CFSP and enlargement?), it is important to emphasize that the question of coherence is main precondition for setting and applying of single European foreign policy. In this paper, I stressed the *coherence of preferences*, which refers to the EU capacity to establish a single foreign policy towards particular international issue (e.g. Macedonian EU accession process) based on the Member States ability, coherently to set up, and to pursue transcendental (postnational) objectives, harmonious with those of the EU. In that favor, the EU leaders must work *'to increase cohesiveness and to retain [EU] postmodern foreign policy characteristics'*.⁵⁸ The EU needs to improve its *political capacity* in order to gain an ability to persuade its Member States, every time when the EU postnational interests are in question, and *legally to upgrade* its decision-making (e.g. amending the Lisbon Treaty), by substituting the unanimous voting with a qualified majority. Accordingly, it is evident that the modernism as a concept appears as unbridgeable problem for advancement of the EU foreign policy in postmodern and postnational direction. Taking into account the third research question (RQ3: What the EU should reform in order to enhance its coherence?), it can be concluded that the EU need to move in another (postmodern) direction, different from the current. The reforms can be made in two directions. The first one assumes that the Lisbon Treaty can be used as a (continual) legal basis for creating an *additional treaty* which would update and specify the rules and procedures under which the participating EU Member States would decide to co-

⁵⁸ R. Grajauskas, op.cit.

operate together within the CFSP and enlargement. While, the second direction, assumes that both the EU and Member States must start to consider creating a *new treaty*, which will provide a basis for future EU development in truly postmodern direction. This new treaty will need to 'revolutionize' the EU, in sense of transformation of its current modern core into a postmodern one, while respecting its founding values and its postnational and postmodern attributes. The new treaty will need to change the existing structure of the EU in a radical way. It means that the most capable and the most interested Member States will have the right to *institutionalize* an avant-garde (core) group of Member States, based on federal (postmodern and postnational) premises. Whereas, the other EU Member States who do not want, or are not capable to involve themselves deeper in European integration, will have the right to form an association (orbit), based on intergovernmental premises. Certainly, they will have the right to join the avant-garde as soon as they are ready, or are willing to do that. In this way, the EU finally will become capable to set up and to articulate a coherent foreign policy, without being hostage of national (-ist) instincts of its Member States. The core states, or the avant-garde, will be willing and capable to pursue and to achieve only the EU postnational and postmodern interests (*raison de valeur*), not the national ones. This variant of EU future maybe looks complex, but it is reasonable, taking into account the huge (internal and external) differences which exist between the EU Member States, their attitudes towards the future of European integration, and their willingness to invest themselves in the great European design. Thus, the problem of modernism within the CFSP and enlargement can be overcome only by establishment of postmodern and postnational (supranational) avant-garde of Member States, as a federal core of the new Europe. This variant is more possible, taking into account the opportunity to federate few Member States (which seems easier than to federate all 28 EU Member States), who had little differences, or there are no differences between them. In that context, this kind of avant-garde will be capable to pursue and to conduct single foreign policy, guided by the EU postnational (value) interests and not by the national instincts. This avant-garde will have the task to guide the EU in the XXI century, as a postmodern and postnational global actor, armed with its values, as the most powerful tool of the European integration. Or as the father of contemporary European federalism, Altiero Spinelli, stated in the Manifesto of Ventotene (1941): '*The road to pursue is neither easy nor certain. But it must be followed and it will be!*'

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