## МЕЃУНАРОДНА НАУЧНА КОНФЕРЕНЦИЈА

# БАЛКАНОТ МЕЃУ МИНАТОТО И ИДНИНАТА: БЕЗБЕДНОСТ, РЕШАВАЊЕ НА КОНФЛИКТИ И ЕВРОАТЛАНТСКА ИНТЕГРАЦИ

INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE

# THE BALKANS BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE: SECURITY, CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION

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## SUSTAINABILITY OF THE STATUS QUO AND INVIOLABILITY OF THE BALKAN STATE BORDERS: CONFLICT PREVENTION OR PROLONGING OF THE INSTABILITY IN THE REGION

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#### Abstract

The conflict prevention has an emphasized significance within contemporary international community. It has its beginnings in the multilateral diplomatic initiatives and other legal arrangements taken many centuries ago at interstate level in order to reduce the range of violence and the occurrence of war. For centuries the states and regions continue to live in the ancient cycle of creation, existence, but with a different final outcome: destruction, accession to an existing or a new union, and finally disintegration.

The 1990s showed the vulnerability of the whole world to respond to the violence as a result of the changes in the world's international system structure and the dissolution of the Soviet Union and SFR Yugoslavia (SFRY). Thus, a new era of conflict prevention emerged: from interstate into intrastate conflict prevention. The Balkan region, often identified with the Balkan Peninsula, was an area of different types of conflicts, ones not only a consequence and continuation of the latent or visible clash of the Superpowers but also as eruptions of a different kind of nature. Most of the conflicts were rooted way back before the creation of SFRY after the Second World War. In the Balkans, conflict prevention as a process failed because of the speed of the events which lead to the creation and further development of the intrastate conflict prevention mechanisms. At the aftermath, several newly constituted states appeared, one of them still not fully recognized in the international community. The newly constituted states now have boundaries which divide and connect them simultaneously.

Most of the conflicts in the region were and still are motivated by one reason - the desire for unification of territory in which the people of one ethnicity live. The current borders leave the same possibilities that endanger the integrity and existence of the states, and an opportunity for the gap or the crack to be exploited. This paper defines the geographical and temporal scope of conflicts in the region and focuses on the conflict prevention as a holistic systematic approach. It describes the conflicts in the Balkan region since 1990's and makes a classification of the conflicts by intensity and type. Also, by identifying the conflict prevention mechanisms, paper presents the current ongoing processes in the region, simultaneously depicting the current evident, latent, or possible conflicts. The main outcomes are deducted and a prediction of security in the region is presented: binding or separating state borders?

The methodological aspects of the paper are based on analysis of content of documents and experiences and comparative analysis of qualitative and quantitative data.

Key words: Balkans, conflict prevention, security, mechanism, borders, instability

### Introduction

The Balkan, like many other regions in the world, is an area that is very diverse in nationalities, religion, ethnicities and languages. It has been an area of conflicts many times in the last century, and like most of the post conflict regions, it is still an area of current unresolved issues, open animosities among the states, and also latent and frozen conflicts. The conflicts are rooted many years ago, way back before the creation of (Social) Federal Republic of Yugoslavia<sup>1</sup>-FRY after the Second World War. The pretexts for the conflict appeared only during times of change of the world order and the imbalance of the regional powers on the Balkans. There is some kind of misunderstanding regarding the term Balkan. It is difficult to define exactly which area it covers: often it is identified with the Balkan Peninsula, expressed and destructive nationalism, an area of different types of conflicts (mainly intrastate and inter-ethnic), with a strong political fragmentation and hostilities. Because of the multitude of the conflicts in the region in temporal and geographic sense, the paper speaks about the Balkans and Balkan state borders more in a political than in a geographical context. It is focused on the territory of formal Yugoslavia (as the biggest regional power on the Balkans after the World War II), without Slovenia, plus Albania. The reason for this is to limit the paper only to countries not part of the European Union assuming that the EU, the receiver of 2012 Nobel Peace prize, was assessed to be as very successful conflict prevention mechanism for the counties inside EU. As the result of this approach, the temporary frame of the research is limited on Yugoslavian intrastate conflicts occurred since 1990s till nowadays. Armed conflict had the potential before 1990s, but they were rather latent and incipient due to strong federal control in Yugoslavia. Albania was ruled by a strongly centralized authoritarian regime

governed by Enver Hoxha for a long time. The period of rule of Enver Hoxha is characterized by suppressed interethnic, interreligious, intercultural and wider social conflicts that expand with social changes since 1990s. Since the establishment of the Albanian state after the First Balkan War in 1912, Albania has been very active in supporting efforts to unite the territories inhabited by ethnic Albanians, predominantly in Kosovo, Macedonia, but also in Greece and Montenegro.

Although there were many conflicts in the contemporary history of the region, motivated by territorial segregation of different ethnic groups within the state, there were not crucial changes of the state borders. Mainly this is due to principal stance and involvement of the international community. The newly constituted states (deriving from the former SFRY) Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Slovenia remained in their Yugoslavian administrative borders, and a new state Kosovo was borne on the territory previously under the rule of Serbia.

The borders of the states are connected to the territory of the states. The declarative theory of statehood suggests that in order for a state to be internationally recognized<sup>ii</sup>, it needs to have a defined territory. Even nowadays, most of the conflicts are still fought more over territory rather against government forces (Stockholm International Peace Research Scientific, and Cultural Institute, & United Nations Educational. Organization, 1998). Former Yugoslavia was a federal state that had a lot of diversities. It was a state with one ideology, two alphabets, three main religions, five major ethnic groups, organized in six republics and two autonomous provinces<sup>iii</sup>. The implosion of former Yugoslavia created states which have minorities of the neighboring states that range up to 30 per cent. Albania has Greek minority of almost 5 percent, and Albanians live in Greece, Montenegro and Macedonia. Without claiming that a "pure" nation state exists as such in current globalization of the world and the diversity of the people that live in a state, the fact is that the national borders of Balkan states do not respond to the Balkan ethnic maps, just like in many other states and regions in the world.

In this context, the contemporary circumstances in the Balkans based on society and security changes, raised new expectations and challenges related to the promotion of regional cooperation and Euro-Atlantic integrations.

## **Conflictand Conflict prevention**

There is a wide diversity of same (or similar) concepts and terms of conflict and conflict prevention among academics and experts. To avoid ambiguity, the term "Conflict" refers to the definition of the conflict as a

social factual situation in which at least two parties (individuals, groups, states) are involved and who: i) strive for goals that are incompatible to begin with or strive for the same goal, which, can be reached only by one party: and/or ii)want to employ incompatable means to acheive a certain goal (Ulrike C. Wasmuth, as cited in Schmid, 1998), where the conflict is between two states, or two or more ethnicities in a state, and they strive for the incompatable goal- teritory. "Conflict prevention" derives from the widely accepted Michael Lund's definition: "Any structural or intercessory means to keep intrastate or interstate tension and disputes from escalating into significant violence and use of armed forces, to strengthen the capabilities of potential parties to violent conflict for resolving such disputes peacefully, and to progressively reduce the underlying problems that produce these issues and disputes (Lund, 2002)". Conflict prevention is not an previosly unknown process in the history; there are number of projects and efforts in the history that go under this nominator. Thus, history recognizes the Concert of Europe (set up in 1815 and helped in maintaining peace in the following almost forty years), League of Nations and it's more sucessfull successor, the United Nations. United Nations, as main actor in international security community, emphasises its role focused on "saving the succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind (Preamble of Charter of the United Nations, 1945)" with a purpose to "maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace (Article 1 of Charter of the United Nations, 1945)". These different standpoints and definitions help defining the conflict prevention as concept for maintaining peace and security with effective measures for prevention.

The scholars used different terms in the last 60 years referring to the same aim and outcome: preventing conflict from occurring, and from horizontal (bigger area) and vertical (more violent and armed) escalation: Preventive diplomacy (during 1960's<sup>iv</sup>), Conflict resolution - focused more on preventing escalation then preventing escalation (during 1970's), Crises prevention, Conflict transformation, management etc. An array of measures was used during the Cold war to prevent conflicts, such as: the restraint of use of armed force conducted trough arms controls arrangement, confidence building measures and non-aggression measures. The coercive diplomatic measures involved diplomatic and economic sanctions, war crime tribunals and trials, while non-coercive diplomatic measures ranged from fact-finding

missions, bilateral negotiations, third party informal diplomatic consultations, third party mediations, two-track diplomacy, economic assistance, commissions of inquiry, arbitration and adjudication and so on (Lund, 1996).

Conflict prevention became rather "popular" in the 1990s, and very soon it became everyone's job: from UN with its complex system, regional organizations, individual states or groups of states - US, EU, OSCE, World Bank (Stremlau & Sagasti, 1998)and IMF (Rowlands & Joseph, 2003), NGOs, even individuals. The first preventive deployment of UN forces happened (UNPREDEP in Macedonia), and it is a schoolbook example of a successful conflict prevention. Just because all this previously mentioned activities and actors do not necessary have the word conflict or prevention in the name, in their policy or their mission, it does not mean that they are not conflict prevention "mechanism".

In that line, the main hypothesis is based on the role of the international community as most powerful and most illustrative mechanism for prevention of future conflicts and for not changing the borders of the newly constituted states in the Balkans. Understanding of the stance of not changing the Balkan state borders is in correlation with need to understand the etiology of the ongoing and past conflicts.

Conflict and conflict theory in the Balkans are addressed to interethnic and intercultural conflicts. The facts show that there is no such thing as ethnicaly "clean"state in the world. In theory, with only one migration of one individual, the state is no longer monoethnic, and the history has shown us that all fashist movements and ethnical cleansing are and must be stoped and fight against. The thesis that the reunion of the ethnicities with the mother – state troughout Euroatlanitic integration is not in the line with idea of United Europe.

## Brief History of Conflicts in the Balkansand their background

The Balkan region, often identified with the Balkan Peninsula, was an area of conflicts among different ethnicities trough out the history. The most remarkable are the armed conflicts<sup>v</sup> happened with and after the dissolution of Yugoslavia. All the conflicts have one thing in common, and that is the fighting over territory. Although not an object of interest, the conflict happened on the territory of Slovenia was against the government forces of SFRY. Since it was for the creation of the state of Slovenia, it represented again a conflict over the territory in a failing state or as a conflict against territory according to Uppsala Conflict Data Program (<sup>Themnér &</sup> Wallensteen, 2012)vi

The conflicts on the Balkans started as conflicts over territory, but soon enough the interreligious fighting from just a mark became the very hallmark. However, most of the conflicts are rooted way back, even before the creation of the federation as such after the Second World War. Ethnic tensions and killings were present under Austria-Hungary rule at the begging of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and especially during and after the World War I when on the territory of today's Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina the Serbs were treated as aliens. Mass displacement and murderous arracks on the Serbs were happening, carried out by the Schützkorps (an Austrian militia that recruited both Croats and Muslims into their ranks), but also the Bosnian Serbs took revenge upon their Muslim neighbors (Benson, 2004)<sup>vii</sup>. In the period after the Kumanovo battle1912 and in the interwar period, Kosovo was in a state of undeclared war where Serbs fought against armed resistance of katchaks in which thousands of Kosovo Albanians (also treated as alien population to be crushed) were killed<sup>viii</sup> (Noel Malcolm, cited in Benson, 2004).When the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was created in 1918, the territory was divided into 33 districts athwart the historic territories forming the state, without possibility to merge adjacent districts (Benson, 2004). Serbs dominated in all of them (except in Slovenia) because of the way the boundaries were drawn. Only Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were founder peoples, all others did not have the right of statehood (Albanians, Bosnian Muslims, Macedonians, Montenegrins, and Magyars). In 1929 the name of the state changed into the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and the 33 administrative districts were replaced with 9 banovinas<sup>ix</sup> and a separate Prefecture of Belgrade.

During the Second World War, the ethnic killings continued in various places in the Balkans. The borders changed again: Slovenia was divided between Italy and Germany and a small part was annexed by Hungary; Italy occupied Dalmatia and Montenegro, Albania added the Western part of Macedonia and most of Kosovo; Bulgaria took the rest of Macedonia and Pirot from Serbia; part of Vojvodina was given to Hungary. Independent State of Croatia (NDH) was formed and administered by Ante Pavelic which incorporated Bosnia and Herzegovina, but without Dalmatia. The rest of the territory of Serbia was under the collaborationist government of Milan Nedic. Germany took direct control over Banat.

The total number of killed during the WW II on the territory of Yugoslavia is ranging between 1 million and 1.7 million, depending on the source. But the biggest number of the causalities was not from Axis occupiers, but from Yugoslavs themselves, especially on the territory of NDH -where more than 60% of the killings took place (Tomic, 2010). The killings were not only from one ethnicity to another, but also inside one ethnicity, communist partisans and for example, chetnics, or ustashas. When

the Federative Peoples' Republic of Yugoslavia was proclaimed with six constituent republics in 1946, no attempt was made for the borders between the republics to coincide with the ethnic map. Most of the Sadzak area was given to Montenegro, Kosovo & Metohija and Vojvodina with Serbia, and Srem was divided between Serbia and Croatia, with Croatia's part containing Serb enclaves. Bosnia and Herzegovina was intact, with Serbs, Croats and Muslims in various ratios in different parts of the republic. The Communist party perceived the boundaries inside the federation as purely administrative ones and the nationalist aspirations of the peoples were curbed within the monolith political system as such. The internal borders had a lot of anomalies. There were attempts to change the internal boundaries in 1969 because of the demands of Kosovo to become a republic and be recognized as a nation instead of a minority, but the federal leadership ruled out any changes fearing it will harm the balance of the republics in the federation<sup>x</sup> (Crampton, 2002).

In 1990s a series of armed conflicts torn Yugoslavia apart and created a number of independent countries. There were attempts to fix the anomalies of the borders between the states, especially regarding Serbs living outside Serbia. The conflict started in Slovenia because of the secession of Slovenia, and then it transferred into Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and finished with Kosovo and Macedonia. The world was not prepared for a swift and decisive response for the dissolution of the state and more important, it couldn't stop the deadly conflicts. The conflict in Croatia was not as complicated as in Bosnia and Herzegovina: In Croatia the armed conflict was between the newly established state of Croatia and the Serbs living in Croatia, with the assistance from Serbia (then still part of the remaining Yugoslavia). So, the catholic – orthodox pretext is seen, even though the conflict is seen as conflict over territory. In Bosnia and Herzegovina it was much more complicated: the fighting was between (Bosnian) Serbs and the Muslims, between the Serbs and the (Bosnian) Croats, between Croats and Muslims against Serbs, Serbs and Croats against Muslims, even between Muslims themselves in one part of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Kosovo was a clear case, where the conflict was between Kosovars (around 90% Muslim and a small part Catholic) and Serbs. The case is similar in Macedonia, where the lower intensity conflict was between orthodox Macedonians and Muslim Albanian minority.

The result of all these recent territory based conflicts was that the borders between the former republics remained almost all the same. The state borders in this region have not had any changes because of huge impact of international community, especially US and EU, for not changing the borders of the newly constituted states deriving from the former SFRY, both internal and external. Solutions offered by the international community nowadays are

not always supported by local and state authorities; even though they were approved / adopted from the highest political authorities. Also it is considered that the decisions are not imposed and does not match the realities. On the other hand, the solutions have proven to be the most appropriate response for restoring peace and ending violence in circumstances when there is lack of direct communication between the warring sides. There are many arguments which support this conclusion. The final solution for the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H) put out in the Deyton Peace agreement acknowledged Republic of Srpska as a separate entity forming 49% of B&H which is a de facto state in a state, but the borders of B&H comprising of Republic of Srpska and Federation of BH are not changed. Kosovo was created as a newly state within the existing administrative borders of the autonomous province in Serbia/Yugoslavia. Serbia does not recognize Kosovo and considers it as a part of Serbia, and the newly founded state fighting for a recognition has a small part in the North with almost exclusively Serb population.

### Security situation and future challenges on the Balkans

When speaking about the security situation on the Balkans nowadays, we have to ask ourselves where are we now? Security is without any doubt much better than ten or twenty years ago, but we are still far away from durable "warm" peace caracterised with high levels of cooperation, shared values, goals, institutions, economic interdipendance and sense of comunity (Lund, 1996). Balkans is constantly lingering between stable "cold" peace (Ibid.), where value or goal diferences exist, but mailnly addresed trough established, nonviolent chanels and political protests and voilence against property and national symbols may occur, and unstable peace. Even conflicts that have abated, can re-escalate. Also, crisis can never be rulled out, since it is still very likely some dispute to escalate into low level crysis vith varying intesity, with or without significant amount of armed force included.

The region after a lot of misfortunate events is going forward and is coping with the regional security challenges. All the states in the region have a democratic government (including the last one – Serbia after the fall of the regime of Slobodan Milosevic in 2000) and are moving towards European or Euro-Atlantic integration. The enhanced bilateral and multilateral regional cooperation activities combined with a more open approach is seen in many joint regional endeavors. The regional defense cooperation is seen in the new innovative approach "Smart Defense" based on economic rationality. The activities aimed at preventing and dealing with transnational crime is the least politically motivated and is seen as purely practical necessity. The establishment of different kinds of joint border activities and bodies/councils helps understanding the views from the other side of the borders and overcoming stereotypes. Cooperation between the two or more security system subjects is establishing a mechanism that in a way prevents additional ethical based segregation in the states. The cooperation among states contributes to achieving certain solutions to different challenges among the Balkan states that resemble the solutions from the Euro-Atlantic community. In this way, a local ownership over the solutions is "gained" and further this helps in creating a new security identity in the Balkans.

Despite all previously mentioned activities, the future security challenges in the region will be closely connected with the level of understanding of interdependence of the states from the region resulting from the common history, geographic connection but also the types of the future security challenges. Therefore, it is quintessential to understand that no state from the region can define the state security policy and interests without previously aligning them with the security challenges and interests of the states of the region (mainly cooperative but also uncooperative). Two questions still remain unanswered:

- Is the Euro-Atlantic future of the Balkans a substitute and a solution for the territorial and ethnic disputes on the Balkans?
- Do some areas (because of concentrated minorities from another state) have the potential to erupt into a wide interethnic armed conflict (Western Macedonia, deferent region, if not all of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Northern Kosovo, Sandzak, Slavonia)?

The re-integration of the minorities with the nation state might not necessarily mean changing the state borders: already all the countries aligned in NATO as full members or participating in the NATO Partnership for Peace program (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia), while NATO is still present with forces in Kosovo. The membership in NATO did not solve completely or even at all the questions of internal security in some countries (France, Turkey or Spain, for example). To some states it helped to "mend the fences" and overcome the bilateral disputes (Germany and Poland, Slovakia and Hungary). The NATO integration can be an instrument for cutting down the external support of the separatist movements, living them with only their own limited capabilities.

The membership in NATO and EU is a good fundament for further economic growth of the countries<sup>xi</sup>, also an instrument for conflict prevention. It also diminishes the nationalists' strives in the states, but it is wrong to consider that the states can import their "frozen" conflicts into the EU and achieve internal stability. That is the reason the EU is trying to make the countries from the Balkans to resolve their disputes before the process of

membership is accomplished. Among others, the minorities, territory and borders questions are paramount.

Also, the hypothesis that the conflicts in the Balkans are result of poor economic situation in the region is entirely inaccurate, although the economic situation multiplies the destructive phenomena. With the economy improving and advancing democracy, the situation in the region could be improved, but only honest neighbor relations can merge states across boundaries, rather than separate them and minorities (who are mostly part of the border areas) can be bridges that will establish deeper cooperation.

## Conclusion

There many countries in the world who consider their borders unjust. Some of borders were not marked by the state itself: it was done on a peace conference by the global international players. Borders are a reason and a factor of instability all over the world: India - Pakistan, Pakistan -Afghanistan, Palestine... The list is too long. The changing of the borders in most cases involves armed conflict, just like on the Balkans. The obvious relevance of the region even as a Europe's periphery is more than clear. It is confirmed with the stance of the international community for not changing the borders on the Balkans. It is difficult to find a way to re-shape the territory of the states so it is no longer an issue and a permanent reason for disputes and conflicts. That is because all the people living on the Balkan have historic view of their own and almost always a bitter feeling about the unjust done by "the others". Today the conflict prevention is also done trough the regional cooperation, often sponsored by the USA and EU. This approach is just one of the many efforts towards the conflict prevention. The same two actors have their focus on other regions of the world, so it is in their interest to close the Balkan territory issues in a relatively short time. Most of their job involving restoration and maintenance of peace is done because the Balkans states have found a way to communicate, share responsibility in security of the region, share same values and to cooperate towards building a new security identity. Some countries or ethnicities in a state are still insisting on changing the borders, re-creating states. However, it is clear that the wave of creating new states starting in 1990s is considered finished with the creation of the last state – Kosovo. This stance is needed because the region can still relapse into conflicts if the Pandora's Box is once again opened.

Another solution leading towards permanent regional stability and closing the bilateral disputes may be a simultaneous agreement involving all the Balkan states. However, if the states, and more important their leaders, had the capacity to resolve these issues, they would have done it till now. Balkan is still an area where the concessions while negotiating over disputes are seen as treason and dialog is seen as a way to pretend that they are interested in solving the issues and get access to the (European) funds. So, the international community in certain situations will supplement the capacity, vision and courage of the Balkan state leaders, and also will provide them with a "excuse" about their decisions and actions.

From the aspect of intrastate conflicts, the power of the nationalistic rhetoric of the political actors can never be underestimated especially when the economic situation is depriving both on state and individual level. As many times shown in the history, the political leaders on the Balkans can be unpredictable. They can catalyze a crisis, escalate a conflict and turn it into violent one. Even if a state becomes a regional power on the Balkans (like Yugoslavia), it cannot change the borders; it is essential to have a support from a greater ally. That is why the power of the allies of the Balkan states will influence the next redefinition of the Balkan state borders. Till then, they will stay in this format and shape, and that will the firm stance of all the global actors in the world politics regarding this region.

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<sup>iv</sup>The preventive diplomacy's main goal was to keep the conflict from escalating into global confrontations between the superpowers.

<sup>vi</sup>The only armed conflict against government in the Balkans after 1990s, according to that source, is the conflict in Macedonia in 2001.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>i</sup>Although the SFRY was formed as FRY as a socialist and communist state, it became "Socialist" with the 1963. Previously the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was created in 1929 succeeding the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes created 1918.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>ii</sup>The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a ) a permanent population; b ) a defined territory; c ) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states. Article 1 of Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>iii</sup>The provinces got extensive rights of self-rule under the Yugoslav Constitution from 1974. They were autonomous from 1945 (Vojvodina) and 1963 (Kosovo). Kosovo lost its status in 1989.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>v</sup>There are different kinds of conflicts that are researched in the conflict prevention doctrine. Almost always, the word conflict is connected with the word violent or deadly, although conflict implies violence, contrary to disputes that refers to conflicts that have not become violent (some scholars make a distinction between the two by suggesting that disputes are a short-term phenomena, while conflicts are long-term problems). When we use the term armed conflict, it will refer to prolong combat between government of a state military, paramilitary forces or organized armed group, and results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year.

<sup>vii</sup>Only in Eastern Herzegovina 3000 Muslims were murdered in the early post-war years.

viiiIn that time more then 20 000 Kosovo Albanians were massacred and perhaps 5 times as many flee from Kosovo to Bosnia.

<sup>ix</sup>They were named after the names of the main rivers in the banovanas, and one was named Costal banovina. The reason for that was to deprive them of ethnic or historic associations.

<sup>x</sup>Kosovo demanded the status with the argument that one million Albanians from Kosovo could not get the status of nation, and it was given to 370 000 Montenegrins. The fear was that it would imply changing of borders and involving the Albanians from Macedonia and Montenegro, and even more, they might join the state of Albania.

<sup>xi</sup> Foreign direct investment in the countries of the "cluster" in the years before and after joining NATO do not show some regularity between accession to NATO and the amount of movement amounts. For example, in Croatia entered a lot more money before 2008 than after, and in Albania is the exact opposite. In Macedonia, however, every year is different, according to the "hot-cold" changes (Diumeska & Trpkovski, 2013).