



RESEARCHING SECURITY: APPROACHES, CONCEPTS AND POLICIES

INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE

**RESEARCHING SECURITY:  
APPROACHES, CONCEPTS AND  
POLICIES**

Volume IV

[www.fb.uklo.edu.mk](http://www.fb.uklo.edu.mk)

ISBN 978-608-4532-76-7

Skopje

**МЕЃУНАРОДНА НАУЧНА КОНФЕРЕНЦИЈА**

**БЕЗБЕДНОСТА КАКО ПРЕДМЕТ НА  
ИСТРАЖУВАЊЕ - ПРИСТАПИ, КОНЦЕПТИ И  
ПОЛИТИКИ**

**INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE**

**RESEARCHING SECURITY: APPROACHES,  
CONCEPTS AND POLICIES**

**МЕЃУНАРОДНА НАУЧНА КОНФЕРЕНЦИЈА**

**БЕЗБЕДНОСТА КАКО ПРЕДМЕТ  
НА ИСТРАЖУВАЊЕ -  
ПРИСТАПИ, КОНЦЕПТИ И  
ПОЛИТИКИ**

2-3 Јуни 2015, Охрид

**Том IV**

**СКОПЈЕ, 2015**

**INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE**

**RESEARCHING SECURITY:  
APPROACHES, CONCEPTS AND  
POLICIES**

2 - 3 June 2015  
Ohrid, Republic of Macedonia

**Volume IV**

**SKOPJE, 2015**

**Издавачи:**

Универзитет „Св. Климент  
Охридски“ Битола  
Факултет за безбедност –  
Скопје

**За издавачите:**

проф. д-р Сашо Коруновски,  
ректор на Универзитетот „Св.  
Климент Охридски“ – Скопје  
проф. д-р Оливер Бачановиќ,  
декан на Факултетот за  
безбедност – Скопје

**Уредник на изданието:**

Проф. д-р Цане Т.Мојаноски

**Преведувачи:**

Анче Белада  
м-р Даниела Јосифова  
Марија Рашковска  
Марија Вучкова

**Компјутерска обработка:**

Проф. д-р Цане Т. Мојаноски  
Кемал Рушид

**Печати:**

АД „Ван Гог“ - Скопје

**Адреса на издавачите:**

Факултет за безбедност  
1000 Скопје  
П. Фах 103  
тел: 022546211

**Универзитет „Св. Климент  
Охридски“**

1ви Мај б.б.  
7000 Битола,  
тел: 047223788

**Publishers:**

University “St. Kliment  
Ohridski”- Bitola  
Faculty of Security- Skopje

**For the Publishers:**

Sašo Korunovski, PhD Rector of  
the University “St. Kliment  
Ohridski”- Bitola  
Oliver Bačanović, PhD Dean of  
the Faculty of Security- Skopje

**Editor in Chief:**

Cane T.Mojanoski, PhD

**Proofreading:**

Anče Belada  
Daniela Josifova, MA  
Marija Raškovska  
Marija Vučkova

**Computer Processing::**

Cane T.Mojanoski, PhD  
Kemal Rushid

**Print:**

“Van Gog” - LTD Skopje

**Address of the Publishers:**

Faculty of Security  
1000 Skopje  
P.O. Box 103  
tel: ++389(0)22546211

**University “St. Kliment  
Ohridski”**

1 Maj b.b.  
7000 Bitola  
tel: +++389(0) 47223788

## **ПРОГРАМСКИ ОДБОР**

**д-р Оливер Бачановиќ**, декан,  
Факултет за безбедност –Скопје,  
Република Македонија

**д-р Младен Бајагиќ**, декан,  
Криминалистичко-полициска  
академија, (КПА), Србија

**Хелен Мартини**, претседател на  
Асоцијацијата на европските  
полициски колеџи

**д-р Горазд Мешко**, декан на  
Факултетот за криминална правда  
безбедност, Словенија

**д-р Неделчо Лазаров Стојчев**, Ректор  
на Академијата при Министерството  
за внатрешни работи, Софија

**д-р Радомир Милашиновиќ**, Декан  
на Факултетот за безбедност,  
Универзитет во Белград, Србија

**д-р Ремзи Финдикли**, Директор на  
турската национална Полициска  
академија, Турција

**д-р Миле Шикман**, началник,  
Директорат за полициска едукација,  
МВР, Република Српска, Босна и  
Херцеговина

**д-р Иван Тош**, Универзитет на  
применет науки, Хрватска

**Рајко Пековиќ**, Полициска академија,  
Црна Гора

**д-р Трое Даниел Костел**, ректор на  
Полициска академија Alexandru Ioan  
Cuza“, Романија

**д-р Неџад Корајлиќ**, декан, Факултет  
за криминалистика, криминологија и  
безбедносни студии, Босна и  
Херцеговина

**д-р Ференц Банфи**, Директор во  
ЦЕПОЛ (Европски полициски колеџи)

**д-р Аљоша Канџиќ**, Институт за  
корпоративни студии ИЦС, Љубљана,  
Словенија

## **СЕКРЕТАР**

**д-р Весна Трајковска**,  
Секретар на Програмскиот одбор

## **PROGRAMME COMMITTEE**

**Oliver Bačanović**, PhD., Dean of the  
Faculty of Security

**Mladen Bajagić**, PhD , Dean of the  
Academy of Criminalistics and Police  
Studies, Serbia

**Helene Martini**, President of the  
Association of European Police Colleges

**Gorazd Meško**, PhD , Dean of the Faculty  
of Criminal Justice and Security, Slovenia

**Nedelčo Lazarov Stojčev**, PhD , Rector of  
the Academy of the Ministry of Interior,  
Bulgaria

**Radomir Milašinović**, PhD, Dean of the  
Faculty of Security Studies, University of  
Belgrade, Serbia

**Remzi Findikli**, PhD, Director of the  
Turkish National Police Academy, Turkey

**Mile Šikman**, PhD, Head of the  
Administration for Police Education of  
Republika Srpska, Bosnia and Herzegovina

**Ivan Toth**, PhD, University of Applied  
Sciences - VVG, Croatia

**Rajko Pekovic**, Police Academy,  
Montenegro

**Troje Daniel Kostel**, PhD, Rector of the  
Police Academy ”Alexandru Ioan Cuza”,  
Romania

**Nedžad Korajlić**, PhD, Dean of the  
Faculty of Criminalistics, Criminology and  
Security Studies, University of Sarajevo,  
Bosnia and Herzegovina

**Ferenc Banfi**, PhD, Director of CEPOL  
(European Police College)

**Aljoša Kandžic**, PhD, President of the  
Council, Institute for Corporate Security  
Studies ICS Ljubljana, Slovenia

## **SECRETARY**

**Vesna Trajkovska**, PhD  
Secretary of the International Programme  
Committee

## **ОРГАНИЗАЦИОНЕН ОДБОР**

проф. д-р Цане Т. Мојаноски,  
претседател

вон. проф. д-р Марјан Николовски  
вон. проф. д-р Светлана Николовска  
доц. д-р Снежана Мојсоска  
доц. д-р Никола Дујовски  
доц. д-р Љупчо Тодоровски  
доц. д-р Раде Рајковчевски  
доц. д-р Весна Стефановска

## **СЕКРЕТАР**

доц. д-р Марјан Ѓуровски

## **ORGANIZING COMMITTEE**

Cane Mojanoski, PhD, Chairman

Marjan Nikolovski, PhD  
Snežana Mojsoska, Dr. Sc  
Nikola Dujovski, PhD  
Ljupčo Todorovski, PhD.  
Rade Rajkovčevski, PhD  
Marjan Gjurovski, PhD  
Vesna Stefanovska, PhD

## **SECRETARY**

Marjan Gjurovski, PhD

## **CONTENTS**

### **SECURITY AND RISK MANAGEMENT IN THE SECURITY SERVICES**

#### **RISK MANAGEMENT IN THE FUNCTION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION**

Zoran Keković, PhD, Slavica Pavlović, PhD student, Vladimir Ninković, PhD student;..... 7

#### **NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR MONITORING THE QUALITY OF EXPERTS' WORK**

Milan Žarković, PhD, Tanja Kesić, PhD, Ivana Bjelovuk, PhD ..... 17

#### **THE INFLUENCE OF THE LEADERSHIP PERSONAL VALUES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF THE SECURITY CHALLENGES**

Lazar Gjurov, PhD, Ljubomir Drakulevski, PhD, Angelina Taneva Veshovska, PhD ..... 34

#### **REFORMS AIMED AT SERVICE ORIENTATION OF SECURITY SERVICES**

Milko Menkinoski, MA, Dejan Vitanski, PhD ..... 50

#### **THE IMPACT OF MILITARY EDUCATION ON THE QUALITY OF DECISION MAKING OF THE MILITARY LEADERS**

Kemo Djozo, MA, Aleksandra Dimitrovska, PhD, Slavko Angeleski, PhD 65

#### **BORDER RISK MANAGEMENT**

Zafircho Panchev, MA..... 80

#### **DETERMINANTS IN SHAPING CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE FRAMEWORK OF SECURITY POLICY**

Marjan Gjurovski, PhD..... 93

### **SECURITY AND SECURITY SYSTEMS TODAY**

#### **THE OPINION OF THE CITIZENS ON SAFETY IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA**

Cane T. Mojanoski, PhD..... 105



**PEACE AND SECURITY: IS CONFLICT PREVENTION STILL A  
NORM OF SECURITY POLICY?**

Lidija Georgieva, PhD, Marina Mitrevska, PhD ..... 124

**ECONOMIC SECURITY AS A STRUCTURAL COMPONENT OF  
SECURITY**

Metodija Angeleski, PhD, Nikolina Gaberova, Martina Nedelkovska..... 138

**COMMUNICATION AND SECURITY – A WAY OF THINKING**

Nikolay Palashev, PhD ..... 147

**NATIONAL SECURITY IN SERBIA – DE LEGE LATA ET DE LEGE  
FERENDA**

Zoran Pavlovic, Dalibor Krstinic ..... 157

**SECURITY SCIENCE PARADIGMS IN THE TIME OF EXPANDED  
APPROACH TO SECURITY: WHEN TO START AND WHEN TO  
FINISH A SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN A CONFLICT /  
POSTCONFLICT SOCIETY?**

Dimitar Kirkovski, Rade Rajkovcevski, PhD ..... 173

**CRISIS IN UKRAINE: THREAT OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT**

Sinisha Daskalovski, PhD ..... 187

**SECURITY CHALLENGES AND TREATS TO THE NATIONAL AND  
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY**

**THE SECURITY THREATS AND THE NEED FOR CREATING A  
REGIONAL SECURITY CENTRE IN THE WESTERN BALKAN  
REGION**

Tome Batkovski, PhD ..... 201

**EXTREME CASE OF INSECURITY: VIOLENCE NARRATIVES OF  
SURVIVORS FROM THE WAR IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA...**

Goran Basic, PhD ..... 216

**ADVERSE RISK AND NATURAL PROCESSES AND PHENOMENA  
AND NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA**

Tihomir Lichev ..... 234

**THE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AS A SECURITY  
THREAT IN THE FUNCTION OF REALIZATION OF  
TERRORISTIC AIMS**

Ice Ilievski, PhD, Zlate Dimovski, PhD, Kire Babanoski, PhD ..... 243

**CONTRIBUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA IN THE  
FIGHT AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM**

Muhamed Racaj, PhD, Sevilj Muaremoska Abduli, PhD Candidate ..... 255

**RECONCEPTION OF TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME AS  
A SECURITY THREAT-EXPANDED APPROACH TO SECURITY**

Tanja Milosevska, PhD ..... 270

**THE ISLAMIC STATE AS A GLOBAL CHALLENGE TO THE  
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY**

Nenad Taneski, PhD, Metodi Hadji-Janev, PhD, Rina Kirkova, PhD..... 282

**REGIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES PROJECTED IN THE  
MODERN SECURITY THREATS**

Mile Petrovski, PhD, Zoran Cikarski, MA. .... 292

# **SECURITY SCIENCE PARADIGMS IN THE TIME OF EXPANDED APPROACH TO SECURITY: WHEN TO START AND WHEN TO FINISH A SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN A CONFLICT / POSTCONFLICT SOCIETY?**

**Dimitar Kirkovski,**

**Rade Rajkovcevski, PhD**

## **Abstract**

The world order is changing much faster than we think: conflicts are more than ever part of the everyday political life. Interstate conflicts are not a rarity, but the number of intrastate conflicts has significantly increased since the fall of the Iron curtain. Ethno nationalism and a perceived lack of human rights became a root cause for (armed) conflicts in states, with the outcome of strong ethno-political polarization, greater concessions, regional autonomy and even division and “Balkanization” of the state(s). The world has tried to respond to these events appropriately and the number of peace keeping / support missions has also grown. Nowadays, the UN is engaged in more peace keeping mission and is spending more money on peacekeeping than ever. NATO has become engaged outside the Euro-Atlantic area with a new role of peace support operations (first in the Balkans and then even further afar). Security is the first area that needs attention in conflict and post-conflict society. The security system (in all of its dimensions) must be reformed as soon as possible and local ownership of it must be achieved so that a functional system of providing security is set in place. International force should handover security provision as soon as possible, but the question remains: when should the security sector reform (SSR) start and should it ever finish?

This paper will try to give an answer to that question, based on the some UN and NATO examples of SSR in the conflict / post conflict countries occurring since 1990s in Africa, the Balkans and the Middle East.

Key words: *Security sector reform (SSR), conflict, international missions, UN.*

## 1. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM (SSR) AS A HOLISTIC CONCEPT

The fall of the Iron curtain was a major event in the world politics: the Warsaw pact dissolved, some state collapsed (Yugoslavia) and some new states emerged, a huge wave of democratization in the former Eastern European countries occurred with transition towards market economy and reform in the security sector. Also, one of the less visible changes that happened was also the change of the perception of security. In the former divided world between the East and West, the security was predominately seen as state - centric security. The individual was not in the focus of the security.

The Security Sector Reform (SSR) as a concept emerged and slowly evolved at various forums. It became a part of the reform processes of the East European states, but also a part of the military and political interventions in the conflict countries and an essential part of the UN and NATO missions. SSR changed the traditional perception of intervention and security: it went further from the traditional “train and equip” approach towards security reform in the (conflict / post conflict) countries and moved towards a greater integration with the development. It became a prerequisite for development and was seen as central to the international community’s efforts to help prevent violent conflict and building lasting peace<sup>1</sup>. The concepts ‘security sector’ and ‘security sector reform’ first appeared in the late 1990s, and although these relatively new terms have become widely used (in various forms: Security Sector Reform, Security Sector Transformation, Security Sector Development, Security Sector Governance, Sector Security Reform, Security Sector Stabilization, etc.), no single globally accepted definition has yet emerged. One of the first international organizations that “reinvented” the concept of the SSR and developed the security / development nexus was the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The central theme of the 2004 OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance was that “recognition that development and security are inextricably linked is enabling security in partner countries to be viewed as a public policy and governance issue inviting greater public scrutiny”<sup>2</sup>. Then, later in 2007, the official OECD DAC

---

<sup>1</sup> The International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), *SSR in A Nutshell: Manual for Introductory Training on Security Sector Reform* (Geneva: DCAF, 2011), accessed February 28, 2015

<http://issat.dcaf.ch/content/download/2970/25352/file/ISSAT%20LEVEL%201%20TRAINING%20MANUAL%20-%20SSR%20IN%20A%20NUTSHELL%20-%205.2.pdf>, 2.

<sup>2</sup> Angel Gurria and Richard Manning, foreword to *The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice*, by Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD-DAC) (Paris: OECD

Handbook on SSR was promoted with the aim to operationalise the DAC SSR guidance and close the gap between policy and practice. There it is stated that the SSR is aimed towards reform in the security sector that is not seen traditionally as only the military and police. SSR is including: core security actors (e.g. armed forces, police, gendarmerie, border guards, customs and immigration, intelligence and security services); security management and oversight bodies (e.g. ministries of defence and internal affairs, financial management bodies and public complaints commissions); justice and law enforcement institutions (e.g. the judiciary, prisons, prosecution services, traditional justice systems); and non-statutory security forces (e.g. private security companies, guerrilla armies and private militia)<sup>3</sup>.

The organization of the United Nations, as the world premier and leading international organization that is responsible for international peace and security, (but also development), in general has a preventive approach to conflict and sees SSR as an integral part of that approach. But it was in 2008<sup>4</sup> when the UN defined *the security sector* (in the Secretary – General report) as a broad term “often used to describe the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of the security in a country. It is generally accepted that the security sector includes defence, law enforcement, corrections, intelligence services and institutions responsible for border management, customs and civil emergencies. Elements of the judicial sector responsible for the adjudication of cases of alleged criminal conduct and misuse of force are, in many instances, also included. Furthermore, the security sector includes actors that play a role in managing and overseeing the design and implementation of security, such as ministries, legislative bodies and civil society groups. Other non-State actors that could be considered as part of the security sector include customary or informal authorities and private security services<sup>5</sup>”. Now, the United Nations define SSR as “a process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by the national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement

---

Publishing, 2007), accessed February 28, 2015, [http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/fr/development/the-oecd-dac-handbook-on-security-system-reform\\_9789264027862-en](http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/fr/development/the-oecd-dac-handbook-on-security-system-reform_9789264027862-en)

<sup>3</sup> Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD-DAC), *The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice* (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2007), accessed February 28, 2015, [http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/fr/development/the-oecd-dac-handbook-on-security-system-reform\\_9789264027862-en](http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/fr/development/the-oecd-dac-handbook-on-security-system-reform_9789264027862-en), 5.

<sup>4</sup> In reality, the SSR was part of the mission mandate since 2002 in the UN mission in Sierra Leone.

<sup>5</sup> Report of the Secretary-General on SSR (A/62/659-S/2008/39), 23 January 2008.

of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law<sup>6</sup>”.

The UN has a SSR unit and a Task Force (the United Nations Inter-Agency Security Sector Reform Task Force - IASSRTF<sup>7</sup>), established by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in 2007, with a mission to promote an integrated, holistic and coherent United Nations Security Sector Reform (SSR) approach that envisages to assist States and societies in establishing effective, inclusive and accountable security institutions so as to contribute to the international peace and security, sustainable development and the enjoyment of human rights by all.

SSR became a topic for many other actors that have developed their own SSR policies: the EU, NATO, AU, ECOWAS, as well as individual states (USA, Great Britain, France, Canada, etc) that placed the SSR policy into the military doctrine<sup>8</sup>, even established their own SSR Units (for example, Stabilization Unit<sup>9</sup> in UK [previously known as Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit], Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force<sup>10</sup> in Canada, etc). The EU principles of SSR contain rule of law, democratic control over armed forces, human rights, accountability and transparency. EU Commission<sup>11</sup> and Council<sup>12</sup> adopted the SSR concepts and broad definition that are in line with the OECD DAC principles.

It should be mentioned that the word ‘reform’ is nowadays considered misleading and even outdated since thinking on transforming security and justice sectors and systems has moved forward and terminology has not. One of the proposed term for use is ‘Security and Justice Sector Development (or

---

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> “United Nations SSR Website,” United Nations, accessed February 26, 2015, <http://unssr.unlb.org/Home.aspx>.

<sup>8</sup> See, for example: US Army, *Field Manual 3-07: Stability Operations* (Washington: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2008), accessed February 26, 2015, <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/repository/FM307/FM3-07.pdf>; NATO, *Allied Joint Publication 3.4.1: Peace Support Operations* (Brussels: NATO, 2001), accessed February 26, 2015, <https://info.publicintelligence.net/NATO-PeaceSupport.pdf>.

<sup>9</sup> “Stabilization Unit”, UK Government, accessed February 26, 2015, <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/stabilisation-unit>.

<sup>10</sup> “Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START),” Government of Canada, accessed February 26, 2015, <http://www.international.gc.ca/START-GTSR/index.aspx?lang=eng>.

<sup>11</sup> Commission of the European Communities, *A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform*, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, SEC(2006) 658, Brussels, from May 24, 2006, accessed on February 26, 2015, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0253:FIN:EN:PDF>.

<sup>12</sup> Council of the European Union, *EU concept for the ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform* (Brussels: EU, 2005), accessed on February 28, 2015, <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2012566%202005%20REV%204>.

Transformation) – SJSD/T’ as part of a broader post conflict reconstruction and development strategy<sup>13</sup>.

## 2. CHALLENGES FOR SSR

### *2.1. Tailoring the right SSR*

SSR can happen in the all societies. Western European liberal democracies (considered more advanced in the way the security system is functioning and controlled) also undergo regular Security Sector Reform process at regular time cycles<sup>14</sup> so that their security system can be more effective in the ever changing security environment. Reforming the institutions is a paramount in the post conflict societies, since it was in the same societies that complete security (as well as the oversight) system failed in the first place. How can SSR be applied into different societies with deferent political and cultural systems, what is the methodology, how to develop a coherent approach and what to include in the SSR program? In all cases, understanding the specific context is paramount in structuring the right size / type SSR<sup>15</sup> (political, legal, social factors, economy, technology and environment). All conflict settings are unique and the elements such as culture, history, ethnicity, political system, economic foundation and educational level have to be built into the specific country SSR program to accomplish successful implementation<sup>16</sup>. We will look more closely the SSR in the conflict and post conflict countries in this paper because it is there where the newly developed SSR concept turns into reality. The SSR as a process has to have a starting point, objectives that need to be accomplished, and a final outcome when we can consider the reform ended. Often the donor countries and international organization insist on “*local ownership*”<sup>17</sup> of the solutions that will bring stability, accountability and effectiveness of the whole security system as well on the “*Whole of Governance approach*”. The selection of the objectives and final outcome are quite challenging both for the post conflict state and for the external actors in the SSR. The local ownership as it is

---

<sup>13</sup> Reply on questionnaire and individual expert opinion by Gordon Hughes, Associate Senior SSR Advisor at ISSAT, February 2015.

<sup>14</sup> For example, UK has Strategic Defence and Security Review at every 5 years, USA has every 4 years etc.

<sup>15</sup> Even the security systems in the Western European countries are not completely the same.

<sup>16</sup> Peter D. Thruelsen, *Security sector stabilisation in a non-permissive environment* (Copenhagen: Royal Danish Defence College, 2010), accessed February 28, 2015, <http://forsvaret.dk/FAK/Publikationer/Research%20Papers/Documents/Security%20Sector%20Stabilisation.pdf>

<sup>17</sup> More on the concept of local ownership see Timothy Donais, ed., *Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform* (Geneva: DCAF, 2008), accessed February 28, 2015, <http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Local-Ownership-and-Security-Sector-Reform>.

described in the SSR handbooks and in reality implies involving the local actors as soon as possible in the reform, but not necessarily in the creation of the SSR program from the start. After creation of the SSR program, the international actors must not lead the program; it must be the national actor that will lead. However, since the selection of program objectives, models and outcomes is not a local solution, that endangers the legitimacy in those cases where most (if not all) of the SSR solutions are external. So, international actors must consult security sector practitioners and local community experts (and at the end, the population) about issues related to recognizing the capacities and needs, also as for parameters closely addressed to local circumstances (tradition, history, subculture [mentality] and other factors influencing the security sector).

## ***2.2. When to start and when to finish the SSR***

It is very difficult to select the exact moment of the desired start of the SSR in one society because of the importance of the context in the creation, duration and finally the overall success of the SSR program. However, the need for the reform has to be balanced with the political reality in the state. The UK approach<sup>18</sup> makes a clear distinction between security sector stabilization (SSS) that “seeks to enable essential and minimum security and justice and in doing so protect and promote a legitimate political authority and prepare the foundations for transition to longer-term security sector reform” and SSR. SSS prepares the ground for the SSR in the immediate period after the conflict while “addressing substantively the conflict drivers, (and may include elements of transitional justice), rather than acting as an interim palliative”. The period between the immediate security requirements and the reform process is estimated to be around 12 to 24 month period, but it may take longer since transition to security and justice programming and eventually SSR will be a process rather than an event<sup>19</sup>.

During the preparation of the paper, the question when to start and when to finish the SSR process was sent (via questionnaire) to a number of theorist and practitioners of SSR as well as SSR advisers on the ISSAT<sup>20</sup> Community of Practice forum. Giving an answer with a specific moment in

---

<sup>18</sup> As described in the Stabilisation Unit, *Security Sector Stabilisation*, Stabilisation Issues Note, (London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence and Department for International Development, March 2014), accessed February 28, 2015  
<http://sclr.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/su-publications/stabilisation-series/496-security-sector-stabilisation/file.html>.

<sup>19</sup> Stabilization Unit, 16 and 18

<sup>20</sup> “Forum of the International Security Sector Advisory Team,” DCAF, accessed February 26, 2015

<http://issat.dcaf.ch/Home/Community-of-Practice/Forum/Starting-and-finishing-a-SSR-program-in-a-conflict-post-conflict-society>.



time, connected to certain event in the post conflict reconstruction of a country (like the Peace process, Peace accord or treaty, DDR process<sup>21</sup>, conflict phases and timing, elections, etc.) is very difficult. The reasons are very simple: different context (that requires an individual case by case approach) and the fact that SSR is concept that is ongoing and holistic, considered as wide as deep<sup>22</sup>. According to Gordon Hughes, SSR or the proposed term SJSD / T “should begin (with external actor assistance) before the fighting starts as a conflict prevention measure. It is an essential consideration during ceasefire planning and the formulation of peace agreements. Arguably, national SJSD/T programs could finish when the security and justice institutions in a country are effective and accountable, and operating under democratic civil control without the need for any further international cooperating partner (ICP) assistance”.

The perception of the understanding the term SSR plays a key role to the start and end of it: if SSR includes interim security and stabilization measures such as creating conditions for classical SSR through restoration of infrastructure and minimum capacities and capabilities of security and defense forces, facilitating the discussions between various national actors to reach consensus on the future security architecture and the main principles of reforming defense and security forces, then it starts right in the beginning of the peace process in the phase of stabilization; If it means classical SSR, focusing on security sector policies and legislation, civilian oversight and capacity-building, then most of it will start in post-conflict stabilized situation, after the elections of legitimate non-transitional authorities<sup>23</sup>.

The peace process and DDR are considered closely connected with the start of the SSR. Some argue that SSR should start as soon as the peace process is consolidated and DDR is basically a part of the SSR<sup>24</sup>. SSR should be planned to begin just about as DDR nears its end, since reintegration of

---

<sup>21</sup> DDR stands for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. More on DDR see at Colin Gleichmann, Michael Odenwald, Kees Steenken, and Adrian Wilkinson, *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration A Practical Field and Classroom Guide*, (Frankfurt: GTZ, NODEFIC, PPC, and SNDC, 2004), accessed February 28, 2015, <http://www2.gtz.de/dokumente/bib/04-5358.pdf>.

<sup>22</sup> Reply on questionnaire and individual expert opinion by Thammy Evans, Advocacy & Outreach Coordinator at ISSAT, February 2015.

<sup>23</sup> Reply on questionnaire and individual expert opinion by Sossi Tatikyan, Security Sector Reform Officer at United Nations, February 2015.

<sup>24</sup> Reply on questionnaire and individual expert opinion by Agustín J Vázquez, former Project Manager for UN Police Operations and International Cooperation in Guinea Bissau, working within an international police team in police reform, training, advising to upgrade and build up Guinean Bissau security services' capacities, February 2015.

combatants might imply creation of a completely new institution<sup>25</sup> and SSR should start as is during the peace process or just after it<sup>26</sup>. The peace process should contain provision about the DDR and SSR by all the relevant parties, local actors and stakeholders.

It is difficult to establish the termination of the SSR because it is difficult to tell if the SSR will succeed in the post conflict country; it requires a lot of attention and commitment so that a peace, even negative one, is achieved. The danger of relapsing in to conflict can always be present. There for, instead of termination, measures for success and reform indicators can be used, and there is already a well established baseline of doctrine for this in the UN as well in individual donor countries. And while the organizations and donor countries expect result fast (and justification for the money and effort spent), the result can happen after years, decade or even more. That does not go well with the donor political and financial cycles, but that is the reality of the post-conflict environment.

### **3. THE CASE OF MACEDONIA**

The reform of the security sector in Macedonia represents an ongoing process, mostly influenced by the foreign partners (OSCE, EU, NATO, USA and other individual partner and donor countries) that were and are involved in the reform processes (in line with the country's aspiration to obtain full NATO and EU membership), and it involves applying international and widely accepted standards in the area of security. The reform was mostly in the major security areas (Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior and Intelligence Agency) where we will limit the scope of this research, but it also initiated substantial changes in other elements of the security sector, and in certain cases it resulted in setting up entirely new government institutions and bodies – in line with the EU standards and practices. Since the country's independence in the early 90s, the reform of the security sector as a part of the overall political and economic reform process in the society was a matter of pure necessity in order to establish a baseline and solid fundamentals of the state security in the new security environment. Since there was not an adequate National security policy or strategy for the reform processes of the security institutions at times when there were many scenarios for de-stabilization of the state, a lot of improvisations were made in the security sector reform

---

<sup>25</sup> Reply on questionnaire and individual expert opinion by Marko Savkovic, CSO expert for SSR issues in the Western Balkans, February 2015.

<sup>26</sup> Reply on questionnaire and individual expert opinion by Igor Cvetkovski, DDR, SSR and Peacebuilding Specialists for the Transition and Recovery Division (TRD) within the Department of Operations and Emergencies (DOE) at the IOM HQ's in Geneva, February 2015.

followed by some scandals<sup>27</sup>. The domestic creators of the security strategy / policy were looking for the appropriate solutions for some years till most of the inputs for the reforms came externally from the international missions and experts after the 2001 conflict that were in the range of catalyst for excellent solutions in line with the post conflict settlement and rehabilitation to waste of valuable reform time.

The Army started the reform after 1999, when the first NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) was submitted. It was basically a set of criteria that all the countries applying for NATO membership needed to fulfill, as well guidance for the reform process with phases and timings. The Army managed to accomplish all the necessary reform and in 2008 at the NATO Bucharest summit that was clearly noted. Also, the Army formally undertakes a Strategic defense and review process at (i)regular<sup>28</sup> cycles.

The Ministry of Interior (the police) underwent a set of organizational changes with an accent on human resources after the 2001 conflict that was in the spirit of the Ohrid Framework treaty. The Police Reform Project started in 2002, with the support by the ECJHT (European Commission Justice and Home Affairs Mission). Accordingly, the Strategy for Police Reform in Macedonia was adapted in 2003. The police fully used potential of the police advisors that were part of the EU Police Mission (EUPOL Proxima) as well as for the following Police Advisory Team (EUPAT) in the period from 2003 to 2006. Such developments were firm bases for launching the 2-year police reform project leaded by the German police in 2005. In 2008, a new 2-year police reform project began, which was led by the French police<sup>29</sup>. In the period from 2012 to 2013 (15 months), a partial police reform was achieved addressed on police investigations, intelligence, risk management, strategic planning and legislative reform issues<sup>30</sup>. A simple qualitative analysis of all the police reform projects that were finished leave us with the fact that the

---

<sup>27</sup> Rade Rajkovcevski, Security Policy Building: The Case of the Republic of Macedonia] (Skopje: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung - Macedonia Office & Faculty of Security-Skopje, 2014), accessed on February 28, 2015, <http://www.kas.de/mazedonien/en/publications/36931/>, p. 66

<sup>28</sup> Stojan Slaveski, "USA in the Macedonian National Strategy", *Nova Makedonija*, March 3, 2015, accessed on March 3, 2015, <http://novamakedonija.mk/NewsDetal.asp?vest=32151627405&id=13&prilog=0&setIzdanie=23409>.

<sup>29</sup> Stojanka Mirceva, and Rade Rajkovcevski, "Policing in the Republic of Macedonia" in *Handbook on Policing in Central and Eastern Europe*, ed. Gorazd Meško, Charles B. Fields, Branko Lobnikar and Andrej Sotlar (New York: Springer Publishing, 2013), p. 144 - 145

<sup>30</sup> "Partnership in Macedonian European Integration Reforms Marked", UK Government, News announced by the British Embassy Skopje on November 28, 2013, accessed on February 26, 2015,

<https://www.gov.uk/government/world-location-news/partnership-in-macedonian-european-integration-reforms-marked>.

German partner (Brandenburg Police) offered a decentralized model with a lot of authorizations for the local police, while at the same time the partners from the French national police (from the CIVIPOL project) implemented strictly centralized solutions that were not in line with the local context. After finishing of the reform project conducted with the French partner, most of the solutions were withdrawn or left just as an appreciation of the finished reform process. As an outcome, in a relatively short period of time even 3 primary documents of systematization inside the ministry of Interior (which are paramount for internal organization and delegation of responsibilities) were produced, that is indication of misbalance and obscurity of the whole police reform.

The intelligence part of the reform process, because of the power that intelligence contains and reflects upon the power of the political subject in charge of the relevant ministries (the military intelligence sector from the ministry of Defense and the Directorate of security and counterintelligence from the ministry of Interior), failed to re-structure into one unity in spite of the initiative during the reform process. They underwent the reforms as part of the relevant ministries. However, in hindsight, one has to say that the intelligence services have not internalized the principles of good governance, especially issues related to transparency and accountability<sup>31</sup>. The intelligence is always under strong influence of the ruling political parties that has shown during the past with a lot of interception, phone – tapping incidents of the opposition parties as well as leakage of confidential information.

#### 4. CONCLUSION

The right SSR can create better social and economic development as well as rule of law and promotion and protection of human rights. External assistance must be well defined and outlined in terms of objectives and timeframes, not just containing all the principles of “local ownership,” but truly to be locally owned. The whole security sector must be sustainable by local budget funds at long run, with the financial assistance by international organizations and individual donor countries at short and medium term. All those things are exactly what holistic approach to SSR program is, build and based upon the local context. In general, Security Sector reform still brings more questions than answers in many states in the world, and local ownership is still difficult to achieve in the post conflict countries. External experts from international organizations, partner and donor states is beneficial, if not for

---

<sup>31</sup> Andreja Bogdanovski, “Macedonia” in *Almanac on Security Sector Oversight in the Western Balkans*, ed. Franziska Klopfer and Douglas Cantwell with Miroslav Hadžić and Sonja Stojanović (Belgrade: BCSP and DCAF, 2012), accessed on February 27, 2015 [http://www.analyticamk.org/images/stories/files/ALMANAC\\_FINAL\\_WEB2.pdf](http://www.analyticamk.org/images/stories/files/ALMANAC_FINAL_WEB2.pdf), p. 133

else, then for the resources, commitment, and in most cases, objectivity and recognition of needs and solutions they bring. That on the long run will bring accountability while improving effectiveness, effective and professional civilian / democratic control over armed and security forces, vetting protocols, better community / security forces relations including greater influence by marginalized and vulnerable groups.

SSR is a process, not an event. It is context driven and very difficult to predict when is best to start. It is widely accepted that is best to start as soon as possible, since it is a process that is following the stabilization of the country and that is crucial for achieving stability and with that development. It is best to anchor it to the peace process, and afterwards connect it with all the following events / processes: DDR, elections, build up of institutions, donor financial assistance. Till the desired outcome is achieved: security, development, accountability, effectiveness, rule of law, etc. And the question when will it end in point of time is also very difficult to answer. Depending on the phase in which the conflict was in the first place, it will take years, if not decades. At the end, here is a clear case where the reform is not about the destination, but it is about the journey. As long as there a reform of the institutions and it is going on the right way towards sustainable peace, security and development, with all the systematic and behavioral circumstances being addressed and resolved, with accountability, efficiency of the institutions, justice and rule of law. Unfortunately, that is not so good for the donors that need the results as soon as possible, but it is still cheaper than the price of human life and suffering.

Whether security is possible without development and development can happen without the security in place is a never-ending and ongoing debate, and that's why the SSR holistic approach is considered as an important linkage of both. However, just as the 90ties changed the perception of security, the terminology must follow the transformation of the (perception of) security, justice and development. And there for, SSR may change and lose the "reform" bit from it, but it will not lose the essence and importance of the need to transform, reform, change, and respond. And anyhow the reform happens, it should never end. In the case of the Republic of Macedonia, there is still no clear and consistent state policy regarding the security sector reform. Unfortunately, there are no clear guidelines for the reform processes in line with the national security policy and that are locally owned but also, sustainable. The annual MAP process is an external mechanism for annual evaluation of the Army readiness for the NATO membership and certainly it involves a dose of security reform in it. Certain reforms brought less than expected (like the MPRI with the Army and CIVIPOL with the police), but that is, at the end, also part of the learning process.

## 5. REFERENCES

Commission of the European Communities, *A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform*, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, SEC (2006) 658, Brussels, from May 24, 2006. Accessed on February 26, 2015

<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0253:FIN:EN:PDF>.

Council of the European Union. *EU concept for the ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform*. Brussels: EU, 2005. Accessed on February 28, 2015

<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%20125666%202005%20REV%204>.

Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD-DAC), *The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice*. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2007. Accessed on February 28, 2015, [http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/fr/development/the-oecd-dac-handbook-on-security-system-reform\\_9789264027862-en](http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/fr/development/the-oecd-dac-handbook-on-security-system-reform_9789264027862-en)

Government of Canada. “Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START).” Accessed on February 26, 2015, <http://www.international.gc.ca/START-GTSR/index.aspx?lang=eng>

NATO. *Allied Joint Publication 3.4.1: Peace Support Operations*. Brussels: NATO, 2001. Accessed on February 26, 2015. <https://info.publicintelligence.net/NATO-PeaceSupport.pdf>.

The International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT). *SSR in A Nutshell: Manual for Introductory Training on Security Sector Reform*. Geneva: DCAF, 2011. Accessed on February 28, 2015

<http://issat.dcaf.ch/content/download/2970/25352/file/ISSAT%20LEVEL%201%20TRAINING%20MANUAL%20-%20SSR%20IN%20A%20NUTSHELL%20-%205.2.pdf>.

UK Government. “Stabilization Unit.” Accessed on February 26, 2015 <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/stabilisation-unit>.

DCAF. “Forum of the International Security Sector Advisory Team” Accessed on February 26, 2015

<http://issat.dcaf.ch/Home/Community-of-Practice/Forum/Starting-and-finishing-a-SSR-program-in-a-conflict-post-conflict-society>.

United Nations. “United Nations SSR Website.” Accessed on February 26, 2015, <http://unssr.unlb.org/Home.aspx>.

UK Government. “Partnership in Macedonian European Integration Reforms Marked”, News announced by the British Embassy Skopje on November 28, 2013. Accessed on February 26, 2015,

<https://www.gov.uk/government/world-location-news/partnership-in-macedonian-european-integration-reforms-marked>

US Army, *Field Manual 3-07: Stability Operations*. Washington: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2008. Accessed on February 26, 2015. <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/repository/FM307/FM3-07.pdf>.

Thruelsen, Peter D. *Security sector stabilisation in a non-permissive environment*, Copenhagen: Royal Danish Defence College, 2010. Accessed on February 28, 2015

<http://forsvaret.dk/FAK/Publikationer/Research%20Papers/Documents/Security%20Sector%20Stabilisation.pdf>.

Donais, Timothy, ed. *Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform*. Geneva: DCAF, 2008. Accessed on February 28, 2015. <http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Local-Ownership-and-Security-Sector-Reform>.

Stabilisation Unit. *Security Sector Stabilisation*, Stabilisation Issues Note. London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence and Department for International Development, March 2014. Accessed on February 28, 2015 <http://sclr.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/su-publications/stabilisation-series/496-security-sector-stabilisation/file.html>.

Gleichmann, Colin, Michael Odenwald, Kees Steenken, and Adrian Wilkinson, *Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: A Practical Field and Classroom Guide*. Frankfurt: GTZ, NODEFIC, PPC, and SNDC, 2004. Accessed on February 28, 2015 <http://www2.gtz.de/dokumente/bib/04-5358.pdf>.

Rajkovcevski, Rade. Security Policy Building: The Case of the Republic of Macedonia]. Skopje: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung - Macedonia Office & Faculty of Security - Skopje, 2014). Accessed on February 28, 2015 <http://www.kas.de/mazedonien/en/publications/36931/>.

Slaveski, Stojan. “USA in the Macedonian National Strategy” *Nova Makedonija*, March 3, 2015. Accessed on March 3, 2015

<http://novamakedonija.mk/NewsDetal.asp?vest=32151627405&id=13&prilog=0&setIzdanie=23409>

Mirceva, Stojanka and Rade Rajkovcevski “Policing in the Republic of Macedonia” In *Handbook on Policing in Central and Eastern Europe*, edited by Gorazd Meško, Charles B. Fields, Branko Lobnikar and Andrej Sotlar, p. 143 - 168. New York: Springer Publishing, 2013.

Bogdanovski, Andreja. “Macedonia” In *Almanac on Security Sector Oversight in the Western Balkans*, edited by Franziska Klopfer and Douglas

Cantwell with Miroslav Hadžić and Sonja Stojanović, p. 129 – 158, Belgrade: BCSP and DCAF, 2012. Accessed on February 27, 2015  
[http://www.analyticamk.org/images/stories/files/ALMANAC\\_FINAL\\_WEB2.pdf](http://www.analyticamk.org/images/stories/files/ALMANAC_FINAL_WEB2.pdf).