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Editorial Notes

The scientific and professional papers that we publish in the dual of the International Yearbook of the Faculty of Security - Skopje, where the authors present their scientific and professional analyzes and findings from several scientific fields through their papers, namely: criminology , criminological, criminal-legal, police and other scientific fields that have their connection with security sciences and make a certain contribution to the development of scientific thought and a unique contribution to the development of criminal and police practice, which is of exceptional importance for practitioners and the application of science in practice with the aim of more successful performance of police and criminal activity in solving the complex problems we face in this dynamic time of new and serious security challenges.

I express my gratitude to the authors from the Faculty of Security in Skopje, fellow professors and doctoral students of our faculty, but also to the authors from other faculties at the University "St. Kliment Ohridski" - Bitola, authors from other Universities who, through their papers, bring us their theoretical studies and research results from the respective fields related to security and dealing with security challenges.

In the double issue of the International Yearbook for 2024, 10 papers are published, which cover topics from several security areas, which I hope will provoke your attention to read, analyze and apply accordingly in your scientific studies and research in part from their research results and theoretical analyzes of the respective problems.

I express my pleasure that with the publication of the double issue of the International Yearbook continuously since 2005. the renewed tradition of publishing this international scientific journal at the Faculty of Security in Skopje is continuing.

Sincerely,

Editor of the International Yearbook of the
Faculty of security

Professor Bogdancho Gogov

DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF CARE INSTITUTIONS FOR CHILDREN AT RISK AND IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW: CONDITIONS AND PERSPECTIVES IN MACEDONIA

Vesna Stefanovska

Faculty of security – Skopje
vesna.stefanovska@uklo.edu.mk

Abstract

The process of deinstitutionalization, its positive effects in the system of social protection, as well as the negative consequences caused on people under institutional care have been many decades subject of in-depth analysis by academic and professional community. In our country, the process of deinstitutionalization and the transformation of institutional care institutions have been officially started in 2007 with the adoption of the first *National Strategy for deinstitutionalization (2008 - 2018)*.

This paper elaborates several aspects related to the process of deinstitutionalization and transformation of childcare institutions: main factors that led to that process, fundamentals for deinstitutionalization process in our country and certain perspectives of Small Group Homes that provide family-like residential care. The last part, based on certain observation and monitoring process by state institutions, gives a short overview of several research reports and documents related to the functioning of SGHs in the last five years.

Key words: deinstitutionalisation, care institution, children at risk, small group houses

1. INTRODUCTION: MAIN FACTORS THAT LED TO DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION

The process of deinstitutionalization, its positive effects in the system of social protection, as well as negative consequences caused on people under institutional care have been many decades subject of in-depth analysis by academic and professional community. It cannot be said exactly when have started the process of deinstitutionalization because its development is a reflection of the socio-economic and cultural contexts of each country. This development in some countries began in the 50's, in others in the 80's, while in the third in the early 21st century. Regardless of its initial stages, deinstitutionalization is generated for several reasons. In terms of child care institutions, the most common reasons for their transformation are related to the negative consequences for the child due to separation from the family, but also because of the institutional way of life, which is confirmed by several researches. The study done by Koller-Trbović and Žižak (2006) confirms that separation of the child from the family is the most difficult and unwanted intervention done by the society in order to protect the child when he/she lives under risky conditions for his/her development. Therefore, it is recommended, prior any decision for separation of the child from its family to determine the risk level in the family and in the whole process

to take into account his best interest. Separation, as the last measure, should be for child's life and health protection, and closely afterwards, social services should work to improve and establish healthy family environment for child's comeback. Or, in other circumstances to provide another form of residential childcare services. In another Report (Eurochild, 2014b) is emphasized that children growing up in institutions have weaker emotional, body and cognitive development, lower intelligence and poor educational results. They also have a problem with communication and establishing normal relationships in further life. Browne (2009) in another survey conducted in Romania in 2000 titled "The Enforcement of Children in Residential Care Institutions" by anonymous questionnaires over 3164 children aged 7 to 18 determined that 37.5% of children placed in institutions were victims of severe bodily injuries. In 77% of cases, perpetrators were child educators employed in the institutions, while 1/5 of the children claimed they were blackmailed for sexual activities (Poljak, 2021:18). Based on more research results, due to the institutional care treatment certain negative consequences are highlighted (Tolfree, 2003): 1. Social isolation of children from community which leads to stigmatization and discrimination, 2. Accommodation is often at the request of the parent, not in the best interest of the child, 3. Contacts with parents are getting less and less frequent over time, 4. There is no enough individual care, attention and love for children, 5. Institutions do not provide adequate treatment activities for children, 6. Friend's relationships with children who live in family environments are rare, 7. There is violence among children, 8. Institutions have no adequate response to the psychological needs of children, 9. After institutional leave, children have difficulties to reintegrate into the communities and some of them return to adult care institutions (in prison or in psychiatric hospitals) (Poljak, 2021:22-23).

The *Analysis of the situation in the institutions for accommodation of children at risk and in conflict with the law in the Republic of Macedonia* (Kambovski, Lazetic, Nanev, Gruevska - Drakulevski, Maljanovski and Mujoska Trpevska, 2018: 118-119) refers to several significant reasons that encourage development of deinstitutionalization. One is related to poverty reduction of the families that allows children who were in residential care to return in their family homes. Other reason, i.e., the transformation of institutions into small homes, is related to the strengthening of citizenship and democracy in the society. That means that the society grows into society capable to (re)integrate its citizens and not to exclude and placed them into closed care institutions. The third reason is related to the application of universal fundamental principles and standards for the rights of the child, respectively the fundamental right to live in his/her family. Or, in last case, to live in the most natural environment that corresponds to child needs for personal development and protection of his/her freedoms and rights. Taking into account the above, the process of deinstitutionalization becomes an irreversible process and a globally accepted policy, recognized as the best way to secure the rights and needs of children.

2. FUNDAMENTS FOR THE PROCESS OF DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION IN OUR COUNTRY

In our country, the process of deinstitutionalization, i.e. the transformation of institutional care institutions has been officially started in 2007 with the adoption of the first *National Strategy for Deinstitutionalization (2008 - 2018)*. It stipulates the basic principles on which deinstitutionalization is based: the best interest of the child, the right to life in the family, civil rights, equality of opportunities and non-discrimination, protection against all kinds of violence, abuse and neglect, inclusion and integration, partnership, multisector cooperation and quality of social services. Potential children can be also children without parental care, with educational and social problems and deviant behaviour, as well as children and other persons with disabilities in intellectual and physical development. The scanning process of our residential childcare institutions before deinstitutionalization strategy adoption identified several challenges: there is no definition for children with educational and social problems and disrupted behaviour, social services (Centres for Social Work) do not make an individual treatment plan for individual work with the child, nor they monitor and collaborate with care institutions on a regular basis. In addition, there are no specialized foster families and daily care centres for children at risk and in conflict with the law and civil society organisations do not provide special programs for them.

The National Strategy for Deinstitutionalization in the Republic of Macedonia 2018 – 2027 “Timjanik” is a comprehensive document that stipulates the legal basis, vision and objectives of the process of deinstitutionalization, needs and institutional framework in our country. It provides an overview of both, the risks and opportunities of this process and elaborates the key strategic areas (pillars) for institutional transformation. Those are: reduction of institution capacity (2) Transferring children and (3) Community Services Development.

According to the Strategy, the basic dimension of deinstitutionalization is the transition from institutional to community care. But, community care is not only a location change, it is also a profound change in the way how social and other services are provided. These services should be personalized; to respond to the local needs and enable equal access of all children regardless of their origin and place of living. It implies community process, participation of various service providers, affirmation of human dignity, empowerment of the child to be active participant in the social life etc. On the other hand, communities should not be only places are coming back children and other people who were under residential care, but need to play an active role in creating and providing social and other services that can respond rightly to their needs. Thus, the civil sector is considered to be one of the main delivery service and engine for proper changes. This way established priorities and tasks give a good basis for their successful implementation. Since the Strategy covers the transformation of the Public institution for care of children with educational-social problems and deviant behaviour, one main question arises: taking into account the basic objectives of the residential care which refers to proper socialization, re-socialization and behavioural correction, does the deinstitutionalization process predict and encompasses certain specific circumstances to meet those objectives? The answer refers that the Strategy does not address the specific aspects of children at risk and in conflict with the law, as vulnerable category.

Nevertheless, institutional transformation was implemented in 2019 and the institution was transformed into 5 separate residential units, referred as Small Group Houses (SGHs), with smaller accommodation capacities (5 to 7 persons). Within one year, all children are placed in SGHs which are located at different locations in the capital city. In fact, SGHs are a type of residential childcare services which provide out-of-home placement for children at risk who cannot be adequately cared for by their families due to various family problems, but also for children in conflict with the law who have committed certain crimes. The aim of SGHs is to provide care in a home-like environment for children until they return to their families and also to provide community services with individual approach and children's personal choices. This means that, with good allocation of resources, group homes are a good solution for transition and reintegration into community.

3. TRANSFORMATION OF THE INSTITUTIONS

The Republic of North Macedonia has a long history of institutional care of children at risk or with deviant behaviour, which need to be temporarily separated from the family and placed in institutions for their care, upbringing and proper development and re-socialisation. In our independent country (1991 – 2019) for almost 3 decades two separate children educational and correctional institutions were in function. In the first, known as the Home “25 Maj”, children with social problems aged from 7 to 18 were placed, referred to by the Centres for Social Work. The Home had accommodation capacity for 90 children, and the average number of children staying, until 2015, was from 40 to 50. In the second institution well known as the Home “Ranka Milanović”, certain number of children aged 14 to 18 were offenders who have committed crimes and who were sentenced to institutional correctional measure by the juvenile court in juvenile criminal procedure. The aim of this measure is to ensure constant supervision by professionals (with professional and school preparation for child educators) for the purpose of upbringing, rehabilitation and proper development. Although the home capacity was 70, an average number of children placed there was 20. As we previously stated, both institutions are transformed into 5 group homes in 2019 (three for children at risk referred by social protection system and two for children in conflict with the law referred by the court system).

3.1. Children under residential care

Table 1. Number of children placed in Child care Institutions during the one year (source: Social Protection of Children, Youth and Adult, State Statics Office, stat.gov.mk)

	Total	“25 Maj”	female	“Ranka Milanović”	Female
2006	92	62	20	30	/
2007	89	62	22	27	/
2008	96	64	22	32	2
2009	81	59	16	22	2
2010	78	55	14	23	1
2011	73	48	14	25	/
2012	73	53	18	20	/
2013	54	34	14	20	5
2014	64	42	15	22	6
2015	59	40	15	19	5
2016	54	37	13	17	4
2017	51	32	6	19	6
2018	56	39	7	26	6
2019	54	38	15	16	2
2020	38	31 ¹	14	17 ²	1
2021	37	28 ³	8	9 ⁴	1
2022	39	27 ⁵	8	12 ⁶	1

Table 2. Number of children under residential care at the end of the year.

	“25 Maj”	“Ranka Milanović”
2017	26	17 ⁷
2018	24	18 ⁸
2019	/	/
2020	25	10
2021	24	6
2022	17	7
2023	22	6

¹In April 2020, 25 children were placed in 5 SGHs, Public institution for social affairs (2020) Izvestaj za sledenje na organizacionite edinici pri Javnata ustanova za zgrizuvanje deca so vospitno-socijalni problemi I naruseno povedenie – Skopje (2020).

² In April 2020 there were 10 children in 2 SGHs, Ibid.

³ In December 2021, 24 children were placed in SGHs, Zavod za socijalni dejnosti (2021) Informacija za JU za zgrizuvanje na deca so vospitno-socijalni problemi i naaruseno povedenie.

⁴ In December 2021, there were 6 children, ibid.

⁵ In November 2022, there were 17 children, Zavod za socijalni dejnosti (2022) Izveštaj za sledenje na organizacionite edinici pri JU za zgrizuvanje deca so vospitno-socijalni problemi i naruseno povedenie – Skopje.

⁶ In November 2022, there were 7 children, ibid.

⁷ Ristevska, M. Donevska, M. & Dimitrovska Galik, G. (2017). Procenka na vlijaniето na regulativata na voveduvanjeto model na socijalni dogovori vo RM, Centar za istrazuvanje i kreiranje politiki.

⁸ Zavod za socijalni dejnosti (2018) Izveštaj za funkcioniranjeto i predlozi za transformacija na JU za zgrizuvanje deca so vospitno-socijalni problemi i naruseno povedenie-Skopje.

The statistical data shows that the number of children placed on an annual basis in the institutions is gradually decreasing. A larger difference can be seen in 2013 at the Home “25 Maj”, when the number of children with educational and social problems decreased significantly.

In relation to the children placed in a certain period, second table shows that the number, by the process of deinstitutionalization and transformation in 2019 is decreasing. In June 2023 in the SGHs were registered 28 children (22 children at risk and 6 in conflict with the law). Both categories are placed in different homes because have different level of risk and treatments needs. Homes for children at risk have an open regime, while the others have semi-open regime, which means that they have stricter rules regarding the opportunities to go out.

Regarding the decreasing number of children, we can point out several reasons: *Reference only by the court.* With the law changes in 2019 and based on the Article 96/1 of the Social Protection Law it is regulated that child offenders in conflict with the law aged 14 to 18 can be placed in correctional homes only by juvenile court after completion of juvenile court procedure. Until 2019 social services have had also right to refer children with deviant behaviour in such institution, but this opportunity is abolished.

Slow court processing of the cases within the criminal justice system for children and restrictive use of educational institutional measure. In particular, juvenile crimes are slowly processed in the children's justice system, which means that the procedures are slow and the courts hardly impose the measure. Only few children are sentenced during one year.

Increased application of the social service “children care in foster families”. Within this service, foster families for children with educational and social problems are also provided. But on the websites of our Ministry of Social Services and the Centre for Support of Foster Families (zgrizuvanje.gov.mk) cannot be found statistics number for families that take care of children at risk, except the total number of families that provide foster care in general.

Reduced number of children at risk and with deviant behaviour.

Table 3.

	2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022 2023
Children at risk	832, 1034, 916, 896, 1101, 992, 1798, 1875, 1735
Children in conflict with law	2325, 2195, 2010, 1950, 2537, 2467, 1867, 2267 2054

Source: Social protection for children, youngsters and adults (2015-2022), State Statistic office (stat.gov.mk)

The above statistical numbers indicate that the number of children at risk recorded in the Social Work Centres in the last 3 years has increased, while children in conflict with the law have decreased (although there are certain oscillations). Such statistical data indicate that other forms of social protection are used much more than placement in SGHs. In relation to children in conflict with the law, although their number decreases, it can be noted that courts imposed much more other educational measures, compared to the institutional educational measure.

In addition to previous mentioned factors associated with a reduced number of children referred to SGHs, (which should additionally be subject to in-depth and multilayer analysis), the reduction is caused by the same process of

deinstitutionalization because of the limited accommodation capacities and because of the general tendency to apply other alternative foster care services instead of residential care. But whether this tendency shows the expected results and is of best interest of children (as fundamental principle) must be subject of serious scrutiny. Some research reports indicate certain weaknesses few years after SGHs introduction in juvenile social (welfare) and justice system.

4. PERSPECTIVES OF SGHs THAT PROVIDE FAMILY-LIKE RESIDENTIAL CARE

The field data show that the 5 already formed SGHs are placed in well-equipped family houses in urban residential areas with good infrastructure in quiet environments and near city centre. The main aim is to provide care for children at risk or in conflict with the law in stable and safe home-like family living environments for a certain period of time, as specified by the individual treatment plan. It assumes that all rights and needs related to children health, welfare and their overall growth and development should be recognised, protected and promoted in a family atmosphere and in a community, with the right to access all community services. In this context, the educational process, the extracurricular activities during free time, communication with the educators, with other children in the home and outside need to take place in a home-like environment. As it is stated in the Work Programme of “Small Group Home for Children with Educational – Social Problems” (2018): *SGHs represents a replacement of family living, thus achieving the slightest deviation from the natural environment in which the child grows and develops. It provides conditions for continuous development, whereas the relationship with parents/guardians, brothers/sisters and the wider family is not terminated and thus allows easy reintegration into the family.*

Conforming with the essence of the family-like residential care service for this category of children, SGHs in order to function as much similar as family living need to meet several aspects: material and spatial living conditions, family house order, positive atmosphere and functioning close to family living, access and realization of social services in the community, relationships and respect of educators as their “parents-fosterers”, peaceful resolution of conflict situations, enhanced supervision and control whenever necessary. In the consideration of the above-mentioned aspects, socio-cultural, material, family, educational and health background, together with deviant behaviour history cannot be ignored and marginalized, because every well-intentioned, humane and noble idea that is made in child best interest should be considered from child perspective. Since almost every child with educational-social problems, deviant and criminal behaviour has a history of abuse and victimization in childhood, a history of mental problems and behavioural disorder, it requires special treatment and attitude towards him/her, if we want in the period of development in the adolescence years (from 14 to 19/23 years) to make a positive change in his/her behaviour and upbringing. In other words, if the educational component is missing in the primary family, the new family environment should focus both on treating childhood trauma and behavioural correction, but also on creating material and organisational-functional conditions necessary for normal family life. The process of deinstitutionalization, as set out in the Strategy, means community process, participation of various service providers, affirmation of human dignity, empowerment

of the child to be active participant. This means that the resources, previously used by the institutional care system, are redirected and re-allocated to both, the community services and individual child. This means that the community should become a service provider based on the needs of its members by implementing micro projects that will be of whole community benefit and for common good. In this way, the community will develop a better understanding of social inclusion process which ensures that those at risk of social exclusion gain the opportunities and resources necessary to participate in social life and enjoy a standard of living that is considered normal in the society in which they live. Taking into account the above-mentioned key points in the strategy, SGHs, in addition to accommodation, physical and basic care services, should provide social and recreational activities which include participation on community events and providing opportunities for children to cultivate individual interests and abilities. This enables involvement of the civil sector, but also the participation and integration of children in social life. This means a double process. On one hand, requires integration of the child into the community, inclusion and equal access to the services, while on other hand, means developing civil society awareness for acceptance, non-discrimination and providing assistance, support and inclusion of children in certain programs and activities.

4.1. What are the benefits of community involvement in providing social services to children?

Benefits for children

- *Active community support and a sense of visibility and acceptance.* Active community support causes a feeling that the child is not alone and that there are civil society organizations that have desire to provide support in order to strengthen his/her sense of belonging and that he/she has not lost all connections to the community.
- *Motivation and responsibility for active participation in overcoming certain challenges and risks.* The offered assistance and support by the community encourages the child to accept responsibility and to participate in provided treatment activities. That increases child self-confidence.
- *Social inclusion and building a social network.* Participation in certain community activities allows active communication and building social relationships with others who can provide help and support in the long term.
- *Reduce stigmatization and secondary deviation.*

Benefits for community

- *Increase community safety and reduce recidivism.* Accepting the child in the community and his/her active participation in social life and in other treatment activities reduces risk factors that lead to deviant or criminal behaviour. Accepting as a useful member, instead of as a risk to security reduces the feeling of fear among citizens and increases community safety.
- *Shared and shared responsibility.* Police and penal systems for the execution of criminal sanctions cannot handle with the needs and challenges faced by children which means that juvenile justice response should have common and shared responsibility with welfare system and civil society too. The community has responsibility to ensure protection of children with social problems and deviant and criminal behaviour, to protect victim of secondary victimization and to create appropriate conditions for their reintegration.

- *Development of human dimension of citizens.* Active participation of citizens develops social and human dimension and reduces their stigmatization approach and condemning attitude towards that vulnerable category of children. The faith in the process of re-socialization is increasing together with the possibility that the child, after returning to his family environment, can make significant changes in his life.

5. SHORT OVERVIEW OF THE FUNCTIONING OF SGHs (2018-2022)

In the period from 2018 to 2022 since the functioning of SGHs, the Ombudsman and the Public Institution for social affairs Skopje have made several visits in the group homes and considered many challenges noted in their official reports.

In particular, in the Annual Reports (2019 and 2020) about the level of respect and protection of human freedoms and rights, the Ombudsman determined that children are often absent from the home for few days or more because they have run away. Also, they rarely participate in sports - recreational and other activities. This is confirmed by the children's educators who claimed that homes offer only accommodation and education with no integrated treatment or other creative or rehabilitative services. This means that transformation of the institutional care does not resolve previously identified problems and negative consequences of institutional treatment. For example, group homes may face challenges and may not meet all safety care standards and also, there is social stigma associated with living in a group home which affects children self-esteem and how they are perceived in the community. Additional problem is limited personal capacities that cannot meet all needs nor can handle all problems that arise among children.

In the Annual Report for 2021 it is again stated that the children often run away from the small group homes and do not return for a long period, which negatively affects and disables their re-socialization. This additionally raises the question of the negative impact they cause on other children. Other consideration is put on the problem with young offenders who continue to commit crimes, mostly property and drug-related offences. They are usually reported to the police, but due to slow juvenile justice trials, and in absence of certain control mechanisms to prevent and limit children deviant and criminal behaviour, the criminal infection and criminal attitudes may flourish.

In the Monitoring Report for the SGHs (Jan-April 2020) it was concluded that two children in conflict with the law have been absent for a long time and that there is insufficient cooperation with social services who have guardianship over children under residential care.

In the 2021 Report, children educators indicates that neither children themselves are ready enough to be placed in an SGH, nor they have time to prepare for reception of new children. They have a personal safety problem, and complain about frequent escapes and manipulative behaviour of certain children. Regarding the re-socialisation process, they say that some children do not have enough concentration, nor show any good will to actively participate in their own re-education. Additionally, they emphasize the financial problems because they do not have any funds on disposal so without own budget they are limited to plan and realize certain sports and other activities. They also address the absence of cooperation with the Psychiatry Clinic, taking into account that certain number of children takes regular medicament therapy.

The 2022 Report addresses the following challenges:

- insufficient number of professional and technical staff,
- long-term absence of many children from the homes,
- problem with deviant behaviour and disrespect of house rules by certain children,
- termination of regular education
- illegal drug and alcohol use
- weak cooperation with certain Social Work Centres.

In the media, an event about the violent behaviour of certain children toward child who has played on playground was also published. After police report by the child's parent, they got a police response that those children are already known to the police and because they are beneficiaries of the SGH they cannot be charged nor detained. This claim indicates that juvenile justice and welfare system in some cases is incapable to cope efficiently with this vulnerable category of children⁹.

CONCLUSION

The short overview of the challenges that SGHs face on a daily basis indicate that group homes and their open regime does not prevent the escape of those children at risk and in conflict with the law who are prone to self-willing leave, nor succeeds in adapting them successfully to a family environment with a dynamics of family life. The group homes failed to adapt and to deter those children who are prone to criminal behaviour and did not improve cooperation with other social and health services. Finally, the SGHs did not solve the problem of staff deficiency, nor the problem of limited financial resources. This means that, deinstitutionalization process and institutional transformation does not increase the staff resources to deal with high-risk situations, especially with those children who need special treatment.

⁹ Pece Superhiks: Mojot sin e istepan dodeka sam igral košarka vo Kapištec, published on 28.03.2023 at A1on.mk, available at: <https://a1on.mk/macedonia/pece-superhiks-mojot-sin-istepan-od-shtitenici-od-dom-za-deca-dodeka-sam-igral-kosharka-vo-kapishtec/>

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THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND COALITION GOVERNMENT IN THE CONSOCIATIONAL THEORY. THE MACEDONIAN EXPERIENCE IN A COMPARATIVE CONTEXT WITH OTHER ESTABLISHED CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACIES

Nikola Ambarkov

Ph.D. in Political Science, M.Sc. in European Studies;
ambarkov_nkl@yahoo.com amvelbares@gmail.com

Abstract

Consociation, as a theoretical but also an empirical model, implies the survival of the “divided society” through institutions that protect and guard the rival ethno-cultural groups and “their territories” in a process in which the lack of democracy, in the beginning, is justified by the survival of the state. The grand coalition government in the model is considered exactly one of the key mechanisms. The broad coalition, in whose work the legitimately elected political representatives of the most relevant segments in the divided society participate, is not only the starting point in the analysis of the consociational model but also an element-variable through which evaluations and consideration of the other three aspects of the consociational democracy are carried out – the veto, the autonomy of the segments and their adequate and fair representation in the institutions of the system. This model, which was developed in the last few decades of the 20th century, offers not one but several solutions, including regarding the issue that is the subject of interest of this paper – the grand coalition. The purpose of this analysis is to determine how the grand coalition government is formed in the two most essential European consociational examples from Belgium and Switzerland, through a side-by-side review of the Macedonian experience. R. Macedonia adopted some consociational features after signing the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) with the help of which the armed conflict in 2001 ended.

Keywords: *power-sharing, Belgium, Switzerland, R. N. Macedonia, executive authority*

1. INTRODUCTION

Consociation, as a theoretical and empirical model, developed in the late 60s of the 20th century, was primarily dimensioned for “divided societies”. Through the institutes for: 1. cooperation of the elites within *the grand coalition* (where the legitimate representatives of the segments are represented); 2. *proportional representation* in the institutions of the system and *adequate allocation* of resources; 3. *the autonomy of the segments* in the areas that directly affect them; and 4. *the veto*; was aimed at the survival of such a segmented and

plural society. With their help, the rival ethno-cultural groups protected each other and guarded their “territories” and interests, in a political process always marked by a lack of democracy. Although the model is nominally called consociational democracy, we have elements of sacrificing the essential features of democracy for a higher goal – the state’s survival (Dijedović, 2017: 112). It is important to emphasize that consociation, theoretically, can be tied to a series of eminent names, but Arend Lijphart remains its most prominent and most cited author. The key example on which he theoretically bases the model came from his native Netherlands. We are talking about 1917-1967, a period known in Dutch political history as *the sixty-year consociation*. Additionally, Belgium’s political system, and especially Switzerland’s, with its unique *directorial system*, are examples of still visible consociation in Europe. Therefore, both countries are considered “primary examples” and continue to be seen as successful consociational stories (Stojanović, 2007: 66). Due to the success of the model,¹⁰ it began to be treated as an optimal solution for divided, especially post-conflict societies. Its good sides, by the International Community, were implemented in some other countries such as R. Macedonia with the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA).

Hence, the purpose of this paper is to make a comparative review of how the main component of the consociational model, the grand coalition government, is formed in the established consociations – Belgium and Switzerland, with the one in R. N. Macedonia. For this purpose, the paper is structured so that, first, a theoretical discussion will be presented about how the grand coalition government is elaborated in the consociational theory. Then, each case will be considered separately. And in the end, certain conclusions will be drawn.

2. THE GOVERNMENT OF GRAND COALITION IN CONSOCIATIONAL THEORY

Governments in consociational democracy, in their basis and essence, are considered the complete antipode of those in majoritarian democracies, which are also known under the name of cabinets in the Westminster system.

For the first type, the sharing of power in a coalition executive is immanent, where the leaders of all significant social segments in that plural and divided society participate. In this way, an assumption is created that there will be no permanent exclusion of any relevant segment from the power-sharing arrangement. The positive aspect of the coalition is seen in the fact that it should, by definition, result in greater pragmatism between the government partners, which, on the other hand, should be more moderate in their demands, and be prepared for what in German political science is called *kompromisbereit* – ready to compromise. During the functioning of such governments, potentially conflicting situations may arise, as well as mutual mistrust. However, the joint exercise of power and mutual supervision can be described and experienced as corrective mechanisms. The grand coalition is a framework where various demands, addressed by political actors, can be moderated, dimensioned, and harmonized. In politics, no one wants to be a loser, hence the desire for participation in the government of the grand coalition creates cumulative assumptions for the relaxation of the tensions between the political actors of the segments on the political scene (Vankovska, 2014: 122-123).

The second format of governments, such as those of the British i.e. Westminster type, as a rule, enjoy a small majority of support and “on their neck” also have broad opposition (Lijphart, 1994: 25).

¹⁰ This finding is less conditional if we consider some contrary examples from Europe, such as the failure of the consociational model of Cyprus in 1960-63 (see: Lijphart, 1994: 154-158).

In political science, the standard threefold classification of the types of coalitions that can be formed is well established. Here, a distinction can be made among: *minimal winning cabinets* (do not include any party that is not necessary to reach a majority); *oversized cabinets* (contain more parties than are required for majority support); *minority* or “*undersized*” *cabinets* (are not supported by a parliamentary majority) (Lijphart, 2012: 79-80). Hence, it is logical to conclude that majority democracies are suited to single-party and minimal winning cabinets, i.e. one-party majority cabinets, while multi-party and oversized cabinets are characteristic of consociations (Ibid., 80).

Some authors, such as Brian Berry (1975: 405), do not believe the grand coalition is the most important instrument for guaranteeing political stability in divided societies. According to him, the broad coalition is only an apparent phenomenon. However, broad coalitions remain a reference point for consociational theory because if they are founded on electoral logic, not on necessity; of the common interest and the common good, not on “division of the spoils”; on a comprehensive rather than minimal program basis; they can make a significant contribution to improving the overall quality that should be inherent in the consociation itself (Nešković, 2013: 311).

The consociational model is designed so that it can develop democratic and non-democratic performances. Lijphart’s model is essentially elitist, which hypostasizes such elements at the expense of the rule of law because informal and unwritten rules between the segment leaders function more successfully, contributing to politics being practiced outside legally defined boundaries (Vankovska, 2014: 131). Hence, the establishment of “the democratic form of broad coalitions is not possible without the rule of law, and the rule of law is again not possible without the supremacy of the constitution” (Nešković, 2013: 311).

Until now, in the paper, the notion of the grand coalition was elaborated in a general way, without citing examples of its institutional formation. Therefore, in continuation, some paradigmatic examples will be pointed out.

3. GOVERNMENT OF GRAND COALITION IN THE ESTABLISHED CONSOCIATIONS – SWITZERLAND AND BELGIUM

3.1 Swiss Federal Council – *Bundesrat* (de), *Conseil fédéral* (fr), *Consiglio federale* (it), *Cussegl federal* (rm)

Under Article 174 of the Swiss Constitution, “The Federal Council is the supreme governing and executive authority of the Confederation¹¹”. For Jean-François Aubert (1967, 1982) it is a collegial body, as in a series of states, but it is a collegium of equals which recognizes no elder. It is a government that originates from the Assembly, as in parliamentary systems, but its mandate depends on the Constitution, and not on the goodwill of those who entrusted it with power. Here, the principle is anticipated, that neither the Federal Assembly can recall the Government (no vote of confidence), nor the Federal Council can call for the dissolution of the National Council. Resignation of federal councilors is not foreseen, but it is not prohibited either. The composition of the Federal Council is determined by art. 175 of the Constitution. It consists of seven members, which

¹¹ “Since 1848, Switzerland has had a Constitution called ‘Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation’, which means that this state is *de jure* and *de facto* a federation, by retaining the old German name Eidgenossenschaft (‘community of the oath’), which in Romance (but also Anglo-Saxon and Slavic) languages is translated as ‘confederation’ (Confédération suisse, Confederazione Svizzera)” (Stojanović, 2007: 67).

are elected by the Federal Assembly (at a joint session of the National Council and the Council of States) after each general election for its lower house – the National Council, for a term of four years. The Federal Assembly elects the president of the Confederation and his deputy among the members of the Federal Council, for one year, with the right to re-election, but not consecutively. That means the Federal Council is a collective head of state, and its chairman is only *primus inter pares*.

Based on a referendum statement of 07.02.1999, which entered into force on 01.01.2000, and was translated into the constitutional text (art. 175, pr. 4), it is said that “In electing the Federal Council, care must be taken to ensure that the various geographical and language regions of the country are appropriately represented”. Before 1999 and this referendum result, the rule that no canton could have more than one representative in the Federal Council at the same time was valid.¹² Until then, “the cantons of Zurich and Bern almost always had one representative each in the Federal Council, the canton of Vaud usually had one, and the rest were represented on a rotating basis” (Lovo, 1999: 224). Out of 26 cantons, Nidwalden, Schaffhausen, Schwyz, and Uri have never been represented in this federal body. Jura, the last and most recently formed canton (1979), received a federal councilor in 2022.

As stated, since not all cantons can be represented, not even all parties represented in the parliament, additional criteria have been elaborated – the size of the canton, multilingualism, multiethnicity, religion, and party strength (Vasović, 2007: 128). Here it is worth paying attention to the following three aspects.

Multiethnicity implies that no more than five members may be from identical language cantons. As we previously indicated, after the constitutional amendments of 1999 there were cases when the two cantons with a specific weight in Swiss politics – Zurich and Bern, each had two councilors in the Federal Council. Still, all the other five members came from other cantons.

Multilingualism means that language groups are represented according to their demographic strength in Swiss society. Hence, the unwritten rule is to have four to five German speakers, one or two Francophones, and one or no Italian speaker. But with the 2023 Council, the constitutional insistence that languages and regions be properly balanced is under increasing threat. “Latin speakers” – people who speak either French (Gallo-Romance group), Italian (Italo-Romance group), or Romansh (Gallo-Rhaetian group)¹³ – now form a majority in the Council, even though more than seventy percent of Swiss citizens speak German as their first language.¹⁴ Additionally, whenever a member resigns, he or she is generally replaced by someone who is not only from the same party but also from the same language group. But even from this principle in the last two decades, there were numerous deviations in 2006, 2016, and 2023, as Francophones were replaced by Germanophones, and *vice versa*. However, for a candidate to be elected to the Federal Council, a high degree of fluency in German, French, and Italian has always been an important reference in their CV.

Concerning *party strength*, the greatest invention of the Swiss consociation is the way of ensuring the appropriate party representation in the Federal Council, through the so-

¹² After the abolition of the rule, there were two situations in the period 2003-2007, when two federal councilors were from the canton of Zurich, and in 2010 two candidates from Bern were elected, who remained in office until 2018 (i.e. in two terms).

¹³ The first and so far the only Romansh speaker to be elected to the Federal Council was Felix Calonder from the FDP back in 1913.

¹⁴ But the first such case in the history of Switzerland happened with the composition of the Federal Council from 1917-1919.

called *magic formula* (de: *Zauberformel*, fr: *formule magique*, it: *formula magica*, rm: *furmla magica*), innovated in 1959, which represents an arithmetic formula for dividing the seven executive seats in the Federal Council between the four coalition parties. Until 1891, all federal councilors came from the ranks of the Liberal Radicals (FDP), when the Christian Democrats (KK/KCV/CVP) got the first federal councilor, and in 1920 the second. The predecessor of the Swiss People's Party (SVP), the Party of Farmers, Traders and Independents (BGB) would receive the first federal councilor in 1929. The Federal Council received a representative from the Social Democrats (SP) for the first time in 1943, and this party received its second councilor in 1959. From 1959 - 2003 the formula was 2: FDP, 2: CVP, 2: SP, 1: SVP. From 2003, the SVP will gain two councilors, and the CVP will lose one. The SVP will share one council seat with the more moderate breakaways from its ranks, the BDP – Bourgeois Democratic Party, following the split between the two formations in 2008, and will continue to do so until 2015, when the SVP will regain that seat from BDP, which will merge in 2021 with CVP in a new party formation under the name – Center. As a rule, the three largest parties in the Council, which had two councilors each, control about ¼ of the seats in the National Council, while the fourth party, which has one councilor, has about one-eighth of the seats in the lower house of the Swiss parliament (Lijphart, 2012: 33).

Switzerland is a small country 41,285 km², but with great interest in its political system, great interest but few attempts to copy it (Vasović, 2007: 103), as was the case of Uruguay which with its *colejido* imitated the seven-member Swiss federal council from 1919 to 1933 and from 1952 to 1967 (see: Lijphart, 1994: 207-210).

3.2 The broad coalitions in the Belgian consociational model

In 2030, Belgium will celebrate two centuries since its independence, which it gained in 1830, after the revolutionary events of the same year when it declared independence and neutrality. Belgium, as a monarchy, maintained its unitary status until the 1970s of the 20th century because “since then, with six (*my note*) successive institutional reforms¹⁵ of the state, they turned the country into a federal state composed of communities, regions and a federal level of power” (de Ceuninck & Reynaert, 2011: 1018). The result of such a reform process was sublimated in the first article of the Belgian Constitution: “Belgium is a federal State composed of Communities and Regions”. The constitution recognizes two types of federated entities, namely three administratively-territorially defined regions – Flanders, Wallonia, and the Brussels-Capital Region, and three federal communities embodied as cultural-linguistic units – Flemish (speaking a variant of the Dutch language), French and German.¹⁶ Hence, “it is important to emphasize that Flanders and Wallonia are mainly homogeneous communities that the Belgian federation characterizes as an ethno-cultural and not a territorial federation” (Djedović, 2017: 103).

Lijphart's consociational arrangements are woven into the entire Belgian political system in its federal development phase, as Belgium adopted its basic settings and worked them out to the fullest. Given the 15-member government, it should be underlined that the language groups are represented on parity, with seven ministers from both communities, except the prime minister (Ibid., 104). However, when it comes to the government, it should

¹⁵ Reforms occurred in 1970, 1980, 1988-89, 1993, 2001 and 2012-2014.

¹⁶ Consisting of nine out of a total of 11 municipalities in Eastern Belgium in the Eupen-Malmedy district, in the province of Liège, in the Wallonia Region, colloquially known as the East Cantons – *Ostbelgien*, which does not have the status of a federal region like Flanders and Wallonia, but only cultural and linguistic autonomy.

be pointed out that there are not one but six governments in the complex Belgian federal structure. In addition to the one at the federal level, which is the focus of this paper, there is a Government, but also a Parliament, of the Flemish Community¹⁷ that had taken over the powers of the Region of Flanders. Now there is only one Flemish Parliament and one Flemish Government. This is not the case with the French Community¹⁸ and the Wallonia Region, which have separate parliaments and governments. The German-speaking Community also has its own representative body and government, as does the Brussels-Capital Region, “which is francophone but in the middle of Flanders” (Ibid, 105).

The federal government of Belgium “in party terms, is a multi-party government (since 1981 four or six parties)” (Vasović, 2007: 213). But “from 1918 to 1963, Belgian grand coalition governments included members of all three major parties that governed the country for a quarter of that time. All other governments were changeable coalitions, where Catholics played the key role; they spent only 14% in opposition in 1918-63. Liberals and Socialists were not as frequent coalition partners, but were also in government three-quarters of the time (Liberals) and more than half of that time (Socialists)” (Lijphart, 1994: 32). Belgium’s transformation from a unitary to a classically structured federal state was further accompanied by “the growing salience of linguistic and regional divisions that internally divided the Christian Democratic, Liberal, and Socialist unitary parties, and each split into two organizationally and programmatically independent branches in the Flemish and the French-speaking area (more precisely in 1968, in 1972 and 1978)” (de Winter, 2009: 442).

Such party fragmentation necessarily presupposed broader multi-party coalitions. Until the 70s of the 20th century, minimal winning coalitions were formed in Belgium, i.e. a minimum combination capable of forming a majority in the parliament along the left-right axis of the political spectrum. After the linguistic divide, minimal coalitions in this country became a thing of the past. The comprehensive and fundamental reforms after 1970 encouraged more and more decisions in the Belgian parliament to be made by a special majority, thus starting a process involving the formation of over-sized coalitions with four to six coalition partners. But here, too, the choice of coalitions was mainly limited to two formats – *center-left* consisting of the Christian Democratic formations in Flanders and Wallonia CVP/PSC [CD&V/cdH (Les Engagés)]¹⁹ and the Flemish and Walloon Socialists SP [SP.a (Vooruit)] / PS or *center-right* where the backbone was again CVP/PSC, but this time in coalition with the Flemish and Walloon Liberals PVV/PRL [*Open VLD/ MR*] (Vasović, 2007: 214-215). So *center-right* were the I, II, and III Cabinet of Tindemans from 1974 to 1977; the V and VI Cabinet of Martens 1981-1987; but also the I and II Cabinet of Michel, including the *ad hoc* Cabinet of Wilmès²⁰ (2014-2020), where the Francophone Christian Democrats did not participate. *Center-left* were Tindemans IV Cabinet (1977-78);

¹⁷ It is made up not only of all the inhabitants of Flanders but also of Dutch speakers from the Brussels-Capital Region. Members of the Flemish Parliament elected in the Brussels-Capital Region are not entitled to vote on Flemish regional matters, but only on community matters, as matters concerning their region are governed by the Brussels Parliament.

¹⁸ The Community is colloquially known as the Fédération Wallonie-Brussels and covers the French-speaking inhabitants of Wallonia and the Brussels-Capital Region.

¹⁹ The current names of the parties are given in brackets [], because, in the past few decades, the main Belgian parties have often resorted to their changes.

²⁰ The only female prime minister in the history of Belgium who replaced Michel, who became the president of the European Council. The II Cabinet of Michel and the *ad hoc* of Wilmes were the only ones in the past fifty years that consisted of only three parties, which was a real rarity in Belgian politics during this period.

Vanden Boeynants II (1978); the I and II Cabinet of Martens (1979-80), but also the IV (1980-81), as well as the VII and VIII (1988-91); Eyskens Cabinet (1981); Dehaene's I and II (1992-99). But in the past fifty years from 1974 from the first cabinet of Tindemans, to the last one of De Croo (2020-2024), there were also deviations from this format of coalitions. In many ways such were the four governments led by Verhofstadt. The I Government of Verhofstadt (1999-2003) after 40 years of continuous participation in governments, was composed without the Christian Democratic formations because the Flemish and Walloon Liberals, Socialists, and, for the first time, the two Green parties from Flanders and Wallonia participated in its work. Verhofstadt's II and III Cabinet (2003–2007) was ideologically similar to the previous one, but now without the two Green parties,²¹ and the IV (2007-2008) united Flemish and Walloon Liberals and Christian Democrats, plus francophone Socialists. This coalition format was also characteristic of the I (2008) and II (2009-2010) Government of Leterme and the Cabinet of Van Rompuy (2008-2009). Already in the Cabinet of Di Rupo (the first Francophone Prime Minister after 1979, in the period 2011-2014) the Flemish Socialists joined the previous coalition form. With this, for the first time the three mainstream ideological groups from the Flemish and French Communities (the Socialists, the Liberals, and the Christian Democrats), were in the same government. De Croo's last Cabinet (2000-2024) was the largest with 7 parties, namely: the Liberals, the Greens, the Socialists (from both linguistic groups), plus the Flemish Christian Democrats. In the aforementioned coalition governments, sometimes, besides the four ideological mainstream parties from the two communities (the Christian Democrats, the Socialists, the Liberals, and the Greens), some other regional parties participated, such as Rassemblement wallon RW (Tindemans II); Front démocratique des francophones (FDF, today DéF) (Tindemans IV, Boeynants II, Martens I); the Flemish Volksunie, VU (Tindemans IV, Boeynants II, Martens VII); the Flemish Sociaal-Liberale Partij – Spirit (Verhofstadt II); as well as the Flemish nationalists from Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA) (Michel I) (see: Database on WHO GOVERNS in Europe and beyond, Cabinets, Belgium).

The government is nominally a significant, but still not so influential political body, because it operates in Belgium, synonymous with a fragile political creation. Due to its too-wide setting, inhomogeneity, and incoherence, it has neither decisive power nor the ability to grow into a powerful structure (Vasović, 2007: 217). In the Belgian political system, as indicated above, there is not one but several governments. It is conceptualized in such a way that almost all significant parties, now, if they are not in power in the federal government, can be in the governments of the regions or communities, which means that they can be considered, in some way, as ruling parties at one or another governmental level.

4. THE MACEDONIAN VERSION OF THE GRAND COALITION GOVERNMENT IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Unlike Switzerland and Belgium, “the grand coalition of the executive power is not formally and legally foreseen in the Constitution” (Vankovska, 2014: 161). However, that does not mean it was foreign to the Macedonian political reality. Ever since the establishment of the first democratic government, the state was governed informally by a government of a broad coalition in which, without exception, the democratically elected political

²¹ „Reducing the fragmentation of the party system in 2003 (partly due to electoral reform) kicked out the Greens and thereby reduced the number of government partners to four, which was a common situation in the 1980s and 1990s“ (de Winter, 2009: 454).

representatives of the second largest ethnic community in the state – the Albanian, were always represented. This proves that certain “rudimentary” elements of consociation, nurtured more through political pragmatism than through systematically guaranteed solutions, existed *de facto*, even before the OFA. With the OFA’s help such elements were only strengthened and made more explicit (Ibid., 160).

In the first decade of independence, after the elections in 1990 and 1994, three political governments were formed, which were coalitional led by SDSM, in which the Albanian partner was the political party PDP. The party had the largest number of Albanian MPs in both assemblies, thus it was considered a legitimate representative of this ethnic community in the executive power. The average share of Albanian ministers in these governments was 22%, which is quite complementary to the demographic share of this ethnic community from the 1991 Census. But the Albanian coalition partner was getting less attractive ministerial posts, compared to some others they might have been more interested in at that time, especially after the events of 1995, such as the security sector or the Ministry of Interior.

After the political change in 1998, the country was governed by a new coalition government led by VMRO-DPMNE, with a new Albanian coalition partner DPA, which had 3 MPs less than the then-ruling party PDP. DPA was considered a relevant party in that period, but it did not have the best electoral record among Albanians.²² The coalition led by VMRO-DPMNE ruled during an extremely turbulent time for the country, due to the 2001 Conflict.

However, the key turning point in Albanian representation in the Macedonian version of the grand coalition government happened in 2002. It is about “precedent in terms of the transformation of an armed formation (NLA/UÇK/ONA) into a political party (DUI), which later entered the government coalition as a result of the electoral success among the Albanian population” (Vankovska, 2014: 168). This political formation from 2002 to 2024, except for 2006-2008, was the Albanian representative in the Macedonian consociational power-sharing arrangement for exactly two decades. It was in the period after the 2006 elections that there was considerable tension. DUI had a decisive victory of 17 mandates against 11 of the then-ruling Albanian DPA. But, VMRO DPMNE opted for a government coalition with its traditional partner DPA, just like in 1998 when it was again the second option behind PDP, but then the difference in mandates between them was only 3. DUI claimed “that this violated the Framework Agreement and the rule established by the International Community” (Vankovska, 2007: 228). But is that quite so? First, nowhere in OFA is it explained how to form the government, as it is partially done in Switzerland for example,²³ or post-federal Belgium (1993). Second, after the 2001 constitutional amendments, the academically correct definition of the Macedonian political system is a parliamentary democracy, with certain consociational features. Since in our political system, the parliamentary dimension continues to prevail, it is more than evident that the government is formed by political parties or coalitions that can consolidate 61 MPs. However, the party VMRO DPMNE corrected the mistake of 2006, and after the 2008 elections invited DUI to

²² Since the electoral model was changed, with the introduction of a majority and proportional component, the Albanian parties decided on an independent performance according to the majority, and in a coalition according to the proportion. The number of mandates was equal according to the proportion, in a ratio of 4:4, and according to the majority model, the mandates were won in the ratio 10 PDP, 7 DPA.

²³ In the country, however, there is no formal “(ethno) national” key, as is the case in Belgium, but only an informal one (Stojanović, 2007: 81).

the Government. In the government of the grand coalition, DUI had different amplitudes in its behavior. The general impression is that this political option fits well into Sartori's definition of a relevant party and operationalized it even more successfully in practice. According to this eminent Italian political scientist, the relevant parties have either coalition or blackmail potential (Sartori 2008: 34). There is no doubt that the DUI, in the past two decades on the Macedonian political scene, was like instant coffee drinks 2 in 1 – it had both coalition and blackmail potential. Hence, even a relatively small party, such as DUI, regardless of whether after a total of 8 election cycles in which it participated, consolidated 10 (2016) or 19 mandates (2014), it was always relevant, precisely because of its blackmail and coalition potential. When DUI was weakest in the 2016 elections (10 mandates), its blackmailing potential culminated. After ten years of joint exercise of power, DUI sent its “senior” coalition partner VMRO DPMNE into the opposition. Another time, when the Macedonian mainstream parties had an excellent result, close to an absolute majority (SDSM in 2002) or an absolute majority (VMRO DPMNE in 2008), DUI as the winner in the Albanian bloc was undoubtedly a relevant and legitimate coalition partner. In other situations, when the winner in the so-called “Macedonian bloc” did not have categorical majorities like VMRO DPMNE in 2011, 2014, or SDSM in 2020, the blackmail potential of DUI came to the fore. It was expressed in a way that not only increased the number of departments managed by DUI but also their attractiveness.²⁴ For most of the SDSM governments, it was characteristic that DUI was not enough to strengthen the parliamentary majority in the two consecutive mandates (2017-2024). Except for the Zaev's VI Government after the 2020 elections and the reconstructed VII of 2021, in all the previous ones, especially the mandate (2017-2020), other formations such as NDP, Besa, the Alliance, DPA, and Alternative participated. However, the greatest dissatisfaction and revolt among ethnic Macedonians was caused by the I Cabinet of Kovačevski in 2022 when 9 out of 21 ministers (or over 40% of the government composition) were from the Albanian parties, i.e. there was a state of ethnic Albanian overrepresentation in this institution of the system.

The question of how the government of the grand coalition should be formed was re-actualized again after the 2024 elections, when the winner VMRO DPMNE, for the third time in the political history of Macedonia, decided to form a coalition with the second-placed Albanian formation, this time the VLEN Coalition. DUI again referred to the basic consociational principle indicated above, that the representatives of the segments with the greatest legitimacy participate in the government of the grand coalition. But this is not the case even in the most emblematic examples of consociational democracy. For example, in Belgium, the two parties of Flemish nationalism, the more moderate N-VA after the general elections in 2014, and 2019 was placed first; and the more extreme Vlaams Belang in the 2019 elections was second.²⁵ The two options individually had the largest number of votes and mandates won in Belgium, but when the federal government was formed in 2020, no one took them to power. Other political formations simply made a “cordon sanitaire” towards them. The Flemings in the federal government were represented by political leaders who did not have the legitimacy of this community. But that is why the N-VA had the main say in the formation of the Flemish government in 2014 and 2019. On the other hand, precisely these and similar examples gave DUI the right to call for the reorganization of the

²⁴ E.g. the first Albanian minister of defense after the 2001 Conflict in 2011, or the minister of finance and foreign affairs in 2020.

²⁵ At the last Belgian federal elections held in 2024, again, N-VA and VB were in first and second place at the national level.

state, including on the model of Belgian regionalism, with an implicit message that if we are deprived of power at the state level, we will exercise it in some potential territorial autonomous entity.

5. CONCLUSION

The fact that the political party DUI, as well as other Albanian stakeholders, even after almost a quarter of a century since the signing of the OFA, are again raising questions, such as the way power should be shared in the grand coalition, through the idea of a precise legal definition; or the ideas of some kind of territorial organization on the Belgian or Northern Irish model with the goal of greater segmental autonomy; does lead to the conclusion that for part of the political elite in the country the process of its transformation is not finished. The highlighting of new, and new, proposals for deepening the existing consociational arrangements is a confirmation that R. N. Macedonia should continue to nurture its authentic and recognizable parliamentary model with certain moderate consociational components, which after the 2001 Conflict, made it possible to weaken the centrifugal tendencies in the divided Macedonian society and to achieve a certain centripetality. The R. N. Macedonia cannot be inspired by Belgian solutions (the idea of regionalization) or ideas for a special law for the formation of the government of the grand coalition (as in Bosnia and Herzegovina) – federal states with pronounced one-way disintegrative centrifugal tendencies. No matter how much it is criticized and attacked, the discreet charm of the consociational model is still perceived not in the Belgian or Bosnian, but in the Dutch and Swiss cases, to which the R. N. Macedonia should also strive because its success there was measured precisely by the degree of its overcoming and turning to “normal” (parliamentary) democracy. As for the Belgian arrangement, there is unanimity in political science that such a form of consociation can hardly be recommended to anyone else, for the simple reason that no constitutional arrangement, even as a theoretical model, can be simply copied and pasted in another country. The constitutional solutions there were designed so that the constitutional makers were not guided by some existing theoretical and comparative models, but sought authentic solutions adapted to the Belgian specifics. In that way, legal institutes were created that are without analogy and precedent in comparative constitutional law. But there is also something to learn from Belgium. It is above all the Belgian democratic spirit, pragmatism, and rationality that is perceived in the gradual reforms, and not in a violent way. The relationship between the two leading communities is still tense but pragmatic and peaceful (see: Djedović, 2017: 112, 121, 124-125). Such a Belgian political consociational culture can also be inspiring for the Macedonian political elites from the two largest ethnic communities in the country.

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SEMANTIC ANALYSIS OF THE NOUN “ABUSE” AND ITS TRANSLATIONAL EQUIVALENTS IN MACEDONIAN

Vesna Trajkovska

Faculty of Security – Skopje
trajkovska_vesna@yahoo.com

Abstract

An important feature of English language is the existence of words which may have several meanings, different yet related to one another. Although the same word may have multiple meanings, the distinction between the various meanings can be deduced from the context in which it is used. However, this possibility of various uses of the same words, may cause difficulties to learners of English who might find the task of identifying their meanings in specific cases rather challenging. This also applies to the acquisition and translation of specialized terminology where many general English words adopt new meanings when encountered in specialized lexical environment.

Bearing this in mind, the paper deals specifically with the noun abuse as a polysemous noun and its Macedonian translational equivalents. It provides overview of its meanings in both languages and also presents the results of a small-scale research carried out with the students from the Faculty of Security – Skopje, regarding their translations of *abuse* in different contexts in Macedonian.

Key words: *abuse, polysemy, English, translation, Macedonian*

1. INTRODUCTION

Polysemy is an important feature of the English language. It refers to situations “when an expression has two or more definitions with some common features that are usually derived from a single basic meaning” (Bussmann, 2006: 918). The “coexistence” of several meanings of one word in English makes their translation into other languages a complex task both for its learners, as well as for translators. In some cases, it may be possible to find an equivalent in the target language in the form of a single lexical item that would carry the same semantic notion of the original word in all its meanings, depending on the context in which it is used and the words it collocates with. However, in many cases, the translators should search for more than one word in the target language lexicon, to transfer the meaning of the original term as accurately as possible.

Taking into consideration the complexity of the translation process, one may notice various practices as far as the translation of words from English into Macedonian is concerned. This equally applies to words with a single meaning, as well as to polysemous words, i.e. those with several meanings. If we focus on polysemous words specifically, we may find many examples when the separate meanings of one word can be translated with several lexical equivalents in the target language. This tendency can be illustrated with the English noun *claim*, which has several meanings that can be translated into Macedonian

differently. Thus, with the meaning 1) “a statement that something is true although it has not been proved and other people may not agree with or believe it”²⁶, *claim* is translated as *тврдење* (*tvrdenje*); with the meaning 2) “a request for a sum of money that you believe you have a right to, especially from a company, the government, etc.”²⁷, used in the context of money, its Macedonian equivalent is *барање* (*baranje*) or *побарување* (*robaruvanje*); while when the same noun is used in a legal context to refer to 3) “a right that somebody believes they have to something, especially property, land, etc.”²⁸ it is translated as *право* (*pravo*). On the other hand, there are also cases when a single translational equivalent covers all the meanings of the original English word. Thus, for example, the English noun *prison* may be translated as *замвор* (*zatvor*) when it is used to refer to 1) “a building where people are kept as a punishment for a crime they have committed, or while they are waiting for trial”²⁹, 2) “the system of keeping people in prisons”³⁰, or 3) “a place or situation from which somebody cannot escape”³¹.

The presented examples clearly illustrate how challenging the translation process can be in cases of terms with multiple meanings. One such word showing flexibility regarding its meaning is the English noun *abuse* – a specialized term which denotes concepts related to several fields. In the sections that follow, we will explore its meanings and present the results of a small-scale research regarding the translation of this term in Macedonian, provided by the students from the Faculty of Security in Skopje.

2. ON SOME OF THE MEANINGS OF THE NOUN “ABUSE”

The English noun *abuse* falls into the category of polysemous words. *Abuse* may refer to several concepts with related meanings, and may be used in general communication as well as in professional communication, to refer to concepts in the fields of law, security, law-enforcement etc. Its verbal equivalent has the same form as the noun, and the distinction between the two parts of speech is inferred from the contexts in which they are used. For example, the context makes it clear that in the sentence *The manager abused his position*, the word *abuse* is used as a verb; while in the sentence *The manager was accused of abuse of position*, the word *abuse* is used as a noun.

General dictionaries of English provide various definitions of the recorded meanings of this term. The Online Oxford Learners’ Dictionary lists three meanings of the noun *abuse*. One possible meaning of *abuse* is 1) “the use of something in a way that is wrong or harmful”³². When used with this meaning, it can be found in collocations like *abuse of power*, *substance abuse*, *abuse of position*, *abuse of procedure* etc. The second meaning of *abuse* is 2) “unfair, cruel or violent treatment of somebody”³³. This meaning of *abuse* is usually encountered in collocations like *domestic abuse*, *child abuse*, *sexual abuse*,

²⁶ https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/claim_2 (Accessed on 4 October 2024)

²⁷ Ibid (Accessed on 4 October 2024)

²⁸ Ibid (Accessed on 4 October 2024)

²⁹ <https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/prison?q=prison> (Accessed on 29 October 2024)

³⁰ Ibid

³¹ Ibid

³² https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/abuse_1?q=abuse (Accessed on 14 July 2024)

³³ Ibid (Accessed on 14 July 2024)

emotional abuse etc. It may refer to both physical abuse involving the use of force, or abuse in a broader sense, not necessarily involving force, such as psychological abuse, for instance. The third meaning of *abuse* is related to 3) “rude and offensive remarks, usually made when somebody is very angry”³⁴. This meaning of *abuse* is typically related to verbal insults, without the use of force. One such example would be the collocation *sexist abuse*, which refers to the act of uttering words aimed at insulting the interlocutor on the grounds of their sex.

From the presented definitions, a conclusion can be drawn that all the meanings given above contain the element of the common denominator of harm, violence, or treatment that is negative in its essence, towards an object or a person, or that is against the morally or legally accepted norms of conduct. Thus, knowing one of the meanings of *abuse* may serve as a good starting point for guessing the meanings of the other ones, based on the specific context in which this noun is used.

3. TRANSLATIONAL EQUIVALENTS OF “ABUSE” IN MACEDONIAN

If we focus specifically on the noun *abuse*, as defined in the previous section, we will arrive at the conclusion that the original English term cannot be translated with a single lexical counterpart in Macedonian. When *abuse* is used with meaning 1) elaborated above, the most accurate Macedonian equivalent would be the noun *злоупотреба* (*zloupotreba*), which in Macedonian is defined as “unlawful, improper use of something (power, position, idea, law, weapon etc)”³⁵. This translational equivalent can easily be recognised as the most appropriate one if we consider the collocational relationships it makes with other words in Macedonian. The noun *злоупотреба* (*zloupotreba*) may be found in collocation with the same words listed above *abuse* collocates with in English. Therefore, the collocations such as *abuse of power*, *substance abuse*, *abuse of position*, *abuse of procedure* etc. will be translated as *злоупотреба на моќ/власт* (*zloupotreba na moќ/vlast*), *злоупотреба на супстанции* (*zloupotreba na supstanci*), *злоупотреба на положба* (*zloupotreba na položba*), *злоупотреба на постапка* (*zloupotreba na postapka*) etc.

However, we cannot use a single translational equivalent when it comes to the translation of *abuse* with its meaning 2) presented above. In Macedonian, when we talk about treating somebody in a way that is unfair, cruel or violent, we usually use the nouns *малтретирање* (*maltretiranje*), *злоупотреба* (*zloupotreba*) or even *насилство* (*nasilstvo*), depending on the context and the words it is used in collocation with. *Малтретирање* (*maltretiranje*) is derived from the verb *малтретира* (*maltretira*) meaning “treat badly, harass, oppress someone or something”³⁶, and is also translated into English as *maltreatment* which, to a great extent, is semantically close to the definition of *abuse*. For this meaning of *abuse*, we can also use the Macedonian noun *злоупотреба* (*zloupotreba*) or the gerund form *злоупотребување* (*zloupotrebuvanje*). On the other hand, in certain contexts, we can also use the noun *насилство* (*nasilstvo*) which is literally translated into English as *violence*, and primarily refers to “the use of force against someone contrary to their will and their rights”³⁷. Thus, for instance, the collocation *domestic abuse* would be translated as *семејно насилство* (*semejno nasilstvo*), *child abuse* would be

³⁴ Ibid (Accessed on 14 July 2024)

³⁵ <https://makedonski.gov.mk/corpus/l/zloupotreba-zh> (Accessed on 14 July 2024)

³⁶ <https://makedonski.gov.mk/corpus/l/maltretira-nesv> (Accessed on 14 July 2024)

³⁷ <https://makedonski.gov.mk/corpus/l/nasilstvo-sr> (Accessed on 14 July 2024)

translated as *злоупотреба на деца* (*zloupotreba na deca*), *sexual abuse* would be translated as *сексуална злоупотреба* (*seksualna zloupotreba*), *сексуално малтретирање* (*seksualno maltretiranje*) or even *сексуално насилство* (*seksualno nasilstvo*) in some contexts, *emotional abuse* would be typically translated into Macedonian as *емоционално малтретирање* (*emocionalno maltretiranje*), *емоционална злоупотреба* (*emocionalna zloupotreba*), *емоционално злоупотребување* (*emocionalno zloupotrebuvanje*) or *емоционално насилство* (*emocionalno nasilstvo*) etc. It is interesting to note that even in English, the nouns *abuse* and *violence* can interchangeably be used in some of the examples given above, so we may come across both *domestic abuse* and *domestic violence*, *sexual abuse* and *sexual violence* etc. which may be considered synonyms in English. As far as meaning 3) of *abuse* is concerned, when referring to verbal insults, the most appropriate equivalent in Macedonian would be *навреда* (*navreda*), which in Macedonian is defined as “words or action which inflict injustice, undermine the dignity, honour”³⁸.

4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Bearing in mind the polysemous nature of the English noun *abuse*, as well as the difficulties it may pose to translators into other languages, accompanied by the importance of this type of words in the context of law enforcement, we attempted to assess the knowledge of the students from the Faculty of Security in Skopje about the different meanings of *abuse* presented in the sections above. For that purpose, we designed a questionnaire that was distributed to 23 students who attended the lectures in English Language 4 in the summer semester of the academic year 2023/24. The students were given three sentences in English containing the noun *abuse* with different meanings. They were also given the Macedonian translations of these sentences and were asked to insert only the missing Macedonian translational equivalents of the noun *abuse*, based on the context of the original English sentences, as well as their translation in Macedonian. Our hypothesis was that the students were familiar with the semantic nuances of the noun *abuse* when used in different contexts. This was based on the fact that the students had already taken English Language classes during their academic studies and had background knowledge of basic law-enforcement terminology in English and the fact that the questionnaire was distributed at the end of the fourth semester, which is the last semester when they were offered English Language as an elective subject. The students’ answers were analysed and grouped into the categories of acceptable, partially acceptable and unacceptable translational equivalents, and are presented in the following section.

5. RESEARCH RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

As was previously elaborated, the questionnaire consisted of three sentences. The following is the first sentence in English and its Macedonian equivalent:

³⁸ <https://makedonski.gov.mk/corpus/l/navreda-zh> (Accessed on 23 October 2024)

Sentence 1:

English: *The leader of the organized criminal group spent several years behind bars for sexual exploitation and abuse of children.*

Macedonian: *Водачот на организираната криминална група помина неколку години зад решетки за сексуално искористување и на деца.*

With reference to the translational equivalent of *abuse*, as used in this sentence, we obtained the following answers:

Translational Equivalent	Number of answers
Acceptable translational equivalent	Total: 15 (65.2%)
<i>малтретирање (maltretiranje)</i>	7
<i>злоупотреба (zloupotreba)</i>	4
<i>злоупотребување (zloupotrebuvanje)</i>	1
<i>зоставување (zlostavuvanje)</i>	3
Unacceptable translational equivalent	Total: 8 (34.8%)
<i>силување (siluvanje)</i>	1
<i>вознемирување (voznemiruvanje)</i>	1
<i>насилство (nasilstvo)</i>	6

In the given sentence, the noun *abuse* is used with meaning 2) from the previous section and refers to maltreatment of persons, in this case children, in the context of sexual exploitation. As far as the Macedonian equivalent is concerned, in bilingual English-Macedonian dictionaries, in this specific context *abuse* is typically translated as *малтретирање (maltretiranje)*. More specifically, the expression *sexual abuse* is translated as *сексуално малтретирање (seksualno maltretiranje)* (Мурпроски, 2001:6), while the extended form *child sexual abuse* is translated as *сексуално малтретирање деца (seksualno maltretiranje deca)* (ibid). However, in Macedonian legislative documents, there is a tendency towards using the noun *злоупотреба (zloupotreba)*, particularly in the context of sexual exploitation and abuse of children. We will illustrate this practice with the Law on Protection of Children, which operates with the term *сексуално искористување и сексуална злоупотреба на децата (seksualno iskoristuvanje i seksualna zloupotreba na decata)* (Закон за заштита на децата, 2021), which is the Macedonian lexical counterpart of *sexual exploitation and abuse of children*. Therefore, for the purpose of our research, both *малтретирање (maltretiranje)* and *злоупотреба (zloupotreba)* were counted as appropriate Macedonian translations. Additionally, we included the gerund form *злоупотребување*, as well as the term *зоставување (zlostavuvanje)* which is semantically close to *злоупотреба/злоупотребување (zloupotreba/zloupotrebuvanje)*. Bearing this in mind, a total of 15 answers were counted as acceptable, amounting to 65.2% of the provided answers, as opposed to 8 incorrect answers, amounting to 34.8% of the answers. The unacceptable answers included the noun *силување (siluvanje)* which refers to *rape*, and *вознемирување (voznemiruvanje)* which refers to *harassment*. Additionally, 6 students translated *abuse* as *насилство (nasilstvo)* which literally means *violence*. Although in some contexts *abuse* can be translated as *насилство (nasilstvo)*, in this example that was not the expected answer. The given Macedonian sentence contained the preposition *на (na)* which cannot postpositively be used in collocation with the noun *насилство (nasilstvo)*, to refer to abuse inflicted on children. Namely, in the collocation *насилство на (nasilstvo na) + noun*

in Macedonian, the noun refers to the doer of the action, in this case *the children* as doers of the act of violence or abuse. On the contrary, in the collocation *насилство врз (nasilstvo vrz) + noun* and *насилство кон (nasilstvo kon) + noun*, the noun would refer to the object, or “recipient” of the action, i.e. *the children*, and in that case the noun *насилство (nasilstvo)* would have been considered acceptable Macedonian equivalent. Bearing this in mind, this lexical solution was counted unacceptable. However, a conclusion can be drawn that the obtained answers indicate students’ familiarity with the semantic nuance of *abuse* in the context of sexual exploitation of children.

As far as the second sentence from the questionnaire is concerned, it illustrated the use of *abuse* in a context not related to persons. The following is the sentence in English and its Macedonian equivalent:

Sentence 2:

English: *There was no evidence of abuse of position by the Minister of Interior in the tender procedure for procurement of police vehicles.*

Macedonian: *Немаше докази за на службената положба на Министерот за внатрешни работи во тендерската постапка за набавка на полициски возила.*

The following is the distribution of the translational equivalents of *abuse* in this context:

Translational Equivalent	Number of answers
Acceptable translational equivalent	Total: 20 (87%)
<i>злоупотреба (zloupotreba)</i>	15
<i>злоупотребување (zloupotrebuvanje)</i>	2
<i>искористување (iskoristuvanje)</i>	3
Unacceptable translational equivalent	Total: 3 (13%)
<i>насилство (nasilstvo)</i>	3

In the second sentence, the term *abuse* is obviously used in the sense of wrong, inappropriate use of something, as described in definition 1) above, and in this specific context refers to official position held by a person in power, namely the Minister of the Interior. Therefore, the expression *abuse of position* should be translated into Macedonian as *злоупотреба на службена положба (zloupotreba na službena položba)*. This was the choice made by a huge majority of respondents (73.9%) who correctly translated the term into Macedonian. This group also includes 2 students who chose the gerund form *злоупотребување (zloupotrebuvanje)*, which is also acceptable in this context, where the entire expression *abuse of position* was translated as *злоупотребување на службената положба (zloupotrebuvanje na službenata položba)*. It is interesting to note that 3 respondents provided the answer *искористување (iskoristuvanje)* – the gerund form of the verb *искористи (iskoristi)*. In a monolingual Macedonian dictionary, we found 3 recorded meanings of *искористи (iskoristi)*, namely 1) “to make use of something or somebody”; 2) “to use a given opportunity, a situation, to achieve something”; and 3) “to use, abuse someone, take advantage by force, or deceive someone to someone's detriment”³⁹. It is meaning 3) which denotes action which can be counted synonym of *abuse* in the sense in which it was used in the expression *abuse of position*. Therefore, the Macedonian term

³⁹ <https://makedonski.gov.mk/corpus/l/iskoristi-sv> (Accessed on 28 October 2024)

искористување (*iskorisuvanje*) in the expression *искористување на службената положба* (*iskoristuvanje na službenata položba*) was also considered acceptable translational equivalent.

However, 3 respondents are still struggling with the meaning of *abuse* in this context. They translated *abuse of official position* as *насилство на службена положба*, which is totally unacceptable, since *насилство* (*nasilstvo*), literally meaning *violence* is not typically used in Macedonian in collocation with *службена положба*. Taking into consideration the total number of acceptable and unacceptable answers, even though 13% of the students did not translate *abuse* in this context properly, the obtained results show that at group level they show very high degree of familiarity with this meaning of *abuse*. One possible explanation might be the wide range of collocations with *abuse* with this meaning in Macedonian, which make it sound natural to Macedonian speakers. Apart from the examples mentioned above, this group includes expressions such as *злоупотреба на лични податоци* (*zloupotreba na lični podatoci*) meaning *abuse of personal data*, *злоупотреба на должност* (*zloupotreba na dolžnost*) meaning *abuse of duty*, *злоупотреба на финансиски средства* (*abuse of funds*), *злоупотреба на доверба* (*zloupotreba na doverba*) meaning *abuse of trust* etc.

Finally, the third pair of sentences in the questionnaire contained the following sentence in English and its Macedonian equivalent:

Sentence 3:

English: *In their joint statement after the football match, both teams condemned the racial abuse the fans shouted at the referee.*

Macedonian: *Во својата заедничка изјава по натпреварот, обата тима ги осудија расните што навивачите му ги довикуваа на судијата.*

The respondents provided the following translational equivalents of *abuse* in this context:

Translational Equivalent	Number of answers
Acceptable translational equivalent	Total: 11 (47.8%)
<i>навреди</i> (<i>navredi</i>)	10
<i>навредувања</i> (<i>navreduvanja</i>)	1
Partially acceptable translational equivalent	1 (4.3%)
<i>напади/навреди</i> (<i>napadi/navredi</i>)	1
Unacceptable translational equivalent	Total: 11 (47.8%)
<i>насилство</i> (<i>nasilstvo</i>)	3
<i>малтретирања</i> (<i>maltretiranja</i>)	1
<i>закани</i> (<i>zakani</i>)	1
<i>предрасуди</i> (<i>predrasudi</i>)	1
<i>насилници</i> (<i>nasilnici</i>)	1
<i>злоупотреби</i> (<i>zloupotrebi</i>)	1
<i>осуди</i> (<i>osudi</i>)	1
<i>омаловажувања</i> (<i>omalovaživanja</i>)	1
<i>насилства/неправедности</i> (<i>nasilstva/nepravednosti</i>)	1

According to the obtained answers, it may be concluded that the translation of *abuse* in the collocation *racial abuse* was the most challenging task for the students. It is obvious that in this context the noun *abuse* refers to an action carried out verbally, so it should be translated with a corresponding Macedonian noun which refers to verbal activity. For expressing this type of action, Macedonian speakers would normally use the noun *навреда* (*navreda*), which literally refers to “words or action by which injustice is inflicted, the dignity and honour are ruined”⁴⁰, and may actually be used as a translation of *insult*, *offence* and related nouns. However, considering the fact that the English noun *abuse* may also denote verbal activity, we agree that the most suitable translation of *racial abuse* would be *расна навреда* (*rasna navreda*), or in this context its plural form *расни навреди* (*rasni navredi*), since this kind of verbal insults are usually expressed through a series of words. According to the obtained answers, 47.8% of the students offered acceptable answers, which equals the percentage of those who provided unacceptable answers. More specifically, 10 students translated *racial abuse* with *расна навреда* (*rasna navreda*), and another one opted for the gerund form, namely *расни навредувања* (*rasni navreduvanja*) which we also considered an acceptable solution. As far as the other answers are concerned, none of them covers the semantic notion expressed by the English original. Thus, we cannot say *расно насилство* (*rasno nasilstvo*), which literally means *racial violence*, or *расно малтретирање* (*rasno maltretiranje*) which means *racial maltreatment*, since neither the example sentence carries that notion, nor would it sound naturally to Macedonian speakers. Similarly, it would be wrong to say *расни закани* (*rasni zakani*) or *расни предрасуди* (*predrasudi*), since *закани* (*zakani*) refers to threats, while *предрасуди* (*predrasudi*) refers to prejudices. Also, in this context we cannot say *расни злоупотреби* (*rasni zloupotrebi*), for reasons elaborated in the introductory sections. It would also be incorrect to say *расни осуди* (*rasni osudi*) and *расни омаловажувања* (*rasni omalovažuvanja*), as 2 students suggested, knowing that *осуди* (*osudi*) refers to judging somebody, while *омаловажувања* (*omalovažuvanja*) means *humiliations*. Finally, *насилници* (*nasilnici*), meaning *abusers/violators*, which was suggested by 1 student, refers to persons and is a totally unacceptable lexical choice. There was one case in which we counted the answer as partially acceptable, since the student gave two options, namely *расни напади* (*rasni napadi*) and *расна навреда* (*rasni navredi*), which we already discussed as the correct translation. However, although we may say that in this case *навреди* (*navredi*) may mean a form of verbal attacks, which is what actually the Macedonian noun *напад* (*napad*) literally means, it would be impossible to use it in collocation with the verb *довикнува* (*dovikniva*), the equivalent of *shout* which clearly indicate verbal utterances and requires nouns meeting this semantic criterion.

⁴⁰ <https://makedonski.gov.mk/corpus/l/navreda-zh> (Accessed on 10 July 2024)

6. CONCLUSION

The analysis presented in the paper shows that translating the English noun *abuse* into Macedonian can be a challenging assignment, due to its polysemous nature. However, if properly analysed, the identification of appropriate lexical equivalents can successfully be achieved, which was proved by our research as well. The research results presented in the paper confirmed our starting hypothesis that the students from the Faculty of Security – Skopje are familiar with the semantic nuances of this concept, since the majority of them provided correct answers for the translation of *abuse* in the given sentences. They showed highest level of familiarity with the meaning of *abuse* in the expression *abuse of power*, and significant level of familiarity with its meaning in the expression *sexual exploitation and abuse of children*. On the other hand, they achieved lowest scores regarding the meaning of *abuse* in the expression *racial abuse*. In spite of the limitations of the research regarding the relatively small number of participants, a conclusion can be drawn that the students do possess the potential for distinguishing between the different meanings of *abuse* and can deal with semantic analysis and translation of polysemous words related to their field of study.

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TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

Trpe Stojanovski

Faculty of Security- Skopje

Aleksandar Stojanovski

Ph.D. Candidate, Faculty of Security - Skopje

Abstract

Trafficking in Human Beings (THB) is a persistent and complex issue impacting the Western Balkans, involving the exploitation of women, children, and men through forced labour, sexual exploitation, forced begging, and other forms of coercion. This article examines the trends in human trafficking in the Western Balkans between 2018 and 2023, focusing on the distribution of victims by gender and age, as well as the specific forms of trafficking prevalent in each country. It analyses the effectiveness of international and regional frameworks, such as the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Palermo Protocols, in combating trafficking and highlights the ongoing challenges posed by organized crime networks that adapt to circumvent law enforcement efforts. The findings indicate a significant gender disparity, with women and children disproportionately affected. This work also presents a comparative analysis of trafficking forms across Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Kosovo. Key recommendations are made to enhance the capacity of relevant authorities, improve victim identification, and strengthen regional cooperation to mitigate the threat of human trafficking in the region.

Summary of Key Findings

1. **Gender Disparity:** Women constitute the majority of trafficking victims in the Western Balkans, accounting for approximately 74% of all identified and presumed victims from 2018 to 2023. The highest number of female victims was recorded in 2021, indicating that gender-based violence and exploitation remain significant issues in the region.
2. **High Vulnerability of Children:** Children are highly vulnerable to trafficking, making up 63% of all reported victims between 2018 and 2023. The prevalence of trafficked children varies across the region, with Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina having the highest rates of child victims.
3. **Regional Variations in Trafficking Forms:** The most common forms of trafficking differ among the Western Balkan countries. Sexual exploitation is the most dominant form, particularly in Albania, North Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Forced begging and labour exploitation are also prevalent, with variations in peak years for each country.
4. **International and Regional Cooperation:** The Western Balkan countries have made significant efforts to harmonize national regulations with international anti-trafficking frameworks, such as the Palermo Protocols. Regional cooperation

initiatives, like MARRI, have been established to improve coordination, but further action is needed to adapt to evolving trafficking methods.

5. **Impact of Organized Crime:** Organized crime groups remain a driving force behind trafficking activities in the region. They utilize advanced technology to conceal their operations and evade law enforcement, making it increasingly challenging to disrupt trafficking networks and identify victims.
6. **Challenges in Victim Identification:** The number of identified victims has fluctuated over the years, with the highest number recorded in 2018. Despite progress, trafficking remains underreported, and many victims go undetected, indicating the need for improved victim identification measures and awareness campaigns.
7. **Dominance of Sexual Exploitation:** Sexual exploitation continues to be the leading form of trafficking, involving 49% of all identified and presumed victims. Forced begging follows at 27%, with labour exploitation accounting for 16.5%. This highlights the urgent need for targeted interventions to address these specific forms of exploitation.
8. **Recommendations for Action:** Key recommendations include enhancing the capacity of authorities for early victim identification, emphasizing the needs of children and other vulnerable groups, and raising awareness of gender-related issues. Strengthening cooperation with the education sector and promoting gender equality are also crucial steps to prevent trafficking.

Introduction

Trafficking in human beings destroys individuals' lives by depriving people of their dignity, freedom and fundamental rights. It is often a violent crime committed by organised crime networks. It should have no place in today's society⁴¹.

Faced with the new wave of the threat of transnational crime in the post-communism era, on the one hand, and globalization, on the other hand, the Western Balkan countries, as a coalition with 180⁴² UN members, have signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000) and the protocols, including Human Trafficking Protocol⁴³. This set of UN instruments was the first legally binding document in the new millennium to combat organized crime on the latest strategic level, including Trafficking in Human Beings. The convention and the protocol provide the governments with a new, powerful and legal instrument in the fight against organized crime and Trafficking in Human Beings as an old sort of slavery, but now described and defined as a serious form of organized crime. By signing and ratifying this convention, the signatory states joined forces to form a powerful legal instrument, the foundation of international cooperation, and a positive instrument for the institutions implementing the law.

⁴¹ European Commission. (2021). *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the EU Strategy on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings*. EUR-Lex. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52021DC0171>

⁴² U.S. Department of State. (2023). *Trafficking in Persons Report*. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Trafficking-in-Persons-Report-2023-Introduction-Additional-Pagesv4_FINAL.pdf

⁴³ United Nations. (2000). *Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime*. <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/intro/UNTOC.html>

The Western Balkan countries, as signatories to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, after acceding to the Protocol for the Prevention, Suppression and Punishment of Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (and other protocols supplementing the Convention), significantly harmonized the national regulation with international instruments in the subject area. Additionally, they established several networks for cooperation, and the most relevant is the network of the National Commission for the Prevention of THB and the MARRI initiative with the Regional Centre⁴⁴.

This article is focused on human trafficking and the position of the victims, with divisions of juveniles versus adults and females versus males in the Western Balkans. The covered period is 2018 – 2022, and for some specific aspects, it is 2018 – 2023. Also, the most specific sorts of THB are elaborated for the whole region and specifically for each member state.

WBs and Trafficking in human beings

Understanding Human Trafficking

“Trafficking in human beings” is a term to refer to a crime whereby traffickers exploit and profit at the expense of adults or children by compelling them to perform labour or engage in commercial sex. When a person younger than 18 is used to perform a commercial sex act, it is a crime regardless of whether there is any force, fraud, or coercion involved.

2023 Trafficking in Person Report, US Department of State, <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-trafficking-in-persons-report/>


The Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative (MARRI) implemented research "Trends of Human Trafficking in the MARRI Participants" (2023) focused on patterns and trends in trafficking in persons and their changing, both internally in the region and externally, in transit routes and migration routes to the Balkans. In response to the actions taken by governments and organizations, traffickers have adjusted their *modus operandi* to avoid detection and increase profit. Consequently, trafficking has become less visible, and the number of victims identified in some parts of the region has decreased. The figures from the research indicate that Law enforcement entities and other concerned stakeholders must re-assess the situation and adapt to the new circumstances of trafficking in persons.

The data provided in the research were collected by the ministries of Interior and security of the MARRI participants. The reference period for this research is 2018 – 2022. Additionally, for this file, the data for 2023 were collected through desk research and other sources.

⁴⁴ Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative - *Regional Center*. <https://marri-rc.org.mk/regional-center/>

Table 1: Number of presumed and identified victims of THB in Western Balkan countries for 2018-2023

Year/country	Albania	Bosnia Herzegovina	North Macedonia	Montenegro ⁴⁵	Serbia	Kosovo
2018	95	36	134	8	227	25
2019	103	61	130	1	91	37
2020	86	70	13	52	153	22
2021	159	56	58	5	159	30
2022	112	38	22	16	117	30
2023	165	37	16	18	203	17
Total	720	298	373	100	950	161



Trafficking in human beings is a global phenomenon. It happens in every country and every region. The actual number is likely to be significantly higher as many victims remain undetected.

The reports of the national commissions in the WB countries generally recognize the primary forms of trafficking in human beings: forced labour and sex trafficking. The basic meaning of these forms of human trafficking and the characteristics of each are set in the UN and CoE instruments.

⁴⁵ N.B. In the last 5 years Montenegro has a methodology designed to present only the number of victims of THB

Modern slavery

Modern slavery encompasses slavery, servitude, forced and compulsory labour and human trafficking. Traffickers and slave drivers coerce, deceive and force individuals against their will into a life of abuse, servitude and inhumane treatment. Modern slavery is often interwoven with other forms of criminality, for example, the criminal exploitation of children in drug distribution or the abuse of border controls to traffic migrants into sexual or labour exploitation. The harm caused to victims is profound and long lasting, yet the high profits, particularly from sexual exploitation, provide the motivation for organized criminals to continue to commit this crime.

HM Government. (2023). *No place to hide: Serious and organised crime strategy 2023-2028* (p. 16).

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65798633254aaa0010050bdc/SOC_Strategy_23-28_V9_Web_Accessible.pdf

Very often, the THB cases which directly affect the WB countries have an international element. This is because either the commodities or people being exploited are from overseas, the criminals are foreign nationals, or their criminal activity is based overseas, which makes detection and capture harder. In some cases, the threat of online crime also emanates from overseas, but it directly impacts people in the WB countries.

Organized crime groups seek to hide their activities from detection and disruption. Technology is an enabler of Trafficking in Human Beings, with organized crime groups using technology for concealing communications or financial transactions. Trends in technology are likely to make it much harder for intelligence and law enforcement agencies to disrupt groups, gather evidence and bring offenders to justice.

During the analysed period, the highest number of victims was registered in 2018, 525. By country, the highest number of 227 victims was recorded in Serbia, followed by 134 in North Macedonia, 95 in Albania, 36 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 25 in Kosovo and 8 in Montenegro.


The highest number of identified victims was registered in 2020 when the total number of victims was 138. Serbia recorded the highest number of victims, 57, 52 in Montenegro, 17 in Kosovo, 7 in North Macedonia and 6 in Albania.

Gender

Disaggregated by gender for the period 2018-2023, the highest number of female victims at the regional level was recorded in the year 2021, with a total number of 339 victims. Divided by the countries, Albania is leading with 159 recorded victims, followed by 56 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 48 in North Macedonia, 46 in Serbia, 25 in Kosovo and 5 in Montenegro. Analysing by structure (women vs. men) in 2021, the percentage of women trafficked in all six countries varied from 25% to 80%.

Female Male

Gender Aspect of Trafficking in Human Beings in the Western Balkans (2018-2023)




In the period 2018 – 2023, females accounted for 74% of all reported presumed and identified victims of THB (PVT/VT) in the Western Balkans. Disaggregated by gender, the highest number of victims at the regional level was recorded in 2021, with a total of 339 female presumed and identified victims.

Furthermore, one transgender victim was solely documented in 2020 in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Based on that, the majority of identified victims of THB in the Western Balkans are women. As much as already three-quarters of the countries in the region argued that human trafficking has a component of gender-based violence.

Children Adults

Ratio of Children vs Adults as Victims of Trafficking in the Western Balkans (2018-2023)



For the period 2018-2023 in the Western Balkans, there are 434 or 63% reported trafficked children and 250 or 37% are adults.

Analysing by structure (children vs. adults) for the period 2018-2023, the percentage of trafficked children in all six countries varied from 20% to 100%. Kosovo recorded the highest percentage of trafficked children (85%), followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina (69%), North Macedonia (66%), Montenegro (65%), Albania (61%) and Serbia (50%).

In 2023, the age limit of child victims generally has been decreasing⁴⁶. Children are most often exploited through forced begging, then sexually, through forced to commit criminal acts, forced marriages and labour exploitation.

⁴⁶ Centre for the Protection of Victims of Trafficking in Human Beings. (2023). Statistical report of the Centre for the Protection of Victims of Trafficking in Human Beings for 2023 (p. 11). Republic of Serbia.

Albania

According to the most used forms of trafficking, the majority of the (presumed) victims were trafficked for:

- Sexual exploitation, reaching its peak in 2019;
- Forced begging, reaching its peak in 2021;
- Forced marriage, reaching its peak in 2018 and 2020;
- Labour exploitation, reaching its peak in 2021;
- Forced criminality, reaching its peak in 2022.

North Macedonia

The most used form of THB for the reported period in North Macedonia for the following purposes:

- Sexual exploitation is still the most dominant form of human trafficking, reaching its peak in 2018, 2020 and 2023⁴⁷;
- Forced begging, reaching its peak in 2019, 2020 and 2021;
- Forced marriage, reaching its peak in 2022;
- Labour exploitation, reaching its peak in 2021;
- in 2018, one victim was recorded for Trafficking with organs.

Bosnia and Hercegovina

The most used form of THB for the reported period in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the following purposes:

- Sexual exploitation, reaching its peak in 2020;
- Forced begging, reaching its peak in 2021;
- Forced marriage is permanently present.
- Labour exploitation is permanently present.

Serbia

The most used form of THB for the reported period in Serbia for the following purposes:

- Sexual exploitation, reaching its peak in 2018 and 2022;
- In 2023, forced begging is the dominant sort of THB⁴⁸;
- Forced marriage;
- Forced labour and forced labour criminal acts have increased tendency in the last year.

Montenegro

The most used form of THB for the reported period in Montenegro for the following purposes:

- Sexual exploitation, reaching its peak in 2022;
- The forced begging, reaching its peak in 2022 and 2023;
- Forced marriage, reaching its peak in 2022.

⁴⁷ National Commission for the Fight Against Trafficking in Human Beings and Illegal Migration. (2024). *Annual report of the National Commission for the Fight Against Trafficking in Human Beings and Illegal Migration for 2023* (p. 23). Government of the Republic of North Macedonia, Skopje.

⁴⁸ Centre for the Protection of Victims of Trafficking in Human Beings. (2023). *Statistical report on the protection of victims of trafficking in human beings* (p. 9). Republic of Serbia.

Kosovo

The most used form of THB for the reported period in Kosovo for the following purposes:

- Sexual exploitation, reaching its peak in 2022;
- Forced begging, reaching its peak in 2021;
- Forced marriage, reaching its peak in 2018, 2019 and 2022;
- Labour exploitation, reaching its peak in 2020;
- Forced criminality, reaching its peak in 2019;
- Trafficking in babies, one victim was recorded in 2019.

The analysis of human trafficking trends in the Western Balkans from 2018 to 2023 reveals a complex interplay of socio-economic, cultural, and legal factors that contribute to the persistence of this crime. The findings underscore the significant disparities in victim demographics, the evolving nature of trafficking, and the challenges in combating organized crime.

The disproportionate number of female victims highlights the gendered nature of trafficking in the region. Women and girls are particularly vulnerable due to socio-economic factors, gender inequality, and cultural norms that limit their access to education and economic opportunities. These vulnerabilities make them easy targets for traffickers, especially for sexual exploitation, which remains the dominant form of trafficking. Addressing these disparities requires a multi-faceted approach that includes strengthening gender equality, providing better access to education and employment for women, and ensuring targeted interventions against sexual exploitation.

The high prevalence of child victims in the Western Balkans is another alarming trend. Children are often trafficked for forced begging, labour exploitation, and sexual exploitation. Economic instability, lack of parental oversight, and limited social support contribute to their vulnerability. Countries like Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, where child trafficking rates are particularly high, require focused interventions to protect children through education, social services, and community awareness programs.

Regional differences in trafficking forms and victim demographics reflect variations in socio-political conditions, economic stability, and cultural practices. For instance, Montenegro and Kosovo show higher rates of forced begging, while countries like North Macedonia and Serbia have higher incidences of labour and sexual exploitation. This highlights the need for country-specific anti-trafficking strategies that consider the unique socio-economic and cultural contexts of each nation.

Despite the ratification of international instruments like the Palermo Protocols and the establishment of regional initiatives such as MARRI, the effectiveness of anti-trafficking efforts is hindered by organized crime networks that adapt quickly to evade detection. Traffickers leverage technology to communicate, recruit victims, and launder money, making it challenging for law enforcement to disrupt these activities. Strengthening international cooperation and providing training to law enforcement agencies on the use of technology in combating trafficking are essential to counteract these challenges.

One of the critical gaps identified is the inconsistent identification of victims. The fluctuation in the number of identified victims across the years suggests that many cases go undetected, possibly due to inadequate resources, lack of training, or fear of retaliation among victims. Strengthening victim identification mechanisms, particularly among vulnerable groups like children and women, is crucial for improving the response to

trafficking. Enhanced training for frontline workers, including police, social workers, and healthcare providers, can improve early detection and support for victims.

Furthermore, regional cooperation needs to be strengthened to provide a unified response to trafficking across borders. The Western Balkans remains a source, transit, and destination region for human trafficking, and coordinated efforts are necessary to prevent traffickers from exploiting gaps between national jurisdictions. Initiatives like joint training programs, shared intelligence, and consistent cross-border protocols can help minimize the scope of operations for traffickers and provide better protection for victims.

In conclusion, addressing trafficking in the Western Balkans requires a comprehensive approach that integrates prevention, victim protection, and law enforcement efforts. Emphasis should be placed on gender-sensitive interventions, protecting children, and enhancing regional cooperation. While progress has been made, trafficking remains a significant threat, and ongoing, coordinated efforts are necessary to protect vulnerable populations and bring traffickers to justice.

Conclusions

Trafficking in human beings in the Western Balkan countries is a serious and complex crime which mostly affects women and children. It brings enormous revenues to criminals while causing tremendous suffering to victims and high costs to society. Despite progress made over the last decades to reinforce the national as well as the regional response against the trafficking of human beings in the Western Balkan countries, the threat of being trafficked remains high for any vulnerable person. Trafficking in human beings impacts society, the rule of law and sustainable development in WB countries.

The Palermo Convention and the Protocols are the basis of a new, strategic and more efficient approach to recognising, managing, and suppressing human trafficking. Southeastern European countries, including Western Balkan countries, are improving their capacities in regulating procedures for dealing with human trafficking and enhancing national and regional cooperation.

The Western Balkan continues to be the region of origin of human trafficking. For the researched period, 77.6% of identified and presumed victims are domestic victims exploited internally, 12.6% are persons from the WBs exploited abroad⁴⁹, and 9.8% are foreigners exploited in the region.

Desegregated by gender, 70% of identified and presumed victims are women, and 30% are men⁵⁰. 56% of the overall number of identified and presumed victims are children, and 44% are adults.

Sexual exploitation is still the most dominant form of human trafficking, with 49% of all identified and presumed victims. Forced begging comes next as the most common form of exploitation with 27%, followed by labour exploitation with 16.5% of all identified and presumed victims.

⁴⁹ In 2020, 534 different trafficking flows were identified globally and more than 120 countries reported victims from more than 140 different countries of origin. Trafficking is a transnational crime, and half of the victims identified in the European Union are non-EU citizens, mainly from Africa, Western Balkans and Asia, EU Strategy on Combatting Trafficking in Human Beings 2021 – 2025 <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52021DC0171>

⁵⁰ In 2017 in EU 72% of women and girls and 23% of man and boys were victims of THB, with 5% unknowns; European Commission. (2021). *EU strategy on combatting trafficking in human beings 2021-2025* <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52021DC0171>

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Strengthening the capacities among relevant authorities to ensure the early identification of trafficking victims, with particular attention to children and other vulnerable groups, and to spend awareness of gender-related needs;
- Taking into consideration the most dominant forms of human trafficking, additional actions for prevention and fight against them are required. Strengthening the capacities and engagement of relevant authorities such as health workers, police officers, social workers, and labour workers and focusing on early identification is urgent, particularly emphasizing the identification of children victims or other vulnerable groups;
- Awareness raising campaigns for the risks of sexual exploitation through all forms, including the internet (cyber trafficking), should be developed at Participant and regional levels and disseminated more frequently;
- Awareness-raising campaigns should incorporate gender dimensions of all forms of human trafficking to increase general sensitivity, understanding, and knowledge about gender (in)equality and the root causes of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in the context of early identification of the victims;
- To explore and strengthen cooperation with the education sector and to jointly work in the prevention, identification, and suppression of human trafficking among youngsters. Those commitments and efforts should also include the joint promotion of gender equality, the fight against gender discrimination, sexual and gender-based violence, and stereotypes, as well as the joint advocacy and implementation of specific actions and measures as means of combating the root causes of trafficking in human beings;
- Further qualification of social workers both in quantity and expertise in providing relevant mental health and psychological and social support services, social protection, rehabilitation, and reintegration support for victims of trafficking according to their gender-specific differences, needs, priorities, and concerns;
- The regional cooperation of the Anti-Trafficking Coordinators should continue. The regional meetings should be more frequent, aiming to minimize the scope of operation for traffickers and provide victims with easy access to social protection, free legal aid, and compensation;
- Strengthening the overall Referral Mechanisms (NRM) by including the survivors in the decision-making processes and supporting the Anti-Trafficking authorities in the creation of comprehensive operational responses;

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CLIMATE CHANGE AND GLOBAL SECURITY

Nikolčo Spasov

Faculty of Detectives and Security

nikolco.spasov@fon.edu.mk

Basri Kastrati

University of Priština, Kosovo

Basri.Kastrati@oik-rks.org

Abstract

Environmental security focuses on the ecological conditions necessary for sustainable development. It encompasses discussions of the relationships between environmental change and conflict as well as the larger global policy issues linking resources and international relations to the necessity for doing both development and security differently. Climate change has become an increasingly important part of the discussion as its consequences have become increasingly clear. What is not at all clear is in what circumstances climate change may turn out to be threat multiplier leading to conflict. Earth system science findings and the recognition of the scale of human transformations of nature in what is understood in the 21st century to be a new geological epoch, the Anthropocene, now require environmental security to be thought of in terms of preventing the worst dangers of fragile states being unable to cope with the stresses caused by rapid environmental change or perhaps the economic disruptions caused by necessary transitions to a post fossil fuelled economic system. But so far, at least, this focus on avoiding the worst consequences of future climate change has not displaced traditional policies of energy security that primarily ensure supplies of fossil fuels to power economic growth. Failure to make this transition will lead to further rapid disruptions of climate and add impetus to proposals to artificially intervene in the earth system using geoengineering techniques, which might in turn generate further conflicts from states with different interests in how the earth system is shaped in future. While the Paris Agreement on Climate Change recognized the urgency of tackling climate change, the topic has not become security policy priority for most states, nor yet for the United Nations, despite numerous policy efforts to securitize climate change and instigate emergency responses to deal with the issue. More optimistic interpretations of the future suggest possibilities of using environmental actions to facilitate peace building and a more constructive approach to shaping earth's future.

Key words: conflict, development, earth system, environment, safe operating system, security, sustainability.

Introduction

As climate change accelerates, its impacts exacerbate existing social, economic, and environmental challenges in many contexts, which can contribute to insecurity at local levels, or even internationally. Security concerns linked to climate change include impacts on food, water and energy supplies, increased competition over natural resources, loss of livelihoods, climate-related disasters, and forced migration and displacement.

Despite growing recognition of the interlinkages between climate change, peace and security, few examples of integrated programmatic approaches that address specific risks at the intersection of climate change and insecurity exist. Conflict and crisis affected contexts are more susceptible to being overwhelmed by climate change, but too often peacebuilding and stabilisation efforts often do not consider climate-related impacts or environmental hazards. At the same time, insecurity hinders climate change adaptation efforts, leaving already vulnerable communities even poorer and less resilient to interlinked climate and security crises, but climate change adaptation initiatives often fail to fully integrate peacebuilding or conflict prevention objectives. The focus of the paper will be the United States and Africa.

Environmental Security and Sustainable Development

The contemporary formulation of environmental security was effectively put on the international policy agenda by the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) in its 1987 report, *Our Common Future*. While the report is best remembered for its advocacy of sustainable development and its catalyzing role in shaping the agenda that led to the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), the so called “Earth Summit,” environmental security is specified in the report as the provision of the conditions necessary for sustainable development. Environmental security is also unlikely to be a possibility in the long-term future if sustainable development is not followed as an overarching economic priority. Thus, the two formulations mutually reinforced each other. Without environmental security sustainable development was unlikely to succeed because conflict and disruption would prevent sensible initiatives. Likewise, if sustainability was not a policy priority, in the long run, ecological destruction would prevent its accomplishment.

While the exact trajectory of climate change was not clear in the 1980s, and *Our Common Future* suggested that much more science was needed, it was noted as a significant issue that needed attention in formulating environmental security. Other matters, including the dangers of the cold war arms race, were highlighted; clearly nuclear military preparations were anathema to long-term survival and the possibilities of environmental security:

Perhaps the greatest threat to the Earth’s environment, to sustainable human progress, and indeed to survival is the possibility of nuclear war, increased daily by the continuing arms race and its spread to outer space. The search for a more viable future can only be meaningful in the context of a more vigorous effort to renounce and eliminate the development of means of annihilation.

While the dangers of nuclear warfare and the possibilities of a nuclear winter disrupting climate patterns for years, or even decades, were on people’s minds in the 1980s, environmental security was understood as a larger planetary concern needing attention and, implicitly, a very different formulation of security. “The time has come to break out of past patterns. Attempts to maintain social and ecological stability through old approaches to development and environmental protection will increase instability. Security must be sought through change”. Simultaneously, *Our Common Future* suggested that there were growing sources of environmental conflict where resource shortages fed into violence in many underdeveloped parts of the world. Wise use of renewable resources, to ensure their sustainable yields, was a key part of providing environmental security too. Quite how resource shortages were causing conflict was not clearly specified in the report; this was simply assumed to be the case and assumed to be a situation that was getting worse. That

there were numerous environmental problems in need of attention is not in doubt, but the assumption that scarcity was the cause of the difficulties went more or less unexamined.

Three decades later, as the science on climate change and the role of fossil fuel consumption in particular is highlighted as a key cause of global warming, it is clear that the problem that needs attention is not a matter of scarcity. While climate disruptions may cause local scarcities of water in particular, the problem with climate change is that there is too much fossil fuel, not too little, being used in the global economy. As climate change accelerates, security is increasingly a matter of infrastructure provision and vulnerabilities to extreme events. Fossil fuel's geographical distribution likewise has consequences for geopolitics and the conduct of climate policy, which does not make global coordination of climate change efforts easy (McGlade & Ekins, 2015). Renewable energy is widely dispersed and, given the lack of fossil fuels, access and transportation difficulties are much less likely to be a matter of geopolitical disputes (Overland, 2019). However, despite this, much of the discussion about climate change and security replicates the earlier discussion of the 1990s, on environmental causation of conflict, without focusing on the larger system transformation that climate change is driving and the consequences of that for security broadly understood.

This is changing, however, as discussions of climate risk and the need to rethink environmental contexts and interconnections in the global political system become clear, in the aftermath of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change of 2015, and the toll rises of casualties from storms, droughts, fires, and floods as a result of accelerating climate change. Earth system science, in its nascent stages when *Our Common Future* was being written, has progressed by leaps and bounds, and the necessity of thinking through human vulnerabilities, in what is now widely called the Anthropocene, has become clear to most researchers (Lewis & Maslin, 2018). This is not necessarily clear to many policy makers still working within traditional developmental frameworks and energy supply security agendas. The contrast between traditional energy security priorities with energy independence as top priority, for the United States in particular, and climate change policy, is especially stark in the Trump administration, a matter that highlights the importance of politics in deciding on priorities in security planning.

Our Common Future did not provide a precise definition of environmental security, but it clearly suggested that environmental *stress* was a cause of conflict and that sustainable development required stable environmental conditions to succeed. Hence, environmental security emerged as a policy goal despite the lack of a clear definition as to what it entailed. These themes subsequently shaped both the policy and scholarly agendas in the 1990s, engaging the relationships between environment and insecurity, widely understood, as well as the more specific research focus on environmental change causing conflict. While scholarly and policy attention to environment temporarily receded in the early years of the 21st century, during the war on terror, climate concerns reactivated this discussion in updated form, especially in the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in 2005, an event that raised numerous questions about human vulnerability and the capabilities of states to provide security for their citizens in the face of accelerating climate change.

Various formulations of climate security emerged, and in parallel with the discussion in the 1990s, scholars set about trying to clarify the role of climate in causing conflict while simultaneously addressing how this new discussion of human vulnerabilities required updated formulations of security. Most recently, this research and the policy debate have been shaped by the findings of earth system science and emergent discussion of the policy implications of the Anthropocene era (Dalby, 2020). In all this, there is no commonly

accepted definition of either environmental or climate security, beyond a general sense that predictable weather conditions are key to human flourishing, both directly in agricultural societies, and indirectly given the vulnerabilities of urban societies to infrastructural disruptions.

To explicate all this further, the rest of this article looks back briefly to the discussion in the 1990s concerning environmental change and conflict, then observes the reinvention of the environmental causation arguments and their links to security in the middle of the first decade of the new millennium. Subsequent sections deal with the emergence of the larger earth system science discussion, which documents the scale and urgency of dealing with climate change, energy security that frequently contradicts climate policy, the emergence of climate risk as a policy focus, the discussion of climate securitization, and possibilities of planetary geoengineering; finally, the chapter draws some tentative conclusions about future research directions.

Environment and Conflict

While *Our Common Future* assumed relationships between resource shortages and conflict, quite how this relationship actually worked was not clear in the report. Two major research projects were undertaken in the 1990s to address the question of how environmental change might generate conflict, in what conditions, where, and with what implications for policy. Thomas Homer-Dixon led a team of researchers that investigated a number of case studies, including South Africa, Rwanda, Pakistan, and elsewhere to trace the casual pathways between environmental change and what he termed acute conflict. One of the initial problems turned out to be that security was such an imprecise term that it was not practical as a research agenda if causal relationships were the key to the investigation. Hence, this project focused more narrowly on acute conflict, rather than security more generally. Guenter Baechler (1999) led a parallel series of investigations that more closely looked at matters of development and discrimination in terms of access to environmental resources in rural areas.

In very broad terms, both research efforts concluded that environmental matters alone were not key to predicting conflict. While they were obviously important in numerous situations, key *intervening variables* included historical patterns of grievance and conflict as well as the competence and legitimacy of existing governmental structures. Scarcity was not obviously a causal factor, and clearly it emerged that in crisis conditions elites often acted to enhance their power and control over resources, a matter that accelerated the marginalization of rural communities. Maldevelopment in Baechler's terms was a key problem and, as such, policies that dealt with the perverse consequences of rural transformation and focused on practical matters in particular contexts were key to sustainable economic activities that were likely to avoid conflict. Elite appropriation of resources was also a theme in Colin Kahl's detailed field-based studies of Kenya and the Philippines. This finding is broadly in parallel with the political ecology literature that has long investigated the power relations in rural transformations linked to development and economic change.

Simultaneously, another series of research efforts were looking to the role of resources in civil wars and larger scale conflict in the Global South. Here, the discussion suggested that control over extraction and export of resources, including timber, oil, diamonds, and coltan, was a key to understanding patterns of violence in the Global South. This is a long-standing pattern in traditional geopolitics, where rivalries over access to resources is a cause of conflict, and in cases such as the Japanese entry into the Second

World War, major warfare too. Controlling resource streams and the revenues that they generate may be a way to power and wealth in poor areas that is much more tempting than waiting for long-term economic development to enrich a society. This suggests that local cases of resource abundance may be much more important than scarcity as causes of conflict generation. But it is important to note that most of the resources in these discussions concerning diamonds, minerals, and petroleum, in particular, are not strictly environmental matters. Hence, the discussion of resource curses, Dutch disease, and related resource economics issues are often tangential to environmental security matters.

These studies all suggest in one way or another that theories of locally generated violence as the source of environmental conflict are inadequate; clearly, the larger global economy and the political economy of resource supplies is key to explaining conflict in particular locations, although the causal link is frequently indirectly environmental, at best. Clearly too, while war is related to famine and frequently involves the use of food as a weapon, starving people are usually far too busy trying to find food to initiate large scale conflict despite the practicalities of violence often involved in these situations. Food riots are frequently urban phenomena emphasizing the importance of economics in insecurity, but large-scale insurrections are at best indirectly related to resource scarcities. As the Arab spring phenomenon suggested global food prices matter; rapid increases in these are often the trigger for political unrest; but environmental matters are indirectly rather than directly involved here as a cause of conflict (Homer-Dixon et al., 2015).

In terms of wider interpretations of environmental security, it was also clear in the 1990s that matters of pollution, food shortages, inadequate nutrition, and lack of safe drinking water were substantial hazards to populations in many places. These concerns were part of the larger discussion of human vulnerability and human security that incorporated environmental matters into its overarching formulation of the dangers faced by the poorest parts of humanity that threatened their prospects for development. Environmental security in these terms is compromised by many factors, not just those related to overt conflict the discussion of specifically environmental security spills over into larger concerns with human security broadly understood. Both the narrow version of conflict-related environmental change and the broader understanding of human security having an environmental component fed into the policy discussion of sustainable development.

Climate and Conflict

The failure of the American state to deal effectively with the aftermath of hurricane Katrina and the flooding of New Orleans, in 2005, dramatically increased the policy attention given to the matter of vulnerabilities to climate change. In 2007, the discussion once again found its way into policy debates in the United States and the United Kingdom (Mabey, 2007) with a number of high-profile publications coinciding with the publication of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) climate assessment and the controversy over Al Gore's documentary movie *An Inconvenient Truth*, which shared a Nobel prize with the IPCC and won an Oscar. Both the CNA Corporation and the Centre for Security and International Studies published reports on national security and climate change in 2007, to be followed soon by the German Advisory Board on Climate Change and the US Army War College analysis of national security and climate change (Pumphrey, 2008).

A key formulation in this literature in the United States was the idea of climate change as a threat multiplier (CNA Military Advisory Board, 2014), something that added to other sources of instability, and in light of the focus on terrorism, a potential source of discontent and terrorist recruitment. Hence this was seen as an issue for national security,

and something worth thinking through in terms of long-term strategy. It once again raised the question of the causal links between environmental change, this time explicitly as a result of climate change induced weather variability, and conflict generation. An updated formulation suggested that climate was better understood as a catalyst of conflict (CNA Military Advisory Board, 2014). In parallel, the American military became concerned that storms and rising sea levels might render its facilities vulnerable (Briggs & Matejova, 2019); a decade before, Tyndall Airforce Base in Florida was badly damaged by hurricane action in 2018. Vulnerabilities of facilities and the potential for growing interventions to deal with disaster relief and insurgencies aggravated by climate change made climate a matter for military attention regardless of the lack of interest from the Bush, and subsequently the Trump administration in Washington (Klare, 2019).

These concerns generated a renewed research focus on environmental conflict and revived the 1990s discussions as to the appropriate frameworks for analysis and methods to investigate political consequences of climate change. A research literature emerged addressing both the empirical studies and policy implications with some quantitative analyses suggesting a clear indication that weather events and larger scale climate change do cause violent conflict. But other research produced results that are much less certain on connections between civil wars and climate (Buhaug, 2015), suggesting that the empirical evidence about such things as drought causing conflict is less than consistent or less than clear. Special issues of *Political Geography* in 2007 and in 2014 and the *Journal of Peace Research* in 2012 have generated both empirical investigations and methodological disputes about how to tackle the relationships between climate change and conflict. In Africa, where many of these studies are done, detailed research does not obviously link climate to large scale conflict. A key part of the methodological debate here in terms of whether large studies are what is required, or whether, given the large variation of social and geographical circumstances over which climate change occurs, data aggregation across diverse situations is in fact useful.

These findings are sometimes complicated by the inclusion of large-scale historical events and more contemporary cases as well as their inclusion of a variety of scales from individual acts of aggression all the way up to climate as a factor in civilizational collapse (Hsiang, Burke, & Miguel, 2013). Historical studies linking up with new scientific analysis of climate records suggest very clearly that the period of the little ice age, especially in the 17th century, when agricultural production and food supplies were severely compromised in many parts of the world, is related to wars and political conflict. Similar investigations of the decline of the Western Roman Empire suggest that climate, and in this case disease, were key factors in these historical events (Harper, 2017). But great care has to be taken to generalize from these past events to draw conclusions about present trends given the sheer scale of transformations in the global economy over the last few generations, and the emergence of international institutions of aid and governance.

While some large statistical studies claim there is a relationship between climate and conflict, detailed empirical work on the ground repeatedly suggests that if there is such a relationship it is relatively weak in comparison to issues of development and governance. Focusing on livelihood issues and historical trajectories in particular places suggests specific local factors are crucially important in understanding relationships of violence. There are numerous difficulties with data sets, distinguishing dependent and independent variables, universal causation claims, and the scales involved. Likewise, difficulties occur in terms of how media reports code events, whether civil wars are the focus or more general outbreaks of violence, the scale at which events register in these sets, given that national aggregation

over large states may produce spurious correlations, and their completeness as a record of political conflict.

Some quantitative analyses focusing on Africa have suggested that there is a relationship between warming and civil war in Africa, but detailed investigation of the statistical claims seems to suggest that the relationships between conflict and environmental change are anything but clear, especially in the case of Eastern Africa. The scholarly research on this theme comes to diverse conclusions. “Sweeping generalizations have undermined a genuine understanding of any climate–conflict link, whereas cumulative results from the numerous studies of individual communities are difficult to summarize”. The finer points of the methodological debate are beyond the scope of this chapter, but efforts to integrate different research methods are obviously important to get greater clarity on which connections are most important. While rural disruptions are clearly a matter influenced by weather (Busby, 2018), the question as to whether distress turns to conflict relates to the political and social circumstances in particular cases, and the particular ways that rural political economy channels social change into conflict, migration, or collaboration. Nonetheless, despite the lack of clarity about results, this literature has fed into policy analyses of climate risks and the need to consider conflict risks as a matter of foreign policy in Europe, and in the United States.

A noteworthy attempt to resolve some of the conflicting claims in the empirical discussions by a process of expert elicitation among the key researchers appeared in *Nature* (Mach et al., 2019). This synthesis suggests that four drivers of conflict are especially important in subnational contexts: low socioeconomic development, low capabilities of the state, intergroup inequality (for example, ethnic differences across groups), and recent history of violent conflict. What is unclear is the importance of climate variability, although there is agreement that further climate change will amplify conflict risks. Much of this is simply because, to date, climate disruptions have been small relative to other conflict drivers. Nonetheless, this research effort continues because “Given that conflict has pervasive detrimental human, economic, and environmental consequences, climate–conflict linkages—even if small—would markedly influence the social costs of carbon and decisions to limit future climate change”. The concerns about climate change are about future possibilities, which climate projections suggest will be severe for most societies, but there is no agreement in the scholarly literature that there is a substantial empirical record of this so far in the 21st century. In the policy discussions that draw on this work, there is considerable concern that climate change induced conflict will change the geostrategic situation in dangerous and unpredictable ways, not least as a result of extrapolations from the war in Syria.

Multiple accounts suggested that one of the causes of the Syrian civil war was the migration by unemployed farmers from drought stricken eastern areas to Syrian cities climate change had induced the drought, which in turn removed agricultural livelihoods from rural areas, and these people, upset with the failure of the government to assist them protested then, so the argument went, here is a case of climate-induced conflict. Careful subsequent analysis of the case and the evidence on which it is based cast considerable doubt on the whole situation, both as to whether climate change had caused the drought in 2007 and subsequent years, and whether the protestors who were attacked by state security forces included substantial numbers of displaced farm workers. While rural distress in Syria clearly happened in those years (Daoudy, 2020), the causal link via formulations of migration and political protest all the way through to the subsequent civil war is difficult to establish. The

violent suppression of protest would seem to be key to subsequent events, and the history of regime violence against protests is nothing new in Syria.

Overall, it may be more important to inquire into how large-scale processes of globalization have played out in the region and how the responses of particular regimes to the ongoing warfare since 9/11 have shaped political rivalries. In these terms, the role of oil in geopolitical competition is important too, and American intervention in particular is a key factor in the larger patterns of violence. That said, even if so-called *oil wars*, to gain access to specific supplies, may be overrated as a direct cause of war. Now global food markets and climate disruptions are adding additional complications to this pattern. In terms of causal factors relating violence and change 21st century events are heavily influenced by the global economy and multiple interconnected crises in the political architecture of the international system.

Conclusion

In light of the growing discussion of security in the Anthropocene to do so will also require more fundamental rethinking of environmental security to focus more explicitly on the ecological functioning of the planetary system, a matter of “ecological security” in McDonald’s terms, referring to a functional earth system, rather than simply taking the environment as a source of resources, or the contextual backdrop for human affairs. The implications of this new Anthropocene context suggest the need for further research looking at the interconnections between places in the earth system, matters sometimes now encompassed in the literature of environmental geopolitics, as well as more work in the emerging field of environmental peacebuilding. This latter work focuses on practical measures to use environmental cooperation as a tool for post-conflict reconstruction and the promotion of quality peace conditions.

Nonetheless, unless this new framing has a comprehensive rethinking of rural ecologies and their interconnections into the global economy, there remain dangers that many of the problems with traditional development projects may stymie innovations. How to avoid these in working on climate adaptations is clearly a key theme for new research on ecology and security in the next stage of the Anthropocene. Research in the future must focus on transition strategies, especially in energy systems and on how to accelerate social transformations, rather than looking to traditional themes of security studies concerned with conflict, war, and its prevention. As *Our Common Future* suggested, at the beginning of the environmental security discussion, security has to be sought in terms of change.

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