

МЕЃУНАРОДНА НАУЧНА КОНФЕРЕНЦИЈА

ВЛИЈАНИЕТО НА ГОЛЕМИТЕ СИЛИ ВРЗ БЕЗБЕДНОСТА НА МАЛИТЕ ДРЖАВИ



INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE

**THE GREAT POWERS INFLUENCE ON THE
SECURITY OF SMALL STATES**

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CONTENTS:

PREFACE

GEOSTRATEGIC INTERESTS AND POLITICAL INFLUENCES

SMALL STATES IN THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS	11
SNEZANA NIKODINOSKA – STEFANOVSKA.....	11
THE PLACE OF WESTERN BALKANS IN THE GLOBAL STRATEGY OF CHINA.....	25
TONI MILESKI.....	25
NIKOLCO SPASOV.....	25
ALEKSANDAR STANKOVIC.....	25
THE BALKAN VECTOR OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY IN HISTORICAL RETROSPECT.....	34
TAMARA GELLA.....	34
SOVIET AND YUGOSLAV ECONOMIC INFLUENCE IN ALBANIA 1945-1948: DESTABILIZING THREAT OR A FACTOR FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH.....	43
BOŽICA SLAVKOVIĆ MIRIĆ.....	43
THE ROLE OF THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH IN SPREADING RUSSIAN GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS IN THE BALKANS. COLLABORATION OR COOPTATION WITH THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLITICS?.....	54
NIKOLA AMBARKOV.....	54
SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANISATION - THE NEW EURASIA REGIONAL ALLIANCE	65
MARJAN ARSOVSKI.....	65
SASE GERASIMOSKI.....	65
ONE BELT ONE ROAD CHINA BETWEEN ECONOMIC PROMOTION AND DEMOCRATIC OBSTACLE - CHINESE-SERBIAN COOPERATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES ON SERBIAN SECURITY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION	78
STEFAN VLADISAVLJEV.....	78
UNDERSTANDING BILATERAL DIPLOMACY OF INDONESIA AND RUSSIA	87
SABRIANA JAYAPUTRI.....	87
“THE 70TH ANNIVERSARY OF NATO - BORDERS AND INFLUENCE: TOWARDS THE BALKANS AND EURASIA“	92
JASMINKA SIMIĆ.....	92
NATO AS A MEANS OF STRATEGIC DETERRENCE FOR THE WESTERN BALKAN COUNTRIES	106
LUKA NIKOLIĆ.....	106

THE UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY IN THE WESTERN BALKANS DURING TRUMP'S PRESIDENCY: TRAJECTORIES AND RECENT CHANGES	114
JOVANKA KUVEKALOVIĆ-STAMATOVIĆ	114
STEFAN JOJIĆ	114
IGOR PEJIĆ	114
THE TWO BASIC GLOBALIZATION CONCEPTS, THE EURO ATLANTIC AND THE EURO ASIAN	129
LJUPCHO STANKOVSKI	129
ZAKLINA JOVANOVA	129
GEO-STRATEGY OF WESTERN SEA POWER AND SMALL STATES' SECURITY: THE CASE OF GREECE 1914–1922	136
ILIAS ILIOPOULOS	136

NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES AND ASYMMETRIC THREATS

BASICS OF SECURITY PHILOSOPHY	152
CANE MOJANOSKI	152
GOCE ARIZANKOSKI	152
THE ROLE OF NON-SECURITY ACTORS IN THE GLOBAL SECURITY	166
OLIVER BAKRESKI	166
GJORG ALCESKI	166
LETA BARGIEVA	166
THE CAPACITY OF PRIVATE SECURITY IN PREVENTING SECURITY RISKS IN SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE	176
SAŠE GERASIMOSKI	176
ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE SECURITY RISKS IN THE REPUBLIC OF NORTH MACEDONIA	189
MARJAN NIKOLOVSKI	189
SASHE GERASIMOVSKI	189
MARJAN GJUROVSKI	189
SECURITY CHALLENGES OF ILLEGAL MIGRATION IN NORTH MACEDONIA: OVERVIEW OF MIGRANT SMUGGLING	203
ZLATE DIMOVSKI	203
ICE ILIJEVSKI	203
KIRE BABANOSKI	203
SAFETY AND PREVENTION OF TRAFFIC DELINQUENCY	214
BORIS MURGOSKI	214
METODIJA DOJCINOVSKI	214
SMALL COUNTRIES AND MIGRATION PROCESSES – MORE THAN A SECURITY PROBLEM	234
NENAD KOMAZEC	234
BRANISLAV MILOSAVLJEVIC	234
MACEDONIANS AND ALBANIANS: TRUST OR SECURITY DILEMMAS AMONG THE MACEDONIAN CITIZENS	246

MARIJA MILENKOVSKA.....	246
ELENA DIMOVSKA.....	246
ISLAM AS A RESULT OF ISLAMIC IDEOLOGY.....	257
HATIDZA BERIŠA.....	257
KATARINA JONEV.....	257
ZELJKO GAJIĆ.....	257
THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON THE STATE’S NATIONAL SECURITY.....	270
TATJANA GERGINOVA.....	270
SOCIAL ENGINEERING IN THE CONTEXT OF CYBER SECURITY.....	282
TONI NAUMOVSKI.....	282
NENAD TANESKI.....	282
MONTENEGRO’S ROAD TO ACHIEVING THE EU CHAPTER 27 STANDARDS “THE WAY FORWARD TO REACHING THE EU CLOSING BENCHMARKS FOR MONTENEGRO IN 2019 AND 2020”.....	292
SRNA SUDAR.....	292
SECURITISATION OF TERRORISM IN EUROPE IN THE ELECTION PROCESS.....	304
IVICA SIMONOVSKI.....	304
ZEYNEP ECE ÜNSAL.....	304
REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA AND THE MIGRANT CRISIS: HISTORY AND PERSPECTIVES.....	315
ANDREJ ILIEV.....	315
ALEKSANDAR GLAVINOV.....	315
JOVAN ILIEV.....	315
SECURITY SYSTEM REFORMS, GENDER INCLUSION AND CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT.....	333
FADIL ISUFI.....	333

PREFACE

Dear readers,

The mission of the international scientific conference entitled “The Influence of Great Powers Over the Security of Small States” is to encourage the academic community and security practitioners to exchange views based on applied subject specific research scientific methods, but also to attach a scientific – research dimension to practical experiences. The idea for organizing this Conference coincides with the need for addressing the contemporary challenges and security risks.

Expanding the spectrum of scientific thought is associated with the security challenges faced by states, especially in a time of global movements and dynamic world processes. Through their papers, the members of the security academic community talk among each other, discussing and sharing their different views, and ultimately arrive at common solutions for every challenge that has emerged in the security sector.

The papers in this Compendium were received by means of a public announcement and they offer solutions for the future establishment and renaming of the security systems of small countries in view of creating an efficient response to contemporary security risks and threats, that is, to the destabilizing factors that cause conflicts. On that note, and in correlation with the title of the Conference, the papers treat security issues in a number of security science sub-disciplines and contribute to confirming the existing and creating new solutions in the area of security, international relations, Euro – Atlantic integration, criminalistics and criminology with an underlying holistic approach and for the purpose of efficient and timely dealing with security risks and threats and accelerating the process of Euro – Atlantic integration.

Hence, the mission of the Conference and the publication of the papers encourage scientists and researchers to exchange scientific knowledge in order to identify the security needs and determine and select an appropriate response, as one of the prerequisites for the integration of small countries.

The practical objective of this Conference and Compendium is manifold, primarily due to the scarce number of papers and analyses on this topic in scientific and expert literature and the partial scientific approach in those that exist, which implies imposing effects in practice.

The aim is to produce valid results and scientifically verified knowledge that will enable the implementation of a rational and acceptable solution for the security sector reforms. Argumentative substantiation and presentation of the derived results and the overall situation are used to consider the systemic and

institutional solutions and to initiate a new phase of qualitative development of the security system and its institutions

The international scientific conference has gained a high reputation over the past nine years among the academia in the region and Europe. The scientific gathering 2019 will cover the following topics that are addressed in the Compendium papers:

Geostrategic interests and political influences

- Geopolitical conflict of concepts, interests and ideologies in the region: Euro-Atlantic vs. Euro-Asian integration;
- Russian influence in the Balkans-destabilizing threat or factor for economic growth;
- Turkish foreign and security policy in the Balkans ; □ One belt One Road-China between economic promotion and democratic obstacle;
- The role of USA in the Balkans in the era of President Trump;
- German strategic interests in the region;

New security challenges and asymmetric threats

- Radicalism and the Balkans;
- Security between strategies and red lines in the Balkans;
- The role of non-state actors in the security of Southeast Europe;
- Hybrid threats as new challenges for security ;

Global movements and changing policies

- Migration, human rights, political and security risks for small states;
- The role of the rule of law in the balance between justice and security in international relations;
- Contemporary forms of crime as a global threat;
- Capacity strengthening of small states and the capacity for fighting corruption and organized crime;

The Faculty of Security – Skopje has a key role in analyzing the processes and threats to the country's internal and international security. Ohrid scientific conference 2019 contributes through a debate of scientific articles to providing answers to all the issues that raise the interest of the scientific and social public. One of these issues is the regional establishment in terms of the great powers and their interests. Through an open and argumentative debate, the conference incites a discussion on the impacts of great and regional security factors in the Balkans.

The exchange of experiences and the presentation of the results from the scientific research conducted by higher education institutions supported by international organizations can contribute to responding to the security dilemmas and problems in the region, achieving better functionality and position of the security system.

Thus, the Faculty of Security – Skopje continues its orientation toward organizing the 10th international conference in the security field in order to contribute to the development of scientific thought, and help policy creators (political level) and decision makers (senior practitioners) on the regional, national and local level to overcome the practical problems they are facing in a faster, simpler and timely fashion with the acquired knowledge and research results.

On behalf of the Faculty of Security-Skopje and the Organizational Board of the Conference, I express my gratitude to the Hans Seidel Foundation from the Federal Republic of Germany for supporting the organization of the International Scientific Conference, as well as to the Chamber for Private Security of the Republic of North Macedonia, which has been our partner over the years in joint activities. I am especially pleased that the idea for organizing this type of international scientific conference launched 10 years ago by Professor Cane Mojanoski with a team of professors will continue to live in the future, and after its first decade it will grow into an even larger-scale international scientific academic forum.

*Assistant Professor Marjan Gjurovski, Dr.Sc
Vice Dean for Science and Development
Chairman of the Organizational Board
of the International Scientific Conference and Editor of the Compendium*

Country	Original Scientific paper	Review Scientific paper	Professional paper	Total work papers
Bosnia and Hercegovina		2	1	3
Croatia	2			2
Germany		1		1
Greece		1		1
Kosovo				
Macedonia	7	15	2	24
Montenegro		1	1	2
Romania			2	2
Russia		1		1
Serbia	2	9	2	13
Slovenia			1	1
Turkey		1		1
Total work papers	11	31	9	51

GEOSTRATEGIC INTERESTS AND POLITICAL INFLUENCES

SMALL STATES IN THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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Abstract

Until the twentieth century, in all European languages states were routinely referred to as ‘powers’. While this noun is still used for a different category of states, namely ‘great powers’ (and, more rarely, also for ‘middle powers’), ‘small powers’ are nowadays simply referred to as ‘small states’. The number of small states has grown drastically in the post-Cold War period. The birth of a new generation of small states was formed through the dissolution of empires and multinational states. Some have regarded this trend as the third wave in the emergence of independent states in the twentieth century - the first and second waves being those that occurred after the First and Second World Wars respectively.

The study of small states and their role in international relations grew in significance in the 1960s and 1970s during the time when many of them were in the process of de-colonization as they became sovereign states.

This article deals with the definition of the so called “small states”, than with International Relations theories that could be used for explanation of the small states’ role in the world and finally, with the strategies that small states employ to achieve greater stability and security.

Keywords: *small states, international relations, shelter theory, balancing, bandwagoning and hedging strategy.*

1. INTRODUCTION

The profound transformation in the nature of international relations in the recent years cannot but affect the position of small states. The number of small states has grown drastically in the post-Cold War period and we are witnessing the birth of a new generation of small states, formed through the dissolution of empires and multinational states.¹ Some have regarded this trend as the third wave in the emergence of independent states in the twentieth century - the first and second

¹ The Soviet Union fragmented, with the former Union republics opting for statehood, but division has continued beyond that. The Russian Federation at the very least bound to transform itself into a looser confederation rather than a federal structure. Yugoslavia has likewise disintegrated, as has Czechoslovakia.

waves being those that occurred after the First and the Second World Wars respectively.

During the Cold War era, the problem of the small states was somewhat neglected because of the tight hierarchical structure of international system. The end of this system has produced the re-emergence of small states and, simultaneously, a kind of anarchy in international relations when small states acquired certain degree of freedom of choice and freedom of action in their domestic as well as foreign policies, which in some cases conducted to international, regional and domestic crises and conflicts. This phenomenon gave an opportunity to the world community to pay more attention to and to have a new look at the problems of new and old small states.

To consider the small states' role in the world, it is helpful to rely on international relations theories that can provide simplified frameworks for interpreting the complex world of states, international organizations and other world actors. Realism, liberalism and constructivism provide the three simplest yet comprehensive frameworks for simplifying the world in a way that gives us explanatory power. Another theory- shelter theory was also created in an attempt to forecast and explain small states behavior in the international system. This theory is derived from the disadvantages and needs that small states face in the political, economic and societal spheres and argues that small states seek political, economic and societal shelter.

From a legal point of view, all sovereign states, great or small, are equal before the law but from a political point of view, however, they are far from being equal. Small states are certainly disadvantaged in the international system.

Small states are geographically and economically diverse, and thus face many challenges, some of which are crucial to their existence. In addition to traditional military threats, small states today also face non-traditional security challenges such as terrorism, environmental disasters, hybrid threats, cyberattacks or economic and social vulnerabilities. A wide range of challenges require capabilities to cope with them, which small states usually lack in absolute or relative terms. They have smaller economies and militaries, limited diplomatic resources, suffer from various economic or political dependencies, and have less means of dealing with more powerful states.

There are several strategies that small states employ to achieve greater stability and security, and gain more influence in relation to other actors. Small states can either engage with great powers, balance against potential threats, develop hedging strategies or stay neutral. Small states can also seek shelter. Each of these strategies follows the same objective to obtain more security and also reflects different circumstances and the vulnerabilities of small states.

2. DEFINING SMALL STATES

The wave of newly independent states during the 1960's gave rise to a debate on how to define a small state. There is no one definition of small states.

Therefore, they have been defined in various ways. Small states have long been loosely defined in terms of what they are not, or what they do not possess, instead of what they are. In European diplomacy, the ‘small state’ emerged as a ‘residual category’ between middle powers and microstates (Neumann and Gstöhl, 2004).

Defining small states are incredibly diverse, having in mind that they vary in size, population, economy, natural resources, and vulnerabilities. The most commonly applied criteria are an objective classification based on population, geographic area and economic capacity (Crowards, 2002).

Population size is the most common single variable in defining the size of states. Many attempts to classify small states turn on population as the most straightforward definition. Still, even population-based definitions vary:

- The World Bank and the Commonwealth tend to use a threshold of 1.5 million people to count nations as small states (Thorhallsson, 2012).
- The Forum of Small States (FOSS) defines small states as those with populations of fewer than 10 million people.² The forum is open to states with a population of fewer than 10 million, although the population of some members has exceeded that level since they joined the group.
- Another category in the literature on small states focuses on the special challenges faced by “microstates.” This term further distinguishes very small states, or countries with populations of less than 500,000 people. Thirteen UN member states currently have populations of less than 100,000 inhabitants, while fifteen member states have populations between 100,000 and 500,000 people (Thorhallsson, 2014).

Size of economy (GDP) and territory are also commonly used to define state size (Archer and Nugent, 2002). However, territory and economy are not particularly useful on their own. It is possible for a state with little territory to have a large population, economy and military capability; and thus, be powerful. On the other hand, states with extensive territory can also have little power. Territory does not necessarily imbue states with strengths in the same way that a large population and economy does. A poor state with a large population can vastly increase the size and scope of its economy by adopting appropriate policies or stumbling upon the right resources reducing the economic challenges that come with a small economy.

Early works, such as David Vital’s *The Inequality of States* (1967), differentiate small states by their material capabilities, having identified small states as a special group of states that appear to have a particular concern with their ability to sustain themselves as sovereign actors in the international system. The early literature therefore focused on the concept of weakness rather than some permanent geographical characteristic, but nevertheless recognizes that this group of states naturally occupies a distinct position in the international structure. In particular, small states have generally been defined in direct contrast to large states,

² Forum of Small States (FOSS) is a loose non-ideological and non-geographical coalition of small states. It is a voluntary and informal grouping at the UN coordinated by Singapore and is based on common interests. Members meet regularly to exchange views and coordinate positions.)

and consequently, by the absence of the internal capacities that enable large states to be sovereign actors in the international structure (Baldacchino, 2009).

Annette Fox in her *The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II* (1959) writes: “Geography was often an important element in the calculations of the great and small powers, but it could not be said to determine their course. The expectations of the leaders, sometimes influenced by geographical considerations, to be sure, were the crucial factor”

Robert Keohane (1969) suggested an alternative definition of a small state based on perceived security capability when the state’s elite does not expect to make an impact acting alone or in a small group. Similarly, Rothstein (1968) described small powers as states which recognize that they are not capable of obtaining security without relying on other states, institutions or processes. This inability to rely on their own capabilities must also be recognized by other states.

In the post-Cold War era, small states’ scholars have combined ‘new variables’ such as perception/image with traditional variables -size of population, economy, territory and military- and have shifted their focus from the power that the state possesses to the power that the state exercises. A state can be weak in one relation but at the same time powerful in another. Small states are the weaker actors in asymmetrical power relationship and weak enough to be unable to change such relationships. Accordingly, Denmark is the weaker partner in the Danish-German relations but Denmark is the stronger component in the Danish-Icelandic relations. Also, a great power is a state whose policy may fundamentally alter a regional and world setting: a German decision to leave the European Union would radically alter the European order. On the other hand, a decision in Copenhagen to leave the EU would mainly affect Denmark itself and only have minor consequences for the Union (e.g. Thorhallsson and Wivel, 2006; Archer, Bailes and Wivel, 2014).

Instead of focusing solely on one factor, Thorhallsson proposes a multifunctional framework, including six categories, for defining the size of states. In this schematic framework, fixed size refers to the population size and territorial size of the state; sovereignty size refers to the ability of small states to maintain sovereignty over their territory and govern it competently; while political size refers to the military and administrative capabilities of the state, the ability of the state to form a foreign policy consensus and the ability to have the domestic cohesion needed to tackle various problems. Economic size refers to the size of the state’s gross domestic product and development status; while perceptual size refers to the political discourse and self-perceptions that leaders, elites, groups and the public have of their own states. Small states that perceive themselves as influential actors with a role to play in world politics may be more successful in making a mark, whereas small states that do not believe that they can ever be influential on the world stage end up victims of this self-fulfilling prophecy. Perceptions by outside actors of the state in question are also important. Finally, preference size refers to the specific ideas, ambitions and priorities that elites in the state have and how expansive they are (Thorhallsson, 2006).

Ultimately, there is no commonly agreed upon definition of a small state because there is always some relativism involved in the discussion. The term small state is defined both by its power relationship to its environment and quantitative factors which determine the challenges, limitations and abilities of small states to exercise their influence and independently make security policy choices.

3. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES AND SMALL STATES

Each researcher of International Relations (IR) stands in front of a question how to choose among theories which can see the world from very different angles. Theories can be perceived as lenses of various colors, through which we look at the same world but everyone sees a different picture. There is one world but there is not one truth about it.

To consider small states' role in the world, it is helpful to rely on international relations theories that can provide simplified frameworks for interpreting the infinitely complex world of states, international organisations and other world actors. Realism, liberalism and constructivism provide the three simplest yet comprehensive frameworks for simplifying the world in a way that gives us explanatory power. Another theory -shelter theory- was also created in an attempt to forecast and explain small states' behavior in the international system.

3.1. REALISM

Realism is a school of thought that explains international relations in terms of power (Goldstein, 2001). The core concepts of realism are that states, which are the central actors in IR, use power to pursue their own interests in the context of an anarchic system lacking central enforcement mechanism. Power capabilities come into play as leverage in bargaining among states over the outcomes of conflicts. Military force according realists is more important form of leverage because of the inherent insecurity of living in an anarchic world (Goldstein, 2001). Self-preservation or self-help is a major theme in realism, as states must always seek power to protect themselves. Although leaders may be moral, they must not let morality guide their foreign policy.

The classic position on realist thinking about the question of power and size is offered in the Melian Dialogue of Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian war where Athens and Sparta are seen as the subjects, and the tiny island of Melos an object, of inter-state dynamics. He wrote that "the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept" (Thucydides). Realists are skeptical that international law and organisations can pacify state behavior and make states respect agreements. Nor do states abide by norms unless these handily fit their underlying interests. Globalisation and economic interdependence do not change the fears and distrust of states, and the logic that leads them to accumulate power stands. As a result, realists expect more security competition and instability (Mearsheimer, 2010). Thus, due to small states' lack of military muscle, diplomatic

power and economic leverage, small states are highly vulnerable to coercion and conquest (Vital. 1967).

In the realist view, the role of small states in international politics is highly circumscribed, with small states being primarily pawns in great power games. Therefore, they find niches and rely on a large state for security and goods, if the small states happen to be strategically important; otherwise, small states without strategic importance will have less room for maneuver and a greater dependence on the goodwill and mercy of larger powers.

3.2. LIBERALISM

The theory of liberalism began to take shape in the 1970s as increasing globalization, communications technology, and international trade made some scholars argue that realism became obsolete (Goldstein, 2001). Liberalism recognizes that states share broad ties, thus making it difficult to define singular independent national interests. Liberal approaches to the study of international relations, also referred to as theories of complex interdependence, claim that the consequences of military power outweigh the benefits and that international cooperation is in the interest of every state. It also claims that exercising economic power over military power has proven more effective. The theory of liberalism in international relations therefore involves the decreased use of military power.

For liberals, there is more to international politics than power competition. The drivers of state behavior are not the same that realists imagine them to be. This means that cooperation between states, regardless of their size, is possible and can be sustained, even in an anarchic world. Democracy, trade, and institutions mitigate the fears and uncertainty that anarchy gives rise to, and make sustained peaceful cooperation possible. In the modern international system, small and large states are increasingly locked into webs of institutional and interstate relations that create significant restraint, especially on large powers (Keohane & Nye, 2011).

On the other hand, liberalism still holds that state behaviour is primarily driven by practical benefits and ideological affinity between states. For instance, Ingebritsen (1998) shows how the European policy of the Nordic states has been heavily influenced by their primary economic sectors. Gstöhl (2002) similarly argues that economic incentives are important to explain the European policy of Sweden, Norway and Switzerland, but that questions of national identity also matter. As a result, these three states opted not to join the EU for a long period even though they had economic incentives to do so, because EU membership and its implications for national identity created domestic political hurdles. They did however enjoy favorable market access to the European market which was of utmost importance to them.

3.3. CONSTRUCTIVISM

Constructivism is not a theory in the same sense as liberalism or realism; but a framework that highlights the role of ideas and identities in shaping systems and individual behaviors. Constructivists argue that states have agency and can respond in various ways depending on the identities and ideas that they have about themselves and others (Wendt, 1992; Hopf 1998). According to constructivists the state behavior shifts along with changes to their identities, interests and intersubjective beliefs. Constructivists also argue that there is more to power than material strength. After all, states and leaders can rely on soft power and the art of persuasion (Nye, 1990; Ingebritsen, 2002).

The constructivist approach describes the deeper generative logic of multilateral principles and institutions, and accommodates small states' use of norms and ideas to support the multilateral order, presenting another avenue through which small states have a role in shaping the institutional structure (Kratochwil, 1993).

3.4. SHELTER THEORY

Shelter theory was created in an attempt to forecast and explain small state behavior in the international system. Shelter theory is derived from both the disadvantages and needs that small states face in the political, economic and societal spheres. Having distinct disadvantages and needs relative to large states, and thus behave differently; small states seek political, economic and societal shelter. These forms of shelter are provided by large states and international organizations. First, small states seek shelter to reduce the risk that crises occur at all. Second, they search for shelter to ensure that they will receive assistance during crisis events. Third, they seek shelter to guarantee that powerful states and international organizations provide assistance to them during their recovery from a crisis situation.

Political shelter refers to military and diplomatic backing by another state or an international organization. Namely, small states are primarily concerned with gaining political and/or military power on the international scene. In international politics, the size of a country's military often determines its level of power in international relationships. Small states lack the ability to field large militaries with diverse capabilities on their own which drives them to seek access to larger militaries. Political shelter can also refer to the ways in which small states rely on international law and norms. It is essential for the small states to be sheltered by the norms and rules of the international system. Shelter theory, therefore reduces small states' vulnerability to coercion, and increases their ability to achieve successful international outcomes. Through political shelter, small states secure the basics needed for their survival, while also attaining the ability to influence broader sets of issues on the international scene.

Small states also face economic insecurities which shape their foreign policy goals. They suffer from diseconomies of scale in production and distribution, exposure to high levels of risk due to small populations and a limited capacity to negotiate with larger powers (Venner, 2009). Small states are reliant on one or a few major exports. This makes the economies of small states more vulnerable to shocks, as disruptions in trade. To meet their economic security needs small states need access to an open global economy and free trade, which is sometimes limited. Without external economic assistance, small states are also more vulnerable to economic crisis. This assistance depends on small states' successful relations with large states and international organizations. Economic shelter may come from a state and/or an organization in the form of direct economic assistance and investment, a currency union, beneficial loans, favorable market access, and/or a common market (Thorhallsson and Steinsson, 2018).

Small-states' theories have traditionally viewed the vulnerability of small states primarily in terms of economic and political elements. However, shelter theory considers that small states seek societal shelter to avoid isolation and social stagnation, and to overcome problems that stem from a lack of native knowledge. Small states seek recognition at an international level. This desire to have a recognized identity is motivated by the fact that small power states with no global interactions may suffer from inactivity. Without international recognition, small states risk being excluded from the international exchange of people, ideas, and information in general which is necessary to promote change and growth within a society (Rokkan, 1983). Relations with the outside world are essential since it is through constant interaction with other cultures, ideas and ideologies that a society evolves, is enriched and moves forward. Interactions with foreign cultures and individuals are consequently important to achieve a marketplace of ideas in the small state.

Shelter theory demonstrates that small states need external shelter in multiple dimensions; not only in terms of hard security but also in other areas which are closely interlinked to the decision of a state to choose a particular foreign-policy strategy. Small states' prosperity is strongly linked to the nature and depth of shelter provided by larger states and/or international organizations.

Shelter theory differs from other IR theories in several ways. Most notably, small states are fundamentally different units from large states. Second, the alliance choices that small states make not only serve to ensure their security, but may also have roots in domestic pressures to obtain the resources needed to achieve a successful, functional society. Third, small states benefit disproportionately from membership in international organizations as compared with large states. Fourth and fifth, small states seek partnerships with other states and alliances to achieve the resources needed to run efficient administrations and also to get the social and cultural relationships needed to keep their societies vibrant. On the other hand, such shelter does not, of course, come without costs (Thorhallsson and Steinsson, 2018).

4. SMALL STATES SECURITY STRATEGY CHOICES

Security and influence are the two things that small states do not have on their own, a capability assessment which is part of what defines a small state. There are several strategies that small states employ to achieve greater stability and security, and gain more influence in relation to other actors. Small states can engage with great powers, balance against potential threats, develop hedging strategies or stay neutral. Small states can also seek shelter. Each of these strategies follows the same objective to obtain more security and also reflects different circumstances and the vulnerabilities of small states.

Contemporary structural realism proposes three strategies a state may pursue to ensure its survival in the international system: join alliances to balance against powerful actors (balancing), align with threatening powers (bandwagoning) or strategic hedging.³ From the three primary alignment strategies the first two, balancing and bandwagoning, operate primarily when confronted by a significant external threat, whereas hedging operates especially under the normal condition of international relations short of imminent threats or crises (Hiep, 2013).

4.1. ALLIANCES STRATEGIES: BALANCING AND BANDWAGONING

According to proponents of the traditional alliance theory, states tend to employ two broad strategies when confronted with threats – either to align with weaker allies to balance against the potential aggressor or align with the threatening power and bandwagon. Both of these strategies are based on available capabilities. Weaker states are also more likely to balance when they are threatened by powers of equal capabilities, and bandwagon when they face greater powers.

Balancing requires an actor to engage in a countervailing behavior in order to maintain “equilibrium” in the international system. Walt defines balancing as “allying with others against the prevailing threat” (Walt, 1987). This can be achieved primarily in two different ways, either internal balancing or external balancing (or in a combination of the two) (Walt, 1987). Balancing is more likely to happen if the capability of a rising power is accompanied by geographical proximity, offensive actions or intentions. There are two factors which motivate small states to choose this strategy. First, small states join weaker powers before they become a potential threat. Secondly, joining the weaker side boosts their influence within the alliance due to a greater need for assistance (Walt, 1985).

Bandwagoning is traditionally defined as the opposite to balancing. Following the bandwagoning school of thought, small states choose to align with

³ Contemporary structural realism refers to the body of scholars identifying “hedging” as an important alternative to balancing and bandwagoning in the international system. See Understanding “Hedging” in Asia-Pacific Security. in PacNet, No. 43. Pacific Forum, CSIS: <http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/pac0643.pdf>. (Accessed on 30 January 2019).

the fast emerging power instead of balancing against it. For Walt, (1987), bandwagoning refers to “alignment with the source of danger”, as opposed to the strategy of balancing against the threat. Small states generally bring little value to a balancing coalition; therefore, bandwagoning can be seen as a more reasonable option to minimize their security risks. Waltz (1979) clarifies that balancing refers to the choice of joining the weaker side in a conflict, while bandwagoning is the choice of allying with the stronger side. According to Walt (1987) bandwagoning involves an unequal exchange: “The vulnerable state makes asymmetrical concessions to the dominant power and accepts a subordinate role. Bandwagoning is [thus] an accommodation to pressure (either latent or manifest).”

The authors identified several conditions under which small states are more likely to bandwagon. Firstly, the weaker the state is, the more likely it is to bandwagon in order to minimize potential costs of losing. Secondly, small states choose to bandwagon when allies are unavailable and the state is directly threatened. Finally, states bandwagon in exchange for mutual benefit (Walt 1990). Small states in close proximity to the threat might be the first victims, so aligning with the aggressor can help to minimize their losses (Walt 1990).

Alliances usually bring together members with similar strategic interests and ideologies and are mutually reinforcing (Walt, 1997). Alliances can be defensive or offensive, intended to attack a third party or aimed at defending its members in case they are attacked.⁴ Joining the alliance can help small states to exercise influence on particular foreign policy issues and advance their international status beyond neutrality or non-alignment. Weaker states join alliances to protect themselves from potential adversaries and increase stability. Belonging to a particular alliance also allows access to consultations and increases the chances of gaining political support and military assistance from other major partners (Shou and Brundtland, 1971). Alliances can also help with burden sharing by pooling resources that small states usually lack.

4.2. BEYOND BALANCING AND BANDWAGONING: STRATEGIC HEDGING

There is another strategic option that small states can employ in relation to other powers – strategic hedging. Defining hedging strategy, however, has proven problematic. There has been a debate on what does it include and what it does not include. Goh (2005), for instance, defines hedging as a set of strategies aimed at avoiding a situation in which states cannot decide upon more straightforward

⁴ NATO is the best example of a modern defensive alliance which was established in response to an emerging threat. Small European states saw it as the main security guarantee able to balance against a potential adversary. Based on common interests and values NATO unites 29 member states, of which one third are small states. NATO is a highly institutionalized framework with a collective defence commitment providing countries with clear benefits of membership. In this regard, NATO was seen by small states as both a potentially stronger power to balance against the adversary and as a platform to advance their international status.

alternatives such as balancing, bandwagoning, or neutrality. Others, like Medeiros (2005-2006), see hedging as a mixed strategy, that on the one hand stress engagement and integration mechanisms and, on the other, emphasis realist-style balancing in the form of external security cooperation. More exhaustively, Kuik (2008) explains hedging as a behaviour in which an actor tries to mitigate risks by pursuing multiple policy options, which would produce mutually counteracting effects, under the situation of high-uncertainties and high-stakes; keeping open more than one strategic option against the possibility of a future security threat.

Lee (2017) defines strategic hedging as the “behavior of a country pursuing the offsetting of risks by choosing multilateral policies with the intention of making mutually reactive effects”. This strategy aims to avoid one particular policy – balancing, bandwagoning or neutrality – and seeks to reduce the potential risk in relation to regional powers without confronting either of them (Sherwood, 2016). Strategic hedging is employed when states do not want to support either side or power, fearing that this could lead to higher security risks. This strategy falls in between balancing and bandwagoning, and must fulfill some conditions to be successful. Namely, states which employ strategic hedging must not face threats from rising regional superpowers and their security environment must not be based on a “rigid logic of a bloc” allowing some flexibility in terms of not being tied to one side (Sherwood, 2016).

Small states prefer hedging over balancing or bandwagoning due to several factors. Balancing can be strategically unnecessary and politically provocative or even counterproductive, leading to the loss of potential economic gains. It can also be politically risky and limit the freedom of action of small states (Kuik, 2008).

5. CONCLUSION

It is not easy to define what a small state is. Smallness is of relative meaning, but small states in international relations are states with relatively less power, political, economic and military alike. They are the states vulnerable and open to external shocks and threats that are weak in both public and private sectors, those with scattered, large and unskilled populations and added to that, that are remote and isolated in the system.

Small states are exposed to a whole set of security challenges and influences that their counterparts lack and which determine their foreign-policy behaviour and security strategies. Because of their small size and limited capabilities to protect themselves militarily or economically, small states are much more vulnerable to internal as well as external dynamics when compared with large powers. To gain more security and stability, as well as, exercise more influence and meet their economic or political needs, small states either seek partners and allies or remain neutral. Each of the security strategies of the small states intends to increase their chances of survival but also carries certain risks. Moreover, small states differ not only from larger powers but also among themselves. Despite sharing similar characteristics of smallness, states tend to employ different security

strategies. Depending on their geography, historical contexts and existing limitations in terms of capabilities and perceptions, they choose different patterns of foreign-policy behavior. These may include, among others, alliances strategies such as balancing or bandwagoning, and strategic hedging.

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THE PLACE OF WESTERN BALKANS IN THE GLOBAL STRATEGY OF CHINA

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Abstract

With the past export-led economic growth that has gradually become a tool of Chinese soft power, China showcased globally a powerful and inviting policy of economic power in action, and investment-seeking countries (especially from the Western Balkans) are willing to show their eagerness towards Chinese loans and capital. The perception of China's foreign policy capacity has changed lately, especially after the introduction of the One Belt One Road initiative.

The total trade volume between China and selected Western Balkan economies reached a level of €3.3 billion in 2015-16. In foreign trade, China accounts for almost half of that total trade volume. China is present in all the countries of the Western Balkans (except Kosovo): in Montenegro and Macedonia mainly through investment in motorways, in BiH it is focused on thermal power plants, in Serbia Chinese companies invest in rail, motorways, power plants, metal processing, industrial parks and IT, in Albania in air transport, oil extraction, minerals, etc. Aiming to re-establish a new Silk Road, the project is as ambitious and lengthy as another Chinese key strategic plan: the 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the People's Republic of China (2016-2020).

Keywords: *China, Western Balkans, One Belt One Road initiative, influence.*

INTRODUCTION

The perception of China's foreign policy capacity has changed lately, especially after the introduction of the One Belt One Road initiative. Aiming to re-establish a new Silk Road, the project is as ambitious and lengthy as another Chinese key strategic plan: the 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the People's Republic of China (2016-2020). The document drafted in 2015 offers a concrete framework of development for the next 5 years

and puts a substantial amount of emphasis (if compared to its predecessors) on words such as innovation, modernization and development. Given the past growth-oriented model of the economy, and despite the actual gradual economic slowdown, China seems to have already taken on the role of an economic leader of global importance - or at least wants to be perceived as such. The outlined set of growth-oriented goals certainly hints at a sense of economic and political confidence, and it would therefore seem safe to assume that a confident domestic policy shall be also reflected in foreign policy. With the past export-led economic growth that has gradually become a tool of Chinese soft power, Beijing showcased globally a powerful and inviting policy of economic power in action. With the example of Chinese investments in Africa in mind, many investment-seeking countries - especially from the Western Balkans - are willing to show their eagerness towards Chinese loans and capital. On the reverse side, China presents itself as an equally eager investor, and can be counted on in all situations, including when Chinese investors picked up projects declined by the EU.

1. CHINA'S ACCESSION TO THE WESTERN BALKANS

While Moscow is actively trying to undermine the region's Euro-Atlantic integration, China views the successful EU accession of the Western Balkan Six as serving the strategic goal of easy access to the Central European EU members. On the issue of NATO membership, Beijing seems to entertain an agnostic view. However, like Serbia, Russia and five EU Member States, China does not recognize the independence of Kosovo. China's engagement in the region is based on geo-economics and is part of two larger geopolitical initiatives:

- the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which aims at constructing a network of energy, trade and transport infrastructure connecting Asia, Africa and Europe, and
- the 16+1 format through which China is seeking to assure policy coordination for its massive financial engagement in Eastern and Southeastern Europe. The 16+1 format is designed as a regional initiative; by transgressing established boundaries – the 16 include both EU members and candidate countries – China tries to forge a new political geography in the region to safeguard the implementation of the European part of the BRI. The Western Balkans is an important transit route for Chinese goods arriving in Europe at the Greek port of Piraeus – the largest Chinese investment on the continent in the context of the BRI initiative to date and currently the fastest-growing container port in the world. Furthermore, the region presents Chinese companies with an opportunity to make initial investments and develop references in the part of Europe not yet fully aligned with the strict rules and regulations of the EU, but with the prospect of joining the block in the foreseeable future.

1.1 China's significance for the Balkan Region

In the Western Balkans, China's engagement has been met with both approval and skepticism: The 16+1 format, initiated in 2012, as well as the BRI present opportunities to attract much-needed investment in infrastructure and the economy. Publicized Chinese construction projects as part of the BRI amount to roughly EUR 12.2 billion in loans for 16 Central and Southeastern European countries between 2007 and 2017⁵. Within these projects, the Western Balkan countries accounted for the majority of funds: 29.4% alone was earmarked for projects in Serbia, 20.7% for Bosnia and Herzegovina and 7.4% for Montenegro. Most of the projects are in either energy or transport. Infrastructure loans under the BRI often come with long maturities (20 years) at low interest (2%) and are not tied to political or human rights conditionalities, which are typical for EU funding⁶. Serbia is China's key partner in the Western Balkans and profits the most from Chinese loans and direct investment. More than EUR 5.5 billion, mostly in the form of concessionary loans, have been approved for infrastructure and energy projects such as the Sino-Serbian Friendship Bridge in Belgrade⁷ (EUR 170 million), the expansion and renovation of the Belgrade-Budapest railway or the Kostolac thermal power station. In addition, highways and railways in Montenegro, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina are constructed and upgraded with Chinese loans. Critics complain that the desired knock-on effects of Chinese investments for the local economy often remain marginal; infrastructure projects have mostly been realized by Chinese companies and with Chinese materials imported free of duties and tariffs under special agreements. In some cases, such as in the Sino-Serbian Friendship Bridge project, state-owned enterprises awarded with contracts are obliged to employ Chinese workers. Furthermore, corruption, rising sovereign debt and political dependencies connected to Chinese loans are a subject of concern. China's "debt trap policy" is a cause for concern as evidenced in parts of Asia and Africa.

⁵ Grieveson R., J. Grüber and M. Holzner. (2018), Western Balkans EU Accession: Is the 2025 Target Date Realistic?. Policy Notes and Reports 22. wiiw. May. <https://wiiw.ac.at/western-balkans-eu-accession-is-the-2025-target-date-realistic--dlp-4526.pdf>

⁶ Tonchev, P. (2017). China's Road: into the Western Balkans. European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS). <https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief%20China%27s%20Silk%20Road.pdf>

⁷ Hollinshead, G. (2015). Deconstructing the Sino-Serbian 'Bridge of Friendship': Discerning Dominant Chinese Logics and Geopolitical Implications. December 14. <http://critcom.councilforeuropeanstudies.org/deconstructing-the-sino-serbian-bridge-of-friendship-discerning-dominant-chinese-logics-and-geopolitical-implications/>

Annex 1. Coordinating Mechanisms / Platforms of Cooperation of 16+1 CI: March 2018

No.	Coordination Mechanism or Platform	Site of Secretariat	Organizer / Host	Progress
1	China-CEEC Tourism Coordination Center	Hungary	Hungary National Tourism Agency	Set up
2	China-CEEC Consortium Institute of Higher Education	Rotating Presidency	Ministry of Education of each country	Set up
3	Contact Mechanism for the Investment Promotion Agencies of China-CEEC	Poland	Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency	Set up
4	China-CEEC Joint Chamber of Commerce	Poland-Executive Agency China-Secretariat	China Council for the Promotion of International Trade	Set up
5	China-CEEC Association of Governors of Provinces & Regions	The Czech Republic	Ministry of Internal Affairs of Czech	Set up
6	China-CEE Association for Promotion of Agricultural Cooperation	Bulgaria	The Ministries of Agriculture and Food of Bulgaria	Set up
7	China-CEEC Technology Transfer Center	Slovakia	Slovak Center of Scientific and Technical Information	Set up
8	China-CEEC Think Tanks Network	China	Chinese Academy of Social Sciences	Set up
9	China-CEEC Association on Transport & Infrastructure Cooperation	Serbia	Ministry of Trade and Communications of Serbia	Set up
10	China-CEEC Association for Logistics Cooperation	Latvia	Ministry of Transport & Communications of Latvia	Set up
11	China-CEEC Association on Forestry Cooperation	Slovenia	Ministry of Agriculture of Slovenia	Set up
12	China-CEEC Association on the Promotion of Health Cooperation	China	National Health and Planning Commission	Set up
13	Association for Arts Cooperation	To be determined	To be determined	In progress
14	Association for Customs Cooperation	To be determined	To be determined	In progress
15	China-CEEC Center for Dialogue and Cooperation on Energy Projects	Romania	To be confirmed	To be set up
16	China-CEEC Maritime Secretariat	Poland	Ministry of Maritime Economy and Inland Navigation Poland	Set up
17	China-CEEC Cultural Cooperation Coordination Center	Macedonia	To be confirmed	To be set up
18	China-CEEC Association of Small and Medium Enterprises	Croatia	To be confirmed	To be set up
19	China-CEEC Inter-Bank Association	China-Secretariat Hungary-Coordination Center	China Development Bank, Hungarian Development Bank	Set up
20	China-CEEC Veterinary Science Cooperation Center	Bosnia and Herzegovina	To be continued	To be set up
21	China-CEEC Environmental Protection Association	Montenegro	To be continued	To be set up

Source. Huang Ping, Liu Zuokui & al. "The Cooperation between China and CEEC (16+1): 2012-2017, and CDI own research

2. CHINA AND THE WESTERN BALKANS WITH A SPECIAL REVIEW OF SERBIA AND ALBANIA

The total trade volume between China and selected Western Balkan economies reached a level of €3.3 billion in 2015-16. In foreign trade, China accounts for almost half of that total trade volume⁸. Regarding FDI, China is present in all the countries of the Western Balkans (except Kosovo): in Montenegro and Macedonia mainly through investment in motorways; in BiH it is focused on thermal power plants; in Serbia Chinese companies invest in rail, motorways, power plants, metal processing, industrial parks and IT; in Albania in air transport,

⁸ J. Bastion (2017)"The potential for growth through Chinese infrastructure investments in Central and South-Eastern Europe along the "Balkan Silk Road", , Athens / London.

oil extraction, minerals, etc. Chinese investment in the Balkans is focused mostly in "fossil industries": energy (coal / gas / oil), transport (autos / airport), and mining / extraction⁹. There is only one investment in telecoms (by Huawei) and one in metal processing (steel production) out of 21 green field or merger / acquisition from Chinese companies in the Balkans. Only four Chinese companies (out of which three in Albania) are privately owned; the rest are state - owned companies. This degree of preponderance of publicly owned companies has been explained by Chinese researchers as a motivation stirred by the desire of managers to show back home the profile of a company that is "successful abroad, and especially on European markets". Unfortunately, this drive has not been always followed by due diligence before the investment phase¹⁰.

**2009 -2016 China’s Investment in the Western
Balkans (Stock Volume in USD Million)**

Country	2009	'10	'11	'12	'13	'14	'15	'16
ALB	435	443	443	443	703	703	695	727
BiH	592	598	601	607	613	613	775	860
MKD	20	20	20	26	209	211	211	210
MNE	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	443
SRB	268	484	505	647	1,854	2,971	4,979	8,268

*Source. Huang Ping, Liu Zuokui & al. "The
Cooperation between China and CEEC (16+1):
2012-2017, Social Sciences Academic Press (China)
2017*

Politically, Chinese officials have publically expressed China's support to the full membership of Western Balkans in the European Union.¹¹ Lastly, at the 16+1 Budapest Summit in November 2017, the financial cooperation between China and the Western Balkans received a special mention. All 17 parties agreed to "...explore the possibility of cooperation between CEEC-China financial instruments with the

⁹ see Table 1.2 China's investment and Construction in the Western Balkans, 2005-16, in CEFTA Investment Report 2017, by WIIW 2018. We have also counted four investment in Albania that do not figure in the table (airport, oil extraction, copper mine and oil-extraction technology).

¹⁰ Private outbound Chinese investment has soared in 2016 as compared with public one. At the same time private investment in China has dropped sharply. Statement by LV Peng, Researcher, Institute of Sociology, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Symposium at the "1+1 Cooperation" in Synergy with the "Belt Road" Initiative", organized by Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 25 June - 1 July 2017.

¹¹ H.E. Yu, Jiang, (2017), Ambassador of People’s Republic of China in Albania, Roundtable on “Albania – China cooperation in the framework of “Belt & Road” and “16+1” Cooperation initiatives”, Tirana, <http://cdinstitute.eu/web/tryeze-e-rrumbullaketbashkepunimi-shqiperi-kine-ne-kuader-te-nismavete-bashkepunimit-brezi-dhe-rruga-dhe-161/?lang=en>

Western Balkans Investment Framework".¹² Also under the headline of "Connectivity", "... participants will further explore synergies between the Belt and Road initiative and the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) and its extension to the Western Balkans"¹³. Both developments bring BRI and 16+1 closer to the Berlin Process initiative.

2.1 Serbia

With respect to the Balkans, data gathered from Chinese researchers indicate a constant increase of the stock volume of Chinese investment. By far, the biggest stock as well as the highest rate of increase is in Serbia. Chinese companies have been active in pan-European corridors going through the Balkans, especially in Serbia. Some of its most important endeavors are:

- Mihajlo Pupin Bridge in Belgrade, for EU 170MiO (85% financed by EximBank) implemented by China Road and Bridge Corporation: completed;
- Corridor X: (i) Surcin - Obrenovac, for 17,6km for USD 103 MiO financed by EximBank: ongoing; (ii) Obrenovac - Ub, for 26,2km for USD 301 MiO financed by EximBank, implemented by Shandong Hispeed Group: ongoing; (iii) Lajkovac-Ljig for 24km for USD 301 MiO implemented by Shandong Hi-speed Group: ongoing
- Corridor XI: (i) Central Serbia - Montenegrin Border (modernization) for 107 km for EUR 106Md to start in 2018 (re-structuring of suburban station in Zemun completed by end of 2017); (ii) Belgrade - Stara Pazova (modernization) for USD 319 MiO implemented by CRI-CCCC
- Belgrade - Budapest railway, Serbian cost estimated at circa EUR 1Bn for 184km in Serbia (for a total Belgrade - Budapest of circa EUR 3,2Bn) partially financed by EximBank, implemented by China Railway International Company Ltd: started

2.2 Albania

Chinese support for Albanian economy was crucial during the 70s and 80s. For example, in 1973 and 1974 Albania sent 24% of its exports to China, from where it received 60% of the total imports. They were mostly in investment goods, which were also financed through financial support from China¹⁴. The years 1971-1975 were the golden years of China - Albania economic cooperation. There were 132 capital investment initiatives (in all economy sectors), out of which 75 were completed, 32 in pipeline and 25 ready to start. Major investments such as Fierza HPP, the Metalurgical Combine in Elbasan, Ballsh Refinery, etc. have been

¹² The Budapest Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries, 2017/11/28, Art. 6.7, "Financial Cooperation", last retrieved on 6 March 2018 at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/26_49_665393/t1514534.shtml

¹³ *ibid*, art. 4.1, Connectivity

¹⁴ "M. Shqiperi (2015) - Kine gjate viteve 1960- 1978", A. Kreka, Tirana University

financed with Chinese money and the technology and the knowhow has been imported from China¹⁵.

Lately BRI and 16+1 CI have significantly contributed to the intensification of the bilateral China – Albania relations. In 2016, China came third in the volume of exchanges with Albania¹⁶ (with 7.1% of the total after Italy & Germany), up from the fifth place in 2012. The weight of imports from China has continued to grow over the last five years, reaching 8.8% in 2016 from 6.4% of total imports in 2012. Exports in China have increased by 29.7% from 2012 to 2016 (ALL 5,744 to ALL 7,452), supported by an increase in exports of minerals and oil and construction materials and metals.

By January 2017, 103 Chinese-owned companies were active in Albania. In stark difference from Serbia, they are all privately-owned. Another interesting difference with Serbia is with respect to the sub-contractors of the large foreign companies¹⁷, Chinese investments in Albania were carried out through indirect acquisition of shares of Albanian companies owned by non-Albanians:

- in May 2014, the subsidiary of Ekin Maden Ticaret ve Sanayi A .Ş. a Turkish-based company, sold a 50% stake in Beralb Ltd for \$65 million to Jiangxi Copper Company ltd. of China¹⁸;
- in September 2016, the Chinese-owned Geo Jade acquired the management rights for the largest oil field (operated by Bankers Ltd - a Canadian company) in Albania for USD 575 million;
- in October 2016, China Everbright Limited acquired 100% of the shares of the Tirana International Airport for 30 years, from its German owner.

In 2014, the Bank of Albania concluded a SWAP agreement with the Bank of China, which is an important step in supporting bilateral economic exchanges. In April 2017, Deputy Prime Minister Zhang Gaoli visited Albania where he was received by PM Rama. In May, the Chinese Government agreed to support the renovation of the Opera House in Tirana with a grant of USD 2 MiO. Until February 2018, no public works contract seems to have been awarded to any Chinese contractor in Albania. Both Rruga e Arbrit Motorway and Spitalla Industrial Park procedures did not go through.

CONCLUSIONS

From a Balkan perspective, the rise of China and its increasing presence in Europe is still in need of a better understanding. Not unlike their EU colleagues, Balkan politicians are courting Chinese decision makers - politicians, large

¹⁵ The bilateral cooperation has been very strong in the military field as well. In the form of military aid, Albania received from China a total of 199 airplanes (70 Mi -17, 12 Mi- 19, 12 AN-2, 95 Mi - 19 ES, etc.) and 36 helicopters. This is in addition to the military aid for the army and the naval fleet

¹⁶ Following data came from "Foreign Trade 2012- 2016", INSTAT 2017

¹⁷ Huawei, sub-contractor for Albtelecom - a 100% Turkish owned telecom company; and Hilong, subcontractor in oil-extraction working for SHELL Oil exploration

¹⁸ Minerals Yearbook, Albania (Advance Release), US Department of the Interior, US Geological Survey June 2016

companies and banks - mostly for their financial power. In a slow growth / high public debt environment, Chinese foreign direct investment is very welcome. Chinese actors are aware of their economic and financial attractiveness, as well as of the unease caused by their foray into the European business and larger economic and institutional cooperation scene.

The immediate conclusions point towards the need for a better communication from both sides, based on nourished debate and increased communication with each other, involving all the stakeholders and not only the politicians, the international finance or the large scale businesses. The Balkans needs to better grasp the rationale of BRI and the 16+1CI. We need to be able to also accept the possibility that even if it looks as a top down carefully planned endeavor, BRI and 16+1CI may both be still in the phase of design. Chinese partners are realizing that the Balkan countries, even if non-EU members, are de facto applying the policy-making methodology and the legal framework of the European Union. Their economies are a satellite of the EU economic power, and follow closely the EU economic cycle.

The Berlin process offers an outcome oriented platform of cooperation amongst the EU, the Western Balkans and Chinese partners. While the Connectivity Agenda invites for cooperation with BRI, the 16+1 Cooperation initiative provides almost the mirror image of the Regional Cooperation component under the Berlin process¹⁹. Given the steady progress of Chinese investment in the Balkans, it must be possible to engage in a constructive way by looking for a win-win-win situation satisfying the Balkan countries, the EU and Chinese partners.

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THE BALKAN VECTOR OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY IN HISTORICAL RETROSPECT

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The article is devoted to the Balkan vector of Great Britain's foreign policy. The author has analyzed the British policy on the Balkan Peninsula at the turn of the 19th – 20th centuries and at the present stage and has traced the British geopolitical interests in a comparative temporal context, motivated to use either military or peaceful methods of asserting the British presence in the region.

Keywords: geopolitical interests, Great Britain, the Balkans, Eastern Question, intervention, European Union, integration.

Research goal

Since the end of the 19th century, Great Britain has constituted the largest state entity, the Empire with a capital letter, which required preservation, protection, and if possible, further expansion. In the context of geopolitical interests, the Balkan Peninsula in this respect has always occupied a special place in British foreign policy, both in the past and in the present.

The goal of this research is to identify the essential characteristics of Britain's foreign policy and to make a comparative analysis of the geopolitical interests of Great Britain and their practical implementation on the Balkan Peninsula in a historical perspective. Special attention has been paid to the Balkan vector of British foreign policy during the rule of the "new Labourites" since 1997.

Research methodology

The chosen methodology was determined by the approach to the study of British foreign policy within the framework of the theory of neoclassical realism, capable of taking into account both internal factors and the context of the international environment for studying the state's foreign policy as the main actor in its international relations. The framework of the chosen approach engaged a combination of general methods of scientific cognition (formal-logical method, analysis, synthesis, generalization, historical descriptive and political descriptive methods) and special methods used in political research (institutional, systematic, method of identification of analysis levels).

Research results

1. The Balkan policy of Great Britain in the late 19th – early 20th century.

Throughout the 19th – early 20th century, the British political circles perceived the events in the Balkan region in the context of the development of the Eastern Question – i.e. a set of problems related to the fate of the Ottoman Empire (its European and Asian provinces). In the second half of the 1870s, the British imperial interests were focused on the eastern regions of the Mediterranean and the countries in the Middle East. The Eastern Question, i.e. the fate of the Ottoman Empire and its relationship with the Balkan Slavic nations, despite the purely European aspect of events, acquired great imperial significance for the British during the period under review. In the period of its aggravation, there was a discussion in English society of what was included in the concept of “British interests”, what the British Empire should be and what was its role in the fate of Britain itself.

London lined up its foreign policy in the Balkans, depending on the changed alignment of forces in the Middle East, i.e. on the strengthening of the influence of another great power there and its possible predominance in Asia, which could pose a threat to the British imperial communications. The policy of the British government in the period of exacerbation of the Eastern Question in the mid-70s and the British-Turkish War of 1877–1878 was a clear indication of such course.

The Conservative government, headed by Benjamin Disraeli, pursued a fairly consistent policy to protect the interests of Great Britain during the growing Eastern crisis. Since the beginning of the crisis, the Prime Minister explained the Cabinet’s attitude to this issue by the need to protect the interests of the British Empire (Hansard, 1876, 271, col.1146). Disraeli (AVPRI, 1876, d. 77, p. 28) was firmly convinced that Constantinople was the key to the East, and it was there, and not in Egypt, that “there was a genuine guarantee of a way to India.” Officially adhering to the policy of “neutrality”, Disraeli repeatedly resorted to threats of a military intervention by Britain in the conflict between Russia and Turkey on the side of the latter.

In October 1876, the Conservative Cabinet made a decision on the Eastern Question, one of the points of which, as the Russian Ambassador to London Count Pyotr Shuvalov (AVPRI, 1876, d. 77, pp. 20 / v.-21) reported, was “to deploy the British fleet to Bosphorus with powerful landing troops, which was partially taken from their military units in India. The manifestations of force aimed at the defence of Constantinople from Russian aggression, its seizure in case of need and its retention...”. Stationing the British squadron under the command of Admiral Hornby in the Aegean and Marmara Seas in close proximity to Constantinople from the beginning of the Russian-Turkish war, the discussion in the Parliament in the winter of 1878 about additional military subsidies and mobilization of British military reserve forces, sending a contingent of Indian troops (7 thousand people) to Malta were all the links along the same political course, aimed at consolidating the imperial positions of Britain in the Eastern Mediterranean.

During the period of the Eastern crisis, the conservative Government also saw its task in getting out of it “not empty-handed”. The Tory Ministers put forward far-reaching plans – the “possible occupation” of several ports in Syria and Lebanon – and dreamt of effective “control and management of Asian Turkey” (Ryder, 1974, pp. 3, 5).

The focus of the Tory cabinet was Cyprus. The acquisition of this island was one of the key points of London’s participation in the work of the Berlin Congress in 1878, which summed up the Russian-Turkish war, and the Eastern crisis at large. Speaking in the Parliament after his return from Berlin, Benjamin Disraeli (Hansard, 1878, 241, pp. 1753-1774), in justification and defense of his policy, stated that the Cyprus Convention (AVPRI, 1878, d. 79, v.2, pp. 371-371/v), according to which Turkey handed over the control over Cyprus to England, eliminated the fears of any threat to the routes to India.

Thus, the geopolitical interests of Britain in the Balkans in the period under review were closely tied to the issues of protecting the routes to India and strengthening the British positions in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. At the beginning of the 20th century, Great Britain, pursuing its policy in the Balkans, was guided by a number of factors, which included the general alignment of forces in the world, motives for bloc politics, internal political processes in the Balkan states and in the Ottoman Empire. The foreign policy of Britain as a whole was aimed at destabilizing the Ottoman Empire, orienting itself to Germany at that period, and searching for allies in the face of the young Balkan states as a possible support for their policies in the region. The complete seizure of the Balkans by Kaiser Germany and Austria-Hungary was totally unacceptable for Britain, which sharply increased its attention to the Balkan Slavs at the beginning of the 20th century.

During the period under review, the foreign policy course of Great Britain in the Balkans was distinguished by a certain flexibility, which made it relatively easy to respond to the emerging problems in the region. In particular, in the period after the Bosnian crisis of 1908, Britain was actively involved in solving the Balkan problems. The tough position taken by Britain on the provision of non-aggression guarantees to Serbia by Austria-Hungary, as well as the friendly attitude towards Bulgaria during the Bulgarian-Turkish negotiations on compensation, showed that Britain partially assumed the functions of a security guarantor of the small countries on the Balkan Peninsula.

As for the eve of the First World War, which took shape in parallel with the warming of Anglo-German relations in 1912–1914, the political situation in the Balkans, following the First and Second Balkan Wars, resulted in a kind of a “departure” of Britain from the Balkans. The British government believed that they would thus be able to focus their diplomatic activity on other, more important directions from the point of view of British interests. The First World War ended with the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the formation of a new state on the Balkan Peninsula – Yugoslavia. So, 100 years later, the “Balkan knot” was

once again at the center of the geopolitical interests of the great powers, including Great Britain.

2. General characteristics of the foreign policy of Great Britain in the Balkans during the rule of the “new Labourites”

After the collapse of the USSR and the breakup of Yugoslavia, a new geopolitical party is being played out in the Balkans, combining the same political and economic methods of persuasion and coercion as were used at the turn of the 19th – 20th century. As Russian historian P. Iskander (2010) states, today, instead of the Entente and the Triple Alliance, Russia and the European Union play their Balkan parties, the latter in many cases acting in conjunction with Washington.

The British foreign policy in the second half of the 20th century was characterized by a combination of old and new methods. According to the well-known specialist in British studies Al. Gromyko (2005), the UK foreign policy strategy consisted of two components – continuity, which can be traced over long periods of time, and variability, constant adaptation to the conditions of the new historical epoch. In the second half of the 20th century, vivid examples of these qualities were the concept of “special relations” with the USA and the slogan “to strike harder than its capabilities”.

The UK policy at the turn of the 20th – 21st century in Europe, and in the Balkans in particular, was largely determined by the foreign policy course proclaimed by the Labourites who came to power in 1997. Prime Minister Thomas Blair, in his keynote speech, “The Principles of Modern British Foreign Policy,” confirmed the role of Britain as a “bridge between Europe and the USA”. The role of Britain was defined as an “axial power”, a “regional power with global responsibility”, which, being unable to dominate the world, creatively implemented the second classical principle – “strike harder than its capabilities”. Other innovations were also introduced. It was envisaged that Britain would return “to the heart of Europe” and take a leading position there. In addition, a programme of “defense diplomacy” was developed, which, unlike “gunboat diplomacy”, put priority to diplomatic, not military means of resolving conflicts (Gromyko, 2005). This course clearly manifested itself in solving the Balkan problems.

Britain’s interest in the Balkan region was determined by many geopolitical arguments. Firstly, from the standpoint of geopolitics and defense, a strong integration grouping of the countries in this region was able to influence, if not all of Europe, then its closest neighbors. This created for the Western countries and for Britain in particular, certain problems in the formation and implementation of its foreign policy towards the countries of Eastern Europe. That was why the United States and its Western European allies contributed to instigating ethnic hatred between the peoples of the former Yugoslavia (Nazemroaya, 2010). Britain came to understand that the collapse of Yugoslavia as a whole would contribute to the weakening of the Russian influence in the Balkans.

Secondly, the countries of the Balkan region are an excellent territory for the deployment of military bases and missile defense systems. In this regard, the interests of Britain and the United States coincided. The collapse of Yugoslavia and its division thereof into a number of independent states made it possible to accomplish this task without any special efforts. At the same time, as noted by domestic political scientists, the Balkans represent for Europe a unique base of natural storehouse of resources, of almost all types, which can be privatized in reserve. In the context of the energy component of modern conflicts, one should not forget that the Balkans are the shadow battle theater for the transportation of gas (Ponomareva, 2010) as well.

Finally, the focus of British political circles was the strengthening of the position of Britain itself in this region. This could benefit from the traditional credo of the British foreign policy – “divide and rule.” By plunging a number of states of the former Yugoslavia into a crisis, it became possible to control this region for a long time, putting under its control and providing first, military and then economic, assistance to the newly formed states.

The British foreign policy in the Balkans at the turn of the 20-21 century can be divided into two stages. The first was related to the conduct of military operations against the former Yugoslav states. The second was the end of wars on the Balkan Peninsula and the transfer of foreign policy into a peaceful course.

3. The first stage in the Balkan direction of Great Britain at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century

The first stage for Britain resulted in its participation in the “Deliberate Force” operation against Serbia, in which the British, following the Americans, played a leading role. Since December 1996, Britain took part in stabilizing the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was active in the NATO Control Commission in Kosovo, supported the NATO evacuation forces in 1998, and also sent its forces to participate in Kosovo operations conducted by NATO in the region since June 1999. At that, the Labour government of Thomas Blair argued for England’s participation in these operations by two factors: first, by British national interests, second – by calls for high humanitarian goals (Deighton, 2005). An extensive anti-Serb campaign took place in Britain, and the British media justified the need for bombing attacks on Yugoslavia. The British military contingent in Kosovo was 12 thousand soldiers, at the same time, the number of US military was 7 thousand soldiers. Since June 2001, as part of the NATO forces, the UK supported the Macedonian government in the fight against the Albanian armed forces.

The NATO war against Yugoslavia ended with an overall success for Britain. In particular, as a result of the Kosovo war, the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 was adopted, determining the new legal status of Kosovo. Another victory of the British was that the region was now controlled by NATO forces and the international administration. This allowed England to exert its influence on the region, acting as part of the above mentioned forces. Great Britain’s foreign policy

in the Balkans was closely linked to the actions of the United States. It should be borne in mind that the Balkan policy pursued by the United States enjoyed the support of both the Labour Party, which was in power at the turn of the century and at the beginning of the new century, and the Conservatives who constituted Her Majesty's opposition.

In general, at the turn of the 20–21 century, Britain took an active part in the armed conflicts in the Balkans. This helped Britain to solve a number of foreign policy tasks and achieve its geopolitical interests. Britain was able to implement its plans for the collapse of Yugoslavia and the decentralization of the countries of the Balkan Peninsula. By supporting the US course on the armed scenario of the development of events in the Balkans, the British, on the one hand, proved their allied relations with the Americans, and on the other, created the conditions for economic penetration and strengthening of the British position in this region.

4. The second stage in the Balkan direction of Great Britain's policy in the early 20th century

The first decade of the 21st century was marked by the new foreign policy tactics of Great Britain in relation to the Balkan countries. The geopolitical importance of the region remained unchanged with respect to the foreign interests of the British. However, their implementation in the new conditions following the end of the military operations on the peninsula could be achieved by peaceful means.

The political and international situation in the Balkan Peninsula is changing. There are several factors that determine the new picture in the region. First, the approach of the international community to the region has changed. Peace, security, social and economic development of the Balkan countries are recognized as being important for Europe as a whole. Secondly, the majority of the peoples of Southeast Europe seek democracy and prosperity through the practice of market economy. Thirdly, their desire to integrate within the Euro-Atlantic community is a strong argument for cooperation among themselves, motivated by the expectation of real, significant changes in the life of the Balkan peoples. Fourthly, despite the tense situation in some areas of the Balkans, the overall security situation in the region has improved. Fifth, the Balkan countries are striving to become "security generators" and strengthen security in the regional context. They conduct an active foreign policy and develop bilateral relations, as well as cooperation within the region (Alp, 2000).

Following the new situation on the peninsula, the goal of the United Kingdom in the Balkans was a policy aimed at integrating the Balkan countries into the European Union and NATO. Control over such an important strategic region is extremely important for England, since it contributes to the solution of many tasks that allow strengthening of its leadership in Europe and, in turn, weakening the influence of other powers.

The validity of this tactics of British political circles is determined by several factors. First, the provision of economic, and primarily financial assistance to the young Balkan states within the EU allowed the UK to establish and expand its control in the region. Secondly, the peace policy towards the Balkan peoples contributed to raising the international prestige of Great Britain, which clearly suffered as a result of its participation together with the Americans in military operations. The new course allowed the British to restore the country's reputation as democratic, peacemaking and peace-loving. Thirdly, the withdrawal of British troops from the region helped to improve the situation in Britain itself, since British soldiers did not have to participate in bloody armed conflicts any more. Another positive consequence of this was the relief for the British budget, since the conduct of military operations abroad was quite a costly undertaking. Finally, strengthening the position of Britain, as well as other Western countries, in the Balkan region by pursuing a peace policy aimed at stabilizing the position of the young Balkan states, was aimed at weakening Russia's influence there.

According to researchers, the collapse of Yugoslavia and the wars in the region, including the NATO intervention in 1999 and the declaration of independence of Kosovo, were part of one scenario – NATO's expansion to the east and the road to further Western geopolitical expansion and the US influence on Russia (Mitrović, 2011, p.104). In the event of an aggravation of its relations with Moscow, London seeks to enlist the moral support of the countries of Eastern Europe, showing solidarity with them and relying on anti-Russian sentiments. This largely explains England's desire to integrate the Balkan states into the European Union and NATO as soon as possible.

Thus, the transition of Great Britain to peaceful methods of realizing its geopolitical interests on the Balkan Peninsula has far-reaching goals. The British actively support the policies of Western European countries, aimed at creating conditions in the new Balkan states necessary for their entry into the European Union. In particular, the stated conditions include legal reforms, fight against organized crime and corruption, and organization of public control over power. The policy of Great Britain, like other EU members, has to a certain extent been crowned with success. Hence, on 1 July 2013, Croatia, not without the efforts of England, became a new member of the European Community.

Another manifestation of the UK foreign policy in the Balkans is security. As part of their decision, the British consider it necessary to pay attention to strengthening stability in the region, reducing thus the risk of a new war and new armed conflicts, fighting organized crime, and carrying out reforms in the Balkan countries. To this end, a special fund of 10 million pounds was created, which was drawn from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense and the Department for International Development.

The British consider the development of bilateral relations as a no less important direction of the British foreign policy in the region. First of all, this allows establishing closer contact with individual countries on the peninsula and thus finding an ally in the region. Secondly, it gives England a chance to increase

its influence in the Balkans. Thirdly, it creates a legal and political basis for the development of economic relations with the Balkan countries. In general, this course of the UK pays off. England was able to control the entry of the Balkan countries into the European Union and exert influence on them politically, economically and humanitarily. By enlisting the support of new allies, Britain has strengthened its position in the Balkans.

CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

For many decades, the UK has been guided by its geopolitical interests in the conduct of its foreign policy in the Balkans. The Balkan direction of foreign policy of Great Britain at the turn of the 19th – 20th century under the “new” Labourists can be characterized as the implementation of a multi-level system of strategic foreign policy priorities, which logically combines universality (clear basic principles and specificity of the foreign policy traditions historically rooted in the national consciousness) and situational character (possibility of adjusting the declared course) depending on the understanding of goals and the political situation. Britain historically used its position in the Balkans in such a way as to avoid the strengthening of continental Europe, Germany and Russia in particular.

At the present stage of development of international relations, the Balkan vector of British foreign policy involves 1) promotion of its own mechanisms of interaction with the EU and NATO through the EU Berlin Process, the “Forces for Kosovo” (KFOR) missions, the European Union Force (EUFOR), the High Representative Office in Bosnia and Herzegovina; 2) weakening of the influence of Russia and “external players”; 3) promotion of US plans; expanding opportunities for their own economic and political influence.

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SOVIET AND YUGOSLAV ECONOMIC INFLUENCE IN ALBANIA 1945-1948: DESTABILIZING THREAT OR A FACTOR FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH²⁰

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Abstract

The paper analyzes Soviet and Yugoslav economic influence in Albania in the period between 1945 and 1948. The first research question is what that influence means: a destabilizing threat or a factor for economic growth and development of Albania. In this context, the purpose of the research paper and the second question is to explore the development of the Albanian state between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union 1945-1948.

Due to the friendship that was established during the Second World War, Yugoslavia was the first country to recognize the state of Albania on 28 April 1945. The Soviet Union did the same on 10 November 1945. Yugoslavia helped Albania in the ideological, political, economic, military and cultural spheres. Albanian leader Enver Hoxha was constantly sending signals to the USSR wishing for direct cooperation. That was the reason why Enver Hoxha visited Moscow in mid-1947. Since then, the pro-Soviet direction had been clearly perceived, although Enver Hoxha talked commendably about Yugoslavia. The highlight took place after the adoption of the Resolution of Inform - Bureau, when Albania prematurely terminated all agreements with Yugoslavia.

This paper draws on researches from the Archive of Yugoslavia and the Diplomatic Archive of the Republic of Serbia in Belgrade, as well as on relevant literature and magazines. In the paper, among the other methods, we used the comparative method which compares the economies of Yugoslavia and Albania and indicates the similarities between these two countries and the method of analyzing archive economic and political documents. In the introduction, we discuss the economic underdevelopment of Albania after the Second World War, which was a reason why that state needed a strong neighbor and help. In the second part, we present the beginning of Albanian trade development relying on Yugoslavia and the USSR. The third part of the paper analyses the friendship between Yugoslavia and Albania, while in the fourth part we discuss the crisis in the relations between the two countries. The last part of the paper illustrates how

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Albania turned from Yugoslavia to the USSR. The conclusion at the end of the paper infers that in the immediate post-World War II period, Albania recovered economically. In this part of the paper we raise the question why Yugoslavia provided economic assistance to Albania and discuss different assumptions.

***Keywords:** Yugoslavia, the USSR, Albania, Economic relations, Period after the Second World War*

1. INTRODUCTION

Albania was an agrarian country with a low level of development of rural households. About 80% of the population was engaged in agriculture, mainly livestock, which was well developed because of the rich forests and pastures. Albania possessed useful ore which could help its development - oil, chromium and copper ores, but they were not exploited sufficiently. Traffic was poorly developed. A railway line in the country was virtually non-existent. The main communications were roads and dirt roads. Albania did not have a developed maritime transport, even though it had two big ports on the Adriatic Sea - Vlore and Durres. Medieval feudalism was the basis of their society until the agrarian reform. Industry was poorly developed as well. Companies were only present in the domestic market. Trade was mostly medium and small. In addition to farmers, workers and traders, there were also small groups of former feudal-beys and intelligence originating from bey and commercial orders. From the above, we can see that Albania was not a sufficiently developed country to be able to rely on its own strength [1].

Albania needed a strong neighbor and help for its economic and political organization. Yugoslavia had its own interests in a small country such as Albania, which is the reason why the two countries began to develop mutual relations and cooperation, which ran with greater or lesser misunderstandings until their final termination by Albania in 1948 and its turning against Yugoslavia. During World War II, Yugoslavia endured the brunt of the fight [58] and after the war, protected Albania from interference from Western allies. In order to achieve balance in the Balkans and to strategically defend Albanian borders, Yugoslavia was a natural ally against Italian penetration, and against Greece, which had requested a review of its northern border [59] (p. 113).

The subject of this paper is the Albanian economic and political development after the Second World War under the influence of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. This paper analyzes the relationship and friendship between Yugoslavia and Albania and the Yugoslav economic assistance to Albania. In last two parts of the paper we discuss the crisis in this relationship and how Albania turned to the USSR. In our paper we conclude that the Albanian reliance on the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, in the period between 1945 and 1948, contributed to Albanian economic development, but also had an impact on the state and political level.

2. THE BEGINNINGS OF ALBANIAN TRADE DEVELOPMENT RELYING ON YUGOSLAVIA AND THE USSR

Due to the friendship that was established during the war, Yugoslavia was the first country to recognize the state of Albania on 28 April 1945 [53] (p. 791). The Soviet Union did the same on 10 November of the same year [45] (p. 233). Velimir Stojnić was appointed as the first Yugoslav diplomatic representative, and the Yugoslav military mission was renamed as the Yugoslav Mission [54] (p. 42).

Even before the official recognition of the Albanian state, Yugoslavia signed two agreements with Albania on 20 February 1945. The first agreement was shaped as a military alliance for the struggle against the German occupying forces, which was supposed to be extended in the post-war years [49] (pp. 513-514). This agreement on alliance was also a way of binding Albania to Yugoslavia, which would make up the basis for the Balkan federation [60] (p. 335). The second agreement was on economic cooperation between Yugoslavia and Albania, which abolished the "customs border between Yugoslavia and Albania" [49] (p. 514). With this agreement, the total value of the exchange of goods would account for approximately 40 million Dinars [2].²¹

In addition to Yugoslavia, Albania relied on the Soviet Union. The Soviet representative to Albania was Colonel Sokolov [3]. In September 1945, Albania and the Soviet Union signed an agreement by which the Soviets provided grains and technical experts for the oil industry and mining, and Albania would, in turn, send to the USSR tobacco, dried fruits, copper ore and oil [4]. The Soviet aid was 100,000 quintals of grain [5]. Following consultation with the Yugoslav side on the needs of Albania, it was decided that the Soviets would send to Albania weapons for three full infantry divisions, as well as military instructors. It was agreed that several economic experts would come, as well as engineers for the exploitation of oil resources and engineers to organize the industrial production. The Soviets took it upon themselves to send 5,000 pairs of shoes, and the uniforms or material needed for their production [65] (p. 145).

Albania looked up to Yugoslavia. They began the expropriation of factories, "enemies of the state" and introduced a tax on the "war profits" (any income obtained from the sale of goods to the occupiers) [45] (p. 236). Albania's state-owned bank was founded on 1 February 1945 and took over all the activities of the former Albanian National Bank [6]. All banking and credit institutions were nationalized and the import and export of currencies was prohibited [55] (p. 67).

New industrial plants were built and the destroyed ones were rebuilt. Near Vlore, a plant for distillation of alcohol, sulfur oil, olive oil and refined oil was built [7]. Oil production in the Kucova was restored [8]. The new bridge near Kuca on the river Semana was commissioned, which connected the Kucova oil fields

²¹ Under the agreement, Yugoslavia delivered to Albania 2,991 tons of wheat, 5,717 tons of corn, 106 t of beans, 2,000 tons of cement and other materials. Yugoslavia delivered the goods worth 20,169.258.20, and Albania 18,375.256.20 Dinars.

with central and northern Albania [9]. There was an autonomous Albanian petroleum company founded for the distribution and sale of liquid fuels [10]. In addition, the state made efforts to improve agriculture in Elbasan. Irrigation canals were made and they worked on the cultivation of rice and olive trees [11]. In order to consolidate the country after the war, an agrarian reform was implemented. The Government of Albania asked from the Yugoslav Government 20 site surveyors [12]. Courses for technical staff in Ljushnje were organized and 20 groups of technicians for the execution of agrarian reform were formed [13].

3. THE FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN YUGOSLAVIA AND ALBANIA IN 1946

One of the main concerns of the Albanian leadership was to improve the economic situation of the Albanian population. They looked up to Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. However, there were large differences in their economies. Yugoslavia was one year ahead compared to Albania. On the other hand, Soviet specialists were not sufficiently familiar with the Albanian situation and therefore were not able to adapt their skills to the Albanian needs. Nevertheless, Albania began to evolve in the industrial, commercial and agricultural field [14].

The Albanian leadership believed that the economic problems would be solved in cooperation with Yugoslavia. Thus, the Yugoslav leaders compiled a list of the most urgent needs of the Albanian industry. It was about further functioning of the oil plants, mills, breweries and other small plants of the food industry, leather and textile industries. Also, the Albanian tobacco factories were supposed to be supplied with cigarette paper. Particular help was needed for the printing companies in personnel and machines [15].

In May 1946, an Agreement was signed on trade and payments between Yugoslavia and Albania. This agreement replaced the agreement dated 25 February 1945 and was to remain valid until 31 December 1946 [16].

In order to continue and strengthen the cooperation between Yugoslavia and Albania, Enver Hoxha, upon an invitation from Yugoslavia, paid an official visit to Yugoslavia in the period 26 June – 2 July 1946 [55] (p. 74). The visit was conducted in the spirit of friendly and cordial manifestations [17]. During the visit of the Albanian leadership to Belgrade, agreements on economic cooperation, payments and loans were signed on 1 July 1946 [54] (p. 48). Yugoslavia was committed to support the development of the Albanian industry and economy by providing technical assistance and sending experts. An agreement on the establishment of economic Albanian-Yugoslav societies was reached. A Treaty on Friendship and Assistance was signed on 9 July 1946 in Tirana [50] (pp. 152-154). On the same date, the Convention on Cultural Cooperation between Yugoslavia and Albania was signed [47] (p. 290).²² In July 1946, the Agreement on Cooperation in Maritime Navigation between Yugoslavia and Albania was signed [18]. In addition, Enver Hoxha insisted on establishing parity of currencies,

²² For more information, see: Bondžić, 2004; Bondžić, 2011; Petrović, 2002; Slavković, 2012.

because he believed that it was an integral part of the harmonization of the Albanian and Yugoslav plans [19]. Therefore, an agreement on the coordination of economic plans, the Customs Union and the equalization of currencies was signed between the two countries on 27 November 1946 in Belgrade [20].²³

In October 1946, after major floods in Albania, which caused substantial damage, economic aid arrived from Yugoslavia [21]. In early December 1946, help from Yugoslavia arrived in Durres in wheat (100,000 quintals) [22].

According to the Soviet opinion, the Yugoslav economic assistance was highly appreciated and they considered it as an important stage in the process of strengthening the relationship between Albania and Yugoslavia. However, they expressed doubt as to how the agreements on bilateral economic cooperation would be implemented in view of the low level of development of the Albanian economy, lack of expertise and limited Yugoslav assistance due to their own poor economic situation [65] (p. 142).

4. CRISIS IN THE YUGOSLAV-ALBANIAN RELATIONS IN 1947

At the beginning of 1947, the Albanian leadership continued with the plans for modernization of the Albanian economy and reconstruction efforts. Albania and Yugoslavia signed an Agreement on Trade in June 1947. The Yugoslav loan to Albania was 2 million Dinars. For the purpose of controlling the implementation of this agreement, representatives from both sides were appointed, who were supposed to meet every three months in Belgrade or Tirana, and the agreement was to be in force until 31 December 1947 [23].

The Soviet leadership believed it was right that Albania was under the auspices of Yugoslavia, as long as Yugoslavia faithfully followed the Soviet state. However, when Yugoslavia began to show signs of independence in its policy towards Albania, the Soviet state began to react. Also, the Yugoslav representatives in Albania noticed that some Albanian leaders increasingly turned to the USSR, that more and more Soviet experts were coming to Albania and the Albanian press popularized the Soviet Union more than Yugoslavia [54] (p. 56). Enver Hoxha did not give up trying for Albania to establish a direct contact with the USSR. After several meetings with the Soviet plenipotentiary Minister Čuvahin, he managed to get an invitation to visit Moscow [63] (p. 121). Enver Hoxha visited Moscow on 14 - 26 July 1947 [24]. In addition to the discussions on the economic and cultural relations between the two countries, the USSR approved Albania a small loan and promised to equip a factory for production of agricultural machines [45] (p. 239). Stalin was not yet ready to alienate Albania from Yugoslavia, stressing that the cooperation with Yugoslavia was the "right path". However, after Enver Hoxha's visit to the USSR, Albania started to increase propaganda in favor of the USSR and there was a growing tendency to diminish their cooperation with Yugoslavia [54]

²³ Based on cancelation of customs border, the border space was considered to be a friendly zone [51] (p. 101).

(p. 60). The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia reacted to the changed behavior of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Albania and in November 1947, sent a letter in which they strongly objected to Albania due to the non-implementation of the economic agreements and accused Enver Hoxha of changing their policy toward Yugoslavia after his return from Moscow [56] (p. 407).

Despite the shaken relations between Yugoslavia and Albania, Albania was developing with the Yugoslav economic help. The Yugoslav loan helped the most in the development of the Albanian industry. In 1947 and early 1948, they began with the construction and completed several factories which were supplied from Yugoslavia. There were Yugoslav experts working there and the Albanians looked up to the Yugoslav techniques in construction [25]. The assistance from Yugoslavia consisted of development projects and plans, deployment of skilled personnel for the installation, commissioning of factories and technical management [50] (pp. 182-183). Yugoslavia sent to Albania a sugar factory with the capacity to cover one third of the Albanian needs in sugar up to 1948, a sardine factory and a jam factory, which were completed and put into operation in June 1948. Then, with the development of the textile industry, Yugoslavia acquired a high-capacity cotton spinning mill for Albania in America, with Albanian funds. They also delivered to Albania a hemp processing plant and built a factory in Rogožina, and a textile factory in Tirana. Following Yugoslav advice, reparation deliveries that Albania had received from Germany were used to build a metal factory for production of spare parts and agricultural machines, which was completed with machinery from Yugoslavia. Albania received two sawmills with installation and operation qualified personnel. They installed a modern printing house with machines supplied from Yugoslavia, as well as automatic telephone exchange [26]. The largest hospital in southern Albania was built in Gjirokastrë and in Peshkopi they built the first high school in the northeastern part of Albania [27].

Yugoslavia helped build the railway Durres-Peqin (43 km) on the old Italian route of Durres-Elbasan. Albanian and Yugoslav youth worked on the railway and it was opened to traffic on 7 November 1947 [28]. Yugoslavia was engaged in the construction of a hydroelectric power plant in Velika Selita near Tirana that was supposed to supply the electricity industry of Tirana and Durres [29]. Yugoslavia also helped build a water supply system for the population of these areas [50] (p. 187). According to archival sources by the end of 1947, a loan in the amount of 1.356.811.698.49 or 83% was used. By 31 December 1947 goods of Yugoslav production were delivered or were on their way to Albania, worth 912,637.758 or 80% [30].

The Albanian Government gave loans to poor farmers for the purchase of seeds, chemical fertilizers and agricultural machines [31]. They put into operation three bridges that had been destroyed during the war. The bridges were made of reinforced concrete and connected Peshkopi with Tirana, Elbasan and Skadar [32].

The company for road construction worked on asphaltting the national road Tirana-Durres, in length of 43 km. It was of great importance because it linked the capital with the main Albanian port. They also built locally important roads which linked isolated areas with central points in Albania, such as Berat-Čerovoda, which was 32 km long [33]. Albania's state electricity company completed the installation of power stations in Pekinj, which supplied electricity to the entire city and the workers on the railway line Durres-Elbasan [34]. In early February, a power plant in Kuks was put into operation [35]. A transmission line between the power station in Kucova and the oil-fields in Patos was set up, which provided electricity for the production of oil and for draining the Malić Lake [36]. At the same time, they organized specialization courses for workers [37]. The Albanian state adopted the Regulations on salaries of workers and clerks. Thus, the workers' wages were increased from 25% to 34% and salaries from 13% to 41%. They also adopted the Regulation on social security of workers and employees, which prescribed the insurance for contribution amounting to 15% of the remuneration, hence, lower than in Yugoslavia [38].

5. 1948-ALBANIA TURNED FROM YUGOSLAVIA TO THE USSR

Enver Hoxha followed the development of the Yugoslav-Soviet relations in the early 1948, the talks between Yugoslav leaders and the Soviet authorities and the objections raised by the Soviets towards the Yugoslavs because of the engagement in Albania, especially because of the integration of the Yugoslav-Albanian armies without consulting the Soviets [48] (p. 134). Josip Broz Tito was aware that the relations with Albania were changing. In his communication with Enver Hoxha, he advised him that there was a lack of Albanian confidence in the Yugoslav aid and intentions [39]. The situation definitely aggravated, when the Resolution of the Cominform was issued in Bucharest on 28 June 1948 [57] (pp. 300-302). On 29 June, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Albania supported the Resolution and turned against the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia [64] (pp. 110-111). Due to the deteriorating relations and treatment of Yugoslav citizens, the Yugoslav government requested a meeting with an Albanian delegation in Belgrade for the purpose of regulating the issue of their economic cooperation [40]. Then, in early July, in face of the new situation, Yugoslavia suspended, until further notice, all deliveries of goods to Albania [41].

In September 1948, the Albanian Prime Minister signed a trade agreement with the Soviet Union in Moscow. As part of that agreement, the Soviet Union was supposed to deliver to Albania devices for a sugar factory, a textile factory and a leather processing factory [42].

As for the economic cooperation between Yugoslavia and Albania, it should be noted that in the Yugoslav budget for 1948 there were three billion Dinars planned for the harmonization of the economic plans with Albania as an

expense, and one billion as revenue. Materials and goods of Yugoslav produce worth 1.910 million were supposed to be supplied to Albania, and goods worth 585 million Dinars were to be bought for Albanian needs abroad, while the rest of the loan of 505 million remained unutilized. In addition, Yugoslavia was to invest 1948 300 million in machines and installations in the Albanian-Yugoslav Societies which mainly had to be purchased abroad. From the Albanian loan of one billion, Yugoslavia was supposed to export 565 million, and the rest was supposed to be spent on the needs of the country [43]. From 2 billion in loans in 1948, 1.454.222.364.93 was spent. From the loan of 3 billion Dinars in the first half of 1948 (by 2 July 1948), 2.041.793.389.66 Dinars was spent (with a loan of 2 billion) [44].

6. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it should be noted that in the immediate post-World War II period Albania recovered economically. Factories, hydroelectric power plants, railways, hospitals, schools and other important objects were built. Postal services began to develop and electricity entered Albanian homes. Albanian villagers received government assistance for their agricultural work, the agrarian reform was implemented, which abolished the feudal system in the country, the working class was evolving and unions were established. The standard of living of the Albanian families and workers improved. Albania was economically developing with Yugoslav assistance in loans and other means. The value of the economic aid that Yugoslavia sent to Albania in the period 1945-1948 was about 33 million Dollars [45] (p. 238). Also, Yugoslavia took over the budgeting of the Albanian army, and in the period from 1945 to 1948, Albania was supplied with weapons and equipment in the amount of 704 791 400 Dinars, and Albanian officers were trained in Yugoslav schools [59] (p. 72).²⁴

Finally, the question should be why Yugoslavia provided economic assistance to Albania, when it was itself in a difficult situation after the Second World War. There are different assumptions – in the opinion of Albanian historians, Yugoslavia was trying to subdue Albania, while according to Yugoslav historians and contemporaries, Yugoslavia wanted to help the underdeveloped Albania. There is a possibility that by helping Albania, Yugoslavia wanted to strengthen the Eastern bloc countries, which were under the protection of the USSR. The unification of Yugoslavia and Albania would strengthen the Yugoslav foreign policy position, as it would allow it to have access to the Mediterranean, gain more strategic importance and enhance its role in the Balkans.

²⁴ More about the cooperation between the Yugoslav and Albanian armies, see: Dimitrijević, 1996.

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THE ROLE OF THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH IN SPREADING RUSSIAN GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS IN THE BALKANS. COLLABORATION OR COOPTATION WITH THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLITICS?

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ABSTRACT

Throughout history, Russia has always had a geostrategic interest in the Balkans, and the constant pursuit of its presence in the Balkans is also largely motivated by the religion common for several Balkan nations and cultural-historical ties. Hence, Orthodox instrumentalization has been and still remains one of the important companions of Russian geopolitics in the Balkans. Today, among several active institutions of Russian *soft power*, the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) is undoubtedly a mechanism for creating the image of Russia worldwide, including the Balkan region. In contemporary geopolitical researches, a dilemma is raised whether we can speak of any religion-related geopolitics, since until recently, geopolitics has been perceived as a purely secular realm. The dominance of the secularity principle in the analysis of international relations has been weakened by the processes of religious resurgence and a series of terrorist acts motivated by religious extremism. These developments have sparked special interest in the role of religion in the international affairs. Consequently, the active involvement of religious organizations, as non-state actors in the geopolitical strategies of the states, cannot escape the focus of researchers concentrated on international political processes. In this sense, one group of authors support the opinion that religion cannot be considered as a *game changer* which can offer a fundamental vision about international relations. Another group considers religion (especially the orthodox one) as a source of national ideology and collective legitimatization that can potentially create a geopolitical vision. In this context, referring to Russian geopolitics, it is impossible to underestimate the ROC and its role granted by Russian foreign policy, to achieve purely secular goals, also including in the Balkans. Since the ROC has been perceived by a series of geopolitical analysts as a paradigmatic instrument for spreading the *soft power* of Russia throughout the world, it should be mentioned that the very ROC is closely related to other organizational forms (which will be analyzed in this paper), that serve the Russian state for similar purposes, and as such they act in the Balkans as well, listing here the *Rusky Mir* Foundation, in particular *the Foundation for the Unity of Orthodox Christian Nations*. The Fund is accused of being an undercover

project under the "disguise" of the ROC dealing with intelligence, propaganda and subversive activity thus intensifying Russian presence in the Balkans. Hence, the aim of this paper is to understand the way in which the geopolitical agenda of ROC and other affiliated organizations may be covered by the diplomacy of the Russian state, in order to achieve geopolitical influence of the predominantly Orthodox Balkans, through determination of intriguing parallels between the secular geopolitics of Russia, on the one side and the ecclesiastic geopolitics of ROC, as a phenomenon similar to Russian secular geopolitics, on the other.

Key words: *Russian Orthodox Church, geopolitics, Balkans, Russky Mir, the Foundation for the Unity of Orthodox Christian Nations;*

INTRODUCTION

Throughout history, Russia has always expressed its strategic interest in the Balkans. This is reflected in its imperial state policy, in which the Balkans was treated as a region of significance for the security and stability on its southern and southeastern border. Its constant pursuit of presence in the Balkans is largely motivated by the religion that is common to several Balkan nations (Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Greece) and the cultural-historical ties. In the 19th century, even during the imperial regime, official Russian political focus was aimed at the liberation struggles of the Slavs (pan Slavism), but also other Orthodox nations (pan Orthodoxy), for the purpose of constituting their own national states. Hence, the instrumentalization of Orthodoxy was and remains one of the most important accelerators of the Russian geopolitics for the Balkans (Biserko, p.1). The strategic interests of the USSR in the Balkans do not differ seriously from the Russian in the 19th century, except that there is a change of ideological grounds towards the so called "proletarian internationalism" (Ibid.). However, it is wrong to conclude that Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) was set aside in such constellation. Even today, post-Soviet Russia, which is a secular state, also uses the Moscow Patriarchate in order to spread its geopolitical influence on the predominantly Orthodox Balkans, through successful incorporation into its moral framework of secular and religious traditions. In this way, the Russian Federation evidently deviates from the strictly materialistic and liberal course of the West (Desnin, 2018).

The very term "geopolitics", however, was coined after World War I by Rudolf J. Kjellen, who inspired by the radical changes on the map of Europe and taking advantage of the ideas of Ratzel and Mackinder, in his researches considered it as a relationship between the state and its territory, a relationship that not only influences the domestic affairs of individual states but also their foreign policy (Kalkandjieva, 2018: 16). However, contemporary geopolitical researches raised the dilemma whether we can speak of any religion-related geopolitics, because until recently geopolitics has been perceived as a purely secular realm. Secularism has been regarded as a conventional benchmark in the study of international

relations since the period of the Peace of Westphalia (1648). This peace treaty, which ended the so-called Thirty Years' War, is de facto, a milestone in international relations, because it excluded religion from political power not only in Europe, but also in the world (Perry, 2000: 134).

Nevertheless, in the last two decades, “the dominance of the principle of secularity in the analysis of international relations has been weakened by the processes of religious resurgence and a series of terrorist acts motivated by religious extremism. These developments have sparked special interest in the role of religion in the international affairs“ (Kalkandjieva, 2018: 5). Consequently, the active involvement of religious organizations as non-state actors in the geopolitical strategies of the states cannot escape the focus of researchers of international political processes. In this context, when we review Russian geopolitics, we cannot underestimate ROC and the role it had on the imperial, soviet and modern Russia as a non-state actor, which however, was used by the Russian foreign policy in order to achieve purely secular goals, including the ones in the Balkans.

The purpose of this paper is to show that the influence of ROC is becoming more evident beyond the realm of domestic policies. The Moscow Patriarchate together with Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) play a key role in the formulation and promotion of Russian influence abroad, undoubtedly including the Balkans as a predominantly Orthodox geopolitical sphere. In this manner occurred the “breakdown in the constitutional principle of secularism so evident in domestic affairs and mingled into Russia’s foreign policy, leading to the bizarre reality whereby a secular state is advocating on behalf of religious Orthodoxy and “traditional” values abroad“ (Blitt, 2011: 365). The other goal of this paper is to show that ROC “is itself a body of power“ (Kalkandjieva, 2015: 1), which has a wide range of church-geopolitical interests in the Balkans, especially among the predominantly Orthodox countries, which are largely complementary to Russian geopolitical strategies for influencing the Balkans.

1. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON USING RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION FOR ACHIEVING GEOPOLITICAL GOALS

In modern scientific thought there are two points of view regarding this issue. The first is the one that has been elaborated starting from Huntington's “Clash of Civilisations“ where religion and the corresponding forms of religious organization can change some of the existing paradigms and become the main thinking regarding some international politics (Huntington, 1993: 22-49). The second one, which believes that religion cannot be considered as *game changer*, offers a fundamental vision about international relations, but still cannot underestimate the religious actors, whose neglecting in certain contexts and regarding some issues, will be a mistake (Haynes, 2013: 82-86).

Modern authors, however, pay attention to the more specific behavior of religious actors on the international stage, when they actually turn into a tool for accomplishing the so-called *soft power*, which should be an emerging form of the

close collaboration between religious actors and governments of the respective countries, in order to achieve common goals. As this paper refers to the use of ROC by the Russian authorities to achieve geopolitical influence on the Balkans, as *par-excellence* example of the manifestation of *soft power*²⁵ mentioned by Đurković (2012: 17), it should be emphasized that, in fact, the Russians between the two world wars “they devised and worked out the whole concept (...) enforcing credible propaganda and influence“. “Although Russia had significant experience in using the *soft power*, after the collapse of the Soviet state, that potential was not used until 2012“ (Kurjak, 2016: 127).²⁶

Also, scientific literature, specifically when it refers to the churches of Orthodox tradition, is ambitious to answer a number of other questions, among which the following are the most prominent ones: Are the goals of Orthodox churches on some international or interstate issues, convergent or divergent to those of their respective countries? Can Orthodox churches behave more independently from their own countries in their international affairs? How can these relationships be reflected on secular matters? (Kalkandjieva, 2018:7). Here it should be emphasized that, in Orthodoxy, the territories of autocephalous churches had to be in line with the political and/or national ones, but there is also a deviation from this principle, especially after the dissolution of the USSR and SFRY, and this principle does not apply to the four old Patriarchates. Precisely “the phenomenon of autocephaly in Orthodoxy is the major reason for its past and contemporary international decentralization and a condition for the establishment of closer relations between the church and the state, as well as between the church and the nation in the areas dominated by Orthodoxy“ (Kalkandjieva, 2011: 600). Hence, the accusations of some authors for whom the Orthodox churches are “nationalist institutions“ (Ramet, 1988: 6) remain understandable. Such organization of the Orthodox churches, mainly according to a national indication, among many authors, such as Thual (1993: 121), conceives then opinion that such constellation provides a condition for Orthodoxy to be “a source of national ideology and collective legitimatization“ which can potentially create a geopolitical vision.

Hence, the purpose of this paper is to understand the way in which the geopolitical agenda of ROC may be covered by the diplomacy of the Russian state in order to achieve the geopolitical influence in the predominantly Orthodox Balkans, through the determination of intriguing parallels between the secular geopolitics of Russia, on the one side, and ecclesiastic geopolitics of ROC, as a phenomenon similar to the Russian secular geopolitics, on the other.

²⁵ American political scientist Joseph Nye defined the term *soft power* as “the opportunity to achieve goals in the international arena, not with the help of coercion, but with the help of persuasion and attraction of sympathies of other actors ...“(quoted in Kurjak, 2016: 126). *Soft power*, according Nye, is based on three basic resources: the state's culture (which can include religion), political values and foreign policy (Bešlin, 2016:133).

²⁶ At the consultations with Ambassadors that year, the President of the state Putin, mentioned soft power for the first time (Ibid.,).

2. ROC AS A TOOL FOR GEOPOLITICAL INFLUENCE OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE BALKANS

When we consider the Russian geopolitical attempts to influence the Balkans, according to some groups of authors (such as Reljić, 2009: 6), they are based on three pillars. The first one is the privileged position of Russia as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and thanks to its veto, Moscow can block all processes taking place under the aegis of the UN, that are related to certain conditions in the Balkans. The second pillar is the growing attempt to improve the economic presence of Russia in the Balkans, primarily as the leading supplier of energy to the region, but also as an investor and a trading partner. Finally the third pillar, which is the subject of interest in this paper, is the historical, cultural and political connection of Russia with the peoples and states of Southeast Europe, which have an Orthodox tradition, more specifically the synchronization of attempts between the Russian Orthodox Church and the official Russian foreign policy in the region for the promotion of such traditional relations.

For contemporary analysts, the symphony between the ROC and MFA of the Russian Federation is more evident. Today the Moscow Patriarchate and its head are considered to be the ear of Russia's Foreign Ministry, so the attempt by the Russian foreign policy makers to be in collaboration with it is understandable. The Church's foreign policy objectives are multidisciplinary and diverse. Yet they share many similarities with the Government with regard to Russia's foreign policy priorities. Consequently, the Moscow Patriarchate plays a key role in both formulating and advancing Russian interests abroad, including those in the Balkans (Blitt, 2011: 365-7, 381-2).

Since a range of geopolitical analysts perceive the ROC as a paradigmatic instrument for spreading Russia's soft power throughout the world, it should be noted that the ROC itself is closely related to other organizational forms serving similar purposes. Such is, for example, the quasi-government foundation, formed in 2007 with Putin's decree, *Rusky Mir*.²⁷ The foundation's goal is "to promote Russian language as Russian national heritage, as an important aspect of Russian and world culture, and to support Russian language teaching programs abroad".²⁸ According to some authors, as Miša Đurković (2012: 18), this foundation partly emerges due to the apparent decline in the influence of the Russian language in the world, in schools but also in the public sphere. Hence, it is no coincidence that its main goal is the popularization of Russian language in education and other social segments. There is no doubt that this foundation has developed more than obvious connection with the ROC, regardless of the fact that at first glance the mandate of *Rusky mir* entails little or no connection to the promotion of Russian spirituality or

²⁷ For Biserko and Stanojlović (2016: 149) Putin established this foundation "in order to promote Russian language and culture, following the model of British Council, Goethe Institute, etc."

²⁸ About Ruskiy Mir Foundation: Creation, RUSSKIY MIR FOUND., <http://www.ruskiymir.ru/ruskiymir/en/fund/about>.

Russian version of Orthodoxy. However, since its foundation in 2007, a representative of ROC was not included in the Executive Board of the Foundation, but one was included in the Supervisory Board of the Foundation. In the period between 2007-2010, this was the Vicar of the Patriarch of Moscow and the whole Russia, and since 2010, neither more nor less, the Metropolitan of Volokolamsk, the Chairman of the Department of External Church Relations of ROC. Hence it can be concluded that the co-optation of the ROC, in the governing bodies of this foundation, indicates the fact that Russian Orthodoxy shall be promoted not only under the banner of an ostensibly more inclusive notion of spirituality or culture, but also as part of the government's broader effort to safeguard the Russian language. Strengthening the links between the Russian Orthodox Church and *Russky Mir* gives the impression that the foundation drifts away from its core mission of promoting the Russian language and wanders into the realm of endorsing an exclusively Orthodox version of spirituality of Russia in the world (Blitt, 2011: 383-387).

The foundation is involved in the cultural collaboration of Russia with the Balkans, since *Russky Mir* has founded Russian centres, among which, three in Bulgaria (Varna, Plovdiv, Sofia), two in Serbia (Novi Sad, Belgrade), two in Romania (Bucharest, Cluj Napoca), one in Greece (Salonica), Macedonia (Skopje), Montenegro (Nikšić) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Banja Luka). According to Savić (2016:89), despite the Russian language courses held in these centres, Russian culture is also presented, but often separate Russian political moves in the international community are explained under this culture. In this regard, it is indicative that the foundation *Russky Mir* works in all Orthodox countries in the Balkans, without exception, while in the countries with dominant Muslim population like Albania, Kosovo, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (versus Republic of Srpska), it does not have its branches. Therefore, according to authors such as Blitt (2011: 387), this foundation is trying to “advance the ROC religious and political interests by disseminating an exclusively Orthodox point of view and cementing the linkage between Orthodoxy and the state“ in an implicit way, but also among other Orthodox countries in the Balkans, which are largely complementary to Russia's external geopolitical visions in this region.

When one analyses the synchronous efforts of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian foreign policy for geopolitical influence in the Balkans, one cannot miss the ***International Foundation for the Unity of Orthodox Christian Nations***. The foundation was founded in 1995 with the blessing of the Holy Patriarch of Moscow and whole Russia Alexy II, who was the head of the Trustee Council starting from the foundation's establishment in 1995 till his death in 2008, when he was succeeded by the incumbent Patriarch Kirill. However, the head of ROC, “practically has no function, except purely a representative one. Its true and real manager from then until today is Valery Arkadievich Alexeev. Adjacent to the organization, there is an Expert Council composed of politicians, businessmen, famous names from the oligarchic elite of the Russian Federation, mostly related to the energy business (Matakiev, 2017a). The foundation's goal is

“close cooperation of the Orthodox people in the field of culture, science, economics and spiritual life“ (Savić, 2016: 89). Despite the fact that the tasks of the foundation *Unity of Orthodox Christian Nations* are masked by the term “Orthodox spirituality”, more than evident is the fact that its activity is focused on geopolitical actions, more specifically in Southeast Europe (in the Balkans). The activity consists mainly of financing forums, in order to promote Russian domination in the region, as well as the embedding of Russian agents among church officials in local churches and politicians. A particularly important goal to be achieved by the foundation is the reinforcement of “Slavic unity” within the framework of Orthodoxy²⁹ (Matakiev, 2017a).

For the partial accomplishment of these goals “the foundation also established a reward for outstanding contributions to strengthen the unity of countries with Orthodox Christianity“ (Savić, 2016: 89). From the Balkans, as laureates of this premium among church members and politicians, we can point out: Serbia [Patriarchs Pavle (2001) and Irinej (2018), President Nikolić (2015)], Bulgaria [Patriarchs Maxim (2004) and Neophyte (2015), President Parvanov³⁰ (2002), and also close to the foundation is the former Prime Minister, Crown Prince Simeon II], from Macedonia, President Ivanov (2016), from Montenegro, President Vujanović (2008) and the former President of Republica Srpska, and current member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Milorad Dodik (2013). Hence, if we analyze the list of awardees of this premium, it can be concluded that the majority, regardless of whether they are church dignitaries or political leaders, played a role or were perceived as Russian lobbyists in their respective countries, as patrons or Kremlin favourites, through which an attempt is made to strengthen Russian presence in their countries.

It should be emphasized that the *International Foundation for the Unity of Orthodox Christian Nations* is actively acting in the Balkans and has its own departments in Serbia, Montenegro and Bulgaria. Additionally, it is also finances certain programs in Greece. The foundation is accused of dealing with intelligence, propaganda and subversion activities under the cloak of the “church organization”. Through these units, attempts are being made to create full cohorts of Russian lobbyists in the respective countries. Many of the activities financed by this fund, according to Matakiev (2017a) have been seen as an aggressive advertisement of Russian chauvinism, the imperial appetites of Russia in the Balkans, woven into the spirit of anti-Europeanism and anti-Americanism. It is an interesting fact that the head of this foundation in Serbia is Nenad Popović, Minister without portfolio in the Cabinet of Aleksandar Vučić, and the head of the Trustee Council of this foundation in Serbia, Montenegro and Bulgaria, are Patriarch Irinej, Metropolitan Amfilohije and Patriarch Neophyte, respectively. Therefore, the foundation “For the Unity of Orthodox Christian Nations” of Valery Alekseev, a hidden project

²⁹ Including in the Balkans, because four of the seven majority Orthodox Slavic countries are in it.

³⁰ As a politician, Georgi Parvanov was always perceived in Bulgaria as key “energetic Russian lobbyist“ (Matakev, 2017 b).

under the “omorph” of ROC, continues to work for the Russian presence in the Balkans, through its subversive intelligence activity, largely directed against the Euro-Atlantic political orientation of these countries (Ibid.,).

Another important role that Russian foreign policy has given to the ROC is the achievement of a common church and state vision for strengthening the “spiritual security” of the ROC and the Russian Federation. This concept for authors like Payne (2010), Blitt (2011: 377-378) has a double connotation. One of them is directed to the internal plan and aims to protect Orthodoxy in Russia from the threat of religious competition from missionaries and “nontraditional” faiths. The other refers to an external plan, and refers to the role of the ROC abroad, which Russian President Putin defined as “the dialogue with other Sister-Churches, the Russian Orthodox Church has always defended and hopefully will continue to defend the national and spiritual identity of Russians“ (quoted in Payne, 2010: 712, 715).

The concept of “spiritual security” of Russia and the ROC largely refers to another important concept in Orthodoxy, which is the security of “canonical territory”. The canonical territory in Orthodoxy is defined as a “determination of who has spiritual oversight over the Orthodox people of a particular area“ (Payne, 2010:713). With granting of autocephaly to the Church in Ukraine in 2019 by the Ecumenical Patriarchate, this topic became controversial in the relations between the ROC and the Constantinople Patriarchate, as both churches continued to claim that Ukraine³¹ is their canonical territory. For Kazarian, (2016:123), this clash, which more than evidently has geopolitical connotations, occurs as a result of the tensions between authority (Ecumenical Patriarchate, *primus inter pares*) and power (ROC, the greatest Orthodox denomination in the world). According to Kalkandjieva (2018: 48), the issue of the autocephaly has always produced geopolitical tensions in the Orthodox world. It should be emphasized that this collision has also been partly transmitted to the Balkans, since one of the geopolitical goals set by the ROC and the diplomatic missions of Russia in the Balkans³² is to lobby against the acceptance of the tomos of autocephaly referring to the Ukrainian church. This has once more confirmed that the relationship between the ROC and the Russian Federation is a dynamic phenomenon which

³¹ The centrifugal ecclesiastical process in Ukraine began with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and undermining the positions of the Moscow Patriarchate in the newly established independent state. The bosom of the Russian Orthodox Church was left by many Orthodox believers in Ukraine who established two bodies without canonical recognition: the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (1990) and the Kyivan Patriarchate (1995) (Kalkandjieva, 2014: 15).

³² This issue which is of great importance to ROC and Russia and the priority for Russian diplomatic missions, is also confirmed by the expulsion of two Russian diplomats from Greece in July 2018, as well as the ban on the entry of two more on the territory of Greece. According to Viktor Yelenskyj (2018), a Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Culture and Spirituality in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, these expulsions of Russian diplomats from Greece are not only aimed to undermine the achieved agreement for the name issue between Macedonia and Greece, but also because of lobbying for the interests of the Moscow Patriarchate against the granting of autocephaly to the Church in Ukraine.

shows that ecclesiastical geopolitics can be considered complementary to secular geopolitics.

CONCLUSION

Today, the ROC is undoubtedly listed among the few active institutions of Russian soft power (state authorities, NGOs, foundations, discussion clubs, global media, online resources) as a mechanism for promoting the image of Russia around the world, also including the Balkan countries (Glinskaya and Stefanov, 2018). The Moscow Patriarchate is more than a well thought out instrument for spreading Russian soft power in the Balkans, because in its action on this geopolitical sphere it constantly refers to the common destiny in various difficult periods of the Balkan countries, traditional friendship and fraternity among Orthodox people, but also to the co-existence, related language and culture among the Slavic people of the Balkans (Savić, 2016: 98). According to the same author, these instruments “influenced public opinion in certain Balkan states, which shaped an irrational image of Russia as a savior, a sincere friend and guardian of traditional ties and values“ (Ibid.).

The Moscow Patriarchate continues to reflect the power of modern Russia, as it did in the period of imperial and soviet Russia, which is mirrored in its territory, multinational structure, and international influence. Hence, it remains to be an important tool in the process of coordination, but also in the modification of the guidelines of the secular foreign policy of the Russian Federation. Therefore, Moscow remains to be accused of violation of the “constitutional obligations related to secularism and separation of church and state even in the formulation and execution of its foreign policy“(Blitt, 2011: 367).

However, according to Zoe Knox (2007: 79-81), Orthodox churches in the post-communist countries where the ROC undoubtedly belongs, will continue “to foster links with the post-communist political elites“ and to “promote the symphony between religious and national identity“. Given the example of the ROC and the local governing elite, it is more than obvious that this symphony is of mutual benefit since it focuses on the process of spreading the Russian influence, both in the Balkans and abroad.

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SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANISATION - THE NEW EURASIA REGIONAL ALLIANCE

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Abstract

With the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Cold War and the communist arrangement of much of Eurasia have ended. However, the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance - NATO continues to exist and expands with former Soviet Union states. On the other side of the Pacific new powerful actors emerged, such as China and India, as a challenge of creating new regional groupings and moving the epicenter of power from the Atlantic to the Asian continent. In this context, the paper is aimed to show the state and role of Shanghai Cooperation Organization and to assess the achievements of their work to date. Mainly qualitative research methods are used for gathering, analyzing and interpreting the results of the research. In addition, we also use content analyses of the international relations concerning the creation and conduct of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The used methodology and theoretical insight are expected to give a clearer picture of the legitimacy of their work and assess their real role and contribution in the Global society.

Keywords: Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Eurasian integration

1. INTRODUCTION

With the end of the Cold War, there have been evident changes both on the European continent and in the southwestern part of Asia, on the territory of the former USSR. The last decade of the 21st century was marked by interethnic conflicts, bloodshed, and constitution of new states. Liberal democracy won in this area and this has changed the whole concept of bipolar rivalry. In Europe, with the collapse of the socialist federations, new states emerged, and some of them joined the European Union, along with the independent Baltic countries and the former Soviet satellites. In the Asian part of the USSR independence, all countries, even some small regions in the Kavkaz region, were not recognized by the international community. From a political-economic standpoint, the enlarged European Union has enriched the so-called Euro-American political and west security, taking into

account the fact that new European members have entered the NATO force.³³ However, although NATO enlargement strengthened and made the Atlantic alliance more powerful, divisions and informal alliances took place in the interior of Europe in terms of strengthening the power and influence on the world stage. Namely, based on a political strategic division, certain European countries were grouped into three groups. The first group of countries (which includes the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Denmark and Spain) are opponents of Germanization and advocate a global alliance with the United States and maintain the world's Atlantic-central order. The second group of countries (which includes Sweden, Poland, the Baltic countries and Romania) do not have full faith in the EU, perceive Russia as a threat to their own security and rely only on the United States or, ultimately, on themselves, linking each other within sub regional groupings. The third group of countries (which includes Germany, Italy and Turkey) maintain their policies in a balance between the United States on the one hand, important for security and internal stability, and Russia, on the other hand, on which they are dependent for energy, and aim to establish cooperation with the ultimate goal of creating cooperative security in Europe. Drawing on such a division, US attention is not as directed toward Russia, as it is to the new economic and security forces like China, India, Brazil, Turkey, and even Germany itself. Namely, apart from India as an ally, the United States strives to find new allies in the Pacific and to strengthen relations with China, which has an informal agreement on bilateral co-operation within G2.³⁴

Russia, on the other hand, is not as interested in the EU as a community, as it is individually interested in establishing relations with Germany and the United States in the west and strengthening its power through the realization of the Eurasian project, which is gradually being implemented through the formation of alliances with the former USSR republics. Namely, it is the initiator of the establishment of the State Union with Belarus and the Commonwealth of Independent States, which includes, in addition to Russia, Belarus, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan (Ukraine came out in 2014).

In addition, it is the initiator of the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Community with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, (according to the European model), the Customs Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan; Agreement on Collective Security Organization with Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan (as a NATO counterpart), as well as the **Shanghai**

³³ James A. Millward (2007). *Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang*. Columbia University Press. p. 336. ISBN 978-0-231-13924-3.

³⁴ Suisheng Zhao (2004). *Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior*. M.E. Sharpe. p. 263. ISBN 978-0-7656-1284-7.

Cooperation Organization in the field of security, economy and culture along with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and China.³⁵

The BRIC countries, together with the G8, the EU, Australia, Saudi Arabia, Argentina, North Korea, Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey, have joined the Group 20 (G20) of industrially developed countries, representing regional power and participating with more than 80% of world GDP. In parallel with this group, China, India and Brazil together with South Africa form G4 and are the most influential within the G20 of the developing countries.

Returning to the Asian countries of the BRIC and their apparent development, India receives an epithet of an software empire or office of the world with technological innovations and a specialized and trained labor force, while China is known as a world-class factory that exports low-cost products and prices. In addition to these economic advantages offered by the two countries, their attractiveness stems from the location, and from their military readiness (active armed forces 1.325.000 in India, versus 2.285.000 in China). From a geopolitical point of view, India's attractiveness stems from its access to the Indian Ocean (which Belgian geopolitician Robert Stokers calls the Middle Ocean, between the Atlantic and the Pacific Ocean), that is, a location that allows control over the entire region. According to Stokers, the central position of the Indian Ocean between the east coast of Africa and the Pacific Ocean, which includes New Zealand, Australia, New Guinea, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Indochina, has a key position for the geopolitical influence of the three most important large areas - the South-Eastern Rimland and the Pacific region, that is, the strategic influence of the key zones in Eurasia, namely the Middle East, India, China, Iran, Indochina, the Far East and the Pacific.

On the other hand, China, unlike India, is called the Middle Empire, which, on the one side, belongs to the coastal zone - the Pacific Rim, while on the other side, it is oriented to the continental archetypes, for which reason it is characterized as a continental tele-curricular force. However, ocean and airborne weapons, as well as the deployment of new weapons, enabled China to play an antagonistic role in the Pacific against US supremacy. Such readiness of China, which has always had a coastal and defensive character, has been determined as a threat not only to US domination, but also in relation to the East Asian coastal countries, which, as a result of the Chinese naval arms have established or strengthened their defense relations with the United States.

2. REGULATED MULTILATERALISM

In the world, the United States would remain militarily dominant, China would be the world's first economic power and the largest producer of goods in the

³⁵ Constantine Menges (19 April 2005). China: The Gathering Threat: The Gathering Threat. Thomas Nelson Inc. p. 460. ISBN 978-1-4185-5166-7.

world, India would be the largest service provider, and Europe could focus on the development of innovation and technology. However, only Russia can play a balancer role in its position and thus balance the overall international relations. On the issue of global security, Russia and the United States are committed to mutual cooperation, if for nothing else, then to address all the complex situations in Central Asia. Russia also has more than successful military-technical cooperation with India, and they formed with China (and other partners) the **Shanghai Cooperation Organization**.

In the field of economics, it is a member of the multilateral - BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China), which gathers four economies with the highest potential and has the status of a special partner in the EU relations. In the field of energy, it is an inevitable factor when talking about the future energy security of Europe, but also of Southeast Asia.

Politically speaking, Russia is the only country which enjoys the minimum confidence from all parts of the world. The United States could hardly mediate political activities in the Arab or Latin American world; Europe cannot play this role in Asia and Africa, and China in Europe.

The EU has proved to be an effective economic integration, but it is burdened with many internal problems and a lack of common foreign policy goals and independent military forces, it is politically weak to set up as a country that needs to strike a balance between other powers.

The multi-polar world can function without balances, but then the risk of deterioration in the overall international relations in the world will increase. Such multilateralism can be called - unbalanced multilateralism. If there is no intermediary and a guarantor for the implementation of agreements, the distrust among the major regional powers will continue to increase. In such a system, international relations are regulated by many bilateral agreements that will set up forces among themselves, which would involve a large number of players in the game.³⁶

And if there is such a dramatic development of the situation on a global scale, the country that has the greatest initial advantage is Russia. For the simple reason that Russia has already achieved the regional goals set a few years ago. The partnership with Kazakhstan and Belarus has deepened the creation of a customs union (the emerging disputes with Minsk still cannot jeopardize the strategic partnership), with Ukraine a new agreement has been signed on the use of the Black Sea ports and the shoreline for the navy ships for the next 40 years, the border with China and Mongolia is secured through an alliance in the **Shanghai Cooperation Organization**, bilateral agreements for military-technical cooperation with Iran and energy-economic cooperation with Turkey. It is a framework for peaceful coexistence and co-operation with the two largest Muslim countries in the

³⁶ Martin Sieff (2009). *Shifting Superpowers: The New and Emerging Relationship Between the United States, China, and India*. Cato Institute. pp. 70–71. ISBN 978-1-935308-21-8.

region, and the positions and influence of Russian interests in Serbia, Greece, Armenia, Syria, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan have been substantially restored, and as things are standing, after the next elections, a similar situation will arrive in Georgia as well.

3. RUSSIAN AND CHINESE INTERESTS

Russia and China deem stability as the most important. It is, therefore, a matter of coordination of interests. The SCO thus reduces the tensions between Russia and China. Russia feels threatened in the West by NATO and the EU enlargement. China, meanwhile, is a world champion in export and one of the largest importers of raw materials, which is highly dependent on its ports. In the East it feels under the pressure of the United States and its allies, such as Japan and the Philippines. Both countries feel threatened from the outside and therefore they have to cooperate in Central Asia to withstand the pressure from outside. The stable relations in Central Asia are, moreover, in function of protecting Russian and Chinese economic interests. Both countries are referred to as functional infrastructure, such as gas pipelines and railways. China imports gas and oil from Russia and Central Asia and is at the same time the largest supplier of goods in the region. The so-called iron "silk route" passes through China, through Kazakhstan and connects Russia to Germany. Chinese economy is the generator of China's military, political and diplomatic strength, and if the United States wants to keep the primacy on the international stage, it is now high time to take up something. The attempts for internal destabilization of China through coordinated actions of Tibet and Singapore were quickly and efficiently suppressed by the Chinese authorities, and the attempt for a kind of external destabilization of China simply has no one to bring to Asia. Japan and Korea are not economically in favor of China's destabilization because they see a significant increase in trade with China every year, and they are not thinking about a military reaction. Other Asian countries are almost totally dependent on the Chinese market and investment, and Taiwan remains the only opportunity to open a front against China. However, despite the enormous military aid it received from Washington, which in 2010 amounted to over \$ 6 billion, neither its size nor the size of the population can be an equal rival, and even in Taiwan's public opinion there is almost no support for tightening its relations with Beijing. Hence, the only support in the region, which the US could use as a stable point for action against Beijing, is the Russian Far East. The most elegant action, which could be jointly conducted by Washington and Moscow, could involve defining new energy strategies that would make Russia's oil and gas more difficult to access by Chinese consumers.

The interests of the countries are different. While Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are making efforts to become economically and militarily independent of Russia, Turkmenistan, which is not a member of the SCO, is trying to keep as little neutral as possible. Uzbekistan, on the other hand, has a changing policy, which is sometimes directed more towards China, and sometimes more towards Russia. The

leadership of the largest and militarily and economically strongest country - Kazakhstan is evident, however, there are major problems and tensions at the moment. The Cossacks are afraid of excessive interference by Russia or, at worst, even a Ukrainian scenario with annexation of the northern territories. There is a large Russian minority in the north of Kazakhstan. China is seen in the region primarily as an investor: China's Central Asian leadership has the advantage of being primarily economically interested in the region.

Regarding **India**, Russian-Indian relations continued to be maintained after the Cold War thanks to their common interest against the Taliban in Afghanistan, which were backed by Pakistan, which is an Indian opponent against Kashmir. It was this alliance, which prompted the United States to support Pakistan in order to separate India from the USSR. However, the Cold War has changed the Indian-American relations that are today based on a strategic partnership and an agreement that India enters the nuclear club. With respect to the most current Russian-Indian relations, it should be noted that India is one of the priorities in the Russian political agenda for cooperation, which is gradually being achieved by laying the foundations for cooperation with free exchange between India and the Economic Eurasian Union and for activating high technology projects. In addition, cooperation has been concluded in both the military sector and the atomic energy sector, in order to create a new security and cooperation architecture in the Asian region. However, India is still struggling with a huge percentage of citizens living on the brink of poverty and it will be focused on resolving that problem for at least another decade, and Brazil is still on the geopolitical periphery.³⁷

The United States is trying to influence these things with direct pressure on **Germany**, which can leave long-term consequences on the relations of the two countries; they can try to obstruct Germany through its EU and NATO members, which gives them greater chances of success, but at the same time it can be a very expensive and slow process. Moreover, they can try to enter into a partnership with Russia. If they cut off the line of communication between Berlin and Moscow, Germany almost certainly remains militarily and politically isolated within the EU and NATO, without some greater chances for an independent foreign policy presence. By securing a military position in Europe, the United States can think about the next steps, and the first next step is how to prevent China's economic growth. In 2010, China became the world's first exporter of goods, although only 25 years ago its worldwide export was negligible. China has exceeded the other countries of Southeast Asia, so today the zone that covers the multilateral APT (ASEAN plus three - China, Japan and Korea) founded in 1997, is the center of the global production of consumer goods, and the center of world's economy in the North Atlantic region is moving at an incredible pace in the Pacific-Asian region.

³⁷ Colin Mackerras; Foundation Professor in the School of Asian and International Studies Colin Mackerras (2 September 2003). *China's Ethnic Minorities and Globalisation*. Routledge. p. 168. ISBN 978-1-134-39288-9.

Western services appear not to be calm about organizing the separatist movement in the southeastern province of Baluchistan in Iran. Iran has exported half its own energy to Japan, about a third to China and one fifth to the EU. With the potential crisis in Iran, the price of oil and gas on the world market has grown enormously, and Japan, China and the EU have to buy such expensive oil from somewhere.

4. SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANISATION - THE WORLD'S LARGEST MILITARY, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL EURASIAN ALLIANCE

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), or Shanghai Pact is a Eurasian political, economic, and security alliance, the creation of which was announced on 15 June 2001 in Shanghai, China by the leaders of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan; the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation **Charter**, formally establishing the organisation, was signed in June 2002. The original five nations, with the exclusion of Uzbekistan, were previously members of the Shanghai Five group, founded on 26 April 1996. Since then, the organisation has expanded its membership to eight countries when **India** and **Pakistan** joined SCO as full members on 9 June 2017 at a summit in Astana, Kazakhstan. The Heads of States Council (HSC) is the supreme decision-making body in the SCO, it meets once a year and adopts decisions and guidelines on all important matters of the organisation. Military exercises are also regularly conducted among the members to promote cooperation and coordination against terrorism and other external threats, and to maintain regional peace and stability. The members agreed to reduce the military forces in border regions and to "oppose intervention in other countries' internal affairs on the pretexts of 'humanitarianism' and 'protecting human rights;' and to support the efforts of one another in safeguarding the five countries' national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, social stability as a mechanism for higher level of cooperation. The Economic Cooperation Organization in 2007, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in 2011, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) in 2014, and the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific in 2015, African Union in 2018. In 2017, SCO eight full members accounted for approximately half of the world's population of 4 billion, a quarter of world's GDP - 25% and about 80% of Eurasia's landmass.



4.1.ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE

The Council of Heads of States is the top decision-making body in the SCO. This council meets at the SCO summits, which are held each year in one of the member states' capitals. The official working languages of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation are Chinese and Russian.

The Council of Heads of Governments is the second-highest council in the organisation. This council also holds annual summits, at which time members discuss issues of multilateral cooperation. The council also approves the organisation's budget. The Council of Foreign Ministers also holds regular meetings, where they discuss the current international situation and the SCO's interaction with other international organisations. The Council of National Coordinators coordinates the multilateral cooperation of member states within the framework of the SCO's Charter. The SCO Secretariat is the primary executive body of the organisation. It serves to implement organisational decisions and decrees, drafts proposed documents (such as declarations and agendas), functions as a document depository for the organisation, arranges specific activities within the SCO framework, and promotes and disseminates information about the SCO. It is located in Beijing. The current SCO Secretary-General is Rashid Alimov of Tajikistan, appointed to the office of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Secretary-General on January 2016.

The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), headquartered in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, is a permanent body of the SCO which serves to promote cooperation of member states against the three evils of terrorism, separatism and extremism.

The Head of RATS is elected to a three-year term. Each member state also sends a permanent representative to RATS.³⁸

4.2. OBSERVER STATES AND DIALOGUE PARTNERS

Iran has an observer status in the organisation, and applied for full membership on 24 March 2008. However, because it was under sanctions levied by the United Nations at the time, it was blocked from admission as a new member. The SCO stated that any country under UN sanctions could not be admitted. After the UN sanctions were lifted, Chinese president Xi Jinping announced its support for Iran's full membership in SCO during a state visit to Iran in January 2016. Mongolia became the first country to receive an observer status at the 2004 Tashkent Summit. Pakistan, India and Iran received an observer status at the 2005 SCO summit in Astana, Kazakhstan on 5 July 2005.

Sri Lanka and **Nepal** were granted a dialogue partner status. **Belarus** applied for a partner status in the organisation and was promised Kazakhstan's support towards that goal. However, Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov voiced doubt on the probability of Belarus' membership, saying that Belarus was a purely European country. Despite this, Belarus was accepted as a Dialogue Partner at the 2009 SCO Summit in Yekaterinburg, and after applying in 2012, was granted an observer status in 2015. **Turkey**, a member of NATO, was granted a dialogue partner status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) at the group's 2012 summit in Beijing. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has stated that he has discussed the possibility of abandoning Turkey's European Union membership candidacy in return for full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. This was reinforced again on 21 November 2016, after the European Parliament voted unanimously to suspend the accession negotiations with Turkey. Two days later, on 23 November 2016, Turkey was granted the chairmanship of the energy club of SCO for the 2017 period. That made Turkey the first country to chair a club in the organisation without a full membership status. **Turkmenistan** had previously declared itself a permanently neutral country, which was recognized by a Resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, thus precluding its membership in a military alliance like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. **Armenia** and **Azerbaijan** applied for an observer status within the organization. Egypt and Syria have also submitted applications for an observer status, while **Israel**, **Maldives** and **Ukraine** have applied for a dialogue partner status. **Iraq**, **Bahrain** and **Qatar** have also expressed interest in joining the SCO. The **United States** applied for an observer status in the SCO, but was rejected in 2005.

³⁸ Central Asia: A Gathering Storm?. M.E. Sharpe. 1 January 2002. p. 58. ISBN 978-0-7656-0866-6.

4.3.COOPERATION ON SECURITY, MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION

The SCO is primarily centered on its member nations' Central Asian security-related concerns, often describing the main threats it confronts as being terrorism, separatism and extremism. However, evidence is growing that its activities in the area of social development of its member states is increasing fast. At the SCO summit, held in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, on 16–17 June 2004, the Regional Antiterrorism Structure (RATS) was established. On 21 April 2006, the SCO announced plans to fight cross-border drug crimes under the counter-terrorism rubric. In October 2007, the SCO signed an agreement with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), in the Tajik capital Dushanbe, to broaden cooperation on issues such as security, crime, and drug trafficking. The organisation is also redefining cyberwarfare, saying that the dissemination of information "harmful to the spiritual, moral and cultural spheres of other states" should be considered a "security threat". An accord adopted in 2009 defined "information war", in part, as an effort by a state to undermine another's "political, economic, and social systems". The Diplomat reported in 2017 that the SCO has foiled 600 terror plots and extradited 500 terrorists through RATS.

Over the past few years, the organisation's activities have expanded to include increased **military cooperation**, intelligence sharing and counterterrorism. There have been a number of SCO joint military exercises. The first of these was held in 2003, with the first phase taking place in Kazakhstan and the second in China. Since then, China and Russia have teamed up for large-scale war games in 2005 (Peace Mission 2005), 2007 and 2009, under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. More than 4,000 soldiers participated at the joint military exercises in 2007.³⁹

At the same meeting, the Prime Minister of the People's Republic of China, Wen Jiabao, proposed a long-term objective to establish a **free trade area** in the SCO, while other more immediate measures would be taken to improve the flow of goods in the region. The SCO also prioritises joint **energy projects**; including the oil and gas sector, the exploration of new hydrocarbon reserves, and joint use of water resources. On 30 November 2006, at The SCO: Results and Perspectives, an international conference held in Almaty, the representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry announced that Russia is developing plans for an SCO "Energy Club". The need for this "club" was reiterated by Moscow at an SCO summit in November 2007. Other SCO members, however, have not committed themselves to the idea. However, during the 2008 summit it was stated that "Against the backdrop of a slowdown in the growth of world economy pursuing a responsible currency and financial policy, control over the capital flow, ensuring food and energy security

³⁹ Martin Sieff (8 March 2012). *That Should Still Be Us: How Thomas Friedman's Flat World Myths Are Keeping Us Flat on Our Backs*. John Wiley & Sons. p. 36. ISBN 978-1-118-24063-2.

have been gaining special significance". The creation of an Inter-bank SCO Council was also agreed upon at that summit in order to fund future joint projects. The first meeting of the SCO **Interbank Association** was held in Beijing on 21–22 February 2006. On 16 June 2009, at the Yekaterinburg Summit, China announced plans to provide a US\$10 billion loan to SCO member states to shore up the struggling economies of its members amid the global financial crisis. The summit was held together with the first BRIC summit, and the China-Russia joint statement said that they want a bigger quota in the International Monetary Fund.

4.4. RELATIONS WITH THE WEST

At the Astana summit in July 2005, with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq foreshadowing an indefinite presence of U.S. forces in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, the SCO requested the U.S. to set a clear timetable for withdrawing its troops from the SCO member states. Shortly afterwards, Uzbekistan requested the U.S. to leave the K2 air base. The SCO has made no direct comments against the U.S. or its military presence in the region; however, some indirect statements at the past summits have been viewed by Western media outlets as "thinly veiled swipes at Washington". A European Parliament researcher expressed her view that "institutional weaknesses, a lack of common financial funds for the implementation of joint projects and conflicting national interests have prevented the SCO from achieving a higher level of regional cooperation". There have been many discussions and commentaries about the geopolitical nature of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Matthew Brummer, in the *Journal of International Affairs*, tracks the implications of SCO expansion into the Persian Gulf, the real objective of counterbalancing the activities of the United States and NATO in Central Asia.

5. CONCLUSION

From the afore-stated, it may be concluded that while bipolarism seems to be dead since the end of the Cold War, the rivalry between the two major powers, Russia and the United States, continues through a "conquest" and the establishment of cooperation with the two new super powers of China and India. It may also be confirmed that the epicenter of power is moving from the Atlantic to the Pacific and the Indian Ocean, making Asia more geostrategically attractive. The SCO is widely regarded as the "alliance of the East", due to its growing centrality in Asia-Pacific, and has been the primary security pillar of the region. Being the world's forefront regional organization in economic power and political influence and one of the world's strongest military alliances, it is also the largest regional organization in the world in terms of geographical coverage and population, covering three-fifths of the Eurasian continent and nearly half of the human population (4 billion). At present, the SCO is one of the world's most powerful and influential organizations. With the growing power and enlargement of the organization, its

scope of unity and cooperation has expanded to many other areas, including education, science, technology, health care, environmental protection, tourism, media, sports, humanitarian and culture, while extending its principle to include global governance and fostering of international relationships. It has been a major partner of ASEAN, with both of the organizations establishing a cooperation model for peace, stability, development and sustainability of the Asian continent, and in the field of security, economy, finance, tourism, culture and environmental protection. Given its vast influence and power on the global stage, the organization plays a prominent role in shaping international politics, governance and affairs, and maintains diplomatic missions throughout the world. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is working to establish a rational and just world order and provides the states from Eurasia with a unique opportunity to take part in the process of forming a fundamentally new model of geopolitical integration. The SCO member countries have the ability and responsibility to safeguard the security of the Central Asian region, and call on Western countries to leave Central Asia. However, the United States is maneuvering to preserve its status as the world's sole superpower and will not allow any country the chance to pose a challenge to it. What connects all countries, both members of the present and the observers, is the rejection of the world's politics, which, in their view, is dominated by the West and in which the UN, the World Bank and the IMF are in the United States. "The SCO, just like BRICS, have established their own Bank for Development as global counter-counterparts. Attempts are being made to create alternative international organizations and institutions. However, I think that they will not be turned into 'anti-NATO' or 'OPEC with bombs'. The SCO approach is broader and covers not only a military alliance, but also an economic alliance and Soft Power. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization plans expansion. It wants to become an alternative to the West-dominated institutions. But the lack of resources makes the process more difficult. The negotiations on the Alliance's enlargement is on the top of the agenda. Iran and Mongolia also want to become members. So far they have only the status of observers. If a decision is made for their acceptance, then the WCO will have 20 percent of the world's oil reserves, half of the gas reserves, and will account for about half of the total population of the Earth. Initially, it was primarily aimed at reducing tensions in the region. Therefore, the goals and tasks have been listed as "confidence building measures" in the Charter of the organization since 2002. Central to this is the fight against the so-called "three evils" - terrorism, extremism and separatism. The union also aims at economic and technical cooperation.

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**ONE BELT ONE ROAD
CHINA BETWEEN ECONOMIC PROMOTION AND
DEMOCRATIC OBSTACLE - CHINESE-SERBIAN
COOPERATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES ON SERBIAN
SECURITY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION**

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to show how Serbia, as a small country, is positioned within the strategic initiative of the People's Republic of China known as One Belt One Road Initiative. The paper will shortly present the history and origin of the Chinese One Belt One Road Initiative, also referred to as Belt and Road Initiative. In order to show what the consequences could be on Serbia as part of the Belt and Road Initiative, the article will present implications of the Belt and Road Initiative in other countries which are included in the initiative and it will present short history of the relations between Serbia and China and the current state of relations and cooperation between these two countries. The final part of the paper will be dedicated to the conclusions and predictions of the further implications of the relations to the Serbian Security and European Integration.

1. DEVELOPMENT OF 'ONE BELT ONE ROAD' INITIATIVE

The origin of this strategic project goes back to 2013 and Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Kazakhstan. During that visit, President Xi spoke about the necessity of economic cooperation in the Eurasian region, which was initially referred to as a New Silk Road or Silk Road Economic Belt. The name of the strategic initiative has been changed; now it is fully branded as a Belt and Road Initiative, and in the following years it has also spread throughout Asia, Africa, and Europe, even reaching Latin American countries. Since its beginning, Belt and Road Initiative has been most often referred to as President Xi Jiping's strategic project, with its strategic implications in the international area strongly related to his position in China. He has strongly positioned himself inside the Chinese Communist Party, and even managed to remove the term restrictions; this could help him remain Chinese leader even after 2023, after his second term ends (Buckley & Bradshare, 2018). With the Belt and Road Initiative, since 2013 China has succeeded to become one of the most important economic and strategic factors throughout the world.

China has assured its presence in the Asian, European, African and even South American countries through investments in strategically important areas, while promoting cooperation among countries. Some estimates are that China has invested around 260 million US dollars and that the total value of Belt and Road initiative investment will reach 1 trillion US dollars until 2022 (Kuo & Niko). The fact that China has been investing in different parts of the globe has raised concern in the western part of the globe. Chinese investments have been perceived as a way of establishing influence and gaining powerful position in the international relations. The outcome is mixed, and the results of investments have led to different consequences, leading to positive development in infrastructure and trade relations, but also to national debt rise. A problem regarding Chinese investments is that those are often only presented as investments but are actually financial contracts between China and the interested countries. The impact that those financial contracts had to the level of national debt in some countries led to the “debt-trap” theory that revolves around fact that China is using financial instrument as a way to gain leverage over underdeveloped countries (Fenhorz, 2018). In 2019, China gain control over the military base in Djibouti, a country which could not meet arrangements of the financial contract with China (Paris, 2019). The military base in Djibouti is the first Chinese base outside its territory. Countries like Sri Lanka and Pakistan are continuing to conclude new financial contracts with China, even with the obvious danger to its national debts. China has already took control over a strategically important port in Sri Lanka due to an existing debt, but Sri Lanka’s government representatives have signed new financial contracts in 2018 (Lindberg & Lahiri, 2018). Chinese presence has not been without pushback and criticism. USA has stood up against that kind of spreading of influence, with government representatives campaigning against new agreements and publicly raising concerns about possibilities of even bigger national debts for countries that are signing financial contracts with Chinese financial institutions.

On the other hand, some countries have welcomed the Chinese presence, not only in Asia and Africa, but also in Europe. China has established bilateral relations and multilateral platforms for the cooperation with countries on the Belt and Road map, becoming present through investments and financial arrangements. The most notable multilateral initiative for cooperation is the 16 + 1 initiative, launched based on China’s idea to intensify the cooperation with Central European, Eastern European and Balkan countries on a higher level. The initiative was launched in 2012 and since then the meetings have been organized annually, with different host countries every year. Serbia is also part of the 16 + 1 multilateral cooperation platform with China, and has hosted the summit in 2014. In addition to multilateral cooperation, Serbia and China have had regular bilateral meetings, often on the highest level. Both countries have been engaged in developing political, economical and cultural cooperation. Chinese presence has been welcomed, and China has been very active in Serbia, especially through numerous financial agreements, but also through raising a number of foreign direct investments. At the moment, Serbia is the biggest partner of China in the region

and phrase that has been used most to describe the current relationship between two countries is “steel friendship”.

2. OVERVIEW OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND SERBIA

The current status of relations between China and Serbia has been defined by the current position of both countries in the field of international relations, but they also have joint historical characteristics that have been a good starting point for the development of the relationship. The historical connections have been a good starting point for the current level of cooperation that has been ongoing in the past ten years. There are several aspects both in the historical and current level of cooperation that have affected Serbia’s position in the international relations arena. Economic aspects are the ones that have defined current relations the most, but the level of cooperation also has political aspects and it could affect or is already affecting Serbia’s path towards European integration that has been proclaimed in the formal and informal documents of the Republic of Serbia.

2.1. Historical connections between Serbia and China

Both China and Serbia have historical heritage of communism, more precisely socialism as social-political order. It is true that both countries have moved forward from the hard-core socialism since the middle of the 20th century, but the understanding of the past was the common linkage between the two countries. More recently, at the end of the 20th century, China provided support to Serbia (at that time Serbia as a part of Socialistic Republic of Yugoslavia) during the NATO intervention in 1999. China’s embassy in Belgrade was bombed (by accident) during the intervention, and China has publicly criticized the legality of the intervention, because it came without the clearance given by the United Nations Security Council. China is one of two permanent members of the UN Security Council that has not recognized Kosovo as an independent country; the other one was Russia. In reciprocity, Serbia has supported the One-China Policy, and has aligned with the Chinese in the territorial disputes in South China Sea.

Historical connections have assured that the current level of cooperation will not be burdened by the past. China is not perceived in the eyes of the Serbian public as an enemy, and tends to be seen as a good partner of Serbia in the field of international relations. With the support in the traditionally important questions for Serbian public, like NATO intervention or independence of Kosovo, China has assured that the starting point for the improvement of relations and increasing presence were on the high level before the more intensive cooperation has started.

2.2. Serbian Foreign Policy Attitude towards China

Serbia does not have a foreign policy strategy document, but there are other formal documents that could be used to define what Serbia's foreign policy goals are. In the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia from 2009 (National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia, 2009), China has been mentioned as one of the most important foreign policy partners, apart from the European Union, Russia, and the USA. Around the same time, most colloquial sources, like public statements from the most important government figures, have given even more importance to the relations with China. Former president of the Republic of Serbia, Boris Tadic in his public statements defined China as one of the "four pillars" of Serbia's foreign policy (TANJUG, 2009). The year of 2009 can be pin pointed as a starting point for the fast track development of close cooperation in different aspects and segments of Serbia's foreign policy and economy. The importance of the development of close relations lies in the Serbian position in the international relations. Close traditional ties with Russia, proclaimed and strategically defined European integration and the presence of the United States of America in the Western Balkan region and the role in global affairs have affected the construction of the foreign policy goals and the behavior of Serbia in the field of international relations.

The raising question of duality of Serbia's foreign policy and attempts to keep good relations both with East and West could be seen as an attempt of a small state to assure stabile position in the field of international relations. While having the status of a candidate country for the accession to the European Union, Serbia has not aligned its foreign policy with the EU common foreign and security policy. Serbia has never applied proposed sanctions towards Russia, and is also distancing from the criticism toward the status of human rights and the democratic values in China. And while the good relations with China have been beneficiary to Serbia in the field of economical development, there are justified concerns regarding long term consequences of Chinese presence, especially towards the European integration of Serbia, and the possibility of Serbia to be the "Trojan horse" of Chinese influence (Heath & Andrew, 2018).

What goes in line with Serbia's proclaimed four pillars of foreign affairs is also the military cooperation with major international relations actors. Serbia has proclaimed military neutrality in 2007, but that stance has never been adopted in any official document. That proclaimed neutrality doesn't mean that Serbia is inactive in the field of military cooperation, but given the level of cooperation with the NATO, Russia, and participation in peacekeeping missions of European Union, Serbia has confirmed that at the moment it is not aligned with any specific actor regarding military cooperation. That said, there is a space for the improvement of military cooperation between Serbia and China. Given that strategic initiative like Belt and Road Initiative is based on peaceful cooperation and predominantly on financial agreements and cooperation, military cooperation is not the first topic on the agenda, but it could be part of the future relations, especially if they continue to

intensify.

Serbian cooperation with the China is also assured with the good relations of the two governments. There have been notable number of bilateral visits of both delegations, the most important of them are the two visits of president Xi Jinping to Belgrade, one during the 16+1 summit in 2014, and the second one two years later, still during the presidency of Tomislav Nikolic. After Aleksandar Vucic became the President of Serbia, president Nikolic was appointed as the Head of the Office for Cooperation with Russia and China, newly established office that deals with the communication with those countries. In addition to that, the important marker for the good relations between politicians of those countries is the fact that during the 10 years celebration of the biggest and currently ruling party in Serbia, Progressive party, the only ambassador that came out on the stage was the Chinese ambassador.

2.3.Economical Aspects of Serbian Cooperation with China

As mentioned, the 2009 has been the starting point of the current relations between Serbia and China. The modern relations have been defined by several strategically important agreements between two countries, and the rise of Chinese companies' presence in the Serbia. In 2009, Serbia and China signed the Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation between the government of the Republic of Serbia and the government of the People's Republic of China. That agreement was updated several times since 2009, but is most often referred as a baseline for the development of economical cooperation between two countries. The first major project that came out agreed framework is the bridge over Danube River in Belgrade. The bridge has become the symbol of the Sino-Serbian friendship, even though it was named after the one of the most symbolical figures from relations between Serbia and United States of America – Mihailo Pupin. Bridge over Danube River is also symbolical because it represents the core values of Chinese Belt and Road Initiative values. The bridge was funded by the loan coming from Chinese Export-Import (Exim) bank and it was constructed by Chinese state-owned construction company – China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) (Pavlicevic, 2015). The total value of the project was 260 million USD and it was funded 85% from Chinese loan, and 15 came from City of Belgrade budget. Besides being funded by the Chinese loan, and constructed by the Chinese company, project is also symbolical because it was infrastructure project, connected with the broader Belt and Road Initiative project, where Belgrade plays important role, role of Balkan crossroads.

That Belgrade, Serbian Capitol is seen as a crossing point for the Belt and Road, is also shown with the Belgrade Budapest railroad, first project that includes Serbia, China and one other EU country. The project is also funded by Chinese loan. EU criticized the project, because of nontransparent competition for the company that would work on the railroad construction. Because of that reason, even though the project was agreed back in 2014 during the 16+1 summit, construction on the Hungarian side didn't start yet. There was second tender on the

Hungarian side, and the expected start for the construction is set for the spring of 2019. On the other hand, the construction on the Serbian side is undergoing.

Chinese loans are also used to fund the construction of the highway Corridor 11, that will connect Serbia and Montenegro. The highway will complete the network of roads that will go through Serbia and connect the ports that China controls in Greece, like Pireus port that has been bought by Chinese company (Johnson, 2018). Control over ports gives China strategic and economic advantage of easy transportation via sea from China, and good railroads and highways through Balkans, through Serbia gives it direct way towards EU markets.

Infrastructure is not the only strategically important sector of Chinese presence in Serbia. China has also been present in the energy sector through loans. Loans from Chinese banks are used to reconstruct and upgrade existing energy infrastructure, concretely Kostolac power plant, and also the pipeline going from Obrenovac power plant to New Belgrade, the biggest municipality in City of Belgrade. Raising direct foreign investments, with agreements like Zijin Mining taking over the Mining and Smelting Combine Bor, and previously purchase of Smederevo steel plant assured that Chinese presence in Serbia will be long term one. There has been increase of the direct foreign investments of China in Serbia in previous years. From 2010 to 2017, the loans coming from China were dominating the capital influence coming from China, but with agreements made during 2018, especially during the Serbian delegation visit to Beijing in September, assured that the Serbia will get around 2 billion USD coming from China in years to come (Zivanovic, 2018).

Increased presence of China didn't make it one of the biggest foreign trade partners of Serbia. Serbia still makes the most of the foreign trade with neighbourhood countries, and the countries that are part of CEFTA. Serbian import from China puts it on the 4th place of total foreign import, but Serbian export to China is not that significant, and China is placed 30th on that list.

There are some indicators that Serbia could feel consequences of China's presence, mostly because of the loans that are coming from Chinese financial institutions. The reason for that kind of arrangements with China are described as easy access to big funding, because Chinese loans are usually not burdened with the same conditions like the ones coming from international financial institutions. Also, EU funds are limited for the candidate country, and EU (unlike China) pays additional attention the status of democratic values, human rights, worker's rights, while China is more flexible with those terms. On the other side, China's presence in Serbia could be explained not only through its strategically positioned initiative, but through purely economic reasons also. Serbia has one of the cheapest workforce in the Europe, and if you combine this information with the information that the energy costs in the Serbia are also on the low level, and it is in the China's interest to move part of its production closer to Europe, and the EU market. Also, proximity of strategically important ports, makes costs of transportation lower, and it is because of this in China's interest to achieve the biggest profit as possible.

Serbia still hasnot borrowed the kind of money that would put it in the

danger of a “debt trap” but it should be cautious, especially if it continues for backing coming from Chinese financial institutions in the future infrastructural projects. Also, Chinese presence in the strategically important segments of Serbian economy could put Serbia in position that China gains leverage over the political decisions, and that could put Serbian path towards joining the EU more difficult.

It is important to take into consideration the challenges to not only national, but also the individual security of the Serbia and Serbian citizens that are coming up with increased presence of some Chinese Companies. End of 2018 and the beginning of 2019 were marked by the global campaign against Huawei, Chinese telecommunication company. World is on the verge of coming into the era of 5G technology, and the Huawei is the biggest provider of infrastructure for this project. Led by USA, several countries have banned the Huawei’s involvement in the construction of the 5G network, explaining it with the concerns for the data security, possibility of sharing the data with China’s government, since the Huawei is closely tied to the state. And while the countries like USA, Australia, New Zealand are banning the involvement of Huawei, and Germany and UK are considering it, Serbia has signed strategic partnership document with the Chinese company, and has bought 1000 surveillance safety cameras that will be positioned on 800 locations in Belgrade. Experts have already raised concerns that the collected data could be misused and that there are a lot concerns if the cameras will be used to achieve higher level of security or is there possibility to misuse them and endanger the security. Given the history of intelligence agencies in Serbia, there is some level of concerns that collected data will be used to gain political leverage over political opponents, since the data will be collected by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Serbian intelligence services.

While Serbia is on the path to become the member country of the EU, it doesn’t have all the mechanisms that assures that the coming investments will not be affecting the internal order and security. During the 2018 and 2019, EU countries will adopt screening mechanisms that will inspect all of the coming investments, and their influence to the security and internal order of the country. Serbia still haven’t implemented those kind of mechanism, and the investments are usually welcomed by the political elite (government and the ruling party) because it assures the easy political points for them, especially because a lot of investments went to the rural areas, or medium size, regional centers (like Smederevo or Bor) where those kind of investments assure that the local workers will keep their jobs, and it will keep local factories and companies from shutting down. Those moves put China on the good side of the public eye, and are the predominant reason of the mostly positive image that China has in Serbia.

3. CONCLUSION

With almost complete certainty we can say that we are now living in the multi-polar global order, and that China is close to becoming the equal power to the USA. Given the Serbian foreign policy position, it is in its interest that keeps good

relations with the biggest powers in the world. While “steel friendship” with China is beneficial for Serbia at the moment, there are concerns how it will affect Serbia in long terms. The question of downgrade of democratic values and level of human rights in Serbia could be raised during the conversation about China’s presence, but there are some arguments to be made that the current level of those values could just be the reason that China is present in Serbia. The stable regime ensures that the investments coming to Serbia are sustainable and that good relations with the Government and the ruling party are also something that makes the Chinese presence certain on the long term. On the other hand, loans and takeovers of important strategic companies and dominant role in some part of Serbian economy are also beneficial on the short-term, but the question is how it would affect Serbia in the years to come. Having those kind of leverage could put Serbia in position to advocate for some of the Chinese influence in the region, or EU when (if) Serbia becomes the member country.

In the end, the question of the Chinese influence is still not a burden for Serbia, but there are several important indicators that could point to the risks towards Serbian security and European integration path. Financial loans, involvement in the strategically important sectors and economy and involvement in the security structure are the main ones. How it will effect Serbia in the long terms is yet to be seen, and the time to come will show if it will be positive or malign.

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UNDERSTANDING BILATERAL DIPLOMACY OF INDONESIA AND RUSSIA

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Abstract

Prospective and promising bilateral cooperation between Indonesia and Russia has further strengthened primarily since 2003 when the Joint Declaration of Friendship and Partnership in the 21st century was signed. The efforts to enhance bilateral relations have gone well, albeit rather tenuously, during the term of Indonesia's second President. The Diplomatic relations *per se* between these two countries were established in 1950. The improved bilateral defense cooperation might shed light on the feature of great power role in this biggest archipelagic country in Southeast Asia. In 2017, the Indonesian and the Russian Foreign Ministers signed the "Plan of Consultation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2017 – 2019". Prior to that, several agreements related to security and military matters had been signed not only on the purchase of weaponry but also related to counter terrorism. This could be the definition of the sustainability of dialogue between these two countries at G to G level. It might also be deemed as the rise of Russia's geo-strategic significance in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, this study aims to elaborate the improvements of bilateral relations which will primarily touch upon the cooperation between both countries including the security and defense circumstances and their aspects. In addition, this study will also analyze challenges of terrorism in Southeast Asia as a global threat.

Key-words: Bilateral cooperation, Indonesia, Russia, security, terrorism


1. INTRODUCTION

The influence of the great powers on a country or a region also influences its cooperation. In this regards, Russia, as one of the great powers, will be examined more closely on its role and influence in the bilateral relations with Indonesia and more broadly in the Southeast Asia region. Nevertheless, the dynamics of international relations today require several aspects of cooperation. One of them is the field of defense. Since the era of the Soviet Union, Indonesia has become one of the consumers for its main weapons system. In 2018, Indonesia also signed a weapons purchase contract back from Russia, namely for the Su-35.

On the other hand, in 2017 the United States imposed the Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) which imposed sanctions on Russia, Iran, and North Korea and also a consumer who buys weapons from those countries. However, Indonesia still signed a weapons purchase contract with Russia. The sanction does not affect the long-standing defense cooperation between Russia and Indonesia since the two countries have even agreed upon the Declaration of the Framework of Friendly and Partnership Relations between the Republic of Indonesia and the Russian Federation in the 21st century which was signed on 21st April 2003 in Moscow. Several cooperation agreements between Indonesia and Russia have been well established. In this paper, will be analyzed how the bilateral relations between Indonesia and Russia and how the effectiveness and beneficial to both countries, notably in military-defense cooperation.

2. MILITARY-DEFENSE COOPERATION BETWEEN INDONESIA AND RUSSIA

Military defense is one of those cooperation agreements which implement a strategic partnership for the development of military equipment to improve the capability of the defense system. Military cooperation between Indonesia and Russia has shown significance, notably after the implementation of the contract for the sale of military equipment for the Indonesian defense. Moreover, there have been several deliveries from Russian military equipment to the Indonesian National Army (In Indonesian: "Tentara Nasional Indonesia / TNI"). The deliveries, among others, were: Su-27SKM; Iakhont missiles; Mi-35 helicopters; Tank BMP-3F Ranpur; Tank BMP-3F Ranpur; Kalashnikov assault rifles; 11 Su-35 multi-role jet fighter. In 2016, compared to other Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia was ranked second in the purchasing of weaponry from Russia while Vietnam occupies the top position.



Source: <https://www.aseantoday.com>

Indonesian Foreign Minister, H.E. Retno Marsudi and Russian Foreign Minister, H.E. Sergey Lavrov signed the Plan of Consultation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2017 – 2019. It is as the next step from the Joint Declaration of Friendship in 2003. The point of this effort is to maintain the bilateral relationship and to enhance effective cooperation in economic, political including military. Furthermore, the attempt on strengthening the military relations becomes one of the top priorities to accomplish Indonesian military capability. In this regards, the great power influence can fulfill the national interests in mutually beneficial agreements.

Furthermore, in a wider scope the Southeast Asia sub-region, great power can be considered in the dynamics of the regional security. Talking about Asia in general, currently has three indigenous great powers, two of them rising simultaneously, with Japan still being a significant power notwithstanding its recent troubles. They are joined also by the US and Russia. (Acharya, 2013: 4). As Acharya mentioned in his books that because of globalization, modern military technology have brought Russia to a state of much closer and more continuous interaction in another continent, in this regards, Asia. Russia's foreign policy seems in transforming to expand its influence in a wider area. Moreover, Southeast Asia region is still of secondary priority when compared to Russian effort to maintain its position in Europe, the former Soviet Republics and even in Middle East (Gorenburg and Paul Schwartz, 2019: 11).

Meanwhile, the basic principles of Indonesian foreign policy from the period of independence are freedom and active (Sukma, 1995: 305). Freedom means that it does not favour the Western or Eastern bloc, while the active means participating in the maintenance of world peace and helping to alleviate tensions between the two blocs. The principles of freedom and activity developed, but despite frequent domestic political turmoil after Indonesia became independent and after foreign policy went through several changes, basically such changes were always conceived and justified within these two principles (Sukma, 1995 : 305).

In the Southeast Asia region, Russia has indeed begun to increase its influence. However, Russian relations in the Asian region are more neutral and do not take part into regional or domestic conflicts. The cooperation is focused more on the Asia-Pacific region, although there are significant countries as well as China in Asia and particularly with Viet Nam in Southeast Asia. In addition, Russia has military equipment and technology which is fairly sophisticated and sold without reducing its quality. This makes Russia one of the alternative countries in obtaining good quality weapons. Viet Nam and Indonesia are among the countries in the Southeast Asian region that are cooperating in defense through the purchase of military weapons.

Despite the fact that Russia is still not a significant player in Southeast Asia, but its relations is gradually improving. Moreover, Southeast Asia region is still of secondary priority when compared to Russian efforts to maintain its position in Europe, the former Soviet Republics and even in Middle East (Gorenburg and

Paul Schwartz, 2019: 11). Russia's views on regional security, including its support on multi-polarity and non-intervention and consensus-based decision-making, align well with those of the states in Southeast Asia (Gorenburg and Paul Schwartz, 2019: 12). Albeit between Russia and Vietnam, there was a significant increase in military cooperation. A bilateral or multilateral relationship is often needed in the interdependence of the state in international relations. Indeed, each country needs each other not only to manage good relations which are implemented in various aspects of cooperation, but also for pragmatic needs related to national interests; albeit, it may appear as a security dilemma.

Talking about Indonesia, it is the largest archipelagic country in the world with a population of around 202 million people. In the Southeast Asian sub-regional region Indonesia also has a very significant role in regional relations that are formed in the organization of ASEAN. Diplomatic relations between Indonesia and Russia have begun to take place since the era of the Soviet Union, precisely in 1950. These relations have experienced tidal. Despite having decadency in its relations during the times of Indonesia's second President, but after the reformations began in 1998, Indonesia and Russia slowly return to improve its bilateral relations in various fields. One of which is in defense cooperation. Russia is one of the producing countries that often sell various military weapons to Indonesia. As mentioned previously, Russia is one of the main suppliers of weapons of Indonesian weapons system such as the Su-30, Su-27, Su-35, BMP Tanks.

Furthermore, at least there have been four times of the Bilateral Consultative Forum between Indonesia and Russia. The fourth of Bilateral Consultative Forum was held in 2018 and involved several parties including the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and Security Affairs of Indonesia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation and Ministry of Defense. In addition to enhancing the defense cooperation, it also discussed cooperation in combating terrorism funding and strengthening counterterrorism cooperation (www.polkam.go.id). Bilateral Consultative Forum describes an implementation of defense diplomacy between those countries. Generally, it becomes the way in the process of achieving common goals and national interest as well. In the effort to prevent the occurrence of terrorism in the region, the countries of Southeast Asia through ASEAN have made various efforts on defense cooperation. In this case, mutual trust is needed between the countries that cooperate through Confidence Building Measures (CBM) and defense diplomacy.

Meanwhile, based on the National Long-term Development Plan of Indonesia from 2005-2025, defense diplomacy is one of the factors of the development of basic capacities. Capacity building means improving the quality of human resources, increasing the efficiency of the use of natural resources, the efforts to fight terrorism, and includes efforts to improve the quality and quantity of the main weapon systems.

3. CONCLUSION

Purchasing military equipment from Russia not only fulfils the modernization of armaments, but also to build and sustain the cooperation into a higher level. In this regards, Russia has become one of the alternatives to improve and increase the production of Indonesia's strategic defense industries.

Indonesian military-technical cooperation with Russia has become one of the ways to improve the defense capabilities by strengthening the technological capability of military equipment, that can improve the quality of military personnel as the next step. Furthermore, it could pave the way as well as increase the productivity of strategic defense industries. By signing agreements on military and arms purchasing, the defense cooperation has become more advanced since Russia is one of supplier countries in terms of weapons trade that sell a good quality product. Indonesia is one of the consumers in Southeast Asia who also purchase from Russia. However, this cooperation can be improved not only on arms sales, but also technology transfer and military training.

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“THE 70TH ANNIVERSARY OF NATO - BORDERS AND INFLUENCE: TOWARDS THE BALKANS AND EURASIA“

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Abstract

The process of forming a new era of multilateralism is underway, where NATO, which has existed for 70 years now, remains the last military link that has held Western allies together. All decisions adopted on the recent NATO summits indicate, firstly, that NATO is ready to strengthen deterrence and defense against Russia, and secondly, that the series of so-called “out of area” operations conducted after the Cold War, the last one was in Afghanistan, were replaced with the operations aimed at protecting the borders of the Member States, which was the main goal of establishing NATO in 1949. The Joint Declaration set out areas where NATO and the EU will step up cooperation – including maritime security (terrorism, migrants, vital trading passage for goods, oil and raw materials) and countering hybrid threats (Russia’s growing influence on the public opinion through social media and electronic communications). In such security environment, the author emphasises the fact that Euro-Asia headed by Russia becomes the defence border line from NATO. Through its initiative “One Belt, One Road” launched in 2013, China made a breakthrough towards the West and the European countries, passing through Euro-Asia and reshaped Middle East, and simultaneously giving a response to Asian neighbours challenges led by the US and Japan, thus ending the period of global domination of the western world. The aim of this paper is to show the process of the shifting the world power, during the 30 years of the Post-Cold War era and the 70 years of existence of NATO, from the West to East and Asia and how it affects to region of Western Balkans.

Key words: NATO, security, multipolarism, deepening and widening process, Western Balkans, “One Belt, One Road”.

1. INTRODUCTION - COLLECTIVE AND EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY

International relations in the XX and XXI centuries are characterized by the existence of the system of collective security. Collective security is a security regime agreed between the great powers that establishes peace-keeping rules and is guided by the principle that the act of aggression of any state will be responded by the collective response of other states. It is often seen as a liberal alternative to competitive balanced alliances suggested by

realists. In a balance of power system, it is assumed that each state, acting in its own self-help, will form coalitions to neutralize others, and that balance will prevent war. By contrast, in collective security, each state is asked to share responsibility for the security of all other states (Kegli, Vitkof, 2004: p. 760.).

The League of Nations and the United Nations were founded on the principle of collective security. Neither the League of Nations nor the United Nations were able to operate the principle successfully to prevent aggression because of the conflicts of interest among states (major powers). The existence of such conflicts has in fact been recognized in the institutionalized arrangements of the two world bodies: under the Covenant of the League of Nations the response to aggression was left to the member states to decide (article 16, paragraph 3, as amended by interpretive resolutions adopted in 1921); and under the UN Charter any permanent member of the Security Council may veto collective action (article 27, paragraph 3) (Charter 2017).⁴⁰ Collective security arrangements have always been conceived as being global in scope. This is in fact a defining characteristic, distinguishing them from regional alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Kegli, Vitkof, 2004: p. 846.).

NATO was conceived as a military alliance for collective defense based on Article 51 of the Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations that permits the use of force in international relations for the purpose of individual or collective self-defense. Accordingly, its zone of responsibility is limited to the "Euro-Atlantic area" in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty which is the founding act of NATO:

Article 5 states:

“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.”

Article 6 defines the geographic area in which an armed attack can occur:

“For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack: on the territory of any of the Parties

⁴⁰ Available from: <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-v/index.html> (29. XI 2017.)

in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area; on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.”

NATO is a kind of security community, as a region in which a large-scale use of violence (e.g. war) has become very unlikely or even unthinkable. The term was coined by the prominent political scientist Karl Deutsch in 1957. In their seminal work *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, Deutsch defined a security community as "a group of people" believing "that they have come to agreement on at least this one point: that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of „peaceful change" (Security 2019). Peaceful change was defined as "the resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalized procedures, without resort to large-scale physical force". People in a security community are also bound by the "sense of community", the mutual sympathy, trust, and common interests. Western countries renounced the right to use force in mutual relations.

In 1949 in Washington, the primary aim of the North Atlantic Treaty was to create a pact of mutual assistance to counter the risk that the Soviet Union would seek to extend its control of Eastern Europe to other parts of the continent. The liberal internationalists find the reason for this in the theory of democratic peace ("democracies do not wage war", at least not one another). Members of the realistic school of international relations, however, see the reasons, in the Soviet threat, simultaneously in US superiority within the NATO which prevented armed conflicts among its members (between Greece and Turkey, for example). The United States reintegrated Germany and Italy into the western community through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization after the Second World War and laid the foundations for the European integration, thus controlling the disputes that arose between the three Franco-German and the two world wars between 1870 and 1945.

Collective defense has its roots in multiparty alliances and entails benefits as well as risks. Smaller members of NATO, for example, are free to invest a greater proportion of their budget on non-military priorities, such as education or health, since they can rely on other members to come to their defense, if needed. Every participating country agreed that this form of solidarity was core of the Treaty, effectively making Article 5 on collective defence a key component of the Alliance, binding its members together, committing them to protect each other and setting a spirit of solidarity within the Alliance. The principle of collective defence enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty does not fully commit, but invoked

after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, after which other NATO members provided assistance to the US war against terrorism in Afghanistan.

2. NATO – DEEPENING & WIDENING PROCESS

The 70th Anniversary of NATO is going through the process of its restructuring also, on the global level. The four phases determined the history of NATO (Rasmussen, 2010).

The first stage, „NATO 1.0“ includes the Cold War period, the other „NATO 2.0“ refers to the time of the unipolarism in international relations after the end of the Cold War, the third „NATO 3.0“ begins with the adoption of a new strategic doctrine at the NATO summit in Lisbon in 2010 which should adapt this organization to the globalized and multipolar world of the 21st century, while the fourth „NATO 4.0“ in next 10 years „will continue to guard its members in Europe from Russian pressure, but will also be far more engaged on the borders of the alliance in the High North (Arctic)“ (Politico 2019).

Both the first “NATO 1.0” and the United Nations organization rested on the principles set forth by the United States and Great Britain in the Atlantic Charter adopted during the meeting of the US President Franklin Roosevelt and the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in Newfoundland in August 1941, where war aims of the Allies in the Second World were established as the basement of the policy of the anti-fascist coalition. The equilibrium of conventional and nuclear military power established by NATO and the Warsaw Pact has made the Cold War's time a "long peace" in Europe, as the two military alliances did not enter an open conflict throughout this period, and this unusual war was driven through the race in arms and political propaganda and intelligence. The two sides, the United States and the Soviet Union led real wars outside Europe through proxy wars from Korea, through Vietnam, the Middle East, and guerrillas in South America to the wars in Africa during the breakup of the last European colonial empires. The success of the "first NATO" was primarily reflected in the fact that it survived the end of the Cold War after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disappearance of the opposition of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union in the period from 1989 to 1991 (J.Simić2010, 61).

The path to the second “NATO 2.0” was, however, long and complicated. The first major international crisis after the end of the Cold War induced by the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, which jeopardized the interests of the West in the Persian Gulf and directly violated the principles of the United Nations Charter and thus the entire post-war international order. For the first time in the history, the UN Security Council unanimously decided to send international forces to Kuwait, with the United States as the leading force in this operation. At the departure of the US soldiers to the Persian Gulf, President George H. W. Bush sent a message which determined the direction of the international relations in the first years of the Post-Cold War era (Bush 1991):

"This is a historical moment. We have in this past year made great progress in the ending of a long era of conflict and cold war, and we have the opportunity to create for us and for future generations a new world order - a world in which the rule of law, and not the real jungle, will govern the behavior of the people. If we succeed - and we will - we will have the opportunity in this new world order, an order in which the credible United Nations will be able to carry out their role as peacekeepers, realizing the promises and vision of the founders of the UN."

President Bush's idea of the "New World Order" was essentially a return to the principles of the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Charter after the decades of blockade caused by the Cold War. That goal was attempted by the new UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali, who wrote the document under the title "The agenda for peace, preventive diplomacy, peace-building and peacekeeping" (A/RES 1992). Among other things, this document states that "In recent months, there has been a belief among big and small nations to reopen the possibility of achieving the great objectives of the Charter - the United Nations capable of preserving international peace and security, guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of human beings and to promote, according to the Charter, social progress and better standards of life in greater freedom" (A/RES 1992). The numerous ethnic and territorial conflicts that had erupted at that time showed that the Post-Cold War world was neither safe nor secure and the United Nations was forced to operate dozens of peacekeeping missions around the world, testing to the fullest extent the ability of the UN and its members to bear the burden of numerous peacekeeping operations.

American neo-conservative politicians, whose influence was very strong at the beginning of the 1990s, were unwilling to accept such a role of the United Nations and considered that the United States of America, their military economic power and liberal values have won in the Cold War and, accordingly, they had to play a leading role in the construction of the Post-Cold War world (Fukuyama 2006, 2007, 97), encompassing the new NATO.

2.1. Yugoslav crisis and beyond "NATO 2.0"

The new role of NATO in the Post-Cold War era was shaped through several phases. The first phase covers the period from 1989 to 1992 and marked the survival of NATO on the international scene and the adoption of the New Strategic Concept (1991), which defines the role of the organization in the Post-Cold War era. NATO as a single organization did not participate in the first Persian Gulf War against Iraq in 1991, but it provided logistics and intelligence support as well as the lines of communication in the Mediterranean which were necessary for the war against Iraq. The second phase (from 1993 to 1997) marked the activation of NATO in the service of the UN and in accordance with the mandate of the UN

Security Council in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was its first military engagement outside the territory of its member states, thus overcoming the framework of action defined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. At the same time, NATO also led international missions to implement the Dayton peace agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina and started the process of expanding the organization. The third phase (from 1998 to 2000) marked a new military intervention against a third country - the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1999), but this time without the resolution of the UN Security Council, and the deployment of an international force mission in Kosovo, but under the UN mandate resolution 1244 of the Security Council. The fourth phase (from 2000 to 2011) marked the non-participation of NATO as a single organization in the war against Afghanistan (2001), in the second Gulf War against Iraq (2003), but the inclusion of NATO in the fight against global terrorism. The most effective feature of the second "NATO 2.0" is the process of vertical and horizontal expansion (deepening & widening process), i.e., simultaneous widening of its scope of activity and enlargement (i.e., definition of the new mission). The new NATO member states became Croatia and Albania.

2.2. Back to basics - NATO 3.0 and possibility for NATO 4.0

The adoption of the new Strategic concept⁴¹ at the Lisbon summit in 2010 set out the direction of the NATO's activities in the second decade of the 21st century and modernization of the defence and its adaptation to new conditions: strengthening cooperation with the big partners - Russia, China, India, Japan, Australia, responding to contemporary threats such as terrorism and cyber attacks, natural disasters, environmental protection, reduction of natural resources as a source of conflicts. It was the beginning of the third "NATO 3.0". But, the new era started with a military intervention of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada in Libya (2011), NATO led the command of the operation against the Gaddafi's military forces. With the overthrow of the multi-decade-long regimes in North Africa and the Middle East, the process of "transforming" the region, wide-scale terrorism and mass migration of the population due to fear for biological and economic existence has began.

Since Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its attack on eastern Ukraine, NATO recalled on the fundamental change in the Alliance's strategy at the summit in Wales. The essence is to return to its objective of protecting the member states from threats from the East. It marks "NATO returns home" or reaffirming its commitment to its Article 5 mutual-defense clause (P.Simić 2017, 514-517).

After the NATO summit in Warsaw (2016), the main issue of it was whether the crisis in Ukraine may jeopardize the borders of the North-Atlantic area. All decisions adopted on the summit indicate, firstly, that NATO is ready to

⁴¹ The first Strategic concept adopted in 1991 at the summit in Rome, the second one in 1999 during the solemn summit in Washington on the occasion of the 50 Anniversary of the NATO.

strengthen deterrence and the defense against Russia, secondly, that the series of the so-called “out of area” operations conducted after the Cold War, the last one was in Afghanistan, were replaced with the operations aimed at protecting the borders of the Member States, which was the main goal of establishing NATO in 1949.

NATO leaders took decisions: on projecting stability through support for partners – including an agreement to start training and capacity building inside Iraq; that NATO AWACS surveillance planes provides information to the Global Coalition against DAESH; that expand maritime presence in the Mediterranean Sea. NATO and EU issued the Joint Declaration sets out areas where they step up cooperation – including maritime security (terrorism, migrants, vital trading passage for goods, oil and raw materials) and countering hybrid threats (Russia’s growing influence on public opinion through social media and electronic communications). They agreed to continue the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan beyond 2016, and confirmed funding commitments for the Afghan forces until 2020. The last session of the Summit was a meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, where the NATO leaders reviewed the security situation with President Poroshenko, welcomed the government’s plans for reform, and endorsed a Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine.

At the summit in Brussels (2017) NATO became a full member of the Global Coalition against Daesh. It was agreed to set up a terrorism intelligence cell within the new intelligence division, in order to improve the sharing of information between members, and how members intend to meet the pledge to spend at least two percent of their GDP on defense by 2024. Montenegro officially became a member of the organization (June 2017). No responsibility in the migrant crisis, but NATO gave a support Greece and Turkey, which are both member states of the Alliance.

President Trump’s protectionism and western trade sanction against Russia had been worsening relations between the United States and Europe at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in 2018. European partners again emphasised the need for more military self-sufficiency.

There is uncertainty for adoption of the new strategic concept of “NATO 4.0” mostly because of the President Donald Trump’s questioning of whether the Alliance remains in the American interest and the demand for more defense spending and more anti-terrorism efforts.

3. NATO’S FACING THE NEW SECURITY ALLIANCES

As a reaction to the US unilateralism, Russia and China have renewed their fractured alliances and reached an agreement in the spring of 1997, a new "strategic partnership". The aim was to rearrange the global geo-strategic scene and call for

the creation of a new multipolar system. This treaty of friendship was renewed in 2002 and the following year the Russian and Chinese presidents repeated the appeal for the multipolar world.

As a counterbalance of the West, the nations of EuroAsia are establishing a grouping focused on leading Asia-Pacific nations, which are growing rapidly in the contrast to other areas of the world, which have been slowing down economically since 2008. Presidents of Russia and China, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping have emerged as a driving force in this alliance. Russia managed to institutionalize economic relations with the countries of the former Soviet Union, firstly by establishing the Customs Union with Belorussia and Kazakhstan (2010), which developed into the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) on January 1, 2015, based on the agreement signed by the presidents of the three countries in the capital of Kazakhstan, Astana (2014). Armenia and Kyrgyzstan joined the Alliance 2014. Within the Euro-Asian Economic Union framework, free movement of goods, services, capital and labor were enabled, and it acts on the rules and principles of the World Trade Organization. This economic alliance will be open to new members.

3.1. The new Eurasian alliances

The new alliances have been emerging on strategic security and political level between Russia – Iran – Turkey – Azerbaijan.

a) Russia – Iran – Azerbaijan: There were two historical summit, the first one, trilateral between Russia, Iran and Azerbaijan in Baku (August 8th, 2016), and the second one, between Russia and Turkey in Sankt Petersburg (August 9th, 2016). During the first summit the presidents of Russia, Iran and Azerbaijan, Vladimir Putin, Hassan Rouhani and Ilham Aliyev, discussed on urgency to make the International North-South Transport Corridor operational, which would create a rail link from Iran's Persian Gulf port at Bandar Abbas to Europe, through Russia and Azerbaijan. This would facilitate the ability of the South Asian countries (India, in particular), and the Southeast Asian nations to pass the Suez Canal and send their cargo by sea and rail to Central Asia, Russia, and Europe. The route will reduce the time of transport by almost a third. At the beginning of 2016 Russia helped to lift the international sanctions against the Iran about its nuclear program. Also, there is the opportunity for the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which could impede the development of the North-South Corridor. Turkey, which has had poor relations with Armenia, and has backed Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis, was ready to sit at the same table to help resolve the conflict. For Turkey, resolving the conflict would open the East-West rail link to Turkey and the Black Sea, which would intersect the North-South Corridor via Armenia, with rail links to Turkey and Azerbaijan which have been cut because of the conflict.

b) Russia-Turkey: There is rapprochement between Russia and one of the member states of NATO, Turkey. A military base of NATO was installed in Incirlik and Turkey is a candidate state of the EU since 2005. The meeting between

the Russian President Putin and his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan (August 9th, 2016) in St. Petersburg, followed by the 8-month-long crisis caused by Turkey shooting down a Russian war plane operating over Syria. The meeting put bilateral relations well on the road to deepening economic (trade and tourism), political and strategic cooperation, the prioritizing the Turkish Stream Gas Pipeline project and the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, cooperation in the defense industrial sector, as well as using their own currencies for trade. On the crucial question of ending the Syria war, a tripartite mechanism of high level representatives of each country's intelligence, foreign ministry, and defense ministry was set up. The two presidents signed an intergovernmental agreement for the Turkish Stream pipeline in Istanbul (October, 2016). The project will carry gas from Russia under the Black Sea to the Turkish Thrace. One line, with a 15.75 billion cubic meters of capacity, is expected to supply the Turkish market while a second line is intended to carry gas to Europe (Gazprome 2017).

c) Turkey-Iran: Taking diplomatic steps to begin implementing this Eurasian alliance, the foreign ministers of Turkey and Iran have exchanged visits to Ankara and Tehran respectively, where both the Syrian and Nagorno-Karabakh issues were raised, and the groundwork for a future summit of the Presidents of Turkey, Iran, and Azerbaijan was created. Kazakhstan, one of the most important countries in Central Asia, plays a key role in this Eurasian alliance. Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev helped the Russian-Turkish rapprochement. He became the first head of state to visit Turkey after the *coup d'état* attempt (July, 2016), where he discussed the possibility of Turkey joining the Eurasian Customs Union.

3.2. China and its allies

China's response on the global security challenges goes in three directions: the first one is an alliance with Russia through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the second one is developing cooperation within the BRICS, and the third one is the creation of the "Economic Belt of the New Silk Road" and "21st Century Maritime Silk Road" towards Europe in the framework of the mega project "One Belt, One Road".

a) China and Russia are the pillars of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (2001) including also Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The main priorities of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization are strengthening stability and security in the territory of its member states, fight against terrorism, separatism, extremism, drug trade (Shanghai Convention Against Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, signed in 2001) and encouraging cooperation in the field of economy, energy, science and culture (Memorandum of Facilitating Trade and Investment, signed in 2001). Although it has not yet acted as a military structure, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization could be a

counterbalance to the military, political and economic presence of the US in this part of the world. The economies of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization countries are on the rise, rich in natural sources of energy, open to the latest technology and, with a cheap labour force, have the chance to transform from an „economic tiger“ into a military force. India and Pakistan joined Shanghai Cooperation Organization (2017). While Turkey as a member of NATO was granted dialogue partner status (2012).

b) BRICS - Russia and China together with the Brazil, India (2009) and South Africa (2011) make a very large and economically important regional group which should cope with the rest of the world economic groups. The BRICS established its own development bank, based in Shanghai, with an initial capital of US50 billion and an urgent needs fund of US100 billion. The bank was envisioned as an instrument of breakthrough into markets of developing countries and as a counterpart to the World Bank and World Trade Organization.

c) “One Belt, One Road” (renewed Old Silk Road) envisions an economic cooperation area that stretches from the Western Pacific to the Baltic Sea, bringing “the new opportunities and the new future to China and every country along the road that is seeking to develop”. Six years after the establishing, the “One Belt, One Road” Initiative includes 135 countries and 29 international organizations. China has signed agreements with 76 countries along the routes including Serbia (May 2017), the last one is Italy (March 2019) as a first European power.

China’s intention is to built infrastructure, especially railways and ports along the route (e.g. Beijing - Duisburg (Germany)). China has already bought 67% of the port of Piraeus (Greece) in order to unship and distribute its goods on the European market, at the same time to speed up transportation. China has repeatedly stressed its economic compatibility with many of the countries along the planned route, and offered technological assistance to countries in key industries. In this way, these countries are becoming competitive to their western neighbours. China also anticipates the Silk Road as a region of “more capital convergence and currency integration”- a region where currency exchanges are fluid and easy. China’s currency, the renminbi (RMB) or yuan, is becoming more widely used in Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, and Thailand.

The most visible result of the economic growth of China is its growing military force; the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy is the largest one in Asia. China is engagement is the counter-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden under the authority of the UN, serving additional purposes that are relevant in the context of the „21st Century Maritime Silk Road“.

China’s military power becomes the big issue for the NATO. The South China Sea conflicts over the territorial claims including China and almost six

countries of the Asia-Pacific region, dispute with Japan over Diaoyu Islands in East China Sea, are very disturbing for the West, especially for the United States. South China Sea is a vital trading passage for goods, oil and raw materials to transit to destination around the world. Over \$5 trillion of annual shipping trade passes through the region, and U.S. imports and exports make up \$1.2 trillion of this.

Japan and Australia are the main pillars of an alliance with the United States on the Far East. Negotiations on Agreement on the Transpacific Partnership (TPP) as a free trade area began in 2005, between 12 countries of the region, Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam and the United States and signed in 2016. The aim of the Transpacific Partnership is to develop trade and investment among partner countries, promote innovation, economic growth and development and preserve jobs. Reaching an Agreement on the Transpacific Partnership was the primary trading objective of the former US president Barack Obama, and his interest was particularly focused on the elimination of tariffs and access to the Japanese car market. Except from an economic, the Transpacific Partnership can also be seen from a geo-strategic angle, as an instrument through which the US would mobilize allies to limit the rise of China. Meanwhile, the President Donald Trump withdrew U.S. from this Agreement (2017).

The rise of China is redrawing the transatlantic relation in NATO because “the Americans want Europeans to support them in providing security and protect trade routes in the region of South China Sea, while the most of European allies have little to contribute militarily in this region“ (Politico 2019). The influence of NATO will be determined by the active position of the United States on the Far East.

4. WESTERN BALKANS: THE SCOPE OF THE NATO OR THE OTHER ALLIANCES

All countries in the region of Western Balkans have similar foreign policy priorities - integration in the European and Euro-Atlantic institutions, because it will minimize the risk of armed conflict among neighbours. Serbia has another reason - security problem in Kosovo currently protected by the international NATO forces (KFOR). Also, in Kosovo, the EU mission (EULEX) took over (December, 2008) the civilian UN mission (UNMIK). The sequence of NATO accession by the former Yugoslav republics shows the evolution of NATO mission – Slovenia, Croatia and Montenegro are NATO members, the Republic of North Macedonia has expressed a desire to become a member, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia have completed the first phase of the potential membership - Partnership for Peace. But, Serbia does not aspire to join NATO.

In 1999, following the NATO Military Action, the mandate of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was established by the

Security Council in its resolution 1244/1999. Due to NATO military intervention the majority of the Serbian population opposes to full Serbia membership to NATO, even though Serbia is a member of „Partnership for Peace“ (PfP) program since 2006, but having an observer status (2013) in Collective Security Treaty Organization (so-called Eastern NATO) headed by Russia.

According to the decision of the National Assembly adopted on 26th December 2007, Serbia is a neutral country in its position towards the other military alliances until a referendum which will decide otherwise. NATO fully respects Serbia's policy of military neutrality. NATO and Serbia have steadily built up cooperation and dialogue, since Serbia joined the Partnership for Peace programme and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. Meanwhile, Serbia agreed to deepen cooperation with NATO through an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) in January 2015. SOFA Agreement signed in 2015 concerning the diplomatic status of NATO forces and individual personnel endorsed in the National Assembly in July 2016. In the period from 2015 to 2017 there were more than 100 activities training including “Operational Concept of Capacity (OCC), scientific cooperation through the NATO program “Science for Peace“. NATO training for managing of crisis held in Serbia in 2018 in the light of the migrant crisis which burdened particularly Serbia and the Republic of North Macedonia as a principal “Balkan route” towards the West. NATO is a guaranty of Brussels Treaty achieved through the European union-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Priština and the commitment of both to normalise relations (2013).

The main threat to the security of Serbia and the entire Balkans region in the future, comes from the political and criminally motivated terrorism, organized crime and corruption, characteristic of the social and economic problems of the early transition. Therefore, new threats require a new organization of the security sector, particularly military and police, as well as other state and social institutions in this field. Serbia's cooperation with neighboring countries in the field of border control, judiciary and implementation of solutions that have been in the meantime developed in Euro-Atlantic framework, should be strengthened in the future because of the connection between criminal and extremist organizations at the international level.

All the Western Balkans countries signed the Chinese project “One Belt, One Road” (2013) which includes “1+16” policy (with Greece entering it is “1+17”) towards the Central and Eastern Europe (2012), Serbia was proposed (2016) to cooperate with the Euro-Asian Economic Union.

Although all the Western Balkans countries are Euro-integration or Euro Atlantic focused, the cooperation with Euro-Asian countries is acceptable, especially with Russia, Kazakhstan and China. The Chinese initiatives have been well received in the countries in transition that were affected by the crisis in the euro zone but also met mixed reactions in the EU circles. For the EU, this is a way for its member states to divide. With all major constructing projects, Serbia holds an important position receiving the part of the US 10 billion credit line from the

Chinese “1+16” policy for building the bridge “Mihajlo Pupin” over the river Danube in Belgrade. China finances the construction of the third block of the thermal power plant Kostolac B, and has planned to invest in a highway between Belgrade and the Adriatic Sea, corridor 11. The Chinese automobile giant Dongfeng signed an agreement (2009) with the automobile factory in Priboj (FAP) for vehicle assembly in Serbia). China intends to build the port on the river Danube in order to strengthen aqua network which leads to the Black Sea. In Montenegro, Chinese companies are planning construction of a highway from the Serbian frontier to the Montenegrin port of Bar at the Adriatic Sea. In the Republic of North Macedonia, Chinese companies have been building the highway between the capital Skopje and major tourist resort, the Lake of Ohrid. Turkey intended to contribute to and support the construction of a railway connecting Istanbul to Beijing as part of China’s grand plan to connect China by train lines running to Western Europe via Central Asia and Turkey. Cooperation with China is of special importance for non-EU countries in the region of Western Balkans. The infrastructure projects of China can boost the better regional transport connection and economic cooperation which lead to the faster Euro-integration process and sustainable peace.

NATO continues its deepening and widening process in the future but with more limiting factors that are reflected in the newly-born multipolar world. The future role of NATO will depend on the continuation of the process of globalization, energy self-sufficient and further rise of military power of China and its allies.

5. CONCLUSION

Since its establishment 70 years ago as a primary military alliance, NATO has had a significant political influence on the integration of countries in the European and Euro-Atlantic area as a place to resolve disputes between its members, but also to harmonize their policies in many areas, including scientific, technological and economic development. The new alliances for the new era of multilateralism world are emerging in the region of Eurasia, Middle East and Far East, and by their economic, political, and military powers, marking thus the transparent defense line from the NATO influence and its further enlargement. Western Balkans countries are oriented towards euro(Atlantic) integration. But economic benefits of the Chinese project “One Belt, One Road” could support its better positioning in Europe. Western Balkan countries are oriented towards euro(Atlantic) integration. The new challenge for the West could be an “economic NATO”- economic aspect of the West – West relation started to built by Transatlantic trade and investment partnership (TTIP, 2013), but opposed by the American president Donald Trump (2017).

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NATO AS A MEANS OF STRATEGIC DETERRENCE FOR THE WESTERN BALKAN COUNTRIES

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1. Introduction

In an era of ever-changing security environment, marked by numerous previously unknown threats, actors and structures need to find a proper strategy to remain safe and secure. Post bipolar architecture was intended to bring prospects for permanent peace, while we are witnesses that the multipolar system with one aspiring hegemon is all but the most unstable of them all ^[i]. Therefore, particularly vulnerable categories are those outside the exclusive circle of military or nuclear powers. Certainly, we are talking about small countries, in this case those from the Western Balkans, as an underlying mechanism keeping the region engulfed in many controversies either internal (national identity, religion, territory) or external (relations with big powers). By emphasizing the Euro-Atlantic perspective, those countries committed themselves to follow the Western world through supranational institutions, primarily the EU and NATO. While the EU is still a far-fetched milestone for the majority of them ^[ii], NATO membership has evolved into a matter of present moment, keeping significance far beyond the mere fact of membership. Thus, this paper argues for NATO alliance being the most suitable end to the deterrence strategy of Western Balkan countries. The statement is not conclusive with the intent to predict impossibility of future contingencies, but it is intended to describe the current security environment while searching for the best present and feasible option.

Three are the concepts constituting the theoretical and methodological basis for this paper. In the beginning, NATO alliance, as arguably the most powerful military structure in the world, plays an important role in the creation of global security relations. After that, the Western Balkan countries are marginal actors, albeit to a certain extent strategically and geopolitically important. Finally, the bubble of deterrence is a part of strategic studies area which has recently experienced an upsurge, mainly because of renewed adversarial relations between the countries on the NATO eastern flank and Russia. Accordingly, this paper will be an intrinsic case study, with a particular focus on providing a reasonable combination between theoretical and policy oriented arguments to support the main thesis. There are pertinent limitations stemming mainly from the rapidly evolving security scenarios characteristic for not completely stable political regimes, prone to sudden instability and radical reactions. Moreover, sources for this paper are unclassified, while an array of different strategic, operational and tactical

documents both from national military structures and NATO are not available for research.

The paper consists of four parts. Firstly, the notion of NATO deterrence strategy is explored to show the variety of tactics deployed by the Alliance in order to prevent and protect its territory and beyond. Secondly, the description of the current state of affairs in Western Balkans is coupled with a brief overview of small state deterrence strategies. Thirdly, the main chapter will deal with the multifaceted relation of the Western Balkans and NATO where comprehensive arguments for the thesis will be provided, going from classical political ones, over predominantly military, just in order to finish with the institutionalist, constructivist argument. Fourthly, the conclusion will strive for an appropriate mixture of theoretical insights and policy recommendations.

2. Deterrence as the cornerstone of NATO strategy

Many deterrence definitions have been created in an attempt to capture its twofold nature. One of those is: “discouraging states from taking unwanted actions, especially military aggression”^[iii] (p. 1). In its core, deterrence is de-escalatory, preventive and peace seeking strategy which rose to prominence simultaneously with the appearance of nuclear weapons and the void opened by the annihilatory potential. As described in an analytical report: “A deterrence posture is about convincing the other side that taking an aggressive course of action would result in an unacceptable outcome. Deterrence is supposed to prevent war”^[iv] (p. 2). The Cold War was a decades-long example of successful deterrence strategy where two major blocks managed to overcome escalatory crisis precisely because of the cost imposed by the retaliatory strike of the other side. Despite the fact that end of the Cold War brought up a period of relative peace in major parts of the world, significant attempts to diminish bulky weapon arsenals were made in belief that the weak Eastern Block will not be able to reacquire its old strength. Time will show the faultiness of premises which left NATO in a pertinent stalemate: “The reduction of collective defense capabilities after the Cold War now requires significant additional efforts to re-establish a credible deterrence posture”^[v] (p. 6).

Official NATO documents such as the Strategic Concept (Lisbon, 2010), the Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (Chicago, 2012) as well as every declaration from bi-annual summits, contain more or less a precise definition of NATO deterrence strategy. For example, the declaration from Newport Summit foresees: “Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defence capabilities, remains a core element of our overall strategy”^[vi]. In other words, NATO alliance has genuine capabilities to deter and defend against every possible threat. However, for a deterrent to be credible, beside capabilities, there must exist deliberation to use them. Accordingly, output of the Brussels Summit states: “We are united and resolute in our ability and willingness to defend one another... and to respond to any threats from wherever they arise, potentially from multiple directions in more than one region.

The Russian annexation of Crimea together with aggressive behavior in the east of Ukraine, sent an alarming message to NATO strategists. The concept of collective defence has been revived again, especially when various non-state actors from MENA region started posing a threat to the southern flank of the Alliance. A distinct set of measures has been developed to advance the odds for effective NATO deterrence. The Readiness Action Plan released seven years ago saw deployment of Assurance and Adaptation measures which together combined short and long term strategies how to strengthen deterrence posture^[vii]. After the Warsaw Summit, much more concrete measures were established in order to de-escalate spiraling skirmishes on the eastern flank. Among the most significant are Enhanced Forward Presence and Enhanced Tailored Presence^[viii] as a sort of first line conventional defence force. Missile defence as a key part of nuclear deterrence has been a subject of great debate which eventually resulted in stationing of US Aegis Ashore system in Deveselu in Romania and Redzikovo in Poland with the mighty defensive capability ready to deter transcontinental threats.

Aside from the tactical and operational viewpoint, NATO deterrence posture must be "characterized by restraint, consistency, predictability, and transparency"^[ix] (p. 8). The concept of predictability seems counterintuitive, but must be obeyed for reassuring the other side about intentions to use deterrence and defence capabilities. In order to adapt to a new security environment, NATO introduced the notion of modern deterrence which has encompassed previously marginalized perspectives such as hybrid or cyber warfare, as well as multipolarity of security environment marked by an urgent call for resilient agencies "without requiring NATO members to reorient their defence postures or significantly step up their defence expenditures or acquisition of capabilities"^[x] (p. 10).

This section has shown that NATO alliance is undoubtedly in the possession of a credible deterrent both in the sense of comprehensive and ubiquitous capabilities and unswerving intention to defend its territory and interests.

3. Small states deterrence strategies: making a case for Western Balkans

In accordance with the general theory of deterrence, even amplifying it, stands the issue of small powers behavior in the global arena. When we say small power, it is certainly not the one from nuclear circle with a robust armed forces. Therefore, small states prefer deterrence over defence, especially when engaged with countries multiple times bigger and stronger. Speaking in terms of strategic studies, small states have a choice of how to relate themselves towards bigger adversaries: "Small states can either engage with great powers, balance against potential threats, develop hedging strategies or stay neutral"^(p. 10). While neutrality is a strategy available for an extremely small number of countries with enough of natural or socio-political deterrence capabilities, direct confrontation can easily lead into the harsh defeat within a theater. Other strategies are much more feasible and fall under the bubble of deterrence. Firstly, a small state can engage in risky business of deterrence by punishment or in other words "the intent is to emphasize

the deterring state's ability to overcome the adversary's defensive forces and wreck destruction in its home territories^[xi] (p. 17). Obviously, this is a strategy employable against an adversary with equal or similar conventional arsenal. Secondly, deterrence by denial foresees building defensive capacities in order to deny adversarial hostile action^[xii]. Lastly, the umbrella of extended deterrence or various forms of alliances is the most widely used deterrence strategy of small states precisely because of the surplus value gained by credible deterrent of a bigger ally: "Defensive alliances increase the security and deterrence of small states because of their commitment to collective defence"^[xiii] (p. 11).

The Western Balkans is a region known for the long history of inter-state wars, with the tumultuous recent history of the bloodiest conventional encounter on the European continent after the Second World War. However, today when ethnic and nationalistic tensions are to a reasonable extent lowered, the countries of the region can commit themselves to the fulfillment of national strategic goals. The aim of this section is to briefly describe the current state of affairs in every Western Balkan country with regards to the overall strategic orientation and relation with the NATO alliance.

Albania was the first country from the region together with Croatia (which is, since the EU accession, outside of the signified domain of Western Balkans) to join NATO alliance and since then it has participated in a number of different activities showing strong commitments towards contributing to transatlantic partnership. Montenegro has been under severe pressure originating from Russia who wanted to prevent accession to NATO by various unconventional and hybrid techniques, ending with a wretched coup attempt. The year 2017 was marked by Montenegro joining the Alliance, thus closing a chapter in its national strategy. The most recent country to come on the doorstep of NATO is North Macedonia which has received an invitation and will probably be introduced during the next summit, all that happening after the final resolution of the name dispute with Greece. Serbia can be considered as the last resort of traditional Russian influence in the region, despite the attempts of the political leadership not to completely close relations with the Alliance^[xiv]. Finally, both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo do not satisfy the basic preconditions for the accession talks, for the former being the lack of consensus between constitutional territorial structures, while the latter has not been fully internationally recognized as an independent state.

4. NATO and Western Balkans – deterrence prospects

4.1 Extended deterrence umbrella

Often quoted is the strategic orientation of NATO alliance toward the open door policy of enlargement, especially towards the Western Balkans since it is an area "of special concern to the Alliance, as the events in the region have strongly influenced NATO's post-Cold war evolution"^[xv] (p. 9). In other words, the first out-of area operation and the first NATO peacekeeping mission were

launched precisely there, while the break-up of Yugoslavia in general was *a sui generis* challenge for the policy and strategic role of the Alliance in Europe. Today, thirty years after the bloody dissolution of Yugoslavia, NATO represents a strategic aim for the majority of the countries in the region. Among the main reasons for that is the bubble of extended deterrence offered by membership in the Alliance. As it was aforementioned, alliancing as a form of behavior of small powers has its own foundation in the recent history. Credibility of NATO deterrence is beyond a doubt and thus every country by becoming a member gets a guarantee that the existing capacities will be used to defend its vital interests. Arising from Article 5 of Washington Treaty and numerous examples from official documentation is the formulation: “ No one should doubt NATO's resolve if the security of any of its members were to be threatened. NATO will maintain the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of our populations, wherever it should arise^{[[xvi]]}. Although extended deterrence is not among the most desirable options because a state under protection does not own capabilities by itself, it is obvious that NATO membership for Western Balkan countries means comprehensive protection from various threats by the appropriate mix of conventional and nuclear tools. After a spoiled coup attempt in Montenegro, it became straightforward that additional deterrent is needed in order to prevent external influence, especially that coming from big powers, both directly or by a means of proxy. Therefore: “ This [NATO membership] is its only viable response to the assertive actions of rival players in this geopolitical arena^{[[xvii]]}. The umbrella of deterrence, particularly the one coming from the USA is invaluable leverage when formulating a position of a small country in international relations because it provides additional security and prospects for advancing the odds of keeping a sovereign policy, to an extent from both the provider of security as well as the referential objects.

Not all the countries from the Western Balkans have an equal strive towards the Alliance. However, it does not produce adversarial relations or enmity because every country, including big powers, must admit the military strength and deterrence capabilities of the Alliance. As said in an analytic report: “ As the neighbouring and strategically important countries around Serbia are part of NATO, it is convenient for the Serbs to maintain friendly relations and tight cooperation with the Alliance, even though not within its structures^{[[xviii]]} (p. 8). Even the traditionally friendly relations between Serbia and Russia cannot preclude the possibility of Serbia coming closer to the Alliance, which is an unraveling indicator of how extended deterrence makes its way into the strategically very remote areas.

Finally, extended deterrence as a benefit of NATO membership comes at a price of obfuscating the clear intents of the provider: ”Even if a candidate state meets the basic requirements for membership, NATO’s decision to pursue enlargement is ultimately political and based off potential strategic gain.^{[[xix]]} (p. 14)“ In the case of Montenegro, it was the closure of the coast from Syria to

Portugal, in the case of Baltic states the containment of post Soviet influence and as long as NATO doors remain open, candidates will have to be objectified in a sense and to an extent appropriate for the character of tools at prospective disposal. Despite all of that, Western Balkan countries currently cannot find a better alliance to join and better extended deterrence umbrella to fall under, than that originating from NATO.

4.2 More defence, more security

After extended deterrence and alliance making, which are not among the most effective deterrents in the long term, we come to the territory of deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment, where short term investment (potentially even loss) is being transformed into long term strategic gains. On that note: “Two of the tasks NATO has focused on in the Western Balkans have been defense reform and counter-terrorism^{“[xx]”} (p. 1). Defence reform is a measure often considered as an euphemism for building tactical and strategic capacities to be used with a deliberation for deterrence or in the case of an escalation scenario for national defence. Significant amount of conditions to join NATO falls under the domain of defence reform with a list of modernization measures, procurement of new technologies, as well as research and development. Moreover, becoming a member of the Alliance does not put an end to reformative and transformative efforts, because through an active policy constant engagement of member states is ensured. There are even opinions which eschatologically interpret the role of defence reform: “Further enlargement would only stand to aid other Western Balkan states in building their own national defenses (in line with NATO norms) and contribute to combating domestic terrorism threats“ (p. 15).

There are numerous cases of NATO helping to build capacities for deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment. The Montenegrin army has been among the least developed in Europe, which suffered from the demilitarization initiative that had oversaw melting of hundreds of main battle tanks and armored vehicles. However: “Montenegro made considerable efforts in reforming its own defence and military structures after it joined the Partnership for Peace program in December 2006. Three years later, the country was rewarded for its work when it was invited to join the Membership Action Plan in December 2009”^{“[xxi]”} (p. 241). It was not until the acceptance into the Alliance in 2017 that Montenegrin army became supplemented with Bell helicopters, few light aircraft and dozens of advanced armored vehicles and personnel armored carriers.

Being supported by an extensive indigenous military industry, Croatia is an even better example to analyze NATO influence on building capacities: “Croatia’s accession to NATO in 2009 and the European Union in 2013 respectively gave an important new incentive to the Croatian defence industry,

bringing more free market values sustained by the two organisations and an essential reference for the industry operating in a country that is now a full member” (p. 311). Support from the Alliance comes with an access to the international industrial market at a preferential treatment, as well as through the support for the indigenous industry and export. Therefore, the military export of Croatia being over 200 million euro per year ^[xxii] enables the country to procure significant amount of cutting edge technology and thereby deter potential adversarial action both conventional from near abroad or by proxy regardless of the origin.

4.3 The struggle for international recognition

With regards to the most abstract of the arguments, Western Balkan countries are considered to have benefits from NATO membership which go far beyond pure military or technological advancements. Economic advantage, institutional reputation and symbolical power can all easily be translated into the language of deterrence. Namely, by building internal strength of the country together with external balancing through capital acquired in international activities, a country effectively prevents an array of possible threats to its own security. Let us use the example of Switzerland to confirm this approach where we can see a softer concept of deterrence at its purest.

When it comes to our case study, there is a ruling opinion: “The commitments of all the countries in the region to the overall strategic goal of Euro-Atlantic integration will prevail over time, considering the irresistible “pull-factor” of the EU and NATO, and of the Western values and prosperity they represent“(p. 3). The notion of acceptance of values goes along with membership in a supranational organization, such as NATO but is not a necessary precondition. However, the majority of Western Balkan countries have shown an inherent respect and have highlighted the importance of those values with due diligence. Finally, we can say that because of the ruling values and symbolic capital translated into strategic terms: “The enlargement of the Euro-Atlantic security community to the region undoubtedly brought stability and resilience”^[xxiii] (p. 31). When in a post conflict region the stabilizing factor plays a sufficiently strong role, then it is a strong recommendation for the future for it to become a constitutive factor of the new socio political dynamics: “ NATO will still have a residual role to play in the future stability and security of the region” (p. 243).

5. Conclusion

It is dependent on the rational choice of actors to determine their own behavior in the global arena. We have numerous examples of rogue states, failed states and those opposing international order. However, for a small power it is necessary to give out certain concessions in order to be able to accommodate itself alongside bigger powers. As we said, protection from an external threat by means of

deterrence is the first and foremost strategy to be considered. Bearing in mind a specific position of the recently war-torn Western Balkan region, where the process of building sustainable peace is still to be implemented, there is a need for a strong status quo factor which will engulf a coherent set of values and provide a broad enough security environment for a multifaceted interstate structure for the sake of safe and secure future.

Therefore, this paper argued that NATO alliance is the best currently feasible deterrence strategy for Western Balkan countries. It was supported with the three major arguments. Firstly, by entering the Alliance, the small powers of the region fall under the umbrella of extended deterrence with enhanced prospects of keeping their internal dynamics secure. Although not the most credible option on the market, a robust protection can be all but the irreplaceable deterrence factor. Secondly, deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment are protracted through the defence sector reform and military modernization with a particular emphasis on the research and development aspect. Lastly, the aforementioned featured values and a sense of provided security is being transformed into deterrence capital necessary for countering various types of potential adversarial influence.

THE UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY IN THE WESTERN BALKANS DURING TRUMP'S PRESIDENCY: TRAJECTORIES AND RECENT CHANGES

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The news about Donald Trump winning the presidential elections in the USA and becoming the 45th American president came as a surprise to the whole international public, as well as to the countries of the Western Balkans, which observed the presidential transition with mixed hopes. Many practitioners and observers from the Western Balkans expressed their expectations that this outcome would cause changes in the US foreign policy positions towards this region. This article aims to examine the place of the Western Balkans (WB) in the first two years of Trump's mandate and trace the (potential) deviations of the American Western Balkans policy matrix. The research consists of an analysis of political and diplomatic official public discourses, as well as studies exploring the nature of the US political and security requests imposed to the Western Balkan states. The long-term element of the US WB policy is a hegemonic position in its relations with small WB countries – with rulemaking and imposing key principles in their political and security interactions. Authors argue that David Lake's security relations models offered in his works on anarchy and hierarchy in international relations are a proper theoretical framework for observation of such asymmetric relations. Considering the security relations between the great powers and small, weak countries, David Lake outlines several types of their relations through alliance, protectorate, informal and formal version of an empire. American influence on the security of Western Balkans countries has elements of the protectorate and informal empire relations, so it could be best described as a hybrid relationship, relying on Lake's terminology. The results indicated that since Trump's arrival as President, there has been a change in the established matrix of the US foreign policy towards the Western Balkans. Although the change is most visible in the field of public discourse, the flexibility with which Trump's administration treats some of the urgent security issues in the region is evident. Considering the direction of Trump's foreign policy and his forthcoming successor, whether through elections or by impeachment, certain actors from the Western

Balkans have obtained a more independent position in their relations with the United States, temporarily deviating the patterns of behavior described in Lake's models.

Key words: *United States, foreign policy, Western Balkans, security*

INTRODUCTORY AND THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The influence of the great powers on weaker states can be perceived through various theoretical lenses, one of them representing realism as one of the oldest schools in international relations. In the light of recent global events, the contemporary crisis of liberal institutionalism calls for a more realistic approach towards newly arisen issues in the international politics, in order to better understand them. Since the general theme of the conference is state-centric, the theoretical approach of our work is duly adapted. The theoretical foundation of our paper is based upon the David's Lake conception of hierarchy in international relations. Bearing in mind that the title of this paper highlights the security and political aspects of American foreign policy towards the Balkans, during Trump's presidency, it underlines the main axial concept of Lake's theory. Considering the elements that influence the relations among states, which also determine the state's security dimension, selecting Lake's theory of hierarchical world order comes as a natural choice, upon which we can build the theoretical foundation of our work.

Before we can truly understand Lake's theoretical approach, it is of outmost importance that we undertake a thorough operationalization of the terms that are used in his work. The author defines security as an ability to use, invest or in some way employ national wealth in order to accomplish state interests and freedom, which seems to be appropriate to political will (Lake D. A., 1996, p. 5). This definition implies that the state will focus its efforts in order to sustain two forms of national freedom: the freedom of having national wealth, freedom of having territorial integrity over national territory, as well as the freedom of choosing the preferred form of government, which is reflected upon the independent constitutional right. From the afore-stated we can conclude that the security of one state is established as long as its national wealth is not threatened and can be used freely as the sovereign wishes.

Lake considers security as a complex social phenomenon, which can be fully perceived only through an interstate perspective, or states' mutual behavior that can potentially lead towards antagonistic relations or mutual alliances. This mutual behavior is conditioned by the intentions of the states, as well as by their military capacities. Such security relations between states can have an impact on their defensive efforts to change states' political preferences and to determine the future international environment. The state's defensive capabilities are determined by various factors, including global challenges such as risks, threats and maintenance costs of the state's overall military capabilities. The political will serves as the driving factor behind the idea of maintaining the state's defensive capacities, which hence links Lake's notion of security and politics.

The author's understanding of security relations can take various dyadic forms. The dyadic form of these relations is important to understand and differentiate the levels of hierarchy in states' relations (Lake D. A., 1996, p. 6). From the above mentioned, a state can have different forms of relations with other neighboring states based on current and historical circumstances. It is clear that Lake is trying to analyze the security aspects of the states based on their preferences, environment and overall structure that is present in a given time period. However, the author does not neglect the importance of national interest as an important aspect of every state politics, henceforth Lake's approach requires a two level analysis that can be done from the aspect of international politics, as well as from the angle of national state. The term "national state" in Lake's concept should be perceived as a unique nation based on traditional values such as territorial integrity, sovereignty and national interests, which are central to his idea. Furthermore, the security relations are defined by the level of hierarchy deriving from one or more sides. The security relations are also based upon some sort of agreement, either made voluntarily or by force. The agreements, directly or indirectly, state the conditions on which the integrated security efforts are delegated in terms of control or jurisdiction on some crucial segments. This kind of relationship allows the terms of agreement to be made clear from the start, while any issues can be solved along the way.

It is evident that the circumstances and the environment are important to Lake, which can also differentiate the states of anarchy and hierarchy in the international security relations. In anarchic security relations, there is a possibility that each country can write its own destiny, because in the "rule less" environment each unit goes its own way. According to the previous sentence, in conditions of anarchic security relations, the self-will of each component appears separately. Unlike anarchy, in hierarchically arranged relations, there is a dominating state that sets the rules, while others are in an inferior position. David Lake argues that establishing hierarchy or maintaining authority in a certain region requires the dominating state to produce a political order beneficial to the subordinates, even if the dominating state does not have an immediate interest to do so; secondly, the dominating state must discipline those who reject its rules or threaten to destabilize its authority; finally, the hegemon must commit not to misuse the authority it has been granted (Lake D. , 2009, p. 93). We can say that such state of relations is actually present in most of the classical realist thought. It is very important to mention the fact that the actual method of how a state approaches the agreement, willingly or by force, is essentially irrelevant (Lake D. A., 1996, p. 7).

The continuity of security relations, however, can be usurped by the changing character of international relations; basically, anarchy can over time transform into hierarchy. Since Lake underlines certain relations among states including alliance, protectorate, empire and unofficial empire, examining them briefly, we can establish which one is relevant for our current research. The alliance basically represents a military alliance which is best depicted through NATO. In this particular alliance, there was a transfer of responsibilities and rights

from its very beginnings, which had reflected the organizational changes in this structure. If we examine the Washington Treaty, which is the foundation of the Alliance, we can conclude that all security requirements have been met and are corresponding with Lake's concept. The empire represents an extreme in Lake's theory, positioned on the opposite side of the hierarchical scale, and it develops when one of the sides strives for a dominant position at the expense of the other. There are two more categories between the alliance and the empire, such as the protectorate and the unofficial empire. Protectorate implies that one dominating state controls the foreign politics of the weaker country. The unofficial empire functions indirectly and in a latent form and is therefore very hard to pinpoint accurately. In this case, a state controls the politics (especially foreign affairs) of the other state indirectly, usually through one official sovereign who is *de facto* a controlled subject. The main distinction between the empire and the unofficial empire is the hybrid nature of the latter. Lake underlines that the unofficial empire implies a strong desire for self acclamation of the subordinated state. A state that represents itself as a dominating factor, while continuously maintaining control on various aspects of life and politics, is also testing others' dependency and its own imperial control. Lake highlights the main point in his agreement approach through mechanisms which are used in the relations between states, and they are mostly manipulative and controversial in nature. David evidently reveals the negative side of contractually based relations, explaining them as tools for control over less powerful entities.

The problem with Lake's theory is the absence of relations that are not based upon agreements. In international relations, instruments of foreign affairs such as coercion, ultimatum and other more or less violent approaches are viable, and governed without the obligation of an agreement. Namely, it is a matter of foreign political mechanisms about certain issues, and the resolution of such issues involves the opposed states' interests. By considering events that are a result of particular interactions among states, we will try to observe and explain certain political and security tendencies. It is important to emphasize that due to the nature of the research subject as current topics, there was a restriction regarding the availability of literary and secondary sources of information. The research objective is formulated and defined with the intention to analyze and determine the character of contemporary US foreign politics in the Balkans, during Trump's administration. Based on the afore-stated theoretical framework, we can safely say that the unofficial empire is most probably the correct model. However, the empirical context of our research will exactly determine the applicability of the suggested theoretical model, which we deem relevant.

THE PECULIARITIES OF AMERICAN POLITICS TOWARDS THE WESTERN BALKANS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

For political and security considerations of the previous impact of US foreign policy on the Western Balkans, it is necessary to proceed from several levels of analysis: theoretical, historical-political context, and the paradigm of liberal interventionism. The theoretical platform that enables the analysis presented in the previous section, is within the concept of hierarchical determinism created by David Lake. His theory can be assigned to the camp of the realist school of thought, for making an overview of the potential conflict through the state-centric focus and for taking into consideration the anarchic situation. However, institutionalism can be involved in this concept, bearing in mind that relations and indirect influence of the great powers on small states takes place thanks to regional and international institutions. The regional historical context of the political relations between the US and the Western Balkans is impossible to consider without accepting global contextualism, as well as the paradigm of liberal interventionism (Ružin, 2015, p. 152). During the nineties of the twentieth century, when there was a vigorous stirring of the great powers in the problems of the former Yugoslav countries, a visible global tendency emerged, shaped by the US domination and intervention for the sake of proclaimed democratic ideals. The wave of operations due to this tendency, such as those in Libya, Panama, the Philippines, Somalia, Liberia, Saudi Arabia and the war in Iraq preceded the American presence and influence during the civil war in the former Yugoslavia. The greatest impact of the US foreign and security policy in the Western Balkans region was made during the inter-ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia, and the bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999. The former pretensions of Washington, or the administrations headed by George Herbert Walker Bush and Bill Clinton, were derived from the US global offensive strategy and the desire to impose the US as a world hegemon. In the afore-stated period, the United States had identified the opportunity to expand their already widely known liberal interventionism in the former Yugoslav countries and the Western Balkan region. This way of treatment, in addition to the US, was also inspired by their commitment to support stability and prevent armed conflicts when this region was at the brink of collapse. It is justified with the initial observations that a relevant impact cannot be considered without the historical-political context and liberal interventionism, as its dominant trend.

The most prominent and visible US political-military engagements in the Balkans during the turbulent decade at the end of the twentieth century was in the Bosnian war, and its consequent independence, as well as in Kosovo; the latter conflict is especially interesting since it still represents a contemporary political issue, not only for Serbia, but for the region as well. The Bosnian case became interesting after the inauguration of President Clinton whose administration regarded the conflict as a clear transgression made by the Serbian forces in an

attempt to conquer a pluralistic society. For the US administration, Bosnia and Herzegovina represented a society made up of various ethnicities, very similar in that sense to the United States. Although we can argue about the American material interests in Bosnia, in terms of the US engagement during the process of establishing the Croatian armed forces, the drive to engage in the war was primarily based on humanitarian reasons, as well as confirming and establishing the United States authority across WB (Mandelbaum, 2016, pp. 102-104). One of the segments of US foreign policy at that time, according to public political discourse, was related to the preservation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, some authors argue that the establishment of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a democratic, modern and well-functioning state was more a desire than the target of the official US policy.

The NATO intervention in 1999 was somewhat similar, with respect to the fact that no clear material objectives had been sought. Though the intervention was launched on the basis of humanitarian rights, the main objective had been focused on overthrowing the "rogue" regime of Slobodan Milosevic, while the whole military endeavor was perceived as an auspicious opportunity to redefine NATO post-Cold War framework of operation. The US security interests in Yugoslavia at that time were relatively shallow. Despite being represented as a major concern, Milosevic and the Yugoslav armed forces did not have the intention, nor the needed capabilities to endanger the region or invade the neighboring states; while the economic interests for the US engagement were almost non-existent. However, Kosovo, similarly to Bosnia, served as a good pretext and a fine tool for the promotion of multiculturalism, just wars and the overall idea of liberalism that were otherwise implemented in the United States' global agenda (Kurth, 2001, pp. 68-76). One of the main goals of US policy in WB since the 90s of the twentieth century was creating the sovereign state of Kosovo and Metohija, although it is still today a highly debated issue which now produces significant political and security implications (which will be discussed later). According to the US interventionism policy at that time, 500 soldiers were sent to Macedonia, as a measure and attempt to restore stability and contribute towards creating desirable conditions for peaceful surrounding. Bearing in mind that Albania is one of the countries belonging to this region, it is important to point out that from its territory in 1997, the US withdrew their officials and citizens (Ćirić & Ivanji, 2011).

It is important to emphasize that the relations between the United States and the Republic of Serbia took similar direction. Although the relations between the two countries in the nineties were quite tense because of the bombing, their dialogue and cooperation were enhanced when the Republic of Serbia showed initiative that left behind the socialist legacy and established the values of liberal democracy. As one of the steps that contributed to the consolidation of interests, modernization and democratization was the admission of the Republic of Serbia into the Partnership for Peace Program in 2006.

Based on a brief review on the American impact on the Western Balkans heretofore, our conclusion indicates that the dominant model of influence was

conducting humanitarian interventions, which then switched to the requirements for the European and Euro-Atlantic integration processes. As one of the reasons for the implementation of liberal interventionism in the Western Balkans is the integration of these countries into the collective security and defense structures, such as NATO and the European Union. The US strategic policy in the previous ten years was directed towards the Western Balkan region as a collectivity, and now the approach has been more particular, developing relations with each country individually. Hence, now every country in the Western Balkans has separate political relations with the United States. Thus, for example Macedonia, Serbia, and all countries that belong to the WB region, in communication and negotiation with this great world power, have their own particular and specific sets of challenges, goals and mutual expectations. The character and nature of these challenges that the countries are facing, determine their cooperation with the United States through reform of some institutional components: the judicial, economic, security and defense. The implementation of reforms and the negotiations must be tailored to the mutual national interests (Seroka, 2015, pp. 135-137). It seems that the influence of the United States in the region of the Balkan Peninsula was aimed to promote the establishment of liberal democratic values, at the expense of peace. Maintaining the assertive US foreign policy contributed to the creation of the commitment on the part of the former Yugoslav countries to adapt to the new European security and political architecture. In such conditions, authoritarianism and politicization of all ministries were no longer possible. All this is conducive to the fact that major powers like the US exert their impact on small countries (in this case WB), which corresponds to the hybrid/informal empire described by David Lake. The 90s of XX century was prevailed by the discourse and debate about direct instrumentalization of military forces. Later on, indirect influence created certain conciliation and acceptance by the supranational entities. Therefore, it can be said that the adoption and integration of certain standards by the small countries of the Western Balkans recurrently influenced the improvement of their cooperation with the United States. However, this does not diminish the spreading of the impact of the global hegemon, and its policy goals. On the contrary, making small countries get closer to joint action in regional platforms can exert pressure in a manner that justifies Lake`s model based on the positions of the dominant on the one side and the subordinate on the other.

GENERALITIES ABOUT THE FOREIGN POLICY OF TRUMP'S ADMINISTRATION

After the US presidential elections in 2016, the revolutionary character of Donald Trump, his promises and agenda affected the US foreign policy positions. The dynamic foreign policy of the new president is both a novelty and a challenge to the established patterns of behavior on the American political scene, as well as to their relations with the rest of the world. Using the benefits of modern communication, Trump, with his direct approach to foreign affairs, sometimes

described as a “destructive instinct” (Sullivan, 2018, p. 18), has succeeded to shake the world’s political scene. A transactional approach to foreign relations, oriented towards short-term gains rather than to maintaining long-term relationships, threatens to shake the complete liberal international order and the United States position of a liberal world leader, developed by generations of American politicians over past decades (Schweller, 2018, p. 134). Consequently, the political relations between the USA and the rest of the world are being assessed, and the other countries are interested either to go through the contemporary turbulences with the least possible damage, or to use the change in American foreign policy mood to profit and materialize their own interests.

“Illiberal hegemony” or “primacy without a purpose” (Possen, 2018, pp. 21-25), as its main characteristics has, on the one hand, insistence on the priority of the American national interests within the relations with allies and the obligations towards international institutions and regimes subordinated to it, while on the other, it rests on the hardcore unilateralism, which corresponds well with the superpower in realist understanding of international relations. Since insistence on the relative gains for the U.S. today is one of the primary determinants of its foreign policy, Trump’s administration is willing to act beyond basic principles of liberal trade, global responsibility and cooperation, all established with the main contribution of the US. Trump’s skepticism regarding the American mission to spread liberal values across the world is already widely known and well documented (Laderman & Simms, 2017, p. 124). Also, the pre-established patterns of American foreign policy behavior are affected by Trump’s reliance on bilateral rather than multilateral frameworks for cooperation, which, together with unilateralism and primacy of the American interests, makes the basic trajectory of the American approach to foreign policy today that can be best described as “unilateral bilateralism”.

This kind of approach will leave scars on most American relations with its allies, especially those in Europe, whose earlier relationship was primarily based on common interests and their membership to the same civilization circle, established on the basis of respect and promotion of liberal values and multilateralism. The unpredictable decisions of the US president antagonized his relations with NATO allies to the degree that many observers are worried for the very existence of the alliance which during the second half of the XX century had a decisive impact on shaping the global political architecture. The New York Times columnist, David Leonhardt, is one of those with the opinion that an American president with a secret agenda to destroy NATO would behave precisely as Trump does (Leonhardt, 2018). A firm foreign policy position seems like the most appropriate way to halt the erosion of American power in the world regions, where the U.S. faces “emboldened enemies, nervous allies and increasing disorder” (Kroening, 2017, p. 31). Insistence on the more equal share of burdens for common security, trade competition and political disputes made those relations of US and European allies for a moment look more like those in the period after World War I than the relations from the time of Trump’s predecessors. As a result, some European

countries today see the U.S. as a greater threat than Putin's Russia (Ikenberry, 2017, p. 8). Trump's foreign policy "pragmatism", on the other hand, is best being realized through the observation of his statements: "Both our friends and our enemies put their countries above ours and we, while being fair to them, must start doing the same" (Crowley, 2016).

In its specific foreign policy approach, Trump's administration is facing limitations coming from the nature of the U.S. political system and its principles of power separation. Trump and his collaborators encounter resistance from some parts of the bureaucracy towards the administration's directives as an influence of a "deep state" which resists the supremacy of elected government (Wolff, 2018). Bureaucratic opposition coming from the side of non-partisan, professional cadres is not coming from the "deep state", but simply from the state – "the large, complex hive of people and procedures that constitute the U.S. federal government" (Michaels, 2017, pp. 52-53). The autonomous State Department officials' praxis has a significant impact on the overall outcomes of US foreign policy, especially those oriented towards matters within their routine activities and relations with small countries.

US FOREIGN POLICY IN THE WESTERN BALKANS DURING TRUMP'S ERA

Like the rest of the world, many observers and interested statesmen from the Western Balkans expected that Trump's election would cause some changes in the American policy towards the region. Expectations were various, considering that the Western Balkan states had a different history of relations with the U.S., as well as the fact that some Trump's election promises were perceived differently in the states of this region. Led by their own interest, observers from the Balkans were not hiding their sympathies during the American presidential election process. Those interested in maintaining *status quo*, hoped for the victory of Hilary Clinton, while those wishing changes in American approach supported the Republican candidate, Donald Trump (B92, 2016). However, it turned out that the focus of the new American administration was not on this part of Europe, but instead on global trade and security issues, as well as on domestic political struggle. The biggest part of U.S. foreign policy business in the Western Balkans remained on the agenda of low or mid-level State Department officials. Depending on the importance of the political dispute, the Balkan countries have succeeded only a few times to get the attention of the top U.S. diplomacy. Although revolutionary changes in the US position in the Western Balkans have never occurred, there is a clear change of stance towards certain issues.

Discussing US foreign interests in WB should be a relatively simple subject, however, a recent upsurge in "disobedient" behavior among some of the countries coupled with the unorthodox politics of Trump's administration towards world politics requires a fresh perspective. Despite the potential changes in the US foreign politics and in the politics of some WB countries, we should, nevertheless

acknowledge, or rather establish some ground rules. First of all, NATO is now a deeply embedded structure in the Balkans, with the exceptions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Serbia with its fragile concept of neutrality, which serves more as a political mantra than real state policy, all other states have decided on their future political-military allegiance and military development. Second, all WB countries, without exception, have a steadfast ambition of joining the EU. Even Serbia, that is somewhat considered an "odd child" mainly because of its historical-political sympathies towards Russia, has orientated its foreign politics towards European integration. The official web presentation of the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs even states that "the EU is the primary and most important strategic and foreign policy objective for the Serbian Republic" (Politički odnosi Republike Srbije i Evropske Unije).

Although the political behavior represented by Washington may seem troublesome and reserved for some of the regional actors, it does not mean that the US is passive on all fronts. During the Trump administration, two Western Balkan states have joined NATO, despite the President's initial posture towards the Alliance. Montenegro, a long considered Russian outpost on the Adriatic, joined NATO in June 2017. With this, Montenegro agreed on further security cooperation with the Alliance, implementing an extensive defense and security sector reform and changes in civil emergency planning and scientific-security related research (NATO, 2017). Although Trump was personally reserved about NATO expanding in small WB countries, emphasizing the possible negative consequences of such an action, following the approval in U.S. Congress, Montenegro successfully completed its accession process (Guardian, 2018). After the accession, Montenegro got out of the focus of U.S. foreign policy.

In Macedonia, the USA continued their support for the consolidation of Macedonian society and state on its way to Euro-Atlantic integration. The State Department low and mid-rank officials have played a significant role in that direction. For example, Brian Hoyt Yee, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, had a significant role in overcoming the political crisis after the Macedonian elections, when only after serious pressure, Macedonian President Gjorge Ivanov yielded and accepted to hand over the mandate to Zoran Zaev in order to form the Government (META.mk, 2018). The influence of American diplomacy was also visible during the negotiations between Skopje and Athens on the Macedonian name dispute, when American officials, like Vice-President Mike Pence, gave full support to Zaev's Government and their attempt to end decades-long dispute (Readout of the Vice President's Meeting with Prime Minister Zoran Zaev of the Republic of Macedonia, 2018). After Montenegro had joined the NATO, Macedonia quickly followed. In the summer of 2018, Macedonia managed to finally resolve the dispute with its neighbor Greece, over the name of the country, and quickly after join the accession talks with NATO (Emmot, 2019). Although the process could take a whole year, generally Macedonia has a clear ambition, as a small country, to secure its position by bandwagoning along other more powerful states. As with Montenegro, Macedonia was also seen as an

important blow toward Russian politics in the Balkans. Moreover, the strategic layout in the region clearly shows that the three last remaining countries, which also seek EU membership, are entirely encircled by the Alliance.

As we can see, American top diplomacy is engaging in the Western Balkans only in cases when the problem comes from a dispute with far-reaching regional implications or if the matters are significant for American vital national interests. Therefore, following their accession to NATO, Albania and Croatia are performing the largest part of their relations with the U.S. using the framework provided by the alliance. Allies are expected to give support to the American global role, like in the case of the sanctions against Iran. Similar inertia of American diplomacy after the Trump inauguration is visible in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and this country had the highest concentration of fears and hopes related to Trump's election. In spite of the complexity of the Bosnian society, with the exception of the replacement of the U.S. Ambassador to Sarajevo, there were no significant political issues on the table.

The change in approach is most evident in the dispute between Serbia and Kosovo, on their so-called dialogue to resolve the status of the disputed territory. Until Trump's inauguration, the political dialogue was a mostly one-way street, signaling that the liberal narrative on which the territory established its independence is still present. Serbia needs to come to terms with the loss of the territory if it wishes to successfully reach the end of the EU path of accession. However, after the change in Washington, the same liberal narrative seems to be less present in the talks. In the talks conducted in Brussels, Serbia apparently gained some kind of leverage that is evident in its posture towards the northern part of Kosovo, which by default does not fit with the discourse the Kosovo politicians are trying to establish or rather preserve. Unlike previous administrations, Trump's has expressed its readiness for consideration of "creative solutions" for the Kosovo dispute (Bolton Says U.S. Won't oppose Kosovo - Serbia Land Swap Deal, 2018). Leaving the firm positions of previous administrations according to which Serbia is supposed to simply "accept the reality" and recognize Kosovo's independence, clearly implies the flexibility of the new administration about this dispute. The recent change of Washington's attitudes led Serbian Foreign Minister, Ivica Dacic, to conclude that the US policy towards the region is "no more on autopilot" (Beta & FoNet, 2018).

The circumstances arising from the trade dispute between Belgrade and Prishtina have to a considerable extent eased the identification of the changes in the overall American attitude towards Kosovo dispute. On that note, U.S. officials urged Kosovo's Albanians multiple times to revoke the taxes on Serbian goods (US threatens withdrawal of troops from Kosovo if tax is not suspended, 2019). The recent taxes on Serbian products and Prishtina's stance that the taxes will hold despite the foreign pressure, tells us that Kosovo political elite is not satisfied with the current western politics towards Belgrade. Haradinaj's statements that "despite his love for America, the taxes will hold" (Haradinaj se izvinjava sad: "Ja volim Ameriku, ali taksa neće biti ukinuta, molim vas RAZUMITE NAS", 2019)

implicates that Prishtina still has high hopes for its foreign patron, albeit not with the current US administration. This attitude of the Albanians presents a novelty in their relations with the western ally, whose political support was crucial for the recent success of Kosovo's independence project. Also, it rather speaks about Prishtina's intention to delay solving the dispute until the international circumstances turn in their favor again. Due to the recent change of Washington's attitude towards this dispute, there is a wide notion in Serbian press that America has a plan "B" for Kosovo, and apparently, that does not imply an undeniable support to Prishtina. This is widely praised among Serbian politicians as a victory of Serbian diplomacy.

The previous US administration had played a major role in resolving conflicts and establishing some kind of political-regional framework of cooperation among the WB states. However, President Trump, evocating his seemingly isolationistic politics, creates an impression that the United States' commitment towards the region is in decline. The fear which stems from this notion is that with the Americans in "retreat", the potential political vacuum will be filled by the Russians. Though this could be a reasonable concern, Russia has a history in the region and WB is generally considered as the soft underbelly of the EU where foreign powers can test the Western resolve, the main issue is the American politics itself. In other words, the current US administration considers the Balkans as a region of lesser importance. Almost none of the higher officials of the current American administration is directly involved in the political issues regarding the WB states, with the exception of Kosovo and Macedonia disputes. This essentially means that the US politics towards the WB have gone into maintenance mode, and most probably will stay in that way at least until the duration of this administration. We can safely assume that radical shifts in the politics towards the WB states are highly unlikely, primarily because of the aforementioned reasons, however, this does not mean that certain variations are out of the question. The recent situation and newly arisen political tensions between Belgrade and Prishtina, the issues in Bosnia and even the Macedonian "rocky road" towards NATO, suggest that the politics of the region, although still EU-NATO orientated, might express certain deviations with respect to the current US administration politics.

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE TRAJECTORIES

Although the limited nature of the essay did not allow us to delve deeper into Lake's theory, the concept, albeit questionable at the global level, works fine on the lower levels of world politics and regional politics analysis. When we look at Lake's theory of hierarchy, we can still see how authority is accomplished by a dominating power and maintained for a prolonged period of time. However, we cannot entirely explain certain deviations in terms of regional politics. It seems that a hegemon, such as the United States, can keep its presence and influence in a region that agreed to its authority, although political relations may vary from time to time. However, this is not influenced by the subordinate's politics as much as it

is a reflection of the hegemon's changing political posture. As Lake suggested, the dominating state must "earn" its authority. Although it is really hard to say that the United States lost any of its authority in the Balkans, on the contrary, it may have even bolstered it further with Montenegro and Macedonia joining NATO. This means that the US will exercise control over the countries of the Western Balkans, which are member states of the mentioned alliance. Giving the final word on decision making, this hegemon will confirm its dominant position through politics and the system of collective security. The theoretical framework, whose author is David Lake, proved to be appropriate for our consideration of the emergence of politics known as a *trumpism*. The controversial public discourse posted by Donald Trump, was one of the reasons that inspired us to reveal and analyze the nature and consequences of the current American foreign policy. Also, our desire was to highlight and present the possible changes in the US policy towards the Western Balkans during Trump's presidency. Through this brief research project we can conclude that the requirements for theoretical and empirical suitability were fulfilled.

In spite of some expectations, a revolutionary change in the U.S. foreign policy towards the Western Balkans has never occurred. The reasons for such inactivity can be found in Trump administration's preoccupation with the matters of global significance and the fact that the small Western Balkans countries are out of Washington's foreign policy focus. However, the change of attitude and rhetoric towards Kosovo dispute is evident, yet with no substantial progress. Observing the current situation and political relations of the regional political elites with the US political elites, we can conclude that some of the WB politicians were "betting on the wrong horse" in the last American elections. Lastly, we should keep in mind that the odd political behavior towards the current Washington establishment is only temporary in nature. It is probable that many still perceive Trump as an aberration of American politics and as soon as the elections hit next year, the situation will get back to the previous state. In other words, as soon as Trump is replaced, the regular discourse on which post-Yugoslav states had been built will again become *modus operandi* in regional politics.

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THE TWO BASIC GLOBALIZATION CONCEPTS, THE EURO ATLANTIC AND THE EURO ASIAN

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Abstract

Modern civilization trends inevitably lead to major geopolitical changes in the world. These changes are expressed by the decay of bipolarism, the increasing domination of the United States, the strong processes of globalization, the more frequent imposition of the ideas on a new world order, the processes of de-sovereignization of the medium and small states, the harsh military interventionism, the more frequent crises, the brutal economic exploitation and similar.

These processes did not happen spontaneously, but geopolitical goals were largely planned, which made a strong foundation for the previously mentioned geopolitical theories and teachings. In this sense, neither the modern civilization flows nor the processes that follow will, to a great extent, be a consequence of the current geopolitical interests and plans⁴².

A world order appears, based on civilization, the states that share cultural affinities cooperate among themselves, countries are grouping around the leading states or states that comprise the core of their civilizations⁴³.

Globalization is increasingly imposed as a new phase of imperial domination of the rich and powerful. Masked in the "sophisticated form" of a liberal paradigm, it has been extremely brutal of lately, breaking the smallest attempts to oppose, especially those of the small and weak states.

In this paper we will discuss the notion of globalization, the two basic concepts of globalization, the Euro-Atlantic and the Euro-Asian concept and their proponents, their basic features, the characteristics of globalization and how global reality is reflected in the region and in our country, and the characteristics of globalization.

Key words: *geopolitics, globalization, geopolitical interests, Euro-Atlantic concept, Euro-Asian concept.*

⁴² Lj. Despotovic, M. Drobac (2008), Geopolitics and terrorism in time of globalization, page.23

⁴³ S. Huntington (2000), The Clash of Civilizations, page.20

The notion of Globalization

Although the term globalization dates from an older date, it was more commonly used in the sixties of the twentieth century, becoming increasingly popular in the late 1980s and early 1990s of the twenty-first century. Today in our country its relevance is undoubtedly gaining greater strength. Globalization has become a kind of a phrase in our lives. Globalization encompasses a broad field of activities, from the global financial market to the Internet market. There is almost no debate in the media in our country, and it is a notorious fact that we are quite deeply engaged in the turmoil of global interests, which, according to some unwritten rule, violate the great global interests of the world powers on our backs. Globalization is increasingly revealing itself as a new phase of imperial domination of the rich and powerful⁴⁴. And geopolitics is devising the strategies of the new approach of the great world powers. Modern civilization has not brought more peace, justice and freedom, as expected after the fall of the Iron Curtain; on the contrary, the aggression has become increasingly intense, great suffer appeared, greed and egoism are continually rising, and the means of destruction are enormously and uncontrollably enlarged. But while states are the main actors in international relations, they suffer from the loss of their sovereignty, function and power. International institutions emphasize their right to condemn and restrict the states for what they do on their own territory⁴⁵. Modern civilization trends as we see have led to major geopolitical changes such as: the decay of bipolarism, the growing domination of the United States, the strong processes of globalization, the ideas imposition for a new world order, the processes of desovereignization of the middle and small states, the brutal military interventionism, the brutal economic exploitation, and the like. We are witnesses that these processes did not go spontaneously, but geopolitical goals were planned to a great extent, which had a strong foundation upon already established geopolitical theories and teachings. Geopolitics had its ultimate achievement in the character and the works of Sir Helford J. Mackinder (1861-1947), Director of the London School of Economics and a member of the high level circles of English politics. A geographer by education, Mackinder set all the central, terminologically categorized geopolitical structures⁴⁶. The claim of the fundamental duality that is reflected in the geographical planetary arrangement and in the historical typology of civilizations is the main law of geopolitics. This duality is reflected upon the opposition between "Tellurocracy" (land power) and "thalassocracy" (sea power). The character of such opposition lies in the opposition of trade civilizations (Carthage, Athens) and militarily authoritarian civilizations (Rome, Sparta), or, in other words, the duality between "democracy" and "ideocracy". This duality has an ancient character of animosity, an alternative of its both poles, whose strength varies from case to case. The history of human society as a whole is said to be consisted of two elements -

⁴⁴ Lj. Despotovic, M. Drobac (2008), Geopolitics and terrorism in time of globalization, page.1

⁴⁵ S. Huntington (2000), The Clash of Civilizations, page.36

⁴⁶ Lj. Despotovic, M. Drobac (2008), Geopolitics and terrorism in time of globalization, page.16

"aquatic" (liquid, non-permeable) and "terrestrial" (solid, constant)⁴⁷. Mackinder has determined the prevention of strategic alliance between Germany and Russia as the central land zones of Euro Asia as the main geopolitical task of Anglo-Saxon policy, as well as the strategy of the forces of the external crescendo, which is to tear greater part of the territory of the Heartland states from the former Baltic states and put it under the control of the island civilization⁴⁸.

Tellurocracy ("land power") is connected to space fixation and the consistency of its qualitative directions and decisions. On civilization level it is characterized by stativity, conservatism, strict legal norms, to which the great human communities - clans, tribes, people, states, and empires are subdued. The firmness of the land is culturally characterized by strong ethics and the consistency of the social traditions. Individualism and entrepreneurial spirit are strange for the land people, whereas they are familiar with collectivism and hierarchy.

Thalassocracy ("sea power") is a type of civilization based on opposite directions. This type is dynamic, mobile, and prone to technological development. Their priorities are nomadism (especially seafaring), trade, and spirit of individual entrepreneurship. The individual is the most mobile part of the collective and is held as its highest value, while the ethical and legal norms are undermined, and become relative and mobile. This type of civilization develops quickly, evaluates actively, changes the cultural features easily, and at the same time only the internal identity of the general direction remains unchanged. Much of the history of mankind is played in conditions of limited scales of both determinations in the global supremacy of "tellurocracy". The element of the earth (the land) rules the entire complex of civilizations, while the element "water" (sea, ocean) appears fragmentarily and occasionally. Hence, according to Alexander Dugin: "The geopolitical view of the history represents a development model of the planetary duality to the fullest extent. The mainland and the sea expand their primordial opposition to the whole world. The history of mankind is nothing but an expression of that struggle and the way for its absolutization. Such is the main law of geopolitics - the law of the duality of elements (land against the sea)"⁴⁹.

Basic features of the Euro Atlantic and Euro Asian concepts and their proponents

The Euro-Atlantic concept is a concept of prominent Anglo-Saxon geopoliticians, such as Halford Mackinder (1861-1947, Director of the London School of Economics and a member of the high circles of English politics), Alfred Mahan (1840-1914, is one of the most important creators of the American geopolitical doctrine), Nicholas Spykman (1893-1943, is second in importance for the creation of the American geopolitical model and strategy). The Euro-Asian

⁴⁷ A. Dugin (2004), The Foundations of Geopolitics - Book 1 - The Geopolitical Future of Russia, page.26

⁴⁸ Lj. Despotovic, M. Drobac (2008), Geopolitics and terrorism in time of globalization, page.16

⁴⁹ A. Dugin (2004), The Foundations of Geopolitics - Book 1 - The Geopolitical Future of Russia, page 29

continent is a key territory within the boundaries of the so-called "world island", where Mackinder includes Asia, Africa and Europe.

The Euro-Asian concept is mainly a concept of prominent Russian and German geopoliticians, such as Karl Haushofer (1869-1946, one of the more prominent German geopoliticians) and Petar Nikolaevich Savitsky (1895-1968, is the most significant representative of the Russian Geopolitical School. He created his geopolitical works under the influence of the Russian Slavophiles Danilevsky and Leonteyev, and with the Prince N. S. Trubetsky during the 20`s of the 20th century he led the Eurasian movement).

Mahan has projected and announced the planetary claims and the progress of the United States as a world maritime force through the so-called plan- the "Anaconda Strategy," which included ruling of the outer parts of the Asian ring by the Atlantic structures and closing a tight hoop around the Euro-Asian Giant - Russia, and its extrusion from the warm seas towards the cold north.

Spykman advocates the so-called utilitarian conception of geopolitics, with which the United States should fast-track the establishment of world dominance.

Haushofer wanted to emphasize the growth of the strengthening of the German state. By that, he did not only imply economic and industrial growth, but also military, cultural development and territorial expansion. He predicted that Germany's future would be in conflict with the geopolitical interests of the Atlantic West and their states-leaders, and in Europe these would be England and France and, of course, overseas America. According to him, a geopolitical response to this challenge would be the creation of a continental alliance between Berlin, Moscow and Tokyo⁵⁰.

Friederich Ratzel (1844-1904) is considered as one of the founders of geopolitics¹⁰, not only of the German school, but also of geopolitics in general. He investigated the evolution of the people, the relationships that exist between demography and geography, the impact of the terrain on the cultural - political forming of people etc. and his basic geopolitical postulate is located in his attitude regarding the state as a "living spatial organism rooted in the ground". He emphasized the importance of the moisture of the earth (ground) on the overall development of the growth of people. For him, the movement of history is significantly conditioned by the ground and the territory, and the state as the ultimate and most important organism of the growth and the development of the people, above all, will depend on the terrain, the spatial size and the arrangement of the state territory⁵¹.

Characteristics of globalization

Globalization is a phenomenon of today where, on the one hand, it is claimed to be an objective and spontaneous planetary process, while others claim that it is exceptionally a project for the domination of the West, or more precisely,

⁵⁰ Lj. Despotovic, M. Drobac (2008), Geopolitics and terrorism in time of globalization, page 19

⁵¹ Lj. Despotovic, M. Drobac (2008), Geopolitics and terrorism in time of globalization, page.13

it represents the Americanization of the world. For some, globalization is a new and unique phenomenon in world history, while for others it is only a complete process for spreading the capitalist establishment across the world. On the one hand, it is claimed that globalization will be the end for the sovereignty of the national states, while on the other hand, there are those who claim that integrating the world and the role of the national states will be more important. Leslie Skler cites four features of globalization, the following being emphasized: the world system, the global culture, the global community and the global capitalism⁵². Globalization is, according to some authors, spreading, intensification, acceleration and increase of the importance of the mutual connection among people across the planet.

The reflection of globalization in the region and in our country

It is increasingly evident that the West is trying to bring the Western Balkans into the Euro-Atlantic influence zone, but on the other hand, it is clear that it has become important for Russia to take up that space in order to have access to the Mediterranean. According to a number of analytical texts that we were able to observe lately, they are intensively dealing with the situation in Macedonia, and it can be easily concluded that our country is in the center of the Balkan "hot pot". The Darling of the West, as it was called, which was under the protection of the West during the post-Yugoslavian wars, after it managed to oppose the territorial aspirations of its neighbors, has recently undergone a deep political crisis which threatened with an escalation of ethnic violence and total destabilization of the region. From a present point of view, we can see that there is an attempt to stabilize the situation with the current government in our country, and certain concessions on the political stage of our country have gained the sympathies of the West. In our sincere efforts to become a member of the European Union and NATO, Macedonia as a state was, in many cases, humiliated, exposed to numerous unreasonably difficult, often embarrassing conditions for the political elite of the peaceful Macedonian people, to which it undoubtedly responded positively. Macedonia agreed to all possible and impossible concessions that practically turned it into a literally divided country. The armed conflicts that were undoubtedly planned, financed and managed in the not too distant past, and their goals far away from the ordinary citizens of Macedonia were certainly in the field of strategic thinking of the leading European and world powers. The developments in Kumanovo were in some way a warning for the current Macedonian policy as to what could happen if they continue to agree with the Russian interests in the Balkans. The Transatlantic elite showed that it did not intend to provide the methods and procedures of Viktor Orban, nor allow the installation of the "Turski Tek" (Turkish Stream) installation, but it is more than obvious that it is making every possible effort to prevent any penetration of the Russian economic and military options on the Balkans. Macedonia should make a balance in order to

⁵² Z. Kalugjerovic (2008), The concept of globalization, source excerpt from UDK316.42.063.3339.9.01, page 17

protect its interests. After the end of the conflict in Syria and the frozen conflict in Ukraine, the West has directed its forces towards the Balkans. An EU and NATO plan to definitely implement the concept of the integration of the Balkan space into the structures of NATO and the EU is probably under way. Of course, Macedonia has an interest to finally come out of this long-term crisis, to stabilize and finally provide better living conditions for its citizens. But it is more than obvious that the civilized West, in the name of the specific strategic and economic interests of the United States and the leading EU countries, wants to establish a stable Balkans again, but based on its strategic interests. Until the West realizes its interests, in the near future we will surely see various scenarios which will continue to reflect certain instabilities in the whole region, all of which will contribute to delaying the progress of all Balkan states. Russia's influence was viewed in a completely different way, through occasional announcements in the media, through the support of individual political parties that are trying to emphasize Russia's support for the Macedonian people. There is a permanent "bombardment" with unseen media propaganda in the air, where we often watch almost the same experts and political analysts expressing their views, often repeated in a parrot-like manner in almost every media. According to a number of analytical texts that have been intensively dealing with the situation in Macedonia in recent months, one can easily conclude that our country is in the center of the Balkan "hot pot". Skopje, the capital of Macedonia, according to many analysts and various experts, has become "Casablanca", where numerous members of the intelligence services are acting in order to realize the interests of their countries. In such a state of abundance of information and misinformation, the population is in a state of confusion trying to stay informed as best as possible. Yet, a small number of citizens are able to see the "big picture" and penetrate into the ultimate goal of all these "players" becoming thus aware of the requirements of certain centers of power.

Final conclusion

According to Henry Kissinger, the international system of the 21st century will be comprised of at least six major powers, the United States, Europe, China, Japan, Russia and possibly India and a number of medium and small states. In this new world, local politics is the politics of ethnicity, and global politics is the politics of civilizations. The most important and the most dangerous conflicts will not be among the social communities, the rich and the poor, but among the people belonging to various cultural entities. Tribal wars and ethnic clashes will occur within the civilizations themselves⁵³.

From all of the above-mentioned, it can be concluded that globalization is a long-term historical process that is marked by many contradictions and which is, to a considerable extent, shaped by a series of combined factors that affect the current way of life. History shows that concrete, but always partial interests of power are hidden behind such plans and projects, which cannot be justified or masked with

⁵³ S.Huntington (2000), *The Clash of Civilizations*, page.28

stories about democracy, human rights and free market. The world is created with differences and it should remain that way. By respecting those differences the world can live in peace, otherwise it will be a place for dirty wars and conflicts, caused and managed crises, and geopolitics will continue to be an inevitable ideological tool of the powerful forces in their attempts to justify their imperialist aspirations and actions. All these developments clearly indicate that it is very important for the West to bring the Western Balkans in the zone of Euro-Atlantic influence, but it has also become important for Russia to take up that space in order to have access to the Mediterranean. Much wisdom and diplomacy are needed at this moment, not only for the West and for Russia, but above all for the governments of the countries from the region who should stop being servants to the foreign interests and recognize their own national interests. Only then can we talk about stability of the region.

In Macedonia, at this moment there is a growing need to create a center for geopolitical research in order to follow the geopolitical developments in the world. It is more than obvious that the great power centers, as never before, tend to realize their geopolitical and strategic interests, it is all legitimate, but it is also legitimate for the small states, such as ours, to recognize the ultimate goals and interests of the great powers and try to impose their own interests.

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GEO-STRATEGY OF WESTERN SEA POWER AND SMALL STATES' SECURITY: THE CASE OF GREECE 1914–1922

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I. *Small States*, or *Small Powers* are something more than or different from *Great Powers* writ small. If true, the point is both theoretically and practically important. For the researcher, evidence that the Small State is different in kind, and not merely in degree, provides a clear warning against the dangers of generalizing about the behaviour of all states. Small States think and act differently, and any analysis which fails to take that fact into account is bound to be simplistic and inadequate. Policy practitioners may also find the analysis helpful, if only indirectly. The reminder that a particular Small State's behaviour cannot be understood unless the distinctive perspective with which it operates is understood is a useful correction to the notion that all "rational" state actors will perceive international affairs in the same way Great Powers do.

The formal distinction between Great Powers and Small Powers, or Small States first emerged during the last year of the Napoleonic Wars. Previously, as *Harold Nicolson* noted, "the assumption had been that all sovereign and independent states were in theory equal, whatever might be their responsibilities or physical strength."⁵⁴ While the distinction between Great Powers and Small States was implicit in the political practice of earlier centuries, it was not raised into a formal principle until the exigencies of the struggle against Napoleonic France made it convenient, even necessary to do so.

This fact might not have led to a formal and institutionalized distinction between Great Powers and Small States. Nonetheless, it coincided with the clear realization by a number of Great Powers' statesmen that the *Congress of Vienna* could not function effectively unless the actual differences between Great Powers and Small States were institutionalized so that the Great Powers could arrogate to themselves the right to act for all of Europe. The result was that, in theory, and with a number of exceptions in practice, the formal operating principle was clear: the Great Powers, in concert (the so-called *European Concert*), were to decide; the Small States were to obey.

The decline and eventual collapse of the Concert system, particularly in the last decade of the nineteenth century, was therefore especially significant. As the Great Powers assembled in two opposing alliance systems, the Small States were presented with a unique opportunity. The prevailing power configuration made the support of various Small States seem necessary. As one observer noted, "The

⁵⁴ Nicolson, 1961, p. 137.

wavering allegiance of Romania, a matter of slight importance in normal times, assumed great significance because the balance of power in Europe as a whole was so even that a Small ["Balkan"] State might well bring down the scales on one side or the other."⁵⁵ Similar could be said about Greece on the eve of the Great War, but only in theory as it will be seen.

II. It goes with saying that the issue of the Great Powers' influence on the security of Small States has always been of particular significance to the Balkan States – or the States of South-Eastern Europe, as I would prefer to put it. One may reasonably ask why it was so. The answer is to be found in doctrines thoroughly crystallized in the works of the "Founding Fathers", so to speak, of the "classic" Western (i.e. Anglo-Saxon, or "Atlantic") school of Geopolitics, the British *Sir Halford John Mackinder* (1861-1947) and the American *Alfred Thayer Mahan* (1840-1914). US Navy Rear-Admiral (commonly known as Captain) A.T. Mahan pointed out the struggle for the control of the seas as the very essence of the history of mankind. Professor Mackinder made the assumption that Europe and Asia (i.e. Eurasia), and to a lesser degree Africa form the so-called "*World Island*"; the eastern part of Europe and the western part of [then] Russia form the "heart" of this "World Island", called "*Heart Land*." At the same time, this "Heart Land" is to be understood as the so-called "*Pivot*" of our planet. If the Power that controls that "Heart Land" gains control of South-Eastern Europe's coastline – in other words, if the "Eurasian", land-bound Power achieves access to the most celebrated [Southern] "warm waters" – then that Power may also achieve world domination. In such case, the days of the Western or Atlantic (read: Anglo-Saxon) global supremacy, that started in 1588 and has been going on for four centuries, would be over.⁵⁶

The geo-strategically critical conclusions are therefore: i) that a German or a Russian descent towards Europe's South-Eastern, namely Macedonian, littoral areas should be stopped at any cost; and ii) that a Russo-German alliance must be prevented at any price.

Because of that geopolitical doctrine, South-Eastern Europe has been the Apple of Discord between Land (Eurasian) and Sea (Anglo-Saxon or Atlantic) Power. This was evidently manifested, inter alia, in the assassination of the first President ("Governor") of modern Greece *John (Iōannēs) Capo d' Istria* in 1831 and the overthrow of the King *Otto* of Greece in 1862, who was a member of the *Wittelsbach* dynasty, i.e. the Bavarian Royal House. The Greek state acted from then onwards as a defender of the Western (notably British) interests in Europe's strategically most important south-eastern peninsula; if truth be told, its mission was to guard the Balkan coastline.

If truth be told, that is why, after the end of the Second World War, Stalin

⁵⁵ Mansergh, 1949, p. 211.

⁵⁶ Mackinder, 1902; Mackinder, 1904; Mackinder, 1942 (1919); Mahan, 1965 (1890); Mahan, 1892; Mahan, 1902.

was given, virtually as a gift, the whole of South-Eastern Europe, but not Greece. And that is the reason for both: the Anglo-Saxon (first British, then U.S.) intervention as well as the Soviet, i.e. Russian, non-interference in the Greek Civil War (1944 – 1949). The Powers exercising *Command of the Seas* were by no means disposed to let Russia have an outlet in the Mediterranean Sea.

III. The *Great Powers* decided the *Ottoman Empire*'s dismemberment after the end of the 1877-1878 war between *St. Petersburg* and the *Sublime Porte*.⁵⁷ The origin of the *First Balkan War* is to be found in the very first years of the twentieth century; for it was then that the British took the initial steps in order to control the oil deposits in the Middle East.⁵⁸

Indeed, an axiom of the British Naval leadership read as follows, "All war is a question of communications. The Power controlling communications holds in the hollow of his hand the Power to whom communications are denied."⁵⁹ The First World War was foreseeable as early as 1900, and in the framework of the British *Royal Navy*'s planning, only oil-burning ships would be built from 1912 on.⁶⁰ In 1911, when Winston S. Churchill was appointed to the office of the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Royal Navy had already built or was in the process of building 56 destroyers dependent exclusively on oil and 74 submarines powered only by oil. Oil, nevertheless, was not found in considerable quantities in the British Isles, even though the British had at their disposal the best steam coil of the world, safe in the substratum of their own country. Since continuing British naval supremacy would depend on oil the first steps aimed to control the relevant deposits of the Middle East. On 28 May, 1901, the British concluded an agreement with the Shah of Persia, *Mozzafar-al-Din Shah Qajar*⁶¹ – a concession encompassing the whole extent of the Persian Empire. As a result the "*Anglo-Persian Oil Company*" began to exploit the Iranian substratum. Afterwards, it was the turn of Mesopotamia's petroleum wealth to be exploited. The first oil well was drilled there by the "*Turkish Oil Company*": the drilling started as early as 1902.⁶² The rich Caucasus deposits were exploited by famous oil-dynasties such as the Rothschild and the Nobel families. As a corollary, only the petroleum in Ottoman territory was 'available'. Thus, the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire was in sight; in fact, the main British desideratum with regard to the 1914-1918 fighting between Britain and Turkey was the "final recognition and consolidation of... [British] position in the Persian Gulf"⁶³, and that meant, first of all, security for oil production.

⁵⁷ Driault, 1926.

⁵⁸ *Iraq and the Persian Gulf* (B.R. 524. Naval Intelligence Division, September 1944), pp. 269-280, 493.

⁵⁹ PA, BL/53/4/3.

⁶⁰ Churchill, 1923.

⁶¹ Duret, 1994.

⁶² Al-Marsoumi, Abdul-Mutalib Hasson, "Petroleum Geology of Mesopotamia (general review)", retrieved in <http://www.geologyofmesopotamia.com/p57.htm> on April 30, 2011.

⁶³ PA, BL/63/2.

In the meantime, under the auspices of the Czar of all Russians, the Kingdoms of Bulgaria and Serbia closed an alliance against the Porte (early 1912).⁶⁴ Bulgaria thought itself called by duty to remove the remnants of the Ottoman rule from Europe. Opposite to the attitude of the successive Greek governments of the first decade of the 20th century, Greece under *Eleutherios Benizelos* now entered the anti-Ottoman coalition;⁶⁵ *Benizelos* was imposed on Greek political stage from outside, pushed by the British Minister in Athens, *Sir Francis Elliot* in the aftermath of the 1909 *pronunciamento* of a clique of military officers.⁶⁶

IV. After the outbreak of the Great War in August 1914, the attitude of Greece proved to be a critical factor in the context of the British Mediterranean geo-strategy.

King *Constantine* (Kōnstantinos [Greek: Κωνσταντῖνος]) *I of the Hellenes* (1868-1923; Crown Prince 1868-1912, King of the Hellenes 1912-17 and 1920-22) – also known as Constantine XII or Constantine the Field-Marshal King [Greek: Basileus Kōnstantinos hō Stratēlatēs] – was the eldest son of King *George* (Geōrgios [Γεώργιος]) *I of the Hellenes* (born Prince *Wilhelm* [William] of Denmark from the House of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Glücksburg) and Queen *Olga* (born Grand Duchess *Olga Constantinova* of Russia from the House of Romanov). Constantine had been a graduate of the prestigious German Military Academy (Potsdam); he also had studied Political Science and Business at the Universities of Heidelberg and Leipzig. He was married to Princess *Sophie Dorothea Ulrike Alice* of Prussia, the very sister of Kaiser *Wilhelm II*. He ascended the throne in 1913, i.e. during the Balkan Wars and after his father, King *George I*, had been mysteriously assassinated in Salonika; and the Greek victories against the Ottoman Turks and the Bulgarians (1912-1913) rendered him worthy of the troops' adulation.

On the other hand, the then Prime Minister of Greece *Eleutherios Benizelos* (Ἐλευθέριος Βενιζέλος, 1864-1936) is an enigmatic character in the contemporary Greek history – not only because of the veil of secrecy that still surrounds the facts relating to his origin.⁶⁷ He dominated Greek domestic and foreign policy for the most part of the first half of the twentieth century. Modern Greek mainstream historiography glorifies him as the champion of parliamentary democracy and of Greek irredentism. He is commonly presented as an astute diplomat, a sharp mind and a great statesman, credited with the re-organization of the Greek Army and the happy outcome for Greece of the Balkan Wars (1912-13) – which is historically

⁶⁴ Driault; Lhéritier, 1926.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Marchesini (Markezinēs), 1978.

⁶⁷ Several assumptions have been made about the origin of Benizelos's name (Ben-i-zel, Beni-želi, etc.) For sure, "Ben-" is not a prefix for a Greek name. By the way, 'b' is pronounced 'v' in Modern Greek, hence the name is usually written 'Venizelos' in English.

completely false, for the re-organization of the Greek armed forces had already started in the early 1900s, i.e. long before Benizelos would come to power. In stark contrast to these, the 1922 Greek Catastrophe in Asia Minor is ascribed to his political foes (who were shot in November 1922). If truth be told, Benizelos was imposed on Greek political stage from outside; he had made his *début* as a politician on the island of Crete – then still part of the Ottoman Empire till 1912). He was pushed by the British Minister in Athens, *Sir Francis Elliot* in the aftermath of the 1909 *pronunciamento* issued by infantry officers of lower rank who had formed the *Military League* fearing a loss of status in the wake of the ground-breaking military reforms initiated by Crown Prince Constantine in his capacity as Inspector General of the Army, especially in view of Constantine's emphasis on sciences (artillery etc.) and the creation and special training of a separate team of Staff Officers to man the newly founded General Staff. The British Minister had by then more power in Athens than any Greek Prime Minister or even the King himself. King George I was afraid of losing his throne if Benizelos turned the Military League against him and the British decided to break up with him too (as they had done with George's predecessor, *Otto* of the House *Wittelsbach*, the first King of modern Hellas, some decades before).

As soon as the First World War broke out, King Constantine and PM Benizelos seemed to be in perfect agreement: the country should observe a benevolent neutrality towards the Anglo-French *Entente Cordiale*, for Greece was not in a position to come into conflict with a major maritime Power, namely Great Britain. On the other hand, the flush of triumph which already pervaded the German Imperial Army – mainly since the 1870-71 Franco-Prussian war – made problematic the outcome of the new war. As a result (and given that the country's highest interest was the preservation of gains in the Balkan Wars), neutrality was unanimously regarded by the Greek people as really a smart choice.

Yet, a couple of months later, everything began to change. As British and French men-of-war were about to attack *the Dardanelles*, the British Foreign Secretary, *Sir Edward Grey*, telegraphed to *Sir Francis Elliot*, the British Minister in Athens, instructing him to offer '*most important territorial compensation for Greece on the coast of Asia Minor*' (and that meant: in territories in which Hellenism has been active during its long history since the very birth of the Ionian culture – read Smyrna/İzmir) in return for Greek participation in the war on the side of the Entente. Of course, one might reasonably think of Cyprus, where the Greeks were some 80 per cent of the population; but Cyprus was British. It was easier to offer what belonged to others.

Benizelos stood for wholehearted allegiance of Greece to Britain (and, as a corollary, to France). He positively sought the opportunity for intervention; it was the policy of a *gambler* – and such policy would exercise a heavy impact on the *Greek-Orthodox* population living in the *Ottoman Empire*. For, in the first stage of the war, the Ottoman Greeks were not persecuted in the way the Armenians and Syrian Christians were, but once Greece joined the war against the Ottoman Empire, many Greek-Orthodox families were moved inland out of fear that they

would support *Entête* landings.

Benizelos's opponents – virtually, King Constantine and the entire political world of Greece – argued that in backing England to win the war, he was putting the fate of Greece at stake. They claimed that nobody could forecast the outcome of such a major European conflict. Moreover, whether or not the Entente Powers finally won, Benizelos did not take sufficient account of the immediate danger to Greek territorial integrity from Bulgaria – which had recently been defeated by Greece during the Second Balkan War (summer 1913) and was consequently dominated by a spirit of revanchism. Lastly, Benizelos's policy, which was no secret to the *Sublime Porte* or, worse, the *Young Turks*, exposed the large Greek-Orthodox population in Thrace and Asia Minor to certain persecution in the immediate future, against the uncertain hope of unification with the Kingdom of Greece after the war.⁶⁸

The difference in policy between PM and King reflected a difference of both psychology and political ideology. Benizelos's policy arose from complete obedience to the doctrine of “*The Protecting Powers*”, notably Great Britain. In terms of political ideology and domestic politics, Benizelos liked to present himself as a proponent of Western-style parliamentarism – despite the plain fact that he had been imposed on Greek political life through a military *pronunciamento* (August 1909), that his further political career would be shaped by another four military *coups* (1916, 1922, 1933, 1935) and that he would impose the first dictatorship in modern Greek history from 1917 to 1920 – and an extremely cruel one.

On the other hand, *Constantine* was a *soldier*, a military commander who was first taking care of his men, and an *enlightened monarch* – but not a gambler. His attitude to the war was negative, as it was the attitude of his General Staff (notably the Chief of Operations and later acting Chief of Staff *Iōannēs Metaxas*) or that of distinguished politicians such as the Member of Parliament (and later Prime Minister) *Dēmētrios Gounarēs* (born in Patras, Peloponnese, in 1867, he had studied law in Athens, Germany, France and England; an ardent proponent of social, political and economic reforms, and an admirer of the *Bismarckian* social laws; he would emerge as the leading political figure of the *anti-Benizelist* bloc) and Foreign Minister Professor *George Streit* (born in Patras in 1868, third generation born in Greece of a German family, he had studied law at the Universities of Athens and Leipzig). Some of them believed in 1915 that the most probable outcome of the war was either a *stalemate* or a German victory. But this belief did not lead them to favour cooperation with the Central Powers, which was ruled out by Greece's vulnerability to naval pressure from the British Mediterranean fleet. The clear choice for hardheaded anti-Benizelists was *neutrality*.

⁶⁸ These arguments and variations on them are deployed in the works of two emblematic figures of the anti-Benizelist camp: Streit, G., *Hēmerologion – Archeion* (Diary – Archive), 2 vols., Athens 1964-6 (see esp. ii, A) and Metaxas, I., *To prosōpiko tou hēmerologio* [The Diary of Iōannēs Metaxas], vols. ii and iii, Athens 1952, 1964.

The King was conscious of the responsibility which weighed on him as the Head of the Nation (and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army), but was less consistent, more subject than them to Benizelos's eloquence, and of course, more easily swayed by the romantic vision of a recapture of *Constantinople*, founded by *Constantine I* on May 11th, 330 AD and last defended by *Constantine XI Palaeologus* on May 29th, 1453. Eventually, Constantine's view of the matter was substantially influenced by the then acting Chief of Greek General Staff Colonel *Iōannēs Metaxas* who strongly opposed any notion of a Greek military expedition to Turkey. As early as in January 1915, Metaxas drew up for Benizelos a closely reasoned *memorandum*, which concluded that *it would be extremely difficult for any Power to establish itself permanently in western Asia Minor*. In Metaxas's pedestrian words, Asia Minor was "*a whole of which the parts are closely bound together geographically, economically, historically and ethnologically. It is difficult to divide this territory politically, without creating anomalies which, reacting on the economic and ethnological planes, will inevitably give birth eventually to friction which will lead to struggles for the reunification of these territories through the domination of one of them.*"⁶⁹

Metaxas supported this conclusion with a number of historical allusions, and pointed out that the Greek (Western Anatolian) zone would include an overwhelming majority of Muslim inhabitants. In fact, he said that *Asia Minor had "a great majority of Turkish population against a minority of Greek population"*; thus "*the essence of the Greek Kingdom would be perceptibly changed by our establishment there*"; further, "*its security and protection [of so extensive a territory] from internal reactions will devour almost the whole of the Greek army for many years*"; likewise, "*the rest of the state's means and resources will be devoured*"; hence over a long period of time "*our position in Europe will be weakened, which could prove disastrous if we were hit by the Bulgarians.*"⁷⁰

Based on a profound analysis of strategic-military, geopolitical, demographic, and even geo-cultural reasons, he developed his opinion indeed that such endeavour would end in a catastrophe.⁷¹ King Constantine completely shared his Chief of Staff's reasoning and dissented from the Prime Minister's opinion – on the ground that the interests of the country demanded that $\pi\tau$ should remain neutral. Benizelos remained totally unconvinced though; he resigned on 6 March 1915, after the King had refused to sanction his attempt to bring Greece into the war by contributing a division to the Entente expeditionary force at *Gallipoli*. The "*Ionian vision*" blinded him both to the military dangers of the action he proposed and to the ruinous effects such action would have on the destiny of the Greek-Orthodox population of the Ottoman Empire.⁷²

⁶⁹ Metaxas, vol. ii, 1952, pp. 386-90.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 391-2.

⁷¹ Dakin, 1972.

⁷² Llewellyn Smith, 1973.

Was Constantine, the legendary Soldier-King, adored by the overwhelming majority of the Greek people, an “agent” of the *Kaiser*? That was the thinking of the most influential leaders of the Entente; they believed that the King had missed no opportunity in serving his brother-in-law, namely *Wilhelm II*. The whole situation would soon reach a climax, when French troops would invade Attica in November 1916 and attempt to seize Athens. If truth be told, King Constantine was backed by almost the whole population of “Old Greece”, i.e. the traditional core population of the Kingdom, namely the Peloponnese, Mainland Greece, the southern part of Epirus, and the Cyclades islands. Interestingly, the peasantry and the middle social strata adored the Sovereign; and they wholeheartedly shared his thinking regarding the necessity of an authoritarian way of ruling. On the other hand, Benizelos enjoyed full support of the Greek *haute-bourgeoisie*, particularly of the notorious *compradors* of the Diaspora (Egypt, Romania, Turkey, etc.). More significantly, the King represented a threat to British interests – and should be neutralized by all means.

V. Finally, Benizelos broke off relations with his Sovereign. In late 1915, the Prime Minister crossed the *Rubicon*. For he invited foreign Powers’ (Entente) troops to land in *Salonika*. His justification was the prospect of Bulgaria’s entering the world war, as an ally of the Central Powers (put into effect on 12 October 1915). Yet the King dug his heels in on the issue and continued to have a neutralist attitude – unlike Benizelos who was going out of his clothes forcing the Greeks to get involved in the world war.

Be that as it may, shortly after the Entente troops’ landing in Salonika, the King sent for the Premier and demanded his resignation. The latter gave way but later stirred up a military *coup d’état* in Northern Greece, based on the large French and other Entente armies that had practically occupied Northern Greece, *de facto* abolishing Greek state sovereignty over those territories. Benizelos fled from Athens to Salonika and assumed the presidency of a “provisional government”. As a result, in 1916 there were two Greeces: the so-called Salonika one, i.e. [Greek] Macedonia, Crete and the islands of the eastern Aegean Sea and another with Athens as capital, composed of Epirus, Mainland Greece, the Peloponnese, Euboea and the Cyclades. The *National Schism* (Ethnikos Dichasmos [Ἐθνικός Διχασμός]) of the Greeks was now a fact.⁷³

In November 1916 French troops tried to *occupy* Athens, but they were repulsed by the *reservists* of the regular Army – an impressively large number of common ordinary people (workers, peasants, middle strata) of Athens, The Piraeus and the entire Attica who voluntarily took arms at once to defend their King and country. They were easily distinguished, because they were shabbily dressed. Significantly enough, the Sovereign’s bitterest enemies were counted among the

⁷³ Dalby, 2010.

biggest and most influential compradors and speculants both inside Greece and in the wealthy Greek communities in Orient and Western Europe.⁷⁴

The immediate consequence of the victory of the citizen-soldiers fighting for King and country was the severe *naval blockade* imposed on Southern Greece by British and French gunboats that inflicted a large number of casualties.⁷⁵ Many people died of *famine*. The unavoidable outcome occurred in May/June 1917; the Entente Powers demanded that King Constantine be removed. Against the will of his people, Constantine left Greece wishing to prevent his people from worse: French gunboats and artillery were about to completely destroy Athens and The Piraeus. Constantine escaped to Switzerland. Still, he did not abdicate but simply handed the reins of the Kingdom over to *Alexander* (Alexandros), his second son; for his elder son, *George* (Γεώργιος), i.e. the Crown Prince was regarded as openly pro-German.

VI. From June 1917 onwards, Benizelos ruled the whole of Greece as a dictator; he imposed upon Greece an *apparently parliamentary régime*, which in reality was a purely *despotic* one. His political dogma was clear-cut: “Greece can never progress, or even exist, as a free and independent state except by continued maintenance of the closest contact with the Powers that rule the Mediterranean.”⁷⁶

By this time the opposition had been deprived of its leading figures. A list of about thirty men whom Benizelos considered dangerously *Germanophile* had been prepared, including former PM Gounarēs and senior military officers *Dousmanēs* and Metaxas. These men were shipped to Corsica, where they remained under French supervision for the next two or three years. Another group comprising leading anti-Benizelist politicians was placed under police supervision. The men removed were considered hostile to the interests of Britain and France.

By a thorough and radical reshaping of the machinery of government and the public services, the *Benizelist régime* then attempted to sink deep roots and to eradicate the '*disease*' of *Constantinism*. The Government suspended the permanency of tenure of the judiciary and carried through a complete purge of its crops. The purge of the civil service extended widely. A decree suspended the permanency of all public servants of whatever branch or grade. Another permitted the demotion or transfer of any civil servant. University teachers, mayors, village presidents and other officials were made subject to the purge.⁷⁷ Some 3,000 army officers, another 3,000 Gendarmerie officers, and more than 7,000 civil servants

⁷⁴ Metaxas, II, n.d., pp. 645-646 (letter of Metaxas to his Wife Lela, Athens, 11/24 November 1920).

⁷⁵ Hypourgeion tōn Exōterikōn [(Greek) Ministry of Foreign Affairs], Diplōmatikon kai Historikon Archeion [Diplomatic and Historical Archive], Kybernēsis Thessalonikēs, Dossier A/7, letter of the Athens Medical Association to Spyridōn Lampros, Prime Minister of Greece, Athens, 10 April 1917.

⁷⁶ Dalby, 2010, p. 67.

⁷⁷ Malainos, 1957.

(half of whom were teachers) were fired. Even the *Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Greece* was not spared being as riven by schism as any other part of the nation. Thus parliament, the army, the Church and the public services were purged of their more important anti-Benizelist elements.

That same year 1917 Greece officially took the side of the Entente. Given that the overwhelming majority of the reservists of the Greek Army rejected any notion of Greece entering the Great War, while at the same time remaining loyal to their King, the Benizelos' government hardly managed to form three divisions – largely consisting of reservists from *Crete* – to fight for England and France. Unable to see that the populace did not at all want the war, Benizelos made extensive use of the *police-state* (for the first time in Greek history) created by him, to meet the apathy and even opposition of the Greek people; mostly though, his régime depended on the *ballonets* of the foreign (mainly French) occupation troops.

The followers of King Constantine, not only distinguished military officers, politicians or academics but also huge numbers of common ordinary people, suffered cruel persecution for their beliefs at the hands of Benizelos' *praetorians* (i.e. a clique of opportunist military officers plus the notorious *Cretan Gendarmes* and a militia named “*The Republican Battalions*” [Dēmokratika Tagmata]) or, worse, at the hands of the *French colonial troops*. Benizelos' Cretan praetorians, supported by the British *Royal Navy*, landed on the island of Naxos (Cyclades) and massacred the population of the most famous village of the island, namely *Apeiranthos*, because – despite naval blockade, famine and threats – they had remained loyal to King Constantine and refused to recognize Benizelos' government imposed by foreign armies and fleets.

For their part, the (mainly *Moroccan* or *Senegalese*) French troops seized large parts of Greek Macedonia and several islands, committing massacres, tortures, rapes and kidnappings of women and girls, and other atrocities on civilians.⁷⁸ As a corollary, in 1918, bitterness was prevalent among the Greeks; but Benizelos was still toying with the idea of an imminent Entente victory being enough to get all this forgotten.

At last, by the autumn of 1918, Benizelos had managed to build an army worthy of the name. Greek divisions were in the forefront of the massive Entente offensive of September 1918, which broke the Bulgarian front and eventually led to the collapse of the Central Powers and the sudden end of the Great War.

⁷⁸ Interestingly enough, no Greek government has ever confronted France with reparation claims for the atrocities, war crimes, and crimes against humanity committed by French troops during the French occupation of Greece. Similarly, there is not the least mention of the period of the Entente-occupation of Greece, or of the severe naval blockade imposed by the British Royal Navy and the consequent starvation of large numbers of Greeks, in public history and organized memory. The same enigmatic silence (there is a more appropriate term for this in the German language: “*Todschweigen*”) is the rule with regard to the Anglo-French blockade and occupation of Greece and the subsequent horrible famine in the years 1854-1857 – when *Otto von Wittelsbach* and the Greek people “had to be punished” for their pro-Russian attitude during the Crimean War.

VII. In November 1918 the *Great War* was over in Europe – this, at least, we have been told; and in 1919 a treaty between the winners and the defeated Germany was signed in *Versailles*, near Paris. But *by a strange twist of fate the war was to last for Turkey and Greece until 1922*. For on 29 April 1919, the British Prime Minister *David Lloyd George*, the French Prime Minister *Georges Clemenceau* and the President of the United States of America *Thomas Woodrow Wilson* mandated the Greek Army to occupy *Smyrna (Izmir)* in Asia Minor, which had been a part of the *Ottoman Empire* since the fall of the *Eastern Roman* (“*Byzantine*”) Empire.⁷⁹

Embarking on this Asia Minor Campaign was perhaps Benizelos’ gravest error; for, as Metaxas had explicitly warned since the beginning of 1915, *Greece could never hold territory in Asia Minor*.⁸⁰ Lloyd George, with no clear picture in his mind of a general Anatolian settlement, exploited the Italian *fracas* to press through the decision on the Greek landing in Smyrna *in secrecy and haste* in order to anticipate the acrimonious negotiations over Anatolia, which otherwise might have made a Greek landing impossible. The military experts, who disapproved of the decision⁸¹, were presented with a *fait accompli*. Lloyd George’s idea was based on a sense that *the new Greece under Benizelos was to be the carrier of British interests in the Eastern Mediterranean*. Still, the scruples of Clemenceau, the unreliability of the Americans, the resentment of the Italians, the caution of the military advisers, should have given warning that trouble was on its way.

In the meantime, General *Mustapha Kemal* Pasha had arrived in Erzurum and was organizing a Nationalist Congress there, in order to build up an armed nationalist movement. The British and French Commanders-in-Chief had stated that *it was impossible to subdue Kemal militarily*. And then *Benizelos* committed another error: *he declared the Greek Army able to have the upper hand in Anatolia*. He was terribly mistaken. As a matter of fact, in 1919 the Asia Minor *Moslems* were *exhausted* after eight years of practically uninterrupted war.⁸² Nevertheless, as Metaxas had correctly foreseen, once the Greek troops disembarked in *Smyrna* the Moslems were by no means ready to rise up in arms. Why so? Because the footholds gained in Anatolia by the French, the British and the Italians, the territories occupied by them would be evacuated someday; their final withdrawal was beyond any doubt. *But the Greeks had come to stay*; they never would give up the Asia Minor regions they managed to gain unless by force of arms. Almost any city and important village in Asia Minor had an ancient or mediaeval (Byzantine) Greek name, too. Thus the *Greek Campaign* in Asia Minor rapidly turned into a *struggle for existence* between two nations.

What came after is well known: the Greeks suffered a disaster in Asia Minor at the hands of the Turks (summer 1922). When the Greek army collapsed

⁷⁹ Zürcher, 1993.

⁸⁰ Dakin, 1972.

⁸¹ Callwell, vol. II, 1927.

⁸² The 1911-12 Italo-Turkish War; the Balkan Wars (1912-13); and the First World War (1914-18).

and its remnants retreated towards the sea, a large part of the Greek-Orthodox population of Asia Minor (between 400.000 and half a million), fearing Turkish reprisals, also fled. Thereafter, the *Treaty of Lausanne* – in fact, the "*Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations*" signed at Lausanne, Switzerland, on 30 January 1923, by the governments of Greece and Turkey – stipulated the compulsory population exchange between Greece and Turkey (Greek: *Ἡ Ἀνταλλαγὴ*, Turkish: *Mübâdele*). It involved more than 1,220,000 Greeks (actually, Orthodox-Christians) from Asia Minor, Eastern Thrace, the Pontic Alps [Black Sea region], Central Anatolia, and the Caucasus, and 350,000 Turks (in fact, Moslems) in Greece, most of whom were forcibly made refugees.⁸³

VIII. The Great Powers' influence on the security of Small States has not always been a positive one. Instead of promoting and safeguarding their security, it has often brought about tribulations, oppression, and misery.

That was the rule in South-Eastern Europe in Modern times. The *absurd* rupture between Russia and Germany in both World Wars meant terrible sufferings for the peoples of Eastern (and South-Eastern) Europe; and the major geo-strategic interest of the [Anglo-Saxon] Sea Power to keep the [Slavic] "*Heart-Land*" Power away from the *Archipelago's* littoral areas originated the trials of the Macedonian people during the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. In order to avoid this rule in the future, we must always bear in mind our common stock, our common history, our common culture.

It is all but a truism that, speaking in ethno- and geo-cultural terms, the peoples of South-Eastern Europe belong to the same "family": they are mainly *Slavs* – and "islets" in this Slavic flux, such as Magyars, Romanians, Albanians, and Greeks have been submitted to Slavic influence. Even Greece, despite any proclaimed tie with Classic Hellas, may be reasonably seen as a Slavic country. In point of fact, during the first millennium of our era, the classical soil of the Greek Peninsula was overrun by Slavs who, to tell the truth, met little resistance from the local population (for the latter was decimated by the plague).⁸⁴ Thus, the newcomers settled peacefully in the *Morea* (Peloponnese) and Mainland Greece, gave new vigour to the autochthonous dwellers, and finally proved to be the main defenders of their new country. Many toponyms (such as *Ezeros*, *Arahova*, *Levadia*, *Mystras*) bear testimony today to the saga of the Slav's mediaeval immigration into Greece. Besides, as far as Macedonia is concerned, the Slavic populations were so compact in the sixth century of our era as to produce the last imperial dynasty of a unified Roman Empire: The founder of that Imperial House, Emperor *Justin I* was born near Skopje. His nephew would prove to be far more significant, in terms of Roman, and European History, and of the History of Law: *Justinian I the Great* – perhaps the last truly Roman Emperor. By the way,

⁸³ *Ibid.*; also see Shaw, S.J. and Shaw, E.K., 1978.

⁸⁴ Kolias, 1969 (1948).

Justinian's name was *Upravda*.⁸⁵ And last but not least: there can be no doubt about the Slavic stock of one of the greatest, and most emblematic national heroes of the Greeks for centuries, i.e. *Constantine XI Palaeologus*, the last Emperor who was killed on the walls of Constantinople on the 29th of May, 1453.

In the light of the above, I hope you understand why I pointed out that we must always bear in mind our common stock, our common history, our common culture. To this I would like to add one more thing: our common future.

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⁸⁵ Christophilopoulou, 1975.

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NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES AND ASYMMETRIC THREATS

BASICS OF SECURITY PHILOSOPHY

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Abstract

Security studies development and scientific studies, i.e. *security study (asphaliology)*, can (and need) to be considered in three parallel and mutually related fields: *security training*, *security theory* (including the *subject, research methods and the language of the security sciences*) and *security philosophy*.

On that note, the greatest incentive in considering, defining and content writing for this thesis is the philosophical and scientific -research intention to establish the *basis of the security philosophy* as a special theoretical field/discipline, i.e. to establish and develop the basis for an exhaustive, critical and creative approach of thinking oriented to an ongoing development and promotion of a referential frame of chronological, current and anticipated knowledge of the being (*essence*) of security and its being (presented through the socially-secured existence of the human and other social subjects), as well as the idea and security values (as condition, value, need, interest, function, organization and system), including the knowledge of those elements which presence in reality is crucial, important and sufficient and determined for the human and other social subjects, their property, as well as their living and natural environment to be safe, protected or threatened.

In this thesis, *security philosophy* is based on a theoretical field, i.e. as a special theoretical discipline in growth and development, whereby it is structured as a *union of security ontology, security axiology, and security gnoseology, including security logics and security hermeneutics*.

Key words: security, philosophy, ontological dimension, axiological dimension, gnoseological dimension

1. INTRODUCTION TO ONE OF THE POSSIBLE WAYS OF PHILOSOPHY BASICS ESTABLISHMENT IN SECURITY AS A SPECIAL THEORETICAL DISCIPLINE

All natural and social studies, hence the security studies and scientific studies are established with philosophically determined basics which is classified in the theories of the being (existence) of the security aspects (*security ontology*), of the acknowledgement of the security approaches (*security gnoseology*) and the

validation and values of the security approaches (*security axiology*), whereby the being proposes the acknowledgment and the validation of the security approaches, and vice versa – the acknowledgement of the security studies presents the being and values the acknowledgment, just as the validation proposes the existence of the security approaches with a methodological and methodical opportunity for their acknowledgment. Taking into account the philosophical and methodological basics – social security and life-oriented practical issues of the people and other security related social subjects will be explained in a simple and synthesized way, using the verified and previously accepted philosophical formulation in which people are described as active creatures in the world they are living in (nature, society [and its members], technical systems and people themselves), mainly in three correlated and complex ways: *practical, valuable – normative and acknowledging*. Starting from this philosophical formulation, the human as a practical being and other social subjects (social groups, countries, unions), in the development and realization of their practical relations that are part of more complex social relations, change the social living conditions for themselves and for the others as well, striving to *change nature*. In *this process of change* (process of micro and macro changes generation), the human and other social subjects, based on their *needs*, among other sources and forms of social subjects, produce forms and sources of *threats and stimulation*, i.e. *achievement, maintenance and promotion (protection)* of their own security or security in general and of other social subjects, such as environmental security, security of certain geographically-physical areas and properties. The afore-stated development or bearing the ensuing consequences, or the practical action of stimulation and protection, i.e. achievement, maintenance, and security promotion, has its *axiological (valuable-normative) dimension* i.e. the human and other social subjects act rationally when it comes to security threats, stimulation and protection, on the basis of their own system of values, whereby they create, protect or threaten certain social –security values. In addition, the rational and relevant opinion and action of the human and other social subjects have their own *gnoseological (acknowledging) dimension*, i.e. equal opinion and research, with the exception of the fact that they want to get familiar with the world around them, and their place in it, they know the sources, the holders, shapes, varieties, object and consequences of security threats, acknowledging hence the methodology and the methodic research of the security approaches, and determining the methods of prevention, contradiction, discovery, improvement and vindication of the threats to the legal and moral normative values and interests of the human as an individual or a certain social group in a certain environment, as well as to countries, unions, alliances and the human being.

The abovementioned summarized and synthesized philosophical points of view are considered to be only a part of all elementary philosophical-security and living-rational issues of the relation between people and security, as well as a part of the *philosophical assumptions of the security studies and scientific disciplines*. Security and scientific studies development, i.e. the *security studies* – can (and

need to) be taken into account in three parallel and correlated fields: **security training**, **security theory** (including the *subject, research methods*, and the *language of security studies*) and **security philosophy**.

In addition, the views, arguments and content of this thesis are intended to establish and develop the basis of one *fundamental, profound, critical and creative opinion directed toward the ongoing development and promotion of the referential frame of chronological, current and anticipated knowledge* of the **importance** (*essence*) of security and its **being** (expressed through social – security existence of the human and other social subjects), as well as the **idea and the values** of security (such as condition, values, need, function, organization and system), including the **acknowledgment** of those elements which presence in reality is vital, important and sufficiently determined for the human and other social subjects, their properties, as well as their living environment to be safe, protected or threatened. The abovementioned directs to, and is part of the **establishment of diferencia specifica of security philosophy, as being different from security theory i.e. from the separate security studies and scientific studies (socially or specifically oriented)** which are *studies for the presence of (certain) threatening and stimulating approaches in a given time and space*, as well as from the **establishment of diferencia specifica of security philosophy and the method of the security studies, tactics and techniques of prevention, repression, research and clarification of criminal acts (crimes and offences), apprehension and imprisonment of the perpetrators and security treatment of the crime victims.**

Hence, in addition to the security science (*asphaliology*⁸⁶), whose primary goal is to acknowledge the security and which takes its scientific sources from the abundance of acts, processes, relations and work during the security creation and development and protection, security philosophy has been established with the same intention (but with different goals)⁸⁷.

Given the fact that for more than two and a half millennia, the lengthy developed and unified definition of *philosophy* has not been accepted, we rationally gave up the non-rational expectation that we will define the term of *security philosophy*; this rational cancelation produced and developed rational persistency in creating a temporary term of *security philosophy* which will enable in a methodological and correct way further use of the scope and content of this term;

⁸⁶ *Asphaliology* is a science that systemizes the existing knowledge and with the scientific – research methods, assumptions, techniques and instruments and verifies the scientific knowledge, establishes the educational laws and contributes to the improvement of human security training. For the abovementioned, as well as for the basic theoretical – methodological issues related to the definition of the term security study, i.e. *asphaliology*, please see: Цане Мојаноски, *За поимот наука за безбедноста (асфалиологија)*, Yearbook of the Faculty of Security, - Скопје, 2010. In the afore-stated thesis on Macedonian security studies, the term *asphaliology* has been proposed (and used) for usage for the first time.

⁸⁷ Цане Мојаноски, *Дилеми во дефинирањето на Методологијата на асфалиологијата*, Зборник на трудови од научно-стручната конференција „Безбедност, еколошка безбедност и предизвиците на Република Македонија” (Охрид, 17-18 септември 2010.), Универзитет „Св. Климент Охридски” – Битола, Факултет за безбедност – Скопје, Скопје, 2010., pages: 20-21

with the creation of this temporary term, the endless philosophical – security thinking process will not be terminated, but an attempt for a methodologically correct creation of new elements will be made and it is possible for them to contribute to the analysis of the current conception of *security philosophy*. Namely, *security philosophy*, in general, will be defined as a **fundamental, exhaustive, critical approach towards the continuous development and promotion of the referential frame of chronological, current and anticipated knowledge for the importance, the being, the idea, and the values of acknowledgement of the security reality in its totality, i.e. for the social, natural and technical completeness of the security aspects and their phenomenological, etiological and consequential dimensions, as well as its security establishment (as the condition, values, need, interest, function, organization and system) over the necessity, determination, continuity, development importance of the social security existence (being) of the human and the humankind as an appearance of its existence on the basis of fulfillment of its permanent, existential and naturally – social need of security.** Therefore, *security philosophy and security ontology, security axiology and security gnoseology*⁸⁸ including *security logics* (which also covers, the forms of *security estimation*) and *security hermeneutics* (security, language, interpretation and understanding; security language; meaning of the security terms; as well as interpretation of norms that regulates the security relevant relations).⁸⁹

In our view, **the subject of security philosophy** covers (ontological, gnoseological and axiological) sensuous and intellectual shapes of acquirement of **security scope and content in its temporal, spacious and content related tonality which incorporates its own specific and separate and individually selected integrity and embraces its own social, natural, psychological, technical, etiological, phenomenological and consequential dimensions** – including, inter alia, the creation and development of a security idea (such as a condition, a value, a need, an interest, a function, an organization and a system) as a rational result of the human sensuous and rational knowledge; security values; threatening factors; achievement, maintenance, development and improvement of the security (i.e. factors presented as: consequences, conditions and occasions), as well as ways of their accomplishment: stakeholders and types of security: i.e. specific (human) security, family security, security of the social groups in society, in the country, in the unions and o the entire international community; and the previous, current and future (hypothetical) constellations of security relevant relations, conditions and processes in the global and other social arenas. *Security philosophy*, inter alia, has exhaustive knowledge which is complementary, non-contradictory, but

⁸⁸ The basis of this approach to the establishment of the term *security philosophy* has been partially taken by: Владо Камбовски, *Филозофија на правото*, Македонска академија на науките и уметностите, Скопје, 2010, стр. 15

⁸⁹ Due to the limited space, this level of *security philosophy basics* establishment will not include any elementary explanation of the terms *security logics and security hermeneutics*.

qualitatively different from the existing scientifically verified knowledge of security.

2. Ontological security dimension

The basics of our philosophical analysis and synthesis of the security (as an idea, a condition, a value, a necessity, an interest, a function, an organization and a system) starts with the formerly known ontological fact that in practice, security is as old as the human kind. It developed with the *materialization of the human emotions and instinct of self – maintenance* (instinct of fear and the biological mechanism for organism existence)⁹⁰. It is also based on the assumptions that the *first estimations of the humans were very rational*, i.e. *life should first and foremost be safe* - food, heat, protection from natural disasters and escaping danger, were the *first goals of the mind*⁹¹. Previously determined anthropological assumptions state that the *need for protection, security and assurance is based on the basic natural laws of the existential fight* - which is the most reliable basis of the fact which implies the necessity of security and assurance as one of the *basic needs* of the human.⁹² In this ontological – security fact, **the being of the security and the idea of security** are expressed and they are in a causal relation with the **natural – social need of the human for security (individual/ singular security is included in social security)**, i.e. for **social – security existence (being) of the human in the socially shaped security reality**, as well as the **importance (essence) of security** (the human, tribe, group, municipality, the country and the world), i.e. the *essence* of security by which the differences of the **security occurrences** are determined, i.e. the security of other social appearances according to its importance, as well as their ontological relations and mutual influence. The afore-stated categories (which will be defined further on in the text) are considered to be **elementary philosophical – security theory categories** and they constitute the basis for the **categorical system of security philosophy, as well as for specific theory discipline.**

Pursuant to the assumptions that the first estimations and the first goals of the human mind were that life should first and foremost be safe, we will start the ontological establishment of security by defining the *idea of security*. Namely, the perception, *sense and visualization of the security appearances* are *sensuous*, and the term, the court, and the conclusion are *rational shapes of acknowledgement*, and therefore these two degrees of acknowledgement differ in quality and in

⁹⁰ Dillio, M.: *Politics of Security – Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought*, Routledge, London-NewYork, 1996, p. 17; Anžič, A.: *VarnostnisistemRepublikeSlovenije*, ČasopisnizavodUradnilistRepublikeSlovenije, Ljubljana, 1997., str. 35; во: Саша Мијалковић, *Национална безбедност*, Криминалистичко-полицијска академија – Београд, Београд, 2009., стр. 17

⁹¹ X. Ц. Блекхо, М. Кренстон, П. Фолкис, С. X. Хук, X. Г. Цац, М. С. Лори, Д. Мекреи, А. Квинтон, Н. Смарт, *Растежот на идеите*, Култура – Скопје, Скопје, 1995., стр. 11

⁹² ĐevadTermiz, SlavomirMilosavljević, *Analitika*, NIK Grafit, Lukavac, 2008, str. 343

correlation of their characteristics and cognitive value.⁹³ On the basis of the above mentioned, **the idea of security** will be defined as a **determined and basic term, undefined for other terms, which scope and content differ from the immediate sensual knowledge, i.e. they are noticed as a result of a combined theoretical and rational opinion founded on the socially-secure empirical definition or on its combination with theoretical materials which are directed to theoretical outcomes. This opinion can be creative, critical, exhaustive and directed towards developing an idea for the naturally social need of the human and his social security existence, as well as towards finding relations and establishing relations among security and other social, natural and technical aspects that enable the creation of a future knowledge module that will provide a solution for the rational and theoretical security issues/ problems.** However, *before-securing, meta-securing presents the idea of security and security values*, and without their knowledge and validation there cannot be functionality for the security theory and security practice, i.e. the scientific security studies and the organization and implementation of the security measures and activities cannot be functional. A crucial element of the educational interest of *security philosophy* is the idea of the security and its establishment. The starting phase of security relations, processes and conditions (which are not made only for the natural action!) is based on the assumption that the security relations, processes and conditions generated from social subject, are subjected to the idea of security. *Security philosophy* should identify and determine the rational reasons of the importance (essence) of security, i.e. – identification and determination of something that precedes the experience, i.e. something that precedes a certain security relation and process, the precise security condition of a certain referential object, as well as the formation of a certain security structure in society (or its individual elements) or the component of its security structure.

Security is a constitutional and immanent component of the human *praxis* and *dyspraxia*. From a philosophical point of view, *the human praxis* presents action, an activity which is valid and prolific for the human, as a way of human existence⁹⁴, i.e. an existence that from a security point of view will be defined as **social – security existence (being) of the human**. The existing term (in its scope and content) can be understood as an *appearance or shape of human's existence on the basis of the implementation of the natural social need of security, which shape of existence has its own image in a condition that is relative, but has enough absence of physiological, psychological and social failures crucial for the functioning of the human organism, as well as for the human's behavior oriented to meeting the lack of security.*⁹⁵ In theoretical construction, the term

⁹³ The psychological- scientific basis for the text mentioned above is taken from: Драган Крстић, *Психолошки речник*, ИРО „Вук Караџић” – Београд, Београд, 1988 год., стр. 198

⁹⁴ Arif Tanović, *Vrijednost i vrednovanje (prilog proučavanju aksiologije)*, Zavod za izdavanje udžbenika, Sarajevo, 1972., str. 16

⁹⁵ Definition of the *socially-secured existence of the human is taken by*: Гоце Аризанкоски, *Теоретски основи на Социологијата на безбедноста (обид за втемелување на нова научна*

social – security existence of the human, can be found as a **natural social need of security**, as a separate, crucial and essential element that is determined in the abovementioned definition with aspects accepted by some authors related to the explanations if security is a social or a natural need. However, just like some authors would argue, the activities that cover the knowledge and the skills of the society, individuals, groups and communities that make up that society, the culture and the civilization, their needs, as well as the ways of meeting such needs have been developed and changed.⁹⁶ In addition, it can be said that the basic physiological and existential needs are natural, but have been transformed in social needs. Their satisfaction remains to be a natural necessity, but the ways to meet such needs have become social (cultivated and civilized).⁹⁷ The basic needs, categorized as social security needs and assurance, can be defined as complex, mixed natural- social needs, and they are *met* in a mixed, naturally - social, individual and collective way.⁹⁸ We will point out that the usage of security can be dominant to the extent of taking the role of organizer of the entire human behavior.⁹⁹

*Socially-secured existence of the human happens in a **socially shaped security reality***, by which the entire *security content* in one *social space* or *system* can be understood, whereby they are all in condition of mutual influence of the elements in the social system within which they develop unbreakable links and relations.¹⁰⁰ In the theoretical construction of this term, there are theoretical elements of *secured contents*, which, are in fact **security aspects** discovered with precise safety of the society and with them can be easily understood **sensually-available shapes of mutual action of individuals or social groups as well as of their mutual action with the nature or the technical systems, by which consequentially there is threatening or stimulation of their physiological, psychological and social needs.**¹⁰¹

On the basis of the ontologically established definition of the *social security existence of man*, we will create one of the possible definitions of **individual/singular (human) security** which presents *basic categorical security concept formed* from the theories and rational constructions for security development and protection of the individual.

дисциплина во системот на науки), Годишник на Факултетот за безбедност, Факултет за безбедност – Скопје, Скопје, 2010, стр. 116

⁹⁶ Đevad Termiz, Slavomir Milosavljevič, op. cit., str. 345

⁹⁷ ibidem

⁹⁸ ibidem

⁹⁹ That mechanism is clearly included in the studies of the neurosis, and it is socially expressed in situations of panicking, disasters or war. Cited from: Ivan Kuvачić, *Ljudske potrebe i društvene vrijednosti*, Reviju za sociologiju, 1976. god., VI. br. 1 (ožujak), str. 9, Odsjek za sociologiju, Filozofski fakultet - Zagreb

¹⁰⁰ The definition of the social security reality is taken from: Гоце Аризанкоски, op. cit., стр. 113

¹⁰¹ The definition of the security aspects is taken from: Гоце Аризанкоски, op. cit., стр. 113

Namely, **individual/singular (human) security** is defined as **current (temporary) or relatively permanent (longitudinal, extended) individual, optimally-qualitative, established, sustained, i.e. improved and developed functional-beneficial condition of man in which he meets his social natural need of security and he exists in a precise socially shaped security reality, i.e. in a certain social, national and international environment, as a result of sufficient absence of physiological, psychological and social shortages that are crucial for the functioning of man and man's organism, i.e. as a result of sufficient and optimal protection of certain precise or potential social, natural and technical threats (challenges, risks and threats) in his psycho-physical status, and his moral and healthy integrity, after his material – existential status, and his commonly accepted and standardized freedoms and rights, as well as his legitimate values and interests.** Throughout the general and security history of humanity, security has been transformed and modified from its primary and individual (self)protective behavior into collective (group, tribal, social, national and international) protective action (function)¹⁰², so correspondingly we will say that human security is integrated in the **social security**, which presents a precise and potentially changeable situation in certain social security space where there are consequences because of the influence of the social, natural and technical threats and stimulations, that are not existentially threatened, but they stimulate the social development and protection of the social values, whereby the members of society have elementary, real and relatively possible ability to achieve and protect their values, needs, interests, freedoms and rights which can be found in a certain generally accepted and recognized frame.¹⁰³

Contrary to the praxis, *dispraxia*, from a philosophical point of view, means a bad thing, trouble or something that is considered to downgrade man – from the aspect of values, rejection of his essential abilities on the level of human actions as informed, free and purposeful activities by human measurement to change the world¹⁰⁴, i.e. from a security aspect, it includes, inter alia, the threats of common and justified human freedoms, rights, values, goods and interests - or threats to a precise referential object of the security (individual, social groups, countries, unions and the entire international community). Based on the fact that all segments of human life may be threatened with a certain degree of probability, we determined the following precise frame of concept of human threats as an individual for the philosophically - scientific needs of structuring this thesis:¹⁰⁵ **1) *physical threats*** - physical harm, including life deprivation; **2) *psychological - emotional threats*** - non accepting, disabling, not responding to emotions, denial, frustration of the positive emotions related with the family, with the close people,

¹⁰² Саша Мијалковић, op. cit., стр. 17

¹⁰³ The definition of social security is taken from: Гоце Аризанкоски, op. cit., стр. 114

¹⁰⁴ Arif Tanović, op. cit., str. 16

¹⁰⁵ The basis for the frame convention on threats is taken from: Đevad Termiz, Slavomir Milosavljević, op. cit., str. 352-353

to the local group (neighbors, coworkers, colleagues and etc.), the nation and people in general; **3) *psychological - intellectual threats*** – a failure to create an adequate system of opportunities for education and teaching through disorder and diffusing of self consciousness and veneration of the autochthonic values and etc.; **4) *orientation - value threats*** – a threat to the existing system of values and imposition of other value-oriented systems; **5) *interest - economic threats*** – the legal and moral threats to the allowed acquirement and material goods management, their creation and materialization of the knowledge, skills and creative abilities; **6) *threats to the realization of the needs, freedoms, rights and abilities in the scope of work and labor*** - and enabling the development and growth of human abilities, as well as their free manifestation; infringement of a part or of the total value of people's work results; enabling a free organization and coalition of working with others; as well as free alignment because of the work-related data protection; and **7) *threats to the information -communication field*** – preventing or impeding the gathering, release and achievement of information and communications; as well as the selected, shortened and prevented, or false information, which can cause a threat to the psycho-physical, health and moral integrity of man and disabling his proper behavior, opinion and conclusion.

3. Gnoseologic security dimension

Security has its own educationally-logical dimension that presents relatively objective¹⁰⁶ and studied, reasonable and intuitive knowledge of these aspects, relations and processes whose presence in reality is crucial, ongoing and important for a certain referential object to be secure, protected or threatened (insecure). Regarding the *gnoseological dimension of security*, the *tonality and the unification of the studied, rational and intuitive knowledge* are very important, and it will enable the establishment of creative, precise, coherent, exact, empirically trusted and rationally useful knowledge. Moreover, we will point out that ***the security in social frames is total***, i.e. each social process, or condition is generated by a social subject or natural action, which is directly or indirectly characterized by *security relevance*.¹⁰⁷ Active, current and past (direct and indirect) security-relevant aspects, relations, conditions and processes can structure *creative security empiricism* for which a philosophically-scientific analysis, synthesis and generalization in direction of theoretical assertion, needs a *rational (exhaustive, critical and creative theoretical and practical) opinion*, which, in its turn, has a fully educational value and its practical usefulness is acquired with empirical assurance¹⁰⁸. The rational opinion is needed to enable the social communication of adequate language phrases

¹⁰⁶ *Total objectivity is not possible because the acknowledgment process of security depends on the subjective elements: senses and properties of the human nervous system, language, different prejudice and etc. Adapted on the basis of: Momčilo Sakan, Pojam i filozofske pretpostavke Irenologije, Svarog, časopis za društvene i prirodne nauke, br.1, 2010., str. 41*

¹⁰⁷ Written according to: Гоце Аризанкоски, op. cit., стр. 113

¹⁰⁸ Part of the basis is taken from: Momčilo Sakan, op. cit., str. 42

which refer to established knowledge and security results. *The intuitive knowledge* participates in the unification of the empirical and rational knowledge that prevails in the preliminary phase of the research and security knowledge, and the value of that type of knowledge depends on the previous practical experience of the knowledge and complexity of security and the difficulty to understand it.¹⁰⁹

Although the *philosophical assumptions* cannot be studied with educational methods whose usage will define their truthfulness or falseness, i.e. they cannot be checked empirically¹¹⁰, but still without their presence, development and educational usage the security aspects cannot be thought or created. The value of the philosophical assumptions can be determined only through their consequences.¹¹¹ Security philosophy should for research its subject matter by using the ***philosophical, speculative method***, but also by using ***security studies methods***, adapted to the cognitive nature of the research subject matter. With respect to the access to its subject, *security philosophy* becomes closer to philosophy, and according to its method - towards philosophy and security studies.¹¹² Although *security philosophy* does not primarily produce its knowledge in an inductive way and by applying the empirical method, but in a deductive way¹¹³ – starting from the ideas of security which, as a result of the human mind, i.e. the development of an idea of rational, creative, critical and exhaustive (theoretical and rational) opinion directed to ideal module creation for theoretical and rational security issues solution, *security philosophy* is not a purely philosophical discipline, because the completeness of the security aspects encompasses the theoretical and practical elements of threats, on the one side, and the theoretical and practical elements of the achievement, protection, maintenance and promotion of the security of the referential object on the other side.¹¹⁴

4. Axiological security dimension

Values present main criteria which serve as the basis for establishing human, local, social, national, regional and international security, not only as levels of security, but as security concepts based on different security systems as well.¹¹⁵

¹⁰⁹ Adapted point of view on the basis of: Momčilo Sakan, op. cit., str. 42

¹¹⁰ "The empirical study cannot be established by itself and therefore it is forced to be established on different assumptions. Alienation of those assumptions can rise into Philosophy withdrawal... The scientific mind cannot be moved without the philosophical mind. Only the studies that function on the basis of these assumptions is a study that is aware of itself. Without the assumptions we cannot think and we cannot plan our life." Stated according to: Šušnjić Đ., *Metodologija*, Čigoja, Beograd, 1999., str. 24; во: Momčilo Sakan, str. 35

¹¹¹ Momčilo Sakan, op. cit., str. 35

¹¹² On the basis of: Владо Камбовски, op. cit., стр. 25-26

¹¹³ Adapted on the basis of: Владо Камбовски, op. cit., стр. 26

¹¹⁴ ibidem

¹¹⁵ Inspired by: Зоран Драгишић, *Безбедност и вредности*, Српска политичка мисао, бр. 4/2009, год. 16, vol. 26, стр. 181

From an axiological aspect, i.e. from the aspect of *security axiology*, there are legitimate views according to which security can be determined by means of a clarified and precise *axiological approach* expressed through the definition of the **social security values** by which lato sensu means *occurrences from the social security practice which sense and goals consist of meeting the security requirements of the human being*. Security, inter alia, can mean an **interest** to protect personal and collective goods, but also a warning about possible disorders of the social values that are adopted.¹¹⁶ According to our derivative conception¹¹⁷, in addition to the familiar fact which states that security is an open term and depends on the changes of the circumstances, the time and place include and exclude certain new and some "old" values¹¹⁸, such as **permanent and universal social security values** that will be categorized as follows: **1) existence of the human kind; 2) healthy living conditions; 3) security and protection of the human rights and freedoms of the citizens; 4) living environment protection; 5) peace; 6) order; and 7) security and protection in the forms of social awareness (moral, religious, traditional) of appearing shapes of security- threatening transformation in pathologic collective awareness.**

The term security is correlated with values, hence, among the numerous attempts to define security, the definition of Arnold Wolfers, which is considered by many experts as a "standard" in this field, defines security through values: "Security measures, in an objective way, the absence of threats of the acquired values, while in a subjective way it presents the absence of fear and affection of those values"¹¹⁹. Securitization of the values presents a process by which certain social values are placed in the focus of the security studies, and consequentially, in the security strategies, while non-securitization is a process of excluding the values which have meaningful implications of the total security condition of a specific referential object.¹²⁰ Regarding security axiology, in terms of its essential meaning, it is *the person* who has the authority and power to articulate the values and to organize their protection.¹²¹

¹¹⁶ Цане Мојаноски, *За поимот наука за безбедноста (асфалиологија)*, op. cit, стр. 16

¹¹⁷ Our concept of elementary socially-secured values is theoretically constituted on the basis of our thoughts and the security in its own basis and concepts is consisted in other authors whose points of view are accepted partially. In that direction, inter alia, we consulted the order of the world interests of *Brown*, во: Dragan Simić, *Nauka o bezbednosti - savremenipristupibebednosti*, JP Službeni list SRJ – Beograd, Fakultet političkih nauka – Beograd, Beograd, 2002., str. 54

¹¹⁸ Dragan Simić, op. cit., str. 30

¹¹⁹ Wolfers Arnold, *National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol*, John Hopkins UP, Baltimor, 1962; во: Зоран Драгишић, op. cit., стр. 182

¹²⁰ The basis of this paragraph can be found in: Зоран Драгишић, op. cit., стр. 181

¹²¹ The fundament of this paragraph is established on the basis of: Билјана Ванковска, *Меѓународна безбедност: критички пристап*, Филозофски факултет – Скопје, 2011., стр. 16

5. Conclusion

This thesis presents the essential assumptions of one of the possible ways of establishing the *philosophy basics of security* as a special theoretical discipline with exhaustive knowledge presented as *complementary, non-contradictory, but with different quality from the existing and verified knowledge of security*, whereby we selected the following perceptions:

1. *Security philosophy*, is generally defined as a **fundamental, exhaustive, critical and creative approach of thinking towards the continuing acquirement and promotion of the referential frame of the chronological, current and anticipated knowledge of the being, idea, values and knowledge about the security reality in its totality, i.e. for the social natural and technical completeness of the security aspects and their phenomenological, etiological and consequential dimension, as well as security establishment (like a condition, value, need, interest, function, organization and system) on the importance, determination, continuance, relevance and development of humanity as an occurrence of its existence on the basis of meeting its requirement for a permanent, existential and natural social need of security.**

2. *Security philosophy* presents an integral approach of thinking directed to the ongoing acquirement and promotion of a referential frame of knowledge which is structured as an *ontological unity of security, security axiology and security gnoseology including the security logics and security hermeneutics.*

3. As *elementary philosophically-secured theoretical categories* which present *the basis for the constitution of the system categorization of security philosophy as a specific discipline* we define: 1) **natural social human security need**; 2) **social security existence (being) of man in humanity**; 3) **importance (essence) of security**; 4) **idea of security**; 5) **socially shaped security**; 6) **security occurrences**; 7) **individual /separate security**; 8) **social security**; 9) **social security values**; and 10) **educationally-logical dimension of security**, i.e. **relatively objective and combined unity of empirical, rational and intuitive knowledge in security relevant aspects, relations, conditions and processes.**

4. **The subject of security philosophy** covers (ontological, gnoseological and axiological oriented) sensual and reasonable shapes of knowledge of the *scope and content of security in its time, space and content tonality which presents one integrity with its own special and separate goals, and this tonality has its own social, natural, psychological, technical, etiological, phenomenological and consequential dimensions* – including the security idea development and creation (as a condition, value, need, interest, function, organization and system) like a thoughtful process of human sensual and reasonable knowledge; security values; factors of threats, achievement, maintenance, development and promotion of

security (i.e. factors expressed as: reasons, conditions and occasions), as well as the ways of their knowledge; stakeholders and types of security: i.e. individual (human) security, family security, security of social groups, of society, of the country, of alliances and of the entire international community; and the former, current and future (hypothetical) constellation of secured relevant relations, conditions and processes in the global or other precise social space.

5. *The security philosophy* should research its subject by applying the **philosophical, speculative method**, but with appliance of **security study methods** urgently adapted to the existing nature of the subject of research.

6. The knowledge and the respect of the scientific usage of the *philosophical assumptions* of the security studies, i.e. to the *security philosophy* presents a basic prerequisite in the process of scientific research of the security aspects, as well as in the rational implementation of certain security measures and activities. Consequentially, every researcher in the field of security in general, besides the fact that he/she needs to have different types (prerequisites) of the subject, theory, method of research, language and security studies, also needs to have acquired prerequisites in the field of *security philosophy* (but other *studies and scientific disciplines which belong to other scientific fields, areas and phases*) with their security-educational usage will enable complex and rational approach during the research of the security aspects. Hence, we will conclude that **there is scientific, social and educational justification for the establishment of Security philosophy as a special and authentic theoretical discipline.**

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THE ROLE OF NON-SECURITY ACTORS IN THE GLOBAL SECURITY

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Abstract

This paper is a critical review of the role of non-security actors in the global security. The starting assertion is the need of a straight-forward rectilinear action which would impede the space for canalizing illegal or unlawful governance in order to avoid the unnecessary accumulation of power by the non-state actors, as an aspect which could later imply application of power exclusively by imposing. Nowadays, the thesis for balance lead by the fundamental postulates of state-building and development of relations is a subject of serious theoretical criticism. In this context, the institutional framework is imposed as a base for building security rather than the informal and non-institutional mechanisms for imposing security in the globalized world. The elaboration of the non-state security actors in this paper contains two elements: first, the factors influencing the global security are analysed, and second, the security threats are also analysed in order to establish the possible consequences which would implicate on global security.

Key words: *security, global security, security threats, security environment, non-security actors, non-state elements.*

1. INTRODUCTION

Security is a global public benefit. Yet, it is considered that there is a divergence on the notion of security, regarding the facts that security as a function and a goal is not solely related to the traditional bearers of its provision and maintenance, such as the army, the police or the intelligence agencies, neither it only affiliates the state with its institutions. Furthermore, the threats are not only counterpoised by outside attacks from other countries or other types of entities. It involves much more than that concept, as the security evolves along with the demands of the societies.

In this direction, it is important to emphasize that the involvement of the non-security actors in the global security arena has a dual role and consequence: on one hand, the emergence of the non-security actors in the global security affairs has contributive, affirmative role, stemming from the real necessity imposed by the contemporary risks, trends and challenges; on the other hand, it can have a less successful impact, which means that it could destabilize the currently established state-centered order and subsequently, leave negative social consequences. It could put in question the capacity of the state institutions to manage the security risks and challenges, creating an environment in which the non-state non-security actors may exceed the powers and authorizations of the state institutions, or may avoid scrutiny and accountability for misconduct.

As security develops numerous dimensions, such as international security, regional security, societal security, environmental security, human security, etc., so do the actors which are involved in the process of enabling these security aspects.

Hence, it could be stated that security is a lot more than the absence of an armed conflict. It is rather the safety of the municipalities, schools, and all institutions; the access to clean water and air, and non-polluted environment; healthcare provisions, employment, and retirement opportunities in the community; it is also the traditional provisions of security which imply the rule of law, crime detection and protection; preserving the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the national interests; anti-terrorist measures, etc., provided by the classical security actors, the police and the army, the intelligence agencies and the bodies which support the function of the above mentioned.¹²²

In these discourses occurring on a global scale, the notion of security is shifting towards some alternative actors that will provide security. Some of them are old and some are new, regarding their existence in the past or their emergence in contemporary settings. For instance, the private corporations, which hire professional armed personnel, can be perceived as a centuries old vocation, and the non-governmental organizations counterpoise a contemporary social setting when it

¹²² Engleheart, A., N.: Non-State Armed Groups as a Threat to Global Security: What Threat, Whose Security? *Journal of Global Security Studies*, 2016. 1[2].

comes to resolving different issues.¹²³ Subsequently, the actors that are engaged in this process vary on their nature, their means of founding, their authorities and powers, as well as their mandate and their scrutiny.

Since the world faces new-age threats which erode national borders and can easily have the spilling effect, including situations such as pandemics, mass exodus and migrant crisis, global warming and resource scarcity, a vacuum space has been created; this led the way for new mechanisms in facing these issues.

2. OBJECTIVE FACTORS: RISKS AND THREATS ON SECURITY

In the security policy theory and studies, ‘threat’ is used both as a political term and a scientific concept, which remains undefined in many social science dictionaries. Robertson (1987) used the concept ‘threat assessment’ as an analysis of “the reasons behind an opponent’s armament programmes” that was often made during the Cold War “on a worst case basis”, where “besides personnel and hardware totals” the opponent’s strategic doctrine also had to be taken into account.

Security threats, (Buzan, 1983) define the state’s insecurity and designate the agenda for national security. These threats require the understanding of the state’s vulnerabilities.

Weapons development, as a combination of capabilities and intentions, is semi-independent on threats. Dealing with specific threats, an international security strategy focuses on “the sources and causes of threats, with the purpose not to block or offset the threats, but to reduce or eliminate them by political action.

Ever since the middle of the 20th century, there were standpoints that national security is an ambiguous notion (Wolfers, 1952), and the classical realistic definitions describe security as the absence of objective dangers, i.e. of security threats, challenges, vulnerabilities, and risks, as well as subjective fears or concerns, and to the perception thereof.

Hence, from a realistic perception, the objective notion of security is reached when the dangers imposed by various threats, challenges, vulnerabilities and risks are avoided, prevented, managed, coped with, mitigated, and adapted to by individuals, societal groups, or state, regional, or global international organizations.

From a social-constructivist standpoint, security is reached once the perception and fears of security threats, challenges, vulnerabilities, and risks are allayed and overcome.¹²⁴

While objective factors in the security perception are necessary, they are not sufficient. Subjective factors influence security perceptions as well.¹²⁵ The

¹²³ Krahmann, E.: *New Threats and New Actors in International Security. NGO’s As Security Actors*, 2005. Palgrave Macmillan.[Available online]: <https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9781403966971#aboutAuthors>

¹²⁴ Brauch, H., G.: *Concepts of Security Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks. HSHES, Volume 5*, 2011, Springer.

¹²⁵ Degaut, M.: *What is Security?.* *Revista Brasileira de Inteligência.* 9, 2015. p. 9-28.

perception of security dangers depends on the mindset of policymakers and on the standpoints or traditions of the professionals, analysts and experts. Influenced by these world views and mindsets, security is a concept of peace and conflict research which strives to successfully manage the tasks emanating from these objective threats, vulnerabilities, challenges, and risks (Albrecht/Brauch 2008, 2009). For instance, the concept of threat identification and eradication, as a base for military planning and legitimating military programmes, has drastically altered since 1990, especially in many NATO countries.

As an example, private military contractors (PMCs) enlisted by both governments and maritime shipping companies to combat piracy in strategic waterways like the Gulf of Guinea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Strait of Malacca have been accused of playing a destabilizing role in the regions where they operate. Much like maritime militias and vigilantes, this is in large part due to the lack of accountability regarding how PMCs work. This legal ambiguity has prompted a pushback from some governments, putting in question the role these non-state actors play in the outcome effect.¹²⁶

The threat from nuclear ballistic missiles attacks had resurrected and remains a top priority as the “second Cold war” as many call it, and it is unraveling, in parallel with the shift of balance of the power among the super forces, leaving behind a security vacuum. Keeping the science and technology edge in order to deter adversaries and defend the allies, demands unifying efforts with many manufacturing companies, consulting enterprises, and the industrial complex.¹²⁷

The reporting of the NATO defence expenditure has four categories: expenditure on equipment, on personnel, infrastructure, and other expenditure in deterring among others, non-state actors threatening maritime and global security.¹²⁸

In parallel with the widening of the security concept from the traditional military and diplomatic security toward the new economic, societal, and environmental dimensions, the threat concept has also broadened and has been applied to a series of new threats, not only to the state but also to the other referents of new security concepts, varying from human security to global security.

Based on the quoted definitions, there are six groups of threats, risks, vulnerabilities and challenges that will challenge the world in the following years:

- economic and social threats, including poverty, infectious diseases, and degradation of the eco environment;
- conflicts between states;

¹²⁶ Pryce, P.: The Evolving Role of Non State Actors. Canadian Armed Forces. August 31, 2016. [Available online] <http://natoassociation.ca/the-evolving-role-of-non-state-actors/>

¹²⁷ Thomas, J.: The New Era of Non-State Actors: Warfare and Entropy. Small Wars Journal. [Available online] <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-new-era-of-non-state-actors-warfare-and-entropy>

¹²⁸ NATO Science and Technology: Maintaining the Edge and Enhancing Alliance Agility. NATO Parliamentary Assembly. 18 November, 2018.

- internal conflicts including civil war, genocide, and other large scale violence;
- nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological weapon
- terrorism; and
- international organized crime.¹²⁹

Based on the data of the High-Level Panel on threats, challenges and change of the UN, beside the 3% increased per capita income, the number of people living in extreme poverty exceeds 100 million (there is a recorded decline in at least 54 states). Every year 11 million children die from curable diseases. Hence, we might say that...”poverty is the primary cause for inequality between people. When on the problem with poverty the ethnic and regional inequality is added, respectively the urbanization and unemployment, a basic formula for a possible emergence of civil violence is created.”¹³⁰

Beside poverty, in the last three decades, the world recognizes the emergence of new infectious diseases, revival of the old diseases and also spread of diseases resistant on the existent antibiotics.¹³¹

Apart from the small number of international conflicts between the states in the last 60 years, we cannot be sure that they disappear as a threat on the international peace and security. On the contrary, the unsolved regional disputes in parts of Asia and the Middle East further continue to counterpoise an international threat. On one hand, the rivalry in some regions stimulates and aggravates international wars, making them more difficult to resolve. Wars and the existent instability in Iraq and Palestine stimulate the extremism more and more in part of the Muslim and the Western world. This issue is complex and multidimensional, whereupon if the danger is left unstopped - it deepens.

On the other hand, the contemporary internal conflicts are characterized by an “increased level of criminalization and commercialization”. This particularly refers to conflicts in states where in “criminal warfare”, non-state and irregular actors are included. Also, the war conflicts appear in the shape of “organized crime”, and as a consequence, the governments of the weak states are destroyed rebels with criminal records. A characteristic of these conflicts is the increased percentage of killed civilians and the increased number of child soldiers.¹³²

The possibility of incident or planned use of weapon of mass destruction counterpoises a hazard for inflicting damages on nature, and human casualties with catastrophic scales. According to the High-Level panel, the threat from spread of this kind of weapon is detected in the possibility to divert the nuclear program by

¹²⁹ United Nations Department of Safety and Security. Risk Management, [Available online] <https://www.un.org/undss/content/risk-management-0>

¹³⁰ Georgieva L., Menadjiranje na rizicite. Filozofski fakultet, Skopje, 2006. p. 105.

¹³¹ Burniske, J., Modirzadeh, K., N., Lewis, A., D.: Armed Non-State Actors and International Human Rights Law: An Analysis of the Practice of the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly. Harvard Public Law Working Paper, 2017 no. 17-37.

¹³² Georgieva L., Menadjiranje na rizicite, Filozofski fakultet, Skopje, 2006 p. 107-108.

the state or the member states of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in some other state, or disintegration of that treaty.

Terrorism invades the values that counterpoise the foundation of the Charter of the UN; the respect of human rights; rule of law; warfare regulations that protect the civilians; tolerance between people and nations, and peaceful conflict resolutions.¹³³

Terrorism finds a fertile soil in environments where there is despair, humiliation, poverty, political injustice, extremism and violation of human rights, and in environments with regional conflicts and foreign occupations. That makes it possible for terrorism to profit by states with a weak capacity for establishing and sustaining the order and the justice.

Beside the above mentioned threats, international organized crime can be considered as one of the most dangerous threats on the international peace and security with a reason that it is a chain that unites all the threats and counterpoises a system for their instigation. According to the High-Level panel, international organized crime is a threat for states and societies that endangers human security, as well as the basic responsibilities of the states in the implementation of law and order. Dealing with international organized crime has a double role in the decline of the immediate threat over the states and the human security, taking necessary steps in the efforts of prevention and dealing with the internal conflicts, prevention from the spread of armament, and prevention from terrorism.¹³⁴

3. FORECASTING GLOBAL TRENDS IN MANAGING SECURITY RISKS AND THREATS: STATE AND NON-STATE RESPONSES

The traditional focus of the security studies relies on the fundamentals of war and peace matters between the states (Mearsheimer, 2001).¹³⁵ Still, the disputes among sovereign nations remains high in the international relations as a central referent objects, even though there are specific dimensions of both national and international security which need to be addressed with non-traditional solutions.

More precisely, in contemporary settings, in accordance with the current global security trends, which depict both local / regional occurrences (regional conflicts, diplomatic disputes, economic pressures, etc.) and worldwide matters (mass migration, global warming, terrorist threats and possible cyber attacks, etc.) the actors called upon to offer a solution and provide assistance represent a sum of institutions, agencies, corporations, bodies, groups and individuals as stakeholders and influencers on the global trends in security. Such actors include:

¹³³ A more secure world: Our shared responsibility, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, United Nations 2004.

¹³⁴United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases. Security Council > 8364th Meeting [Available online] <https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13528.doc.htm>

¹³⁵ Kruck, A., Schneiker, A.: *Researching Non-State Actors in International Security: Theory and Practice*. Routledge Critical Security Studies Series. Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. London & New York.

- Rebel groups;
- Warlords;
- Militias;
- Terrorist cells;
- Criminal groups;
- Private military and security companies (PMSC's);
- Business enterprises;
- NGO's.

Subsequently, in parallel with these trends of imperilment, in order to scope the new trends toward managing the security issues, these seven aspects can be designated in order to analyze the concept of non-state security actors involved in providing security:

- governance;
- legitimacy;
- self-regulation;
- integration and implementation;
- differences;
- accountability;
- confidence.

Every aspect has significance in the shaping of the function and disposition of the non-state actors involved in providing security. Non-state actors can be categorized by their contributing role in security, and include industry, trade, laboratories, researchers, academia, and other non-governmental organizations associated with security matters. It is significant to emphasize that the engagement of the non-state actors in the field of security is enforced and regulated with government's legislation accordingly, in mechanisms such as public-private initiatives and partnerships, and are subjected to scrutiny by the government's bodies for their conduct.¹³⁶

Another definition and division of the non-security actors engaged in the security sphere categorizes these entities based on their origin, evolution and interplay. By this definition, the non-state, respectively non-security actors that are involved in global security affairs can be divided in three main categories, which do not include media, academia, or similar independent research institutes:

- non-governmental organizations (NGO's);
- inter-governmental organizations (IGO's);
- transnational corporations.

Each of these three entities has their significant role in the society in dealing with the security matters. Their presence and magnitude vary depending on their

¹³⁶ Lak, M.: Governance in the International Security Arena: A Role for Non-State Stakeholders as Co-Providers of Security. Netherlands Institute for International Relations, 2009. Clingendael, the Hague.

power and authorities, as well as their budgets and resources, their specific field of activity and their mandate.¹³⁷ Their emergence as prominent actors in global security can be tracked from the national laws, standards, international norms and regulations, and local entrepreneurship.

In many of the national strategies of the countries and white papers on security, the scope of the security notion is widened and broadened, and incorporates various threats and challenges which exceed the classical military engagement and include softer security threats; this, if not addressed and mitigated properly, may escalate into serious security threats which will eventually demand a military solution.

The official documents of the countries which regulate the functioning and maintenance of the security affairs include economic aspects of security and stability, environmental threats, urban crime increase and cyber attacks, which demand a response from various institutions not immediately linked to the security complex.¹³⁸

The legitimacy of the non-security actors that are increasingly immediately engaged in the security affairs on a state level derives from these official governmental documents.¹³⁹ In this context, it is necessary to state that the standpoint which calls upon the non-security actors as additional factors that destabilize the current situations and in some cases invigorate even deeper security gaps or stronger conflicts.

In summary, all of these elaborated facts and figures make our world more secure and more dangerous in the same time. It is more secure because the security environment is more enriched than ever, it incorporates many aspects of security and numerous actors coming from different backgrounds. Simultaneously, it is more dangerous because the accountability and responsibility for conduct and respectfully, misconduct is fading between the contracts and subcontracts among the above mentioned actors.

4. CONCLUSION

The idea of collective actions against threats is not new. The birth and the progress of human civilization was contingent upon the ability for effective coordination, management, and regulation of collective activities aimed at harvesting crops, industrial production, or mobilizing troops. The origin of a sovereign state was primarily attributed to centralization of power and resources under a single system of governance. The pivotal role of the state, following what Max Weber called the “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a

¹³⁷ Herbert, S.: Policy Approaches and Lessons from Working with Non-State Actors in Security and Justice. 27 January, 2015. Helpdesk Research Report. Applied Knowledge Services.

¹³⁸ Reinalda, B.: The Ashgate Research Companion to Non-State Actors, 2016. Routledge, New York. p. 29.

¹³⁹ Bryden, A., Caparini, M.: Private Actors and Security Governance. Geneva Center for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, 2006.

given territory,” allowed the existence of a single security environment for a given society.

Contemporary settings had made a significant alternation to this traditional concept; the security of the state is still the central referent object in security matters on a national and international level, but the non-state actors involved in the provision of security have their significant share as well.

In order to balance the equilibrium state/non-state actors in enabling and maintaining national, local and global security, the most important segment is the unequivocal legislation which will designate the realm in which the non-state actors involved in security matters conduct their activities. The mandate, the authorisation, and the scrutiny of their financing and execution has to be in accordance with the national laws and international norms. This means that each non-security, or non-state actor, depending on the engagement, must always abide by the international humanitarian law, code of conduct, and provide transparency and impartiality in its activities.

Finally, the outsourcing of the state authorizations in provision of security to non-state, non-security actors must not signify loss of the state control and monopoly of the use of coercive force. Rather, it has to reflect the complex levels of security that need to be provided for the country and its citizens and assets. Such shift in security affairs implies precise and clear legislative definition and subsequently, appropriate oversight by the appropriate formal parliamentary commissions, as well as informal institutions, e.g. the academia, the national ombudsman, as well as the international bodies authorized to monitor the conduct of the hired non-state non-security actors.

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THE CAPACITY OF PRIVATE SECURITY IN PREVENTING SECURITY RISKS IN SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

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Abstract

The development of private security in the countries of South Eastern Europe was accompanied by interchangeable ups and downs, present in a much more evident way in this part of the world due to its previous security history. Over time, private security in South Eastern Europe has evolved in a serious factor within the security systems, whose role in coping with ever changing security risks could not be underestimated, but is rather something that should always be counted on. Having in mind the respectable human and material capacities of the private security sector, we strongly believe that it could be of valuable use when coping with the emerging security risks. Within this context, the paper will try to elaborate and evaluate the capacity of private security sector in South Eastern Europe in terms of its preparedness and capability to deal with some dangerous forms of security risks that these countries are facing, such as new forms of crime, critical infrastructure risks and risks associated with crises and emergencies. Theoretically, the paper will use the theoretical underpinnings of Ulrich Beck's, Anthony Giddens' and Zygmunt Bauman's contributions in defining and categorizing the new security risks. As far as methodology is concerned, we will use secondary comparative data and some instructive case studies to estimate the capability of some countries of South Eastern Europe (notably Macedonia, Serbia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania) to prevent these contemporary security risks. The paper will also offer some conclusions and recommendations on what has been done so far and what needs to be done in the future to raise the level of capability of private security sector in the countries of South Eastern Europe in order to make them more prepared and successful in coping with contemporary security risks.

Keywords: *private security, security risks, South Eastern Europe, prevention*

INTRODUCTION

Debates over the private security existence and its justifiability for the security system have never been so intensive as are nowadays. The capacity of private security to respond to an ever-increasing security risks, threats and endangerments has been subdued to real test in the new security environment.

Frankly, the region of South-Eastern Europe has never fell short of security challenges and it continues to be like that in the era of accelerated globalization and postmodernism. New security risks, threats and endangerments are, on the other hand, a real free space for the private security to be wisely and successfully filled in, an arena for proving that private security could have a wider meaning and usefulness other than the localized security contexts of countries and securing of persons and property. It is an area that has to be, so to speak, colonized by the private security alone or through different forms of public-private security partnerships with other constituents of the contemporary security systems (state, public and civilian). In these terms, the region of South-Eastern Europe is a place where private security could prove its wider meaning for societal, regional and even global security.

The world has seen an unprecedented growth and development of the private security in the last three decades. Today, at least half the world's population lives in countries where there are more private security workers than public police officers. There are more than 20 million private security workers worldwide. The global market for private security services is now worth an estimated 180 billion dollars (around 160 billion Euros) and is projected to grow to 240 billion dollars (around 210 billion Euros) by 2020. It is a worldwide business that is growing at nearly 6% a year – faster than the global economy as a whole (Provost, 2017). The numbers for Europe are equally astonishing. According to the latest available data issued by CoESS, there were 44 811 private security companies which operated within the CoESS member countries (CoESS represents most part of the European countries). In 2015, there were nearly 2 million active and licensed private security officers (1 943 047) compared to 1 620 000 police officers (CoESS, 2015; Eurostat, 2016) and the annual turnover within the so-called private security industry reached an estimated 40 billion Euros (CoESS, 2015). The numbers for the size and growth of the private security in the countries of South Eastern Europe are closely following this trends on global and continental level.

All these numbers give a somewhat positive and optimistic picture of the status and prospects of the private security. However, we must not neglect the qualitative side of this development, the real contents and the contribution of private security to wider security, not only within its clients. To estimate that, we have to look to the qualitative aspects of its development, such as the level of professionalism and performance, development of the public-private security partnerships, contribution to the wider public prevention, control, security and so on. Also, we have to estimate the real impact of private security in preventing the security risks which are most appropriate to be dealt with by private security given their very nature, such as security risks related to crime, crises and emergencies and critical infrastructure. Moreover, we will demonstrate, in the lines to follow, that the real impact of private security remains a difficult task, mostly due to objective and methodological issues.

MAJOR SECURITY RISKS

Our contemporary everyday life is to a great extent different than the life of our even recent predecessors. We are undoubtedly living in an apparently risk society in which risks have come to mean something very negative. In other words, we are prone to see the contemporary risks as security risks. In such environment, people are being preoccupied with security risks on a daily basis, they live in a constant strain of the all present and all affecting possibility of negative consequences that security risks could bring. There are more and more security risks with every passing day, making our lives so insecure, uncertain and filled with fear.

It is almost unimaginable that a sound scientific research about risks, and security risks in particular, could be done without taking into consideration and implementing the theoretical knowledge provided by Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Zygmunt Bauman (Gerasimoski, Nikolovski, Gjurovski, 2017: 1-8). Although their contributions are mainly theoretical and cover wide scientific areas of risk research, they could be fairly easily implemented in almost all areas of scientific risk research, and, are quite suitable for security researches. In this respect, their theoretical grounds are found to be very adequate for researching the security risks in every society, organization, security institution or individual and the results gained from this research could surely shed new light on the contemporary character of security risks.

What makes the situation with contemporary security risks worse is their constant multiplication, highly detrimental possible consequences, latency and changing character. Under such circumstances, it is impossible that humanity and security institutions in specific could treat all of them, so some sort of prioritization is indispensable. Thus, we must select the security risks by their scope and size, and determine which of them could be appropriately addressed by the security institutions. What is of crucial interest here is whether and to what extent private security institutions could successfully address some of the major security risks that contemporary life faces.

The problem with the determination of major security risks is really serious, owing to the variety of values and their different relative importance for different socio-cultural settings. The one thing that is common is the area of the so-called globalized risks which affect each country or region more or less equally or similarly. We can see these two streams confront and sometimes even flow together within the security context of South Eastern Europe. However, some of the major security risks penetrate national boundaries and link national with regional and global security interests, so that is what partly alleviates the security risk management. If we speak of the major security risks and their adequate managing by the private security institutions in the region of South Eastern Europe, we could differentiate the following areas where major security risks and private security institutions join together and could significantly contribute to:

- Crime prevention

- Critical infrastructure protection
- Crisis and emergency response.

Not underestimating the salience of other major significant risks, such as terrorism and migration in specific, we believe that these are the major security risks where private security could pass or fail the test of its existence. Whether it would be conceived and implemented as a sole or joint effort with other security institutions, these are the security risks where private security contribution to security could be best seen and recognized.

THE CAPACITY OF PRIVATE SECURITY IN SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE IN PREVENTING AND COPING WITH SECURITY RISKS

It is unusually hard to estimate the capacity of private security on super national level, but not impossible nevertheless. Most of the obstacles are related with methodological issues, primarily with obtaining reliable data for the size of private security sector in the countries of South-Eastern Europe. The problem with data reliability and objectivity is becoming rather serious if we take into the account various, sometimes even drastically different data between the official sources and official and unofficial sources and estimates (for instance, when comparing the data on a same item between national and international statistical, scholar and professional sources). With that in mind, we must not forget to mention that all the data presented are compiled from the most reliable sources we could obtain in order to get the initial picture on the matter at hand. Furthermore, we could agree with Ann Marie Singh and Matthew Light, that researching comparative case studies by examining the most similar cases could help us determine more precisely the common features of private security developments in certain states in regional context (Singh & Light, 2017: 16). That is what we have done with this paper, narrowing the interest to regional South Eastern European context.

We should take into account several crucial criteria in order to be able to get a clearer picture of the strength of private security in the countries of South Eastern Europe. For that reason, we have determined not only the criteria by which we could estimate its capacity, but also selected five countries from South Eastern Europe that would serve us as a representative sample for our research. Those countries are Macedonia, Serbia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania. Concerning the criteria, we have decided to analyse the size of the private security sector (subsystem), the state of selected areas of security risks prevention and management (crime prevention, critical infrastructure prevention and crisis and emergency response), as well as the existence of the public-private security partnerships in each of the selected countries. We believe that within such research framework, we can objectively assess the capacity of the private security sector in South Eastern Europe in preventing and coping with the major security risks that we have previously selected, the ones that the private security sector could address

most appropriately. We have not dealt with legislation aspects concerning the topics of the paper due to lack of space herein. Otherwise, the paper of Mark Button and Peter Stiernstedt is rather useful and instructive for an updated and very detailed legislation overview on this issue for the EU countries, both in terms of the approach and methodology applied (Button & Stiernstedt, 2016: 1-17).

Table No. 1. Crucial indicators of the size of the private security sector in the analysed countries of the South Eastern Europe

Country	Private security companies	Private security officers	Police officers	Private security officers/ police officers ratio	Inhabitants	Private security officers/ inhabitants ratio
Macedonia	163	6 500	11 688	0.55612	2 086 194	0.0031
Serbia	291	45 000 est.	45 000	1.00000	8 742 314	0.0051
Slovenia	149	6 750	7 170	0.94142	2 081 702	0.0032
Bulgaria	2 867	150 000 est.	24 283	6.17716	7 003 784	0.0214
Romania	2 421	122 500	60 000	2.04166	19 513 308	0.0062
Total for all countries	5 891	330 750	148 141	2.23267	39 427 302	0.0083

Sources: (Eurostat 2016; CoESS, 2015; CoESS, 2013; Carutasu, Carutasu, Virca & Guirgiu, 2017: 70; Petrović, & Milošević, 2017: 7; Dzhekova & Rusev, 2015: 46; Sotlar & Dvojmoč, 2016: 33; Комора на Република Македонија за приватно обезбедување, 2016: 14).

The data presented in Table No. 1 indicate the size of private security within the selected countries of South Eastern Europe, according to some crucial indicators. We can see that most of the private security companies come from Bulgaria and Romania (almost 90% of all private security companies within the selected countries), and that the ratio of private security officers/police officers and private security officers/inhabitants is by far the largest in Bulgaria compared to other countries. It clearly shows the huge size of private security sector in Bulgaria and it surely stands out from the other analysed countries. In terms of the ratio between private security officers/police officers, there are 2 times more private security officers than police officers in Romania. Together with Bulgaria, they contribute to the overall high average ratio of more than 2:1 in favour of the private security officers over police officers in the selected countries of South Eastern Europe. Slovenia and Serbia with 1:1 ratio of private security officers/police officers have developed private security sectors in terms of human capacity, while Macedonia with 0.6 does not have a well developed private security sector. As far as the ratio between private security officers and inhabitants is concerned, Bulgaria

again stands out with the highest ratio of 0.0214, which means that there is roughly 1 private security officer on every 47 Bulgarians. We can see that Bulgarian private security sector really sticks out among other countries in terms of the portion of employed private security officers and it can be freely said that it is oversized, especially when we see that there are 6 times more private security officers than police officers according to estimates, since there is a lack of official data for the number of private security officers. We must add here that Bulgaria and Serbia have a serious problem with the huge number of unregistered (unlicensed) private security officers, so the numbers for private security officers in these countries are only estimates according to the professional associations and some scholar analyses. The size of the private security sector can be a significant factor of its the development and strength, but, it does not necessarily mean, or guarantee, better security.

In addition, according to the data presented by Eurostat, Macedonia and Serbia have much more police officers than the European average of 324 police officers on every citizen. Thus, Macedonia has 522 and Serbia 596, compared to 335 in Bulgaria, 398 in Slovenia and only 242 in Romania (Eurostat, 2016). In these terms, Macedonia and Serbia can be considered as police states, while judging solely on the number of private security officers, Bulgaria and Romania could be considered as private security states. This phrase may sound weird and could allude to an alienated security function, but, it is not groundless, since Bulgaria, for instance, was and still is, a country where the large private security sector is synonymous with crime and negative privatization of security (Gounev, 2006: 109-128). Surely, this is only a simplification which could be useful for analytical purposes, but nonetheless, we will see the real meaning of these numbers when we correlate them to the effect they have on managing some of the major security risks, such as crime prevention, critical infrastructure protection and emergency and crisis response.

Table No. 2. Security risks prevention and management in the analysed countries of South Eastern Europe

Country	Crime prevention	Critical infrastructure protection (CIP)	Crisis and emergency response
Macedonia	High number of police officers Moderate number of private security officers Relatively high crime index/Assumed failure of crime prevention	Private security entities secure most of the critical infrastructure There's a lack of coordination and cooperation amongst private security and other security entities The legal framework is not well developed	Private security entities play a minor role in crisis and emergency response Generally, the private security sector has been left out or neglected in terms of crisis and emergency response
		Private security entities secure the critical	

Serbia	<p>High number of police officers</p> <p>Moderate number of private security officers</p> <p>Relatively high crime index/Assumed failure of crime prevention</p>	<p>infrastructure</p> <p>Lack of coordination between private security entities and other security entities</p> <p>The interest of private security in this sphere is not very significant due to weaknesses in the public procurement policy</p> <p>The legal framework is not clear and well developed</p>	<p>There is special legislation for crises and emergencies in which private security entities are given significant place and role</p> <p>However, the private security contribution in dealing with crises and emergencies has been fairly small</p>
Slovenia	<p>Average number of police officers</p> <p>Moderate number of private security officers</p> <p>Relatively low crime index/Assumed success of crime prevention</p>	<p>Clear criteria for CIP have been set</p> <p>The real contribution of private security entities to CIP is hard to assess, since there were no serious endangerments so far that could test the level of resilience</p> <p>CIP is recognized and legally regulated</p>	<p>There is special legislation for crises and emergencies</p> <p>Private security entities participate as an obligation in prevention, protection and recovery of values endangered in crises and emergencies (especially those from critical infrastructure)</p>
Bulgaria	<p>Average number of police officers</p> <p>Very high number of private security officers</p> <p>Relatively high crime index/Assumed failure of crime prevention</p>	<p>Private security entities secure most of the critical infrastructure</p> <p>Lack of effective partnership among participants and stakeholders in the CIP regime</p> <p>The legal framework is fragmented</p>	<p>Large sector of private security is a huge potential for crisis and emergency response</p> <p>There is a separate Ministry of Emergency Situation and adequate legislation</p> <p>Nevertheless, the experience has shown little contribution of private security in dealing with emergency situations</p>
Romania	<p>Low number of police officers</p> <p>Very high absolute number of private security officers</p> <p>Relatively low crime index/Assumed success of crime prevention</p>	<p>Most of the critical infrastructure is being protected by private security entities</p> <p>The legislation is harmonized with room for further improvement</p> <p>The real contribution of private security entities in CIP has not been assessed</p>	<p>The role of the private security sector in emergency and crisis response is limited</p> <p>So far, there is little evidence and data on the private security entities being involved in crisis and emergency response, so their contribution is difficult to assess</p>

Sources: (NUMBEO 2019; SGI, 2018; Eurostat 2016; CoESS, 2015; Global Finance, 2019; Dzhokova & Rusev, 2016: 63-64; Petrović & Milošević, 2017: 3; Petrović & Milošević, 2016: 73; Dima, 2010: 13-15, 39; Gerasimoski, Sotlar & Dvojmoč, 2016: 41-43; Gerasimoski, 2014: 366;

Gerasimoski, 2013: 305-306; Пејановић и Ђурковић, 2011: 105; Бакрески, Герасимоски, Милеска-Стефановска, Спасов, Керметчиева, 2016: 67-69; Спасески, Аслимоски, Герасимоски, 2017: 154-155).

Crime prevention is one of the most important indicators that can show the quality of work and provide information on the performance of both police and private security. According to NUMBEO's Crime Index, which calculates the crime index on crime perceptions of millions of Internet reviewers, rather than on official statistical data, for the analysed countries of South Eastern Europe, Macedonia has a crime index of 39.29, Serbia 37.27, Slovenia 22.57, Bulgaria 40.00 and Romania 27.84 (NUMBEO, 2019). The crime index is measured relative to the safety index, so it means that when the crime index increases, the safety index decreases and vice versa. In these terms, we can see that Bulgaria, Macedonia and Serbia have a higher crime index than Romania and Slovenia, who, according to these data, are considered to be much safer than the first three countries of South Eastern Europe. The numbers presented by NUMBEO do not differ too much when compared with the SGI Report on safety of living and protection and the Global Finance ranking of the safest countries in the world in 2019, both based on a comprehensive statistical factor analysis of security risks (SGI, 2018, Global Finance, 2019).

When the analysis is relative to the capacities of both police and private security, we can see that the high absolute and relative numbers of police and private security in Bulgaria, Macedonia and Serbia obviously do not contribute significantly towards crime prevention. The opposite situation is with Slovenia, where both the number of police and private security are absolutely and relatively low compared to other countries, but Slovenia has, on the contrary, the safest society in terms of presence of crime. Romania also stands better than Bulgaria, Macedonia and Serbia, but we should underline the high number of private security officers, which presumably, play a significant part in making the country safer and the crime index lower. These numbers can also lead us to the conclusion that the high absolute and relative number of police and private security officers do not necessarily guarantee better crime prevention and lower crime rates and indexes, but, according to the presented data, it seems that it could prove quite the opposite. It looks like the formal societal control and manned presence of both private security and police is not always a guarantee of a more secure society. Most studies of reduced crime rates, especially of violent and property crime, in Western European countries suggest that among other factors, the rise of private security could effectively contribute to its reduction, but it is considered most likely to happen when private and public security cooperate in crime prevention rather than when they do that separately. However, the real contribution of private security in crime prevention remains hard to measure and assess (Tonry, 2014: 52).

Critical infrastructure protection and crisis and emergency response are two areas where private security could seriously contribute towards risk prevention, reduction and management. These two areas are significantly intertwined. The

qualitative analysis presented in Table No. 2 suggests that all analysed countries of South Eastern Europe have a respectful potential, which if used properly, could significantly improve the prevention and management of critical infrastructure and prevent or alleviate the crises and emergencies. As wider experiences allude, the future of private security are these two major security risks areas where private security could cooperate with other security entities (preferably the police) to maximize the prevention and management effects. To date, as analysis has shown, private security capacity has not even been remotely utilised, especially in crisis and emergency prevention and response. The situation is better when we speak of critical infrastructure prevention and protection, but here, also, a huge potential remains. These are the future chances for the private security to prove the need for its existence, but owing to serious problems in legislation, coordination and measuring of contribution, these two security risk prevention and management areas remain mostly unexploited, for the time being.

Table No. 3. The existence of public-private security partnerships in the analysed countries of South Eastern Europe

Country	Existence of public-private security partnerships (PPSPs)
Macedonia	The PPSPs do not currently exist/ PPSPs are not recognized and promoted in the private security legislation/There is ad-hock cooperation and coexistence
Serbia	The PPSPs do not currently exist /PPSPs are recognized and promoted in special private security legislation/In practice, there is coexistence
Slovenia	The PPSPs do not currently exist /There is advanced coexistence with a tendency towards partnership
Bulgaria	The PPSPs do not currently exist /Cooperation exists/ PPSPs are encouraged within the legislation concerning critical infrastructure protection/ PPSPs are in their inception
Romania	The PPSPs do not currently exist /Cooperation exists/PPSPs are encouraged within the legislation concerning critical infrastructure protection/PPSPs are in their inception

Sources: (CoESS, 2013: 176; Gerasimoski, 2013: 305-306; Sotlar & Meško, 2010: 283-284; Dima, 2010: 13; Kojuharov & Dzhekova, 2017: 4; Petrović & Milošević, 2017: 3).

The public-private security partnership (PPSP) represents the highest form of cooperation between completely equal security entities from public and private security (Спасески, Аслимоски, Герасимоски, 2017: 294). It implies a sort of cooperation where entities from both sectors cooperate formally and informally on a daily basis, routinely, jointly performing security tasks and sharing common goals and values. In this cooperation, the security entities respect each other, do not perceive each other as a threat or competition and are fully committed to attaining their common goals. There are positive examples throughout the world,

like in the U.S.A., Australia and some Western European countries, where PPSPs are established, but in most cases they are part of some projects and short-term initiatives, rather than long-term strategic cooperation. Unfortunately, for most of the countries worldwide, the PPSPs are some sort of paramount value in security, if not an ideal, which is extremely hard to reach. The majority of the countries have lower forms of cooperation, where the security entities understand each other and cooperate, but mostly complement their activities ad-hock, from time to time, depending on their needs. Thus, for instance, the countries of South Eastern Europe and the countries of the region that we have analyzed, have some sort of cooperation between the public and private security, but, none of them have reached the level of partnership. Table no. 3 above indicates the existence of PPSPs in these countries. It is crucial to note the relation between PPSPs and the contribution of private security in dealing with the major security risks that we have previously analyzed. Namely, the experience implies that the contribution to crime prevention, critical infrastructure protection and emergency and crisis response is far greater when done through PPSPs than when private security entities deal with them on their own. Though in the analyzed countries of South Eastern Europe we have no PPSPs as organized and systematic cooperation between public and private security, we have noticed some positive trends which could be seen as harbingers of PPSPs in the future, like the expressed willingness to promote PPSPs, in some countries even in a legal form (like in Serbia, Bulgaria and Romania for instance). Only through PPSPs could the full capacity of private security in the countries of South Eastern Europe be used in the most effective and socially most approved way.

CONCLUSION

Although private security has witnessed an unprecedented growth in the past three decades in the countries of South Eastern Europe, the overall capacity and contribution to security seems to be pretty ambivalent. In spite of its unquestioned and unarguable human and technical capacity to deal with major security risks, the real contribution towards crime prevention, critical infrastructure prevention and crisis and emergency response remains largely either unexploited or even unregistered. Theoretically, the private security sector in the countries of South Eastern Europe follows the neoliberal explanations, which must be balanced with more critical works of Anthony Giddens, Ulrich Beck, and especially Zygmunt Bauman, in order to get a more realistic picture on the matter. What these theories call for is a more cautious approach in assessing the security risk environment in which private security functions and its real contribution to managing the security risks. Furthermore, from a methodological stance, the data provided for each of the countries of South Eastern Europe concerning their reliability could be questioned in some countries, since in certain cases, there are more different and contradictory sources within one country related to a certain amount of unregistered and unlicensed private security officers. Moreover, the

situation is becoming quite difficult when assessing the numbers, trends and drawing conclusions between the countries. However, some impact of private security on reducing crime rates could be presumed in Bulgaria and Romania, while this is not the case in Serbia and Macedonia, where the growth of private security did not see a reduction of the crime rates; in fact, just the opposite happened, the crime rates increased, especially in Macedonia. Slovenia is a country where crime rates have traditionally been very low, so some correlation between the growth of private security and crime rates cannot be easily found. In terms of the contribution of private security to critical infrastructure protection, most of the countries, except Slovenia and Romania, show lack of legislation and coordination, so the role of private security in these area, although visible and real, is hard to assess from a qualitative aspect. As far as crises and emergencies are concerned, it seems that all countries have not understood, nor used the full potential of private security in this field. Primarily, it depends on the status of private security and its relations with other institutions within the security systems of each country, but, some analysed case studies have shown relatively low contribution of private security in this area so far, in spite of some individual positive experiences. Added to that, the absence or lack of real and long-term public-private security partnership in all countries of South Eastern Europe gives part of the answer to the previous conclusions. Building long-lasting PPSPs would probably make the private security in the analysed countries of South Eastern Europe more successful in preventing and coping with major security risks.

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ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE SECURITY RISKS IN THE REPUBLIC OF NORTH MACEDONIA

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Abstract

One of the basic principles that should be taken into consideration in the concept and functioning of the security system is the economic aspect. When designing the security system, the level of the economic development of the society should be considered, accordingly, it should be allocated for financing of defense and security, i.e., to avoid excessive investment in security, to carry out economic exhaustion and disabling normal functioning of other institutions. On the other hand, a stable security situation, integrating the country into international security associations, enables the increase of foreign investments, and thus the improvement of the domestic economy. This means that we can talk about an interactive relationship between the economy and the security of a state. What is lacking, is scientific research results that will point out to the relation between economics and security. Scientific research in the field of security risks in the Republic of North Macedonia is insufficient, and the existing is without a solid theoretical elaboration of the problem of the research.

In this effort we emphasize the economic aspects of the results of the controversial research of the scientific public on the topic "Exploring the Security Risks in the Republic of Macedonia", preceded by field working of rational approaches in defining the security risks, with special emphasis on the impact of unemployment and poverty on the security of a state.

The research includes the public experts, that is, representatives of the institutions that have direct competence in dealing with security risk threats.

Key words: *risk, security risk, threat, security, security institution, economy, unemployment, poverty*

1. INTRODUCTION

The link between economic development and the security of a country is a matter of interest in many scientific debates in the country and abroad. It is about establishing a causal relationship and the impact of the security of a country and its influence on the development and growth of its economy. The Republic of North Macedonia, which is unfortunately still in a transition phase, is on the threshold to become a full member of the NATO Security Alliance, entering a phase of security and economic integration. Rational approaches related to the issue of entry into these integrations are carried out with the economic and security costs that security integrations bring with them.

Stable security brings benefits to the revival of economy, especially in developing countries, as well as the economy of the Republic of North Macedonia. Foreign direct investment is evident in those regions or states that have a stable security situation and are members of the international security institutions. Foreign direct investment has an impact on the growth of the economy which is reflected in a larger source of funds, increasing employment and exports, serving to cover the current deficit, which is characteristic for countries in transition. If we analyze the economy of our country, we will notice a small open economy that has a small capital accumulation and small domestic reserves. The only serious source of funds that could bring the domestic economy back are foreign direct investments.

The level of security of a country has a significant impact on the risk of investing in that country. Thus, security and economic development are in a direct relation, as they affect the environment suitable for investment. The unstable security situation in the environment has an impact on the withdrawal of investments to those areas and their investment in more stable safer areas, as security is necessary for the investors to keep their ownership and make a profit.

The seriousness of the threats of the 21st century is the application of the information infrastructure in decomposition of values, the types of threats which endanger the life and health of citizens, and the seriousness of endangering the values and interests of the citizens. Threats in the new millennium can be amortized and resolved only by means of an internationally created security policy and on those bases the polity of national security is built.¹⁴⁰

The Republic of North Macedonia, within the framework of the security policy, has the intention to provide security and protection of the citizens from both the external and internal influences and threats of a variety of characters: security, economic, political, ecological, or cultural. The main threat to security are the tensions and antagonisms that are the result of interethnic conflicts, extreme nationalism, religious radicalization, wrong reforms, and economic inefficiency.

¹⁴⁰A national security politics an interdependent and complex system of measures, plans and programs undertaken by the Republic of Macedonia for the protection, preservation and promotion of the security of the Republic of Macedonia and its citizens, in accordance with the political, economic, defense, internal, security, social, environmental and other resources

Apart from the weak economy (high unemployment, low standard of living, and cheap labor), political, social and ethnic conditions in the country, and new types of hazards would be: international terrorism, organized crime (human trafficking, weapons, drugs, money laundering, migration, violent extremism, and fundamentalism) etc.

These kinds of threats can directly or indirectly affect the national security of the country. They undermine security and the democratic and economic foundations of society through the weakening of the state institutions and the loss of confidence in the rule of law. But, despite the attempts of the institutions to detect and deal with potential threats to the security of the country in a timely manner, today the state faces a serious economic, political, and security crisis that pretends to endanger the survival of the country. Unfortunately, this situation has been present for too long, starting with the demands of the former oppositional political parties that the current government resigns, to form a technical government and organize early parliamentary elections. The non-functioning of the institutions appeared to be an appropriate ground for the development of organized crime and corruption, a drop in foreign investment and, above all, decline in the economy. If we add to this the global migration crisis, which unfortunately has a direct impact on the economic, political and security system of the Republic of North Macedonia, we can talk about the risks that pose a serious threat to the security of the citizens.

Starting from these bases, as well as the actuality of the issue with the research of the security risks, a scientific research was conducted on the opinion of the expert public, representatives of several security institutions on issues related to prevention from certain risks so that they did not become threats, and threats from a wider scale.

2. RESEARCH ABOUT SECURITY RISKS IN THE REPUBLIC OF NORTH MACEDONIA

The world today lives in times of globalization and postmodern social perceptions. Developmental dynamics is not linear and characterizes many ambivalent processes, of which, perhaps the key one refers to the change of security and freedom as values. Namely, social circumstances create an environment and a culture of living that require greater freedom and realization of personal freedom of people as a universal social, cultural, and civilization benefit.

However, the complex network of social relations and interdependence in times of globalization, which greatly contributed to the breakthrough in the sphere of freedom, simultaneously led to the rise of security and, more closely, the preoccupation with the security risks. Security risks today have become the basic paradigm of the study of security sciences. *First*, we are living at a time in which security risks dominate the theory and practice of risk and have a shift from neutral to negative (security) understanding and defining modern risks. *Secondly*, since security risks are increasingly less locally determined, they are also increasing the

consequence of the complex interdependent relationships of a globalizing society, are more predictable, more numerous, and with ever more possible harmful consequences. *Third*, security risks are closely related to security maintenance as the basic response to the new scope and structure of the nature of modern security risks. *Fourth*, the strategies and ways of managing and assessing security risks have become the basis of the modern way of treating security risks. *Fifth*, there is obviously a change in the very structure and types of security risks, in which the manufactured over external risks and the exposures over the self-extinguishing security risks are dominating.

The Republic of North Macedonia is not and cannot stay out of this intricate network of social relations in which the nature of modern security risks changes. It must necessarily reflect in some way these tectonic movements in the security sphere, and especially in the area of security risks. It is precisely because of this fact, but also because of the fact that in the Republic of North Macedonia so far there is no such way of scientific research and study of security risks, that we have decided to fill one significant gap in our security science and practice related to the study and treatment of security risks. In essence, it is necessary to investigate to what extent and in what manner the wider changes in the nature of the security risks affect the scope, structure, and the type of security risks in the contemporary Macedonian society and state and how those risks influence the stability of the state and thus on the improvement of the economy. This would give a clear picture of the nature of modern security risks and it would be easier to determine the most appropriate approaches to security prevention, handling, management and assessment of safe security risks by the holders of the security policies in the Republic of North Macedonia, acting on a stable security influence on the improvement of the state's economy and thus bring to better economic growth and a better standard of all citizens.

On the other hand, the unfavorable economic, political and security situation requires a profound analysis and inclusion of all segments of society, each of its own country contributing to timely detection of potential risks and scheduling security and taking timely adequate measures by the competent institutions in order to prevent potential risks and avoid threats to security on a wider scale.

According to these facts, the research team from the Faculty of Security during the 2017 conducted a research project with the implementation of an empirical research, a survey of the general public about the current risks and threats to the security of the Republic of North Macedonia. The questionnaire examined the opinions and attitudes of the public expert representatives of the security institutions on issues related to the security risks in the Republic of North Macedonia.

From the security institutions concerned precisely with security, were the representatives of:

- the Cabinet of the President of the Republic of North Macedonia;
- the Intelligence Agency;

- the Ministry of Defense - security organs;
- the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Security and Counter-Intelligence Directorate and Public Security Bureau, Criminal Police and Uniformed Police); and
- the private security chamber.

The purpose of the research project is based on the perceptions of the current opinions and attitudes of the public expert on the security risks, to obtain valid scientific knowledge about the existence of security risks, their types, the process of handling and management as well as the assessment of security risks. The obtained results from the survey, and in full with the entire scientific-research project, will be the benefit to scientists working on the security research of the Republic of North Macedonia, the security policy holders, and the security management of security institutions. The questionnaire itself contained several sets of questions: biographical data, understanding-defining the notion of risk, ways of acquiring knowledge of risks, assessing the vulnerability of society to the types of risks, assessment of the kind of society we are living in relation to the risks. A number of risks were listed, whereby the general public was asked to determine the risks that endanger the safety, starting from the most important to the less significant, the intensity of the influence of the risks on the personal safety of the citizens, and on the security of the vital interests of the state, exploring the reasons for the current security risks in the Republic of North Macedonia, assessing the quality in creating and implementing the security policy, names methodology in assessing security risks and creating security strategy. At the end of the questionnaire, there are open questions for commentaries and presentation of certain attitudes of the expert public on certain issues related to security risks, for issues which are not covered in the questionnaire.

The survey covered a total of 151 persons interviewed from the above mentioned security institutions, from several towns in the Republic of North Macedonia: Skopje, Kumanovo, Bitola, Vinica, Kicevo, Kratovo, Ohrid Struga.

In the analysis, we process the data related to the influence of the economic factors, i.e., unemployment, low living standards, poverty, migration movements and labor market impacts, and their impact as a potential risk to the security of Republic of North Macedonia.

3. STRUCTURE OF THE SAMPLE

The selection of the sample is based on the distribution of certain socio-demographic characteristics among the employees in the security organizations. Thus, the gender structure of the sample shows a certain disproportion in favor of the male population (70:30), which is a result of the greater presence of the male population in the security institutions of the Republic of North Macedonia, i.e., it is about replicating the real situation in this domain. As for the age structure, the percentages show that the largest number of respondents is from the older category

(over 40) - 30%, and the youngest age category (up to 25 years) - 14% are with the lowest participation. The remaining age categories are in the range between these two intervals, and the value of the standard deviation (1,425) indicates the dispersion of the different age groups.

The structure according to the place of residence reveals the dominance of the respondents from Skopje (93%), while the respondents from other towns participate only with 7% (5% from Western Macedonia, 2% from Eastern Macedonia). The ethnic structure indicates the highest participation of respondents from the Macedonian ethnic community (86%), members of the Albanian ethnic community participate with 6% in the sample, the Turkish with 3%, etc. The religious structure (including the structure of the religion) reveals the dominance of the respondents - Orthodox Christians - 81%, then Muslims -11%, atheists - 4%, etc. The structure according to education reveals that almost every second (47%) respondent has completed university education, and almost every third (29%) has a secondary education. 90% of the respondents are employed in institutions / organizations that deal with security issues: the largest part - 43.5% are employed in private security agencies, and 41.3% in the state intelligence agency. In a smaller percentage, the sample includes police officers (6.5%), employees in the criminal police (5.4%) and the Security and Counter-Intelligence Directorate - 3.3%, which means that the research findings are created with the participation of all security organizations in the sample.

The facts that should be market are the data for the survey from the public expert, and the highest percentage of the respondents in the survey are respondents of higher education, masters, and doctoral studies background.

4. ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY

From where the security risks come in the Republic of North Macedonia? Are they the result of a turbulent regional environment or the general globalization trend? Respondents, although not reject the external influences, still consider that security risks mainly originate from "home", i.e. from the state itself (44%). However, a high percentage of respondents (39%) see regional security risks as the main reason for endangering security in the country, while additional 17% of respondents as the source of the security risks in Macedonia, see the globalization (Table 1).

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	globalization	17	17,0	17,0	17,0
	regional security risks	39	39,0	39,0	56,0

	security risks from the state itself	44	44,0	44,0	100,0
	Total	100	100,0	100,0	

Because the respondents consider that the situation in the country is the main source of security threats, several important socio-economic issues (primarily unemployment and poverty) and their impact on security are analyzed for the needs of the paper. From here, respondents in the largest percentage (39.2%) consider that poverty "extremely much" affects personal safety, and an additional 29.9% think that poverty "has a great deal of influence" on personal safety. This means that almost 7 out of 10 respondents think that the impact of poverty is high or very high on personal safety. (Table No.2)

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	extremely little	3	3,0	3,1	3,1
	a little bit relative	4	4,0	4,1	7,2
	a lot	23	23,0	23,7	30,9
	extremely much	29	29,0	29,9	60,8
	Total	38	38,0	39,2	100,0
	Missing	System	97	97,0	100,0
Total		3	3,0		
		100	100,0		

Religion / religion		Table 3 Impact of Poverty on Personal Security					Total
		extremely little	a little bit	relative	a lot	extremely much	
Orthodox	Count	3	4	14	25	32	78
	% within religion	3,8%	5,1%	17,9%	32,1%	41,0%	100,0%
Muslim	Count	0	0	5	4	2	11
	% within religion	,0%	,0%	45,5%	36,4%	18,2%	100,0%
Catholic	Count	0	0	1	0	1	2
	% within religion	,0%	,0%	50,0%	,0%	50,0%	100,0%
Protestant	Count	0	0	1	0	0	1
	% within religion	,0%	,0%	100,0%	,0%	,0%	100,0%
atheist	Count	0	0	2	0	2	4
	% within religion	,0%	,0%	50,0%	,0%	50,0%	100,0%
else	Count	0	0	0	0	1	1
	% within religion	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	100,0%	100,0%
Total	Count	3	4	23	29	38	97
	% within religion	3,1%	4,1%	23,7%	29,9%	39,2%	100,0%

The in-depth analysis reveals that certain socio-demographic characteristics influence the perception of the impact of poverty on security. Namely, Table 3 reveals that religious affiliation plays a certain role in the perception of the relationship of poverty-safety. Namely, 41% of Orthodox Christians believe that the impact of poverty on personal security is "extremely high", while only 18.2% of Muslims think the same. For most Muslims, in fact, the impact of poverty on personal security is relative (according to 45.5% of the respondents).

On the other hand, on the direct question with the offered answers "yes" and "no", 2/3 of the respondents do not see poverty as a factor of influence on the general security. An attempt has therefore been made to differentiate their responses according to certain characteristics.

Crossing the view on the impact of poverty on general security, with the affiliation to a particular security organization, reveals certain differences. Namely, Table 4 reveals that employees of the Security and Counter Intelligence Directorate (fully) and police officers (on a large scale) see poverty as a factor in endangering general security. On the other hand, almost 3/4 of the respondents - employees of the Intelligence Agency and private security agencies (and 3/5 of the crime police) - do not see poverty as an influential factor.

Table 4 Does poverty affect general security?			да	не	Total
security organization	Administration for Security and Counterintelligence	Count % within	3 100,0%	0 ,0%	3 100,0%
	Intelligence Agency	Count % within	10 26,3%	28 73,7%	38 100,0%
	A police officer	Count % within	5 83,3%	1 16,7%	6 100,0%
	Criminal police	Count % within	2 40,0%	3 60,0%	5 100,0%
	Private Security Agencies	Count % within	11 27,5%	29 72,5%	40 100,0%
Total		Count % within	31 33,7%	61 66,3%	92 100,0%

The check-up confirmed that there is a statistically significant link between employment in a particular security organization and the stance on the impact of poverty on security. Namely, the value of the Pearson Chi-Square of 14,223, 4 degrees of freedom and 5% permissible error, is higher than the minimum value - 9,488; which implies the connection between these variables. The Contingency coefficient of 0.366 indicates a significant correlation between the security organization and the stance on the impact of poverty on security.

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	14,223 ^a	4	,007
Likelihood Ratio	14,584	4	,006
Linear-by-Linear Association	,761	1	,383
N of Valid Cases	92		

a. 6 cells (60,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,01.

Symmetric Measures

	Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Contingency Coefficient	,366	,007
N of Valid Cases	92	

Almost 2/3 of the respondents estimate that very high unemployment (30.9%) or extremely high (36.1%) affects personal safety, while only 7.2% consider this impact to be minor. (Table 5).

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	extremely little	7	7,0	7,2	7,2
	a little bit	4	4,0	4,1	11,3
	relative	21	21,0	21,6	33,0
	a lot	30	30,0	30,9	63,9
	extremely much	35	35,0	36,1	100,0
	Total	97	97,0	100,0	
Missing	System	3	3,0		
Total		100	100,0		

Certain socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents influence their attitude towards the relation between unemployment and personal security. Thus, the structure of responses among younger respondents reveals greater heterogeneity in the answers, than in the elderly. As much as 21.4% of the respondents under 25 years of age believe that unemployment affects "very little" personal security, and 50% of them that unemployment affects "extremely much". Much greater consistency exists in older age categories (36-40 years) and especially over 40 years, where it is evident that most of the answers (over 70%) are concentrated in the categories "extremely much" and "many", and in minor percentages (3.6%, or 6.3%, respectively), attitudes for "extremely low" and "small" influence are present.

Age		Impact of unemployment on personal safety					Total
		extremely little	little	relative	A lot	Extreme lot	
to 25 years	Count	3	0	2	2	7	14
	% within age	21,4%	,0%	14,3%	14,3%	50,0%	100,0%
26-30 years	Count	2	1	3	7	4	17
	% within age	11,8%	5,9%	17,6%	41,2%	23,5%	100,0%

31-35 years	Count	0	0	7	8	7	22
	% within age	,0%	,0%	31,8%	36,4%	31,8%	100,0%
36-40 years	Count	1	1	4	4	6	16
	% within age	6,3%	6,3%	25,0%	25,0%	37,5%	100,0%
up 40 years	Count	1	2	5	9	11	28
	% within age	3,6%	7,1%	17,9%	32,1%	39,3%	100,0%
Total	Count	7	4	21	30	35	97
	% within age	7,2%	4,1%	21,6%	30,9%	36,1%	100,0%

Crossing the attitude about the impact of unemployment on general security, with the affiliation to a certain security organization, again reveals certain differences. Namely, Table 7 reveals that the employees in the Security and Counterintelligence Administration (100%) see the unemployment factor as a security threat. On the other hand, most of the respondents - employees of the Intelligence Agency and private security agencies, the police and the criminal police - do not see unemployment as an influential factor in the domain of security.

		Table 7 Does unemployment affect general security?		Total
		yes	no	
Security organization				
Administration for Security and Counterintelligence	Count % within	3 100,0%	0 ,0%	3 100,0%
Intelligence service	Count % within	12 31,6%	26 68,4%	38 100,0%
Police officer	Count % within	1 16,7%	5 83,3%	6 100,0%
Criminalistics police	Count % within	2 40,0%	3 60,0%	5 100,0%
Agency for private	Count	9	31	40

security	% within	22,5%	77,5%	100,0%
Total	Count	27	65	92
	% within	29,3%	70,7%	100,0%
	3			

5. CONCLUSIONS

Security risks originate from "home"

Although they do not rule out external influences, security service employees still consider that security risks mainly originate from "home", i.e., from the situation in the countr.

The impact of unemployment and poverty on personal security is high and extremely high

Most employees in security organizations perceive poverty and unemployment as factors that "very" and "extremely much" affect personal security.

The affiliation to a particular security organization affects the attitude of the impact of poverty and unemployment on the general security

Employees in the Security and Counter-Intelligence Directorate (fully) and police officers (on a large scale) see poverty as a factor in endangering general security, unlike employees in other security organizations. Also, employees in the Security and Counterintelligence Administration (100%) see the unemployment factor as a security threat, unlike employees in other security organizations that do not share this attitude.

- The integration of the Republic of North Macedonia into the international security institutions will positively influence the attracting foreign direct investments, and hence to the improvement of economic growth, reduction of unemployment and better livelihoods

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SECURITY CHALLENGES OF ILLEGAL MIGRATION IN NORTH MACEDONIA: OVERVIEW OF MIGRANT SMUGGLING

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Abstract

Migrations and the movements that go along with this phenomenon can be an important factor in the field of general safety because the phenomenon of migration can cause some emergent and structural changes in the criminal activities of a certain area in a certain period of time. A phenomenon that is closely related to illegal migration, which is carried out for the purpose of acquiring unlawful profits by third persons is the smuggling of migrants. The methods of migrant smuggling are very dependable on the territory where the activities are taking place. On the other side of the law, criminal intelligence and special investigative measures are an important tool that helps the proactive investigation.

The main scope of this paper is the security dimension and the consequences arising from migratory movements, particularly the phenomenon of illegal migration and the smuggling of migrants. Moreover, the paper reviews their current trends through an analysis of statistical data on migrant smuggling in Macedonia. It also elaborates the current trends in the ways of “smuggling“ in terms of motives and reasons for migrants to leave their home countries. The purpose of the paper is to actualize the problems caused by this criminal activity and to emphasize the ensuing consequences in order to find a strategy and tactics to deal with such a negative phenomenon.

Key words: illegal migration, smuggling of migrants, organized crime groups, refugee, crises

Introductory remarks on illegal migration

Migration is one of the major driving forces of human progress and development. The movement of people around the globe has influenced the

construction of many things throughout the history of mankind. From the past to present times, people move from one place to another for various reasons. For example, some people move in order to increase their economic opportunities, or to enable a better level of education for their children. However, from another perspective, migration has led to proliferation and mixing of languages, cultures and ideas all around the globe.

Migrations¹⁴¹ represent physical movement, temporary or permanent relocation of the population from one socio-cultural setting (emigration area) to another (immigration area), or from one country (emigration) to another (immigration). Hence, migrations may be internal and international. International migrations involve any cross-border movement of people and their acceptance and presence of different duration in the country of migration, regardless of the subjective motives and individual characteristics of the participants in this process and the migration policy of the countries in which migration takes place. Two primary elements in the definition of international migrations are significant: mobility, i.e. entry and stay in the foreign country and foreign citizenship. Currently about 190 million people worldwide have the status of international migrants, which is 3 % of the world's population, or any 30th person on the planet. Gender ratio in migrations is 51:49. It is assumed that the number of immigrants from the Republic of North Macedonia is between 350,000 and 500,000 people. It is very difficult to collect official data.

Today, global migration is one of the several so-called very important products of globalization. In addition to the fact that migration is an important "consequence" of globalization, it is also a phenomenon that is exploited by organized criminal groups with the purpose of acquiring material benefit. As a result, current statistics shows that there are various emerging types of criminal activities which are related to migration movements.

The methods of execution of migrant smuggling are very dependable on the territory where the activities take place. From a legal perspective, criminal intelligence and special investigative measures are an important tool that helps the proactive investigation.

Illegal migration is immigration across national borders in a way that threatens the immigration laws of the destination country. According to this definition, illegal immigrants are foreigners who have illegally crossed the border of the state, by land, water or air, or foreigners who have legally entered the territory of the state, but remained longer than the stay specified in their visa for that country.

So, if migration is conducted in accordance with the regulations of the country of emigration and the destination country, it is called legal migration, otherwise, it is illegal migration, which is manifested in unorganized and organized forms.

¹⁴¹Mijalkovič, S., Criminal-intelligence work in the prevention of international organized illegal migration. NBP - science, safety, police. year 12, no. 1, 2007, pp. 77-78

When talking about illegal migration, it can be said that there is no clear and generally accepted definition. From the perspective of the countries of destination, it is illegal entry, stay or work in the country, meaning that the migrant does not have the necessary authorization or documents required under the regulations on entry, stay and work in that country. From the perspective of the country of origin, the irregularity occurs, for example, in the case of persons who cross the international border without valid travel document or who do not meet the administrative requirements for leaving the country. Specifically, there are a number of terms used to describe people without formal permission to enter a country, such as: a foreigner with illegal residence, illegal immigrants, illegal workers, undocumented immigrants, foreigners, workers, etc. Also, the term illegal immigrant is often used to mean "irregular migrant". The notion of illegal migration is an acceptable idea, while a human being can never be illegal. Therefore it is recommended to use the term "irregular migrant"¹⁴².

The main factor in the theory of immigration that stands out, both in terms of legal and illegal migration, is the economic factor. The low living standard, poverty and unemployment are just some of the reasons why people decide to leave their country. Thus, poor people from less developed countries can have a much higher standard of living in the developed countries than in their own country. So, the immigrant influx is almost entirely composed of immigrants originating from countries with lower socioeconomic levels to countries with higher socioeconomic levels, particularly from the developing countries to the developed countries. Although there are other reasons that are associated with poorer countries, the most common motivation for the immigrants is the search for greater economic opportunities and quality of life in the destination country. The choice of country for migration, in turn, depends on the availability of jobs and employability. If that is not possible, people seek other illegal ways to fulfill their purpose. Often, that leads them into illegal channels and illegal activities, which can be easily detected and they hence risk facing negative consequences in terms of expulsion, prohibition of return, etc. By an illegal entry into another country, the illegal immigrants expose themselves and the local people to hazards. Some significantly more dangerous consequences resulting from their activities are evident today, such as the possibility for illegal immigrants being subjected to trafficking for different purposes, including work exploitation, prostitution, sale of human organs, etc.

Illegal migrations¹⁴³ are increasingly characterized by a more organized approach to the recruitment, transportation, acceptance and exploitation of illegal migrants in the countries of destination. Besides the mediating activity of facilitating the illegal entry of persons to another country, known as smuggling of migrants, organized crime groups are increasingly resorting to smuggling victims

¹⁴²Clarberg, B., Keating, T., Radović, N., et al., Combating illegal migration and smuggling of migrants in the Western Balkans, IOM, Brussels, 2006, p. 17

¹⁴³Mijalkovič, S., Criminal-intelligence work in the prevention of international organized illegal migration. NBP - science, safety, police. year 12, no. 1, 2007, pp. 76

for so-called international trafficking. Low risk and high profitability paralleled the extent of this "criminal business" with illegal circulation of narcotics and weapons globally.

Organized illegal immigrations have a negative impact on the country from several aspects: destabilization of the security situation in the country, undermining of the stability and functioning of the state institutions, and reducing the country's reputation in the international community. This situation is further worsened by endangering the safety of citizens, so-called human (individual) security, in terms of the occurrence of a large number of crimes, misdemeanors and pathological deviations in the sphere of physical, health and economic security. Thus, a large number of human rights and freedoms are violated, which means that this phenomenon is also a criminal activity directed against the country.

Organized illegal immigration¹⁴⁴ operates in secret and represents a serious and worrisome security threat to the national security of the country that causes financial, psychological and often physical harm. When immigrants are forced upon or otherwise exploited, it is considered that they are being traded, which represents the beginning phase of human trafficking. In reverse, illegal immigration in the countries that are on the list on their final destinations causes a rise of xenophobia and racism, as well as continuous strengthening of far-right movements and other violent extremist organizations. These new phenomena further complicate the security situation in the host countries of immigrants and further contribute to the creation of a hopeless situation and fear of rapid change of the ethnic structure in the smaller countries that have a low birth rate. In these countries, rapid development of far-right and racist organizations which organize various violent outbursts and brutal attacks on the quarters inhabited by immigrants has been trending lately.

Modus operandi of the illegal border crossings

After the implementation of the selective approach to migrants¹⁴⁵, economic migrants (those that do not originate from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq) are trying in every possible way to enter in Republic of North Macedonia and continue their travel to the west-European countries, and for that reason most of them or 80% are using fake Greek documents (changed, re-written in the place for their origin, containing the name of the countries that are allowed for entry), and small portion of them do not possess ID documents or use false passports and IDs with a country of origin that is not allowed.

¹⁴⁴ Kotovhevski, M., Forms of criminal activities of transnational organized crime, Thematic proceedings of the Faculty of philosophy, Skopje, pp. 6-8

¹⁴⁵ Metcalfe-Hough, V., The migration crisis? Facts, challenges and possible solutions, 2015, <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9913.pdf> [accessed 10.05.2019]

By closing the West Balkan route¹⁴⁶, the only way for movement for the migrants from Greece was and still is the illegal movement through the route or by using the services of migrants' smugglers. Part of the illegal migrants are illegally crossing the border alone or in small groups, but most of them do that in organized groups¹⁴⁷. Illegal migrants, especially in the night or early morning hours, cross the border using the time of shift of the patrol teams. From midMarch 2017 to present day, migrants have been found in trains and buses traveling from Skopje to Gevgelija or at train and bus stations, having had previously crossed the border with Serbia and intending to enter Greece. The reason for their voluntary return is most often due to family reunification or lack of sufficient funds for further travel, then part of them due to exhaustion and prolonged stubbornness in the Temporary Centers. Thus, some of them give up their intention and return to their home countries, while other migrants are taken by Serbian authorities from the camps located near the Croatian-Serbian border and transported to Preshevo near the Serbian-Macedonian border, where migrants illegally enter the Republic of North Macedonia on foot.

The most risky areas¹⁴⁸ used for the illegal crossing of the Greek-Macedonian border are in the Gevgelija-Dojran region: between Kota 4 and Koupot, after which they are directed towards the village of Dinkut; from Evzoni border crossing through the Greek gas station they move in the direction of the village the Virgin and from there, they head to the customs terminal and casino Admiral; at "Tabla" near GK 44/4 they go in direction of the Paljurci dam and village Crničani, pass over the hunting ground "Badjo" and are stationed near the regional road Bogdanci-Crničani; some go to the village Selemli, NK Chede Filipovski, GK56-Dalovod, between GK 52 and GK 54, with the possibility of being transferred through Stojakovo-Bogdanci-highway-Kumanovo-Lojane-Vaksince. The most common places from where illegal migrants are smuggled are the village of Moin, between Stoyakovo and Bogorodica, Kravarski Road, the section of the road from the village of Prdejci to the bridge of the river Zuica, the mountain road from the village Negorci to the village Miravci, and then on the old road to Demir Kapija, through the village Bogorodica, across the field to the village of Djavato and along the old road to the village Grčiste and the village of Marvinci, village Uma-G. Konsko-Sermenin-Negorci up to village of Gradec. A small number of migrants were found in Bitola region near the border stones of GK-159,

¹⁴⁶Buchanan, L.,Peçanha, S., Europe Tries to Shut Down Routes as Migrant Flow Intensifies. The New York Times.https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/03/11/world/europe/europe-tries-to-shut-down-routes-as-migrant-flow-intensifies.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=photo-spot-region®ion=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=0 [accessed 10.05.2019]

¹⁴⁷ Source: Ministry of Interior of the Republic of North Macedonia

¹⁴⁸Because of the frequency of migrants and geographical conditions, border police authorities can't have overall control over these areas. That is why migrants used them for illegal crossings of the border.Source: Ministry of Interior of the Republic of North Macedonia

GK-153/7, GK-144, crossroads for Medzitlija, Zivojno, industrial zone Zabeni, river Negorchanka, village of Gneotino, the surrounding area of the village of Bač; while in the Dojran region the villages Sretenovo, Gjopčeli, Thessaloniki Way, Vladaia and others are used.

On the northern border with the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Kosovo, the Kumanovo-Lipkovo region is a high risk area (most of the illegal migrants are found in the region of Tabanovska River - GK-4, the Resuljka region - GK-1, between GK -3 and GK -4, old Vranjanski road - GK-10, Miratovački road, Ashanski road - Sopot, the junction near Kosturnik village, Katuntsi, the surrounding area of the village of Vaksince, Tabanovce, etc.), because it is part of the Western Balkan route of illegal migrants. Some of the migrants stay on the territory of North Macedonia and are engaged in smuggling of migrants and other criminal activities.

On the western border with Albania, the most common places of illegal crossings are in the vicinity of: GP Kjafasan and Frangovo illegal routes from GK E 38 to GK E 49, due to the proximity of the main road and the villages of Frangovo and Radolishta; GP Blato illegal routes GK E 14/2, GK E 15/5, GK E 15/7; GP Stenje illegal routes GKF 14 and GKF 13/3 and GKF 12/8, GPDzepcishte from GKE 17/8, Eglenik, GKE 17/12 Kutli, GKE 19, GKE 19/1 Stara Karaula, GK E 21 Zendelovi Livadi GK E 22/5 Trebishki Bridge, GK E 23 Crkov and GK E 25 Drenok.

On the eastern border with Bulgaria - possible routes for illegal entry of migrants from the Republic of Bulgaria on the territory of North Macedonia are through the border crossing Novo Selo: the border stone GK3, Belasica mountain; GK9 – Staro Konjarevo; GK32 in Adjiica, Ograzden Mountain and Strumica region: Belasica Mountain.

The adoption of certain decisions and the strengthened border controls have contributed to intensifying the smuggling of migrants, which, in turn, increases the demand for illegal crossing of the territory of the country by the local criminal groups and individuals. Migrant smuggling has a significant downward trend compared to the previous three years. A total of 362 criminal offenses of "smuggling migrants" were conducted by 581 persons, who have attempted to smuggle a total of 3,687 migrants.

	2014	2015	2016	2017	01.01- 31.09.2018
Crimes	94	142	80	13	33
Perpetrators	166	212	123	36	44
Migrants	693	1005	1014	212	763

Table 1: Revealed crimes of smuggling migrants, the perpetrators and migrants prevented in their attempt to smuggle¹⁴⁹

In all these discovered cases, the smuggling of 3.687 migrants was prevented. 1.130 of them were from Syria, 796 from Afganistan, 788 from Pakistan, etc. The migrants were found gthrough controls of passenger and vehicles on the southern border from Gevgelija to Skopje and on the northern border in the Kumanovo region.

	2014	2015	2016	2017	01.01-31.09.2018
Syria	377	598	121	6	28
Afghanistan	186	153	344	21	92
Pakistan	0	51	189	44	504
Iraq	0	83	100	13	36

Table 2: Number of migrants prevented to be smuggled by country of origin¹⁵⁰

In terms of the perpetrators, the largest number are Macedonian citizens - 503, and 78 are foreign citizens (from Greece - 17, from Albania - 14, from Serbia - 13, from Bulgaria - 10, 6 from Pakistan, 5 from Afghanistan, 3 from Georgia, 2 from the Netherlands and Germany and 1 from Poland, Palestine, Italy, Romania, Kosovo and Turkey). Some of them appear as migrants' carriers, some assist in their illegal passage and/or organize their further transportation.

Regarding the routes and the modes of migrant smuggling, the migrants enter North Macedonia illegally through the southern border with the help of persons-leaders, after which they are placed in abandoned buildings near the state border, from where they are taken by carriers and for a certain amount of money they are transfered to the border settlements near the northern border with Serbia. The criminals and the groups provide vehicles that are procured for a small amount of money to transfer the migrants, and if they are noticed by police officers, they leave the vehicles unsecured or crashed in order to destry evidence that may incriminate the perpetrators. Also, the smugglers transport the migrants across the green border belts on foot, and after crossing the border, they can be escorted to a secure house or some other meeting place where they wait before being taken for the next part of their journey.

¹⁴⁹ Source: Ministry of Interior of the Republic of North Macedonia

¹⁵⁰ Source: Ministry of Interior of the Republic of North Macedonia

The main route in the state used for smuggling of migrants is through the Gevgelija-Demir Kapija region, often used is the Valandovo-Strumica region (the mountain Belasica, the Novoselski region - the villages under Belasica, the Osogovo-northern slopes), Bitola-Prilep, Dojran and Kavadarci region, along the roads to Radovish, Shtip, Kavadarci, Prilep, Veles, Kumanovo and Skopje with the goal of illegally crossing the northern border with Serbia, and then onward to the final destination - Western European countries.

In terms of the modus operandi, the persons who are part of the criminal groups are using fast and expensive motor vehicles, most often of the brands: BMW, Mercedes, Audi, Peugeot, Honda, Volkswagen, etc. and they do not stop at the given signs from the police officers, they use stolen Macedonian registration plates, sometimes the vehicles are with foreign license plates, they often change the owners of the motor vehicles, and the like. The communication among the Middle East organizers is usually carried out by telephone and internet communication with unknown persons - organizers from Greece, who agree on the number of migrants to be transferred, which illegal passages to be used and the exact location for their handover. Due to the reinforced police patrols and controls, the migrant guides enter the current GPS coordinates in a message they send via the mobile application "Viber" or "WhatsApp". A new modality used for migrant smuggling in 2018 is crossing a border concealed in a vehicle or a bus (two cases were discovered in March 2018 at the border crossing Bogorodica), which deviates from the usual modus operandi of smuggling characteristic in the past three years.

Organized criminal groups and migrant smuggling

Nowadays there are various views in defining organized criminal groups. Thus, there is one definition which is most commonly used and it comes from one convention in Palermo¹⁵¹, where professionals have defined the organized criminal groups as structured groups of three or more persons, existing in a certain period of time, and acting jointly with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes.

Theoretical studies¹⁵² show that criminal organizations can be considered as fluid organizations, because they are very dependable on the geographic conditions on the one hand, and on the nationality of the migrants on the other. Usually the criminal groups are cooperating with each other. They form small clusters which are able to communicate easily with other small clusters. Each cluster has a specific degree of expertise and therefore the clusters of groups are considered as crucial parts.

Those groups are not randomly formed, but every member knows exactly what their part of the job is. The members of the criminal group are gathered in

¹⁵¹Article 2, Convention of the UN on Transnational Organized Crime, Palermo, 2000, downloaded from <https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCbook-e.pdf> [accessed 22.12.2018]

¹⁵²Камбовски, В., Организиран криминал, 2-ри Август С, Штип, 2005, p. 42

order to perform a certain criminal activity more or less on a sustainable basis. They participate in organized crime in order to provide illegal goods. Like any other organization, criminal groups require a certain level of economic stability and specialization.¹⁵³

Very often, the criminal groups are involved in illegal migration and migrant smuggling, but there are also part of other illegal processes, such as trafficking, extortion and money laundering. It is very important to know that sometimes the process of migrant smuggling can involve small criminal groups which have no more than four or five members who work on a particular territory.

However, there are also ultimately sophisticated criminal groups which offer a full service for the migrants, including forged documents, transport and etc. They are usually decentralized and very hard to catch. They have various so-called actors who operate in a particular field. Sometimes there are also subdivisions that function as partner organizations in order to help the main criminal organization to perform their activity.

The entire operation can be organized by an organizer or group of organizers who cooperate with each other. This fact indicates the melting flexibility that exists among organized crime groups. People who usually recruit are not connected to a criminal group, but they offer their services to the crime groups depending on the needs of the operation. They usually recruit vulnerable groups or persons who may be easily exploited. Also, there are people who work on collecting money for transportation at the beginning of the travel, and then they help the people throughout the journey.¹⁵⁴

The most difficult part of tracing¹⁵⁵ these organizations is to collect evidence against the main actors who are coordinating the whole process of smuggling. Coordinator or organizer is the person who has the responsibility for the operation. He is the one who directly chooses who will be a member of the organization. He is also in charge of defining the route and the way of transportation.

Besides the coordinator, there are some very important roles in one criminal group. According to Shoenhart, the individuals and criminal groups involved in smuggling migrants may limit their activities to one or more roles:

- Investors – people who invest money in the operation and oversee the entire process. The pyramid structure of the organization protects their anonymity,
- Researchers – people who seek potential migrants,
- Corrupt public officials – people who can help secure travel documents by accepting a bribe,
- Spies – people who collect information on issues such as border surveillance, immigration,

¹⁵³ Council of Europe, *Illegal migration and smuggling of migrants in the region of Western Balkan*, ION, Geneva, 2006, pp. 31-32

¹⁵⁴ Paoli, L., *The paradoxes of organized crime*, Crime, Law & Social Change, 2002, p. 62

¹⁵⁵ More details in Reichel, P., *Handbook of transnational crime and justice*, Data Pons, Skopje, 2009

- Guides and crew members – people who are responsible for the transfer of the migrants from one place to another,
- Executors – people who are responsible for supervising the staff and the migrants,
- Money launderers – people who launder assets which are acquired through criminal activity by hiding its origin.

The criminal groups are organized very well in order to achieve great results. As we can see, there are roles that are complementary and each role helps some other role in order to create a chain which will function effectively.

Transport across the border is carried out by local residents on both sides of the border, which constitutes the lowest level of the hierarchy of the organization, while the middle and the top levels of hierarchy are dominated by ethnically homogenous groups.

Often when it comes to migrant smuggling, there is the phenomenon of interdependence between criminal groups. This phenomenon reflects the motivation of sophisticated criminal groups to increase their profits.

Conclusion

Illegal migration is a complex phenomenon and it requires a regional approach. The Republic of North Macedonia is involved in every regional initiative dealing with this issue, but there are also many things that need to be done. The Western Balkan countries need support from the international community, especially from the European Union in order to strengthen their capacities for preventing, identifying and dealing with illegal migration. Having in mind that the Western Balkans is not their ultimate goal, but a transit zone, the competent institutions may not have the same level of motivation to detect illegal migrants because it costs a lot, and sometimes they prefer to "look the other way". It is in the best interest of the EU member states to provide support to the Western Balkan countries and to prevent migrants' attempts to reach the richer EU member states.

In the future, the state, through its official authorities and law enforcement authorities, primarily the Ministry of Interior and other relevant ministries and institutions, should especially engage in preventing migrant smuggling. The enhanced border controls, mobile patrol teams, residence control and movement of foreigners, procurement of modern scanning devices and inspection of freight vehicles at the border crossings for the purpose of detecting migrants, training of border staff to detect such activities are just some of the measures which should be improved internally.

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SAFETY AND PREVENTION OF TRAFFIC DELINQUENCY

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Abstract

In the paper, the authors elaborate issues related to the safety of road traffic and the prevention of traffic delinquency. In that sense, questions about the impact and the role of road safety factors are first addressed, and then through the phenomenological and etiological approach, the traffic safety situation, as well as the characteristics of traffic delicts, conditions, causes and consequences of the traffic accidents.

On this basis, at the end of the paper, certain recommendations for improvement and advancement of road traffic safety and the prevention of traffic delinquency are given.

Key words: traffic safety, traffic delinquency, traffic accident, causes, prevention

1. INTRODUCTION

Traffic in general (land, water, air, telecommunication, Internet), and especially the road traffic, as a way and style of social and individual living, is one of the contemporary challenges of our modern era. The traffic phenomenon surpasses the borders of a commercial branch and it represents its own testing ground for technical inventions and means for satisfying the human existential and broader social, political, economic, and cultural needs. In its essence, traffic is one of the four fundamental and existential functions in every living area (work, living, leisure, and traffic), with the aim to connect all the other functions with as minimized negative effects as possible¹⁵⁶. There are no doubts that the modern traffic contributes to efficient and safe exchange of different goods (ideas and values), shipment of raw materials for production, export of finished goods, work and recreational trips, cultural activities, and many other activities and creations in this modern world.

¹⁵⁶Lipovac.P.K., Traffic Safety, Beograd, 2008, p.139.

However, apart from the great impact of the traffic on contemporary civilizational functioning, existence and creation, on the other side of the trophy (as an antipode), the road traffic represents an immediate typical social sphere of danger and threatening that increases with a huge growth. That is a result of the increased population and vehicles on a narrower traffic space on the one hand and the rising evident disparity between the science and technology development, and the rising of the technical awareness, culture and knowledge of those that are somehow involved in the traffic flows, on the other hand. This is especially a feature of undeveloped and the developing countries where traffic still represents its own testing ground and a source of different threatening to human lives, body integrity, and property. Therefore, in the report of the World Health Organization it is stated that in the world's traffic accidents, 1.300.000 people have lost their lives, and around 50.000.000 people remained with severe injuries. It is pointed out that traffic injuries are one of the three main reasons for death of those in the 5 to 44 age group. Along with that, the forecast shows and indicates that unless more efficient measures are undertaken, the consequences of the traffic accidents are going to become the fifth driving force for the death of humans around the world resulting in increasement of the number of deaths yearly. The material expenses of traffic accidents are from 1 to 3% of the GDP and it reaches US\$ 500.000.000.000.¹⁵⁷ Also, according to the traffic statistics regarding the road traffic safety, in the last decade in the Republic of North Macedonia¹⁵⁸ there are unfavorable conditions and negative tendencies with oscillatory trends. For instance, on the average, around 160 people lost their lives and above 5.500 people suffered from severe bodily injuries and the material damage was around 230.000.000 euros, which is 2,3% of GDP only as a result of traffic accidents. Within the European framework, the traffic accident victims are on the average of 5,2 victims and in Macedonia 7,1 per victim on 10.000 citizens. Research shows that Macedonia is among the last five in the traffic safety compared with 32 European countries¹⁵⁹.

The above mentioned information from the traffic reports shows that the unfavorable level and negative tendencies in the traffic safety, as well as the complexity of the traffic delinquency issues (which are produced by the traffic accidents consequences) are alarming, and they represent yet a serious safety and public health issues with a lot of challenges (on a world, regional and local level). Therefore, in the upcoming period, it is a must to have the need of additional and comprehensive systematically planned, organized, and coordinated, and strategically targeted measures and activities for prevention of the traffic

¹⁵⁷ World Health Organization (WHO,2013), **A global plan for a decade of actions for the safety of road traffic, 2011-2020**).

¹⁵⁸ By overcoming the long-year-two-and-a-half-year bilateral dispute and the signing of the Prespa Agreement between the Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and the Republic of Greece, as well as the constitutional changes during 2018, the former name of the Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) officially for domestic and international use has been replaced with the Republic of North Macedonia

¹⁵⁹ Retrieved from : <https://netpress.com.mk/agencija-za-bezbednost-vo-soobrakajot-ke-ja-namaluva-smrtnosta-na-patistata/>

delinquency and advancement and improvement of the road traffic safety must be implemented.

2. TRAFFIC, SAFETY FACTORS AND TRAFFIC DELINQUENCY

There are no doubts that modern *traffic* represents one of the four fundamental and existential functions in every living area (work, living, leisure and traffic) whose aim is to connect all the other functions, and decreased negative effects as much as possible. The main aim of traffic safety is creation of conditions for neat, smooth and optimal safe traffic as well as protection of those involved, and protection of the property from all kinds of threatening, damages and accidents.

The main *factors* for functioning and from which the road safety depends are: human, road, vehicle, and the environment. In essence, the factors that have an indirect and direct effect on the traffic safety as well as the causes that contribute to the emergence of the traffic delinquency and traffic accidents, are different and mutually conditioned and intermingled. However, based on the character of their nature, in their origin they still might be divided into two groups: For example, in the group of *subjective (human) factors* and reasons for traffic delinquency as well as the traffic accidents are those activities and reasons of subjective character that have an awareness of their behavior, activities, environment and the influence on that environment, i.e. all those circumstances, relations and processes that come from the people (subject-human as a factor in the capacity of: driver, pedestrian, traveler, responsible person of a road safety maintenance infrastructure institution, driving park, etc.). The *objective (natural, societal, technical) factors* and reasons are those factors, circumstances, relations and processes that do not have awareness from them, their environment and influence that environment acting independently from the people's consciousness and will. The list exists of: natural, societal, and technical factors. The natural factors are actually the natural environment factors, such as climatic conditions (atmospheric occasions and rains, air temperature) and the geographic conditions. The social factors contain the traffic environment and a lot of different aspects add on the different intensity and impact, most of all: the level of economic and cultural development, sociodemographic conditions, the social environment condition, the size of the territory and the movement of population, the tradition impact, the organization of the quality education system, education, driving classes (driving schools), and control, the presence of social and pathological phenomena (alcoholism, drug addiction), the culture condition, tradition, and the traffic culture. Technical factors are: the state of the roads (road infrastructure), and the state of the vehicles (technical readiness and correctness).

As a scientific discipline, *traffic safety* deals with the study of the severe consequences of traffic and the methods for their prevention. In its functional and organizational matter, the road traffic safety is a system of planned, organized, coordinated, and synchronized preventive-repressive measures and methods by all authorities and institutions as well as the interested parties (public sector and media) – these are factors that contribute to the improvement of the road traffic

safety.¹⁶⁰ Actually, these measures and methods refer to the prevention, detection, and elimination of the conditions, actions and causes that lead to different threats and dangers by traffic collisions. According to that, safety means non-existence of traffic threats and dangers and on the contrary, existence of traffic threats and dangers means disapproval of the road traffic safety.

Traffic delicts are a special way of criminal behavior which is specific in criminal, (phenomenological and etiologial), criminal-legal, and penological view. Therefore, those delicts, in the positive penal legislation scope, are distinguished in different groups of delicts: criminl acts and offenses, crimes, and offenses and lately there are advocacies for regulations of these issues under a certain given legal act, the so-called traffic criminal law.¹⁶¹

In reference to the term *traffic delinquency*, there are many beliefs in the literature depending on the preferences of the criteria authors of the criminal law. For instance, according to Sheparovich¹⁶², traffic delinquency is a mass negative social situation with anti-law social behavior in the traffic which manifests in contribution or in the making of different social situations with threatening and sufferng of those involved in the traffic and/or destroying of the traffic material values. Makra¹⁶³ refers that the traffic delinquency is the delinquency in the public traffic and according to the delict law the traffic delicts are incriminated as criminal acts and road traffic valuations offenses. Arnaudovski¹⁶⁴ thinks the term traffic delinquency covers all types of valuation of the rules of conduct in the traffic such as: criminal acts as social risky acts that lead to certain consequences by default; traffic misconducts offenses on the situations and the people involved in an irresponsible, undisciplined, and incorrect traffic way; traffic offenses as a way of undisciplined conduct which leads to an abstract danger; and many other ways of asocial traffic behavior of those involved where the established rules of conduct are damaged. Kambovski and Tupancheski show that the traffic delinquency is made of two groups of lawbreaking incriminated in the criminal acts and road traffic offenses out of which the former (criminal acts) are characterized by intensity of damaging of certain harmful consequences and the latter (offenses) in their massive and abstract danger. That is a specific type of criminality, not some technical aberration, a compound of technical mistakes and omissions in the triangle: man – machine – road. Kralev¹⁶⁵ at the same time points out that traffic delinquency is a specific form of criminality and delinquent behavior and the delict offender is called a traffic delinquent. This term consists of the inattentive and criminal acts and offenses done from a possible intent which are performed with disobedience

¹⁶⁰ Mrgoski, B., Babanoski, K., XII International Symposium "ROAD ACCIDENTS PREVENTION 2014" Hotel Jezero, Borsko Jezro, 09th and 10th October 2014. p.65.

¹⁶¹ Milutinovich.M, Criminology, Belgarde, 1986, p.184.

¹⁶² Sheparovich, Z., Stradanje u prometu – sigurnost i odgovornost, Zagreb-Belgrade,1987, p.217-228.

¹⁶³ Makra, A., Prometna delikvencija, Priručnik, No.3/1988, p.243.

¹⁶⁴ Arnaudovski, Lj., Aetiology of traffic delinquency-for one approach to its study, Yearbook of the Faculty of Law, Skopje,1988/89, p.348.

¹⁶⁵ Kralev, T., Criminology of Negligent (Traffic) Delinquency, Skopje,1988 p 151.

and breaking of the traffic rules and regulations with which the traffic set values and goods (life, body integrity of the people and property) are threatened or hurt.

According to the Criminal Code (CC) in the group of the Criminal Acts against the safety of public traffic, the following incriminations are determined: endangering of traffic safety – Art.297; endangering of traffic safety with dangerous action or means – Art. 298; unscrupulous traffic monitoring – Art. 299; tough acts against the people and property traffic safety – Art. 300; failure to provide assistance to a person injured in a traffic accident – Art. 301; abduction of aircraft or ship – Art. 302; air traffic safety endangering – Art. 303; destroying or removing of an air traffic safety sign – Art. 304; The traffic rules, regulations, signs, and sanctions for traffic offenses are regulated in the Law for Traffic Road Safety (LTRS)¹⁶⁶.

In essence, traffic delinquency represents the individual and mass societal non-aggressive phenomenon and tendency which consists of various active (or passive) measures and actions by traffic entities and participants, which is manifested through irregular (violation of the right norms), irregular (violation of technical norms) and unethical behavior in traffic. In addition, by disrespect of the legal, technical, and ethical norms through active or passive actions, it is the traffic entities and participants (mostly drivers, pedestrians and passengers) that cause numerous and varied adverse conditions of *threats*, *hazards* and *traffic accidents*. Due to the massiveness, dynamics, and heterogeneity of the participants, any irresponsible participant can be a victim with various sufferings and consequences of various traffic delinquencies and accidents in the traffic.

3. CRIMINOLOGICAL ASPECTS, INCREASED CONDITIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS

Criminology is an independent, theoretical-empirical, interdisciplinary social science for the phenomenological characteristics and causes (etiology) of criminality as a mass social phenomenon and the criminal behavior as an individual phenomenon, with the aim to explain and prevent it (suppression)¹⁶⁷. *Phenomenology of traffic accidents* studies accidents as phenomena without further study of the causes, complex interrelationships that initiated them, and observes traffic accidents as the so-called "Black box". Thus, traffic phenomenology is very important for understanding the problems and specific sources of danger, especially for defining the number and structure of accidents, the spatial distribution of accidents, the time distribution of accidents, trends in the development of phenomena, and the number and structure of the victims. It is based on statistical and other simple methods and is therefore entrusted to the police. In the phenomenological sense, the numerous and various forms of interception of traffic

¹⁶⁶ Law on Road Traffic Safety, "Official Gazette" in the Republic of Macedonia, No.169/2015.

¹⁶⁷ Arnaudovski, Lj., *Criminology*, Skopje, 2007, p.22; Slobodanka Kostadinovic – Vilic, Vesna Nikolic-Ristic, *Criminology*, Faculty of Law in Nis, 2003, p.17.

participants caused by the use of vehicles and non-compliance with traffic regulations and rules are placed in a special form called traffic delinquency¹⁶⁸. *The Etiology of traffic accidents* actually studies the causes of the occurrence of traffic accidents. In doing so, it "opens the black box", examines the status of traffic accidents and studies the relationship (causality) in the traffic system: man-vehicle-road-environment, which has led to a traffic accident. The aim of the etiology is not only to prevent the risk in the specific space and time but to understand the legality which leads to that risk and reduces the risk of an accident in any similar space and at any time. Etiology monitors traffic accidents as a chain of events and tries to answer the question of which event in the chain and how much it contributed to the occurrence of the traffic accident. A traffic accident can be defined as "an event in a series of events that usually produces death, injury or property damage" (Baker, Rivers, etc.)¹⁶⁹. The main aim of the etiology of traffic delinquencies and accidents is not only the archaeological observation of the past, but also the creation of the future. From an *etiological point of view*, traffic delicts are their own kind of product of numerous and various factors, causes, conditions and circumstances from socio-economic, psychological, psychophysical and meteorological character, poor quality of roads and traffic infrastructure, inadequate regulation or traffic regulation, ignorance and disregard of traffic regulations and rules, low level of traffic culture and many other similar circumstances.

As *unfavorable conditions for the people and property safety in the road traffic*, according to their legal qualification and degree of social danger, are: endangerment, danger, and traffic accidents. This means that if there is a danger or a traffic accident that came with a violation of a *legal norm*, it is considered that this has occurred with an *unprofessional driving*, if it came to a violation of a *technical norm*, it is considered that this was caused by *improper driving*. The relevant legislation regulates the rights and stipulates the obligations for the behavior of the traffic participants and other subjects on which safety depends on such occasions. For example, in the *path* factor, the subjects create favorable conditions even when designing roads, during their construction or reconstruction, during maintenance, equipment with road signalization, traffic-technical regulation and arrangement, etc. In the *vehicle* factor, subjects also create favorable conditions while designing the construction of the vehicle, making-production, servicing, use, maintenance, and more. In the *human* factor, the unfavorable conditions of the subjects - traffic participants are created by ignorance or disregard of the traffic regulations, the rules and the norms of movement and behavior in the traffic, depending on how they participate in the traffic (driver, passenger, pedestrian, cattle keeper, etc.) This is a consequence of the unwillingness or insufficient ability of a person to safely participate in modern dynamic and developed traffic. In addition to the stated, there are other conditions, reasons, and causes that create

¹⁶⁸Boshkovich, M.,: *Криминологија с пенологијом део II, Социјална патологија*, novi Sad, 2002, p. 163.

¹⁶⁹Lipovac.P.K., quoted study. p.151;

unfavorable conditions, such as: the psycho-physical condition of the participants in the traffic, the objective conditions and traffic-technical regulation, traffic and technical education, culture, course, etc.

In essence, *endangerment* is an unfavorable condition for the safety of road traffic caused by man (most often) or nature (rarely) with the manifestation of disregard of legal, technical, and other norms by individual entities in the traffic system (*man - road - vehicle - environment*). Thus, for example: driving too fast or non-adjustment of the speed of movement to the conditions of the road, traffic, atmospheric circumstances, the technical condition of the vehicle, the load, etc.; driving a vehicle under the influence of alcohol, narcotic drugs, and other sedative devices; failure to comply with the right of priority; irregular overtaking; disregard of traffic signs, etc. In addition, threats can, but do not have to be turned to a higher degree of endangerment - danger or traffic accident. In most cases they disappear or remain at the same level, new ones are emerging again, etc. *The danger* in road traffic is a higher degree of endangerment or unfavorable condition for the road traffic safety, which, as a consequence of the threat posed, has caused immediate danger to another participant in the traffic, but without any specific material damages or injuries (the consequence is abstract danger). For example: 1. by driving too fast, in order to avoid traffic accidents, the driver of the vehicle crossed the left side of the carriageway, intended for the opposite direction traffic vehicles. At the moment, another vehicle came from the opposite direction of the carriageway, whose driver reacted individually and skillfully to avoid traffic accidents, but went outside the carriageway, on the sidewalk. By that he was exposed to danger even though there was no a traffic accident; 2. An exhausted bus driver of a bus full of passengers went with the bus outside the carriageway because of drowsiness and negligence, but the surrounding land was such that there was no turning over of the bus or hitting an object. In this case, passengers were exposed to imminent danger, even though there was no a traffic accident, etc. And the danger can, but not necessarily, be turned into a higher degree of endangerment - a traffic accident.

According to the Law on Road Traffic Safety¹⁷⁰, the term "*traffic accident*" is defined as a situation on the road in which at least one vehicle on the road participated and at least one person was injured, killed or died from the consequences of that traffic accident within 30 days or it caused material damage from the same. In case of a traffic collision, the event in which a working vehicle, a working machine, a motocultivator, a tractor or a moving vehicle moving in an uncategorized way or when performing on-the-go movements, does not count as an uncategorized route or has overturned or crashed into a natural obstacle at the same time, no other vehicle or pedestrian participates and when that event does not cause damage to another person. According to the aforementioned law, the term "minor material damage in a traffic accident" means the damage to objects and vehicles

¹⁷⁰ Law on Road Traffic Safety (ZBSP), Official Gazette ” in the Republic of Macedonia, No.169/2015, Article 2 point 139.

that do not have their vital parts for regulating and stopping damaged, while the vehicles can independently move along the road. In order to provide more traffic flow, in cases where a car accident with minor material damage has occurred, the participants in the accident with mutual consent for the purpose of indemnification have the right to fill out a form of "European Road Traffic Accident Report" prepared by the National Insurance Bureau Republic of Macedonia (BSRP points 140 and 141). Regarding the term of traffic collision and accident, there is some controversy and thinking in literature and practice in the sense that these concepts from both semantic and scientific view are different and should not be used as identical or synonyms. Namely, these unfavorable, unwanted and unexpected events in the traffic (which are usually negligent), are essentially different in terms of the consequences, because they need to be identified, differentiated and legitimately precisely defined and normed in the coming period. In that sense, for example, we think it is more appropriate, the term traffic collision should cover those traffic events that caused little material damage, while traffic events with fatal consequences (lost human lives, serious bodily injuries and large material damages) should be named with the term *traffic accidents*¹⁷¹.

Table 1. Scope and dynamics of traffic accidents by types of consequences in the Republic of North Macedonia (in the period 2012-2017)

Year	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	TOTAL		Average
							ALL	%	
Total traffic accidents with victims:	4108	4230	3852	3854	3902	4019	24.065	100	4010
1. traffic accidents with dead people:	124	170	115	135	150	137	831	3,45	138,5
1.1. dead people:	(132)	(198)	(130)	(148)	(165)	(155)	(928)	2,46	154,6
2. traffic accidents with injured people:	3984	4060	3737	3719	3752	3882	23.134	96,55	3855
2.1. heavily and easily injured people:	(6149)	(6484)	(6056)	(5913)	(5971)	(6224)	(36.797)	97,54	6133
TOTAL victims:	6281	6682	6186	6061	6136	6379	37.725	100	6288

Source: Ministry of Interior (MOI) - Statistical data on traffic accidents¹⁷²

In Table 1 there is an overview of road traffic accidents in the Republic of North Macedonia for the period of 2012-2017. During the analyzed six-year period,

¹⁷¹ See more: Murgoski, B., Some aspects of the concepts of collision/accident and criminalistic processing, Scientific writing, St. Clement of Ohrid University of Bitola, 2007, p. 59

¹⁷² <https://mvr.gov.mk/statistiki/soobrakjaj>

a total of 24,065 heavy traffic accidents occurred, in which a total of 37,725 people were affected, 928 (2,46%) of whom lost their lives, and 36,797 (97.54%) people received heavy or light injuries. Regarding the volume and dynamics, an oscillatory trend was observed, with an annual average of 4010 heavy road accidents in which an average of 155 people lost their lives a year, and 6133 people received severe and light bodily injuries. This means that in the observed period, on average, almost every second day there was one victim in the road traffic, and daily on 17 people received heavy or light injuries and as a consequence remained with permanent or temporary disability from traffic accidents. Regarding the area and the resulting consequences, about 65% of the traffic accidents occurred in the settlements (urban environment), and about 35% outside the settlements on the open roads.

Analyzing the data, in terms of the structure of the traffic participants who made certain mistakes with their behavior in the mentioned period, the following is noted: most of the errors originate from drivers - 92.7%, pedestrians - 6.2%, followed by passengers, vehicles, roads and other reasons. In the total number of deaths, an average of approximately 5% a year are children (people up to 14 years of age). Predominant mistakes caused by the subjective factor - the man (about 96%), most often manifested as inadequate, undisciplined, aggressive and shameless traffic behavior among drivers and pedestrians (driving too fast, disregard of the rules for passing, irregular movement and turning, non-sustaining side and movement and turning, irregular overtaking and management under the influence of alcohol, non-passing of marked pedestrian crossing, etc.), and while data on the low representation of other factors are paradoxical (with around 4% - road, vehicle, etc.). Namely, in our country there are longer-term problems and difficulties with regard to the construction, maintenance and revitalization of the road network and the public roads traffic infrastructure. Regrettably, there are still situations of a great and worrying discrepancy in terms of the "how should" standards and the factual "how is it" situation. At the same time, the relatively high level of obsolescence of the *traffic fleet* in the public and private sector (especially by importing vehicles from abroad with over ten years of age and exploitation) is a special problem, which from a technical point of view represents a latent security concern in the traffic. Therefore, we think that additional institutional efforts, cooperation and coordination of the competent bodies are necessary in the upcoming period, as well as continuous funded research for a consistent traffic policy and strategy towards the modernization of the road infrastructure and the revitalization of the fleet, both in the public and in the private sector.

Regarding the reasons for the occurrence of traffic accidents, from the data analysis, the following distribution is noticeable: in the first place is the fast driving on the roads, i.e., unaccounted speed (40,19%), followed by disregard of the rules of passing (21,1%), irregular movement and turning (14,63%), unsupported side and direction of movement (13,92%), irregular overtaking (5.21%), driving a vehicle under the influence of alcohol (4.95%), and the remaining 3% for other reasons.

Below we will give a brief overview of some of the rights and obligations of road users and some of the underlying factors and reasons that lead to traffic accidents.

Namely, as to the basic rules on road traffic, in accordance with the zoning provisions, the participants in the traffic are obliged to act in accordance with the regulations on traffic rules, traffic signalization on the road, as well as the traffic signs and orders given by the police officers, and exceptionally and according to the requirements given by signs and uniformed officials of the customs service, the financial police, the forest police and uniformed military personnel (ZSPP-Article 17).

1. From the analysis of the presented data, the fast driving i.e. failure to adapt the speed of movement to the conditions and the state of the roads, it is noted that it is still in the first place as one of the reasons for causing traffic accidents (about 40%). Namely, according to the speed legal provisions, the driver is obliged to adjust the speed of the vehicle movement to the properties and conditions of the road, clarity, visibility, atmospheric conditions, the condition of the vehicle and the load, the traffic density and other traffic conditions, in a way of timely stopping the vehicle before any obstacle that can be foreseen under the given conditions. In doing so, the driver must not reduce the speed of movement to the extent that their vehicle constitutes an obstacle to the normal traffic flow (ZSPP Article 33). Regarding the restriction of the speed of movement with vehicles on a public road *in a settlement*, the driver must not drive the vehicle with a higher speed of 50 km/h, that is, with a speed greater than the speed with the assigned traffic sign for the entire settlement or their defined area. As an exception, if the traffic-technical elements of the road allow it, traffic with a speed greater than 70 km/h can be allowed with a traffic sign. On a public road *outside of a settlement*, the driver must not drive their vehicle at a higher speed determined by a traffic sign placed on the road of: 130 km/h on a motorway, 110 km/h on a road reserved for traffic of motor vehicles 90 km/h. (ZSPP-Article 36). According to the law (Article 37), the motor vehicle speed of movement on a public road under normal traffic conditions cannot be restricted by a traffic sign below 40 km/h, and in certain cases when the conditions of the road so require, the speed of movement to limit even below 40 km/h (ZSPP-Article 37). On public roads there are restrictions on the speed of movement of some categories of vehicles: 80 km/h for buses and buses with light trailers, for freight motor vehicles whose maximum permissible mass is not more than 7,500 kg., for motor vehicles that pulled a trailer and for passenger cars that pulled a light trailer and others. As an exception, the speed of movement of the following categories of motor vehicles is limited: 100 km/h for buses and freight motor vehicles whose maximum permissible mass is not more than 3.500 kg, 90 km/h for freight motor vehicles whose maximum permissible mass ranges from 3,500 kg to 7,500 kg and 80 km/h for freight motor vehicles whose maximum permissible mass is more than 7,500 kg and for buses when organized transportation of children. In essence, *the adjusted (safe) speed* of the vehicle's movement means the driver's ability to correctly assess and evaluate in specific

traffic conditions and on the road with his vehicle to move at such speed, which in any case may be a hazard or an obstacle on the road, can instantly notice them in a timely manner, adequately react and safely stop their vehicle, while not causing immediate danger to other participants in the traffic accident or traffic collision. By contrast, any speed that crosses the bounds of a safe speed - represents an *unregulated speed*. Regulated speed is a relative term. For this reason, it should be taken into account the fact that not only the speed above the permissible speed is unregulated, but also that the speed that is within the permissible speed of that part of the road is unregulated speed, but given the specific conditions and state on the road (reduced visibility from fog, heavy rain or snow, at night, moist, slippery carriage, etc.) is not safe due to the inability to respond promptly and adequately to avoid the accident or safe stop of the vehicle.

Then, in the structure of the causes of the subjective factors in the traffic, very frequent violations of the regulations follow: disregard of the road rules of passing, the road irregular movements and turnings, the non-keeping of the side and the direction of movement, the irregular overtaking and rounding, under the influence of alcohol and about 4% are objective factors.

2. The psycho-physical readiness, and especially the influence of alcohol, fatigue, drugs, other drugs and psychotropic substances, have a serious impact on the *driver's* factor, that is, the ability to safely drive a vehicle. The Law on Road Traffic Safety (ZSPP) includes certain prohibitions and penalties for drivers driving a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, as follows: 1. the driver must not drive a vehicle in the road traffic, nor begin to operate with a vehicle if he or she is under the influence of alcohol. 2. An alcoholized person will be considered to be a person who, by analysing blood or blood and urine together or another method for measuring the amount of alcohol in the body, will determine that the blood alcohol content is more than 0, 50 g/kg or if the presence of alcohol in the body is determined by appropriate means or by means of measuring alcoholism (alcohol, etc.), which corresponds to quantities greater than 0.50 g/kg or in which regardless of the alcohol content in the blood, with a professional examination, it will be determined that it shows signs of alcohol disorder.¹⁷³ A driver - beginner, a driver to whom it is a primary occupation, a driver-instructor and members of a test committee, may drive a motor vehicle if they are under the influence of alcohol.

In addition to numerous and various life problems in the contemporary conditions, the problem of alcoholism is one of most serious and it is not only public health's but also security's because of its presence in the area of the traffic. Statistics confirm this with their data indicating that about 50% of the consequences of all traffic accidents are caused by alcohol. Studies show that when driving under the influence of alcohol and drugs, many more mistakes are made than when driving without the influence of alcohol and drugs¹⁷⁴. Namely, the

¹⁷³ Law on Road Traffic Safety, Art. 234;

¹⁷⁴ See more: Josifovski, D., Murgoski, B., Angeleski, M., "Judicial, Medical and Psychological Aspects of Alcohol and Drugs in Traffic Safety", Proceedings of the second "Symposium on

alcohol entered in the stomach of a person passes into his blood through the mucous membrane of the mouth and stomach and mucous membranes of the intestine, and then throughout the whole organism and that process is called resorption. It starts immediately after the intake of alcohol in the oral mucous membrane and stomach and lasts 90 minutes, and sometimes even up to 120 minutes. The speed of blood resorption depends on several factors: whether alcohol is entered into an empty or full stomach, the quality and quantity of food, the type and strength of alcohol, the amount and the time of consumption, the psycho-physical and health condition, the mood, etc. The influence of alcohol on driving skills is not the same for all people. It depends on weight, age, physical fitness, metabolism and various other factors. However, in quantities above 0,30 mg/ml, the alcohol has a very negative impact on all drivers, regardless of personal characteristics¹⁷⁵. As it is commonly known, alcoholism has adverse effects on the health and psycho-physical ability of humans. Primarily it affects the blindness of the senses and the sensible behaviour, and the instinctive feelings fall from the sphere of self-control.

The level and concentration of alcohol in the blood has a huge influence on the so-called "*psychic second*", i.e. the time that flows from the moment of danger detection to the moment of taking measures to avoid that danger. This ability depends on the function of the senses (perceptions) for the coordination of the psychomotor and musculoskeletal apparatus and it implies: emotional stability, concentration capability, danger detection, processing of the contents of the performances in the brain and understanding of the situation, decision making for a reaction and coordinated, fast and reliable performance of the driving functions of the motor vehicle. With the rise in alcohol concentration, the ability to perform conscious and automated movements gradually falls, which must be mutually synchronized and appropriate to the newly occurring traffic situation. The value of the "*psychic second*" increases in proportion to the amount of alcohol¹⁷⁶. The "*Psychic Second* ", in a large number of people who are not under the influence of alcohol, i.e. when sober, it is 0.75 seconds. In alcoholism of about 1 g/kg it doubles and equals 1.5 seconds. Accordingly, if the driver drives at a speed of 100 km/h, it is 27.8 m/sec, which means that the sober driver passes a path of about 21 meters during a "*psychic second*" and a drunken driver about 41.5 meters. From this we can conclude that in this case the "*psychic second*" is twice as long as the "*psychic second*" of a sober person. Observed by a court-medical aspect, depending on the

Medicine and Psychology in the Road Traffic of the Republic of Macedonia", Ohrid, May 25, 1995, p.8-17.

¹⁷⁵Dushan Josifovski, Traffic Psychology, "Auto-Moto Association of Macedonia -AMSM ",2006, p.190-199.-The Influence of Alcohol, Drugs and Smoking on Drivers

¹⁷⁶The blood concentration is expressed in pro mille or millimoles (mmoli) and depends on the amount of alcoholic beverages consumed, their strength and other factors. Prolom is a quantity of pure alcohol, expressed in grams in one liter of blood. The value of alcohol in milligrams is obtained when the concentration of alcohol expressed in promills is multiplied by a 21,71 factor. Dobrichanin, S., : *Forensics, Krushevac*, 2004, p. 163

concentration of alcohol in the blood, the influence of alcohol on the driver's ability is divided into the following five phases. 1. The first is the so-called initial phase (0.1-0.5 g/kg) in which mental disorders occur, which are manifested by minor error in judgment and behavioural changes depending on the personality. These changes do not affect the general driving ability, but the probability of the error is about 2 times higher than for drivers with zero blood alcohol value. 2. The second is the so-called *stimulation phase* (0.5-1.3 g/kg). This phase brings its name after the fulfilling the effects of central nervous system stimulation, and in fact they are a consequence of the depressive action of the alcohol on the brain, with its blocking effect on the low brain spheres weakened. The people that consume alcohol have an increased self-esteem, aggression in behaviour through simultaneous drop in concentration and attention. Objectivity is obscured by the subjective assessment, personal abilities are overestimated, and the criticality is declining and easy-minded and hasty decisions are made easily. In the sensory sphere, at this stage, the most evident are visual disturbances, and visual function impairments increase with the rise in alcohol concentration in the blood. First of all, damage to the peripheral vision occurs, and then follows a drop in the vision sharpness. In alcoholism of about 1 g/kg, the sensitivity of the retina is reduced by about two times and an enlarged eye pupil occurs. Darkly contrived and unlighted objects in the twilight are more difficult to notice, which is particularly dangerous if the person drives in such conditions with reduced visibility or at night. Moreover, the spatial orientation is twice decreased, and the adaptation in darkness and blending is reduced by about 30%. During the night-time driving, an illusion of irreplaceable objects is created most of the time from small animals, or from some objects or shadows, and the reaction that follows is abrupt braking and avoiding obstacles by turning to the side, which at a high speed can be fatal. Hearing functions are also reduced, which initially manifests by losing the ability to distinguish fine nuances of sounds. With an increase in alcohol concentration, the threshold of hearing sensitivity decreases, with difficulty locating the sound source. Disturbances in the sense of balance are visible at the end of this phase in the form of walking uncertainty. In the motor sphere, the severe reflex time is not significantly damaged, but there are disturbances of complex reflex actions such as: finger movements, synchronized raising of the eyeballs, interaction responses that require integration through the central nervous system. Reflex time is a time interval in which people with a motor reaction respond to a certain external stimulus. These changes are particularly emphasized at a concentration above 1.0 g/kg, whilst below that they are less obvious. In these blood alcohol concentrations, the general driving ability decreases, but since the changes are most emphasized in the psychic sphere, and less in the sensory and motor functions, this is not an important degree. However, at this stage with an increase in alcoholism and the complexity of the traffic situation, the likelihood of driver errors grows. In alcoholics of 0.6 g/kg it is 2-3, in 1 g/kg and more than 3-4 times higher than for sober drivers. 3. The third is the so-called *incoordination phase* (1.3-2.0 g/kg). For the drivers, all important driving functions are integrated and coordinated through the central nervous system:

perceiving obstacles, understanding the danger, making decisions for an adequate reaction, making decisions about motor responses. In the incoordination phase there is significant damage to these integrative and coordinating functions, which is manifested by delayed or inadequate reactions, for example, the accelerator is pressed instead of pressing the brake pedal. In the psychic sphere, the braking effect of the brain bone is noticeably impaired or in the low zones of the brain is completely lost, which is manifested by aggression, and in some people even with depression. In any case, the critical decision-making is significantly reduced, and the overestimation of one's own abilities, the perceptual mood and the audacious behaviour are often present. The ability to focus the attention is significantly reduced or lost. The ability to concentrate attention is significantly reduced or lost. Particularly disturbing is the vagility of the attention (the ability to direct attention from one thing to another or occurrence), that is, the time for the transfer of attention has continued. Therefore, in case of rapid changes in the traffic situation, the driver gradually loses the ability to adequately coordinate the steering functions. At a concentration of over 1.5 g/kg, spatial and temporal disorientation occurs. Notes are wrongly processed, and reactions are inadequate. In the reflex centres, the alcohol inhibitory effect is expressed, after which the reflex response continues globally. Motor obstacles are therefore strongly expressed, with rough negligence on the coordination of all movements. The ability to accurately perform automated (coordinated) movements is significantly damaged, i.e. completely lost, because their integration through the central nervous system plays a lot slower and imprecise. Speech is difficult and even incomprehensible due to "tangles of the tongue". Especially important is the non-synchronized behaviour of the eyeballs, which is very difficult to centre the optical axis. The visual acuity is reduced, narrowing of the vision field is significant, and due to the increasingly difficult centring of the optic axis, binocular viewing is more complicated. After that, double images appear occasionally, whose participation grows along with an increase in alcoholism, and the speed and distance of the encountered vehicles are poorly assessed, especially when the observer and the subject are in motion. By increasing the speed of movement, the risk of errors increases. The depression of the red and green colour is reduced to the critical values of the differences in these two colours. The blinding phenomenon is very prolonged, and it is very difficult to see the lightly illuminated and darkly contoured objects, which is significant for night-time driving. There is a change in the sensory balance, because the movement is often either on a broad setting or lean. At this stage, the general driver's ability is significantly reduced. The reduction is particularly high in cases of night driving, reduced visibility on a bad weather, etc. The probability of errors in an alcoholised driver is 15-40 times greater than for a sober driver, depending on the complexity of the traffic situation. 4. The fourth is the so-called the *confusion phase* (2.0-3.0 g/kg). This phase corresponds to the values of alcohol in heavy drunkenness in which the effect of alcohol on all functions of the nervous system is significantly manifested when phenomena of psychomotor and musculotony impairment occur. As it is said, there is "confusion" (disturbance) in the brain system, which also

determined the name of this phase. Persons in this phase of drunkenness are incapable of safe traffic, regardless of whether they are drivers of motor vehicles, cyclists, pedestrians or livestock herdsman. In addition, there is difficult intellectual damage, disturbances of time-spatial orientation, occurrence of double and false images and drowsiness. The words are difficult and unclearly pronounced; the movement is severely damaged, devoured, with harsh and sudden changes in the direction, astonishing and frequent crashes to its complete impossibility. Attention and perceptions are superficial and short, and understanding is compromised. Objective assessment is completely lost. The eye sight is severely damaged and objects are generally seen as double, so the depth estimate of the distances is impossible. The reflex time is prolonged, and the motor functions are slow and inadequate. The performance of coordinated purposeful actions is hardly damaged, and sometimes it is completely lost. 5. Fifth is so-called stage of *stupor or coma* (more than 3.0 g/kg). At such blood concentrations there is a state of suppression in which the image of alcohol poisoning is expressed. All the functions of the central nervous system are so damaged that a complete disorientation, loss of sphincter control ability, disturbance of consciousness of varying degrees and, eventually, coma occurs. Such persons are absolutely incapable of participating in traffic.

4. MEASURES AND ACTIVITIES IN THE FUNCTION OF SAFETY AND PREVENTION OF TRAFFIC DELINQUENCY

Due to the vast social and individual importance of traffic in modern living conditions, the United Nations and the whole world pay special attention to regulating the traffic conditions and behavior. One of the basic standards for the development of any country can be perceived through the level of achieved development of the transport system. This leads to the fact that the most developed countries have the most developed traffic systems. In this direction, during the seventies of the 20th century, the most developed countries through the progressive development of societies and the steady growth in the number of registered vehicles and kilometers traveled, managed to curb the rising trend of traffic accidents and achieve a declining trend in the number of victims (especially the number of people killed and injured). While in the same period, in the underdeveloped and developing countries, the number of killed and injured people and large material damages in traffic increased.

From traffic safety perspective, *three groups of countries* can be distinguished: 1. States that have accepted that traffic safety can be managed, have built an organized security system and successfully implemented traffic management in practice, continually reducing the number of injured people and damages (England, Sweden, the Netherlands, Norway etc); 2. States that generally accept the idea of reducing the number of road traffic injuries, but have not yet managed to build effective safety and security systems, still fail to manage traffic safety, causing major fluctuations in the number of victims in traffic accidents (Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria, etc.);

and 3. Countries that have not yet accepted the idea of traffic safety management¹⁷⁷ (most countries from the continent of Africa, India, etc.). On October 26th, 2005, the General Assembly of the United Nations declared the World Day of Remembrance for Road Traffic Victims, commemorated in the third week of November and called on all member states and international communities to accept and mark this day.

The Republic of North Macedonia is in the second group and continues to make efforts and reforms to reach the European level and move to the first group of countries. In that direction, the implementation of the adopted second National Strategy for the Improvement of Road Traffic Safety (2015-2020)¹⁷⁸ is expected to give its contribution to the traffic safety. The main objective of the National Strategy is to reduce the number of victims in road traffic in the Republic of Macedonia by 2020 and to be similar with the average number of victims in the European Union and the number of victims - young drivers to decrease 30%, the number of injured, with severe bodily injuries, to be reduced by 40%, while the number of child victims of traffic in the traffic is reduced to zero; this is a forecast made following the plans and acts of the European Union¹⁷⁹.

In that direction, our state and the responsible authorities and institutions through the organization of various preventive activities and campaigns in the traffic make the efforts to raise the responsibility and the level of the traffic-technical culture of the traffic participants to better improve their safety. In the further part of this paper some preventive activities will be reviewed that are realized in the form of campaigns, projects, information, announcements, reports, analyzes, advice and other concrete measures. For example, in the organization of the Ministry of Interior and coordination with the Republican and Municipal Councils for Traffic Safety, the following preventive activities and campaigns are continuously realized¹⁸⁰: "Wear a safety belt" - Traffic safety campaign - via a video; Campaign "Turn on the Light" - through posters, billboards and TV presentations; "Three basic rules for safe driving" (a campaign whose main goal is foreign nationals). Through the presentation of these rules, efforts are being made to increase road safety: use seat belts; turn on the light (even in daylight); do not use mobile phones (neither hands-free devices are allowed). Campaign "Against the Use of Mobile Phones in Motor Vehicle". Its main motto is: You have 2,500 reasons to ... not call while driving; Campaign "Using Seat Belts" with the motto "Use Belts - Just One Click Protects Your Life – Then Click"; Campaign "Summer

¹⁷⁷ Lipovac Krsto, Jovanovich Dragan, and Vujanich Milan, Basics of Traffic Safety, Belgrade, 2014.

¹⁷⁸ Second National Strategy of the Republic of Macedonia for the Promotion of Road Traffic Safety, adopted by the Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia on 30.12.2014 година.

¹⁷⁹ National Strategy of the Republic of Macedonia for the Promotion of Safety of Road Traffic 2009–2014, Skopje, 2008, p. 21

¹⁸⁰ Police-preventive activities are listed according to the official website of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Macedonia www.mvr.gov.mk.

Guide for Radars" - realized in June 2010. Through joint cooperation of the Ministry of Interior with the daily newspapers, a map of the Republic of Macedonia with marked places on the roads with radar control has been printed. As part of this campaign, together with the maps for the radars, there are also tips for paying attention to the 80 speed sign on highways, the amount of the fine for refusing an alcohol test, advice that only police cars with blue cubes that are part of the highway traffic unit of the Ministry of Interior can stop a vehicle and other useful information; Traffic-educational action "Greater safety for pedestrians and cyclists"; Action "Useful Information for Road Drivers in the Republic of Macedonia" - Read - Think - Remember, realized by handing out leaflets to foreign nationals at the border crossings entrance in the country, in cooperation with the Republic Council for Road Traffic Safety.

The Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Macedonia has recently taken care of informing the public through modern means of communication, primarily the Internet and computer technology. The following list of published information, reports, analyzes, advice, and other articles on the official website of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Macedonia can serve as an illustration: Information about the locations where a speed-radar-measuring instrument is used; Practical tips and warnings for drivers; Comparative analysis of the traffic rules, allowed quantity of alcohol in the EU drivers from 1990 up until now; Comparative analysis of traffic rules, maximum speeds, use of lights and mobile phone on the roads throughout Europe; Amendments to the Law on Road Traffic Safety; Overview of the tunnels on the main and regional roads; Campaigns in the form of short video clips and educational video videos posted on the YouTube channel of the Macedonian Police, within the campaign "Traffic is not a game - participate responsibly" in cooperation with the Republic Council for Road Traffic Safety; Campaign "Traffic Primer" realized through short animated video clips (a total of 10 with a duration of one to three minutes), in cooperation with the Republic Council for Road Traffic Safety, etc.

In addition to the large number of campaigns and activities that the Council has implemented together with the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Macedonia, which were previously described, the Council initiated and independently conducted several similar actions¹⁸¹: Campaign "Safe on the motorcycle" - through an educational video clip and a manual for parents Safe on a motorcycle; Enhanced campaign for greater safety of pedestrians, cyclists and motorcyclists; Expert consultations, meetings and round tables were held by the Council for exchange of experiences regarding the impact of various factors in the traffic and proposing measures for improving the traffic and safety situation.

¹⁸¹ The activities of the RS BSP are listed according to its official website <http://www.rsbsp.org.mk>

5. CONCLUSION, CONSIDERATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the stated data and knowledge in terms of volume, the dynamics and consequences of traffic delinquencies and accidents are unfavorable, alarming and worrying. Namely, as a result of traffic accidents every year, an average of 155 people lose their lives and 6133 people remain disabled with temporary or permanent disability. This means that only because of the so-called conditions of "war on the roads" or some kind of "blood tax on the roads" from the demographic map of the Republic of North Macedonia, one smaller village and one school class still disappears.

However, the efforts so far and the strategic goals of the National Strategy for the Safety and Promoting Road Traffic Safety do not give the expected results and they are difficult to achieve. Therefore, in the following period, the need for additional efforts towards scientific (etiological) and expert (phenomenological) research regarding the safety in the road traffic and traffic delinquency is imposed as an imperative. Due to the diverse and multifactor influences in the occurrence of traffic delicts, exact knowledge is needed through multidisciplinary and continuous research on all elements of traffic safety and traffic system: driver - road - vehicle and environment. Through planned organized and coordinated activities of all competent and interested entities in the field of safety it is necessary to intensify all institutional capacities and subjective potentials in the country, in order to improve the unfavorable situation with negative trends, and through systematic measures and activities to continuously improve and promote traffic safety.

Prevention of socially negative phenomena and trends is the best policy in society: as in medicine - and here the principle is that it is more rational to prevent than to treat it. Basically, measures and activities need to be streamlined and intensified in the following content: 1. prevention of traffic delinquency, as a negative occurrence of social indiscipline in traffic, with specific means of repression and prevention; and 2. preventing traffic accidents, as a general policy of maintaining security-traffic safety with a variety of means.

In order to further improve traffic safety, we believe that it is necessary to continuously strengthen and enhance the partnership between the public, private, governmental and non-governmental sectors. Traffic safety should be made a political priority. To appoint a leading agency for road safety, to give funds and to require accountability from it. The goals set in the National Strategy of the Republic of North Macedonia through coordinated and synchronized measures and activities by all competent and involved entities are consistently realized. For the improvement of traffic safety, mechanisms needed to be established that will promote a multidisciplinary approach to road safety and scientific and professional recommendations to be adequately and continuously incorporated in strategic measures and activities.

Viewed in terms of suppression and prevention of harmful occurrences in traffic, it would most likely look like this: there are no systematic, educational processes that cover all participants, there are no desirable examples of behavior as

an incentive for the formation of ethical attitudes, the widespread enjoyment of alcohol is not prevented, but it is suppressed by a contribution that is surely quite upside down to see things that here the full expression is supposed to come to an almost unknown value (safety and protection measures are essentially the penalties, the very useful system of punitive points is still not fully revived, nor the special measures towards those that repeat) and the like. Hence, an inseparable part of the changes related to the revival of well-organized and consistently implemented preventive programs would have to be the shifting of the attitude towards the scientific-research work and its results. Immediate bearers of preventive programs should be all councils and commissions for traffic safety; the traffic safety service within the Ministry of the Interior (traffic police); all pre-school and school institutions that have traffic education in the program; driving schools; medical institutions authorized for regular control checks of drivers, toxicological analyzes, etc.; specialized organizations (automotive union, driver associations, red cross, ambulance services, fire protection); the mass media and all the organizations that perform maintenance activities on the road network; organizations that provide services to road network drivers; organizations that provide services to motor vehicle drivers - carry out technical inspections, which are specialized for the traffic of vehicles and parts; market and other inspections; courts and public prosecution offices and local communities with its internal organization. This means that a wider social action is needed in which there will be involvement and mutual cooperation, coordination and synchronized activities of several social entities, competent bodies, bodies, entities and institutions.

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SMALL COUNTRIES AND MIGRATION PROCESSES – MORE THAN A SECURITY PROBLEM

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Abstract

Migration of the population goes hand by hand with the development of human society through its history, with various forms of manifestation of numerous social, economic, demographic, cultural, and historical causes and consequences. The spatial, temporal, and social dimensions of today's migrations are still inconceivable, and the ultimate results are unpredictable. Motivational factors of migrations depend largely on security, economic, and political processes, as well as on other conditions that determine contemporary international relations. However, the monitoring of the contemporary phenomenon of migration is further complicated by the fact that motivational factors are most often hybrid and could rarely be strictly and uniquely classified. At the same time, the process of globalization in the sphere of economy has led to an increase in the gap between the rich and the poor, i.e., to the growing disproportion in the level of development between developed and developing countries. This will definitely lead to more pronounced economic motivation factors for migration in the coming decades. The paper analyzes in particular the countries of Southeast Europe in which the migration problems are much more emphasized and located on the most frequent migration route towards Europe. In addition to the problems of bad economic situation, the negative heritage of closer history and political instability in many countries contribute to a marked migration problem. The particular difficulty of the problem is the fact that young and highly educated people are constantly leaving these countries.


Key words: *migration, attracting factors, migration problems*

1. INTRODUCTION

A MULTIDISCIPLINARY SECURITY PROBLEM

The social phenomenon of migration is studied by several scientific disciplines in a systematic way, including demography, geography, sociology, anthropology and economics, and indirectly by history, political science, and medicine. Demography focuses on the statistical parameters of migration, presenting immigration and emigration of the population from one region to another as opposed to natural movement as a result of birth, mortality, and fertility. Migration is generally observed as a response to differences between countries of origin and ultimate destination in terms of opportunities and employment, human rights and security, as well as demographic growth. Geography determines migration as resettlement and any other spatial movement of the population in a wider sense, and in limited terms as a change of the permanent residence. Unlike geography, which is interested in migration flows, social geography studies the causes of migration, or the causes of population statics. Sociology deals with migration through the prism of social relations as an incentive role of social relations in the countries of origin to the outflow of the native population, as well as with the integration of migrants in new social circumstances and their impact on the development of social relations in the countries of the ultimate destination. Anthropology studies prehistoric migration and its role in the development of *homo sapiens*, and in contemporary conditions the consequences of cultural intermingling of different ethnic composition of migrants with native population. Economics also deals with the causes and consequences of migrations, because not only economic reasons are practically present in most migrations, but also, the migration process itself has the biggest consequences in this area. Therefore, economics brings to the fore the impact of migration on the labor market. History is concerned with the study of migration through different periods of development of the world, highlighting social and political environments in which they occurred, as well as their impact on the social changes which followed [Curić, Z. Curić B, 1999].

In the new conditions of globalization, migration is increasingly becoming a subject of study of political science, because political processes trigger forced migration flows, and on the other hand, the integration of migrants has a significant impact on the development of political relations in the receiving state. Medicine is primarily interested in the epidemiological aspects of population movements, especially when it comes to drastic changes in the climatic conditions, but also in the further adaptation of migrants to the new conditions of life with the purpose of general health security in the new community.



Scheme No.1: Types of migration

Thus, approaches to this social phenomenon differ; accordingly, the phenomenon is defined in different ways, emphasizing those of its dimensions that give particular character to a study in a particular scientific discipline. Common objective dimensions to any theoretical understanding of territorial mobility are space and time, and subjective dimensions include will, or motivation, and activities.

Migration characterizes human society since its creation, and in particular has taken a large scale and different forms in the modern world [UNDP, 2009:32]. Observed at the global level, the United States have been the most exposed to the rush of migrants' populations for decades, not just those coming from neighboring countries and countries of the region, but also those from other continents. In the mid-twentieth century, the expansion of economic migration in Europe also takes place [Ignjatović, 2007:37].

2. ESSENCE AND CAUSES OF MIGRATION

Migration flows caused by economic and other factors (political instability, ethnic, national, religious, racial, and other conflicts and the like), and altered patterns of migration flows in Europe created after the end of the Cold War also relate to ethnic conflicts in the former SFRY. Like other complex social phenomena, migratory flows of people have numerous causes, manifest in different forms and result in diverse consequences for the migrants, but also in relation to numerous aspects of social and cultural environment from which they leave (emigration areas), that is, those in which they come (immigration areas). For example, some of the factors that encourage the disposition of population in a given territory, those bound by natural conditions (geographical, geological, climatic, hydrological, and similar) can be identified as well [UN OCHA, 2009: 8]. In 2008, approximately 20 million people were displaced due to rapid climatic, hydrological, and meteorological changes.

Some of them attract people to live in a certain territory (coastal areas, river valleys and lowland with favorable climatic conditions), while others deter them from settling certain areas (extreme climatic conditions, poor quality of agricultural land, lack of drinking water). Numerous migration flows are caused by various natural phenomena, climate change, and in particular certain natural disasters and force majeure events. One group of such factors is manifested in the form of sudden and extreme events (earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, abundant precipitation, floods, fires, etc.), while others are slow and include, for example, drought, soil erosion, oscillations in precipitation and temperature patterns. When it comes to extraordinary situations, these can manifest as those caused by dangerous natural phenomena, and then those of technical - technological nature (damages and dangerous technical and technological events, respectively, incidents and accidents), those related to modern means of warfare, biological and social, which are associated with particularly dangerous or widespread infectious diseases of humans, domestic animals or plants [Živković et al.,2009:185-202].

The importance of migration has created a new field of scientific research that is complex and multidisciplinary, and these are migration studies. The aim of this discipline is to explain and anticipate migration patterns, investigate the impact of migration flows and inspire policy makers. The initial theories were focused on economic motivation, with the goal of explaining the reasons and dynamics of geographical movement of people from one territory to another. They adapted neoclassical economic theory to the new scientific discipline by pointing to "push" and "pull" factors suggesting that negative conditions "push" individuals to leave the countries they were born in, and economic and other advantages of the new countries "pull" them. This theory has been and still is important, but it does not explain all phenomena, and in the recent past it has been complemented with others, such as the world-systems theory or the theory of trans-nationalism. The pull and push theory is most often used to analyze migration, although it has been criticized for over-simplifying migration flows. Through the factors of rejection and the factors of attraction the causes of migration can be explained in the easiest way. The refusing "push" factors can include unemployment, poor health care, political insecurity, torture, natural disasters, human rights abuses, war, and so on. The attracting "pull" factors for migrants to go to a country are employment opportunities, better living standards, conditions of education, better medical and social protection, security, family ties, and so on [Cervone, 2012].

The most relevant "push" and "pull" factors are related to demographic aspects and especially to the onset of demographic transition, the evolution from pre-industrial high birth rate and mortality to modern times, where the post industrial period is characterized by a low birth rate and mortality. This trend is currently the case in the poorest countries of the world, creating overwhelming and hard pressure for the population to move more and more towards developed countries, and thus the population is getting reduced and old. The main reasons of modern migration gaining in importance are their dimensions and growth rates. In a special category of migration, there are those whose causes are primarily related to

forced circumstances, which is why they are referred to in literature as "forced migrations", although the boundary between forced and any others is very often unclear. In the international law, the status of this category of migration is basically linked to the 1951 Refugees Convention with the 1967 Protocol, but there are many dilemmas in interpreting certain elements from the definition of the term "refugee". In the contemporary literature dealing with various aspects of forced migration, there is an increasing number of titles dedicated to the need to (re)define the status of forced migrants, whose causes are in various ways related to environmental problems. In this context, the specific situation and the need to redefine the status of refugees are discussed, and the causes of migration are related to climate change and natural disasters [Todić, 2014: 138]. There are, however, a number of theories that explain the international flows of capital and people from one country to another.

The question of the migration patterns is most often observed by taking into consideration the coexistence of various social, economic, and political relations in a certain area and at a certain historical moment or period. With the reason it is emphasized that migrations are always in close interaction with the prevailing social and economic realities in the countries of origin and destination. This is because most migrants come from areas characterized by high unemployment, low wages, low living standards, poverty, lack of arable land, hunger, etc., but also by a high crime rate, a feeling of insecurity, etc. [ILO, 2012: 10]. Migration is particularly encouraged by various forms of social conflicts, and in particular those of a wider scale on religious, racial, and national basis that escalated into armed conflicts.

3. MIGRATION ON A GLOBAL LEVEL

Global migration includes any cross-border movement of the population and its reception and presence, of different duration, in the country in which migration flows, regardless of subjective motives and individual features of participants in this process, and the migration policies of the countries, migration takes place between [Politička enciklopedija, 1966: 665]. There are two primary elements in defining international migration: mobility, *i.e.*, entry and stay in foreign lands, and foreign citizenship. The number of international migrants has been rising year after year for several decades. This fact is illustrated by the data of their numbers in 2000, 2005, and 2008. In 2000, there were approximately one hundred and fifty million people, in 2005 approximately one hundred and ninety-one million [IOM, 2010: 1], and in 2008 approximately two hundred and fourteen million. In the observed period, the number of illegal migrants and those migrating temporarily and cyclically, was also increasing. Although the share of migrants in the total population did not significantly change in the last decade (at the level of 2,9% in 2000 and 3,1% in 2010), in 2005, every thirty-fifth person on the planet was an international migrant, while in 2008 it was every thirty-third person [UN DESA, 2008:1].

It is assumed that the number of migrants varies from country to country, and it is expected that the number of countries with more than a million inhabitants, where the share of international migrants in the total population is greater than 10%, will increase from 29 in 1990 to 38 in 2010. Countries with a high percentage of migrants in the total population are Qatar (87%), United Arab Emirates (70%), Jordan (46%), Singapore (41%) and Saudi Arabia (28%). South Africa (3.7%), Slovakia (2.4%), Turkey (1.9%), Japan (1.7%), Nigeria (0.7%), Romania (0.6%), India (0.4%) and Indonesia (0.1%) have a significantly smaller share of migrants in the total population [UN DESA, 2008: 3].

The United States of America is the largest recipient of international migrants. Their number is estimated at about 42.8 million in 2010. The second largest is the Russian Federation with 12.3 million, then Germany with 10.8 million, Saudi Arabia with 7.3 million and Canada with 7.2 million. If changes are observed in the period 2000-2010, in nine countries the number of international migrants increased by more than one million, in the United States by 8.0 million, in Spain by 4.6 million, in Italy by 2.3 million, in Saudi Arabia by 2.2 million, in the United Kingdom by 1.7 million, in Canada by 1.6 million, in the United Arab Emirates by 1.0 million. The number of migrants in Europe in the middle of 2010 was estimated at 69 819 282 (in Western Europe 23 452 978, in Eastern Europe 21 045 866, in Southern Europe 14 663 710 and in northern Europe 10 656 728). It is estimated that the number of illegal migrants in the middle of 2010 in the countries to which they gravitate or from which, after a short or longer temporary stay, illegal migrants who transit through the Republic of Serbia come from is at the following level: Germany 10 758 061, Italy 4 463 413, Switzerland 1 762 797, The Netherlands 1 752 869, Austria 1 310 218, Sweden 1 306 020, Greece 1 132 794, Belgium 974 849, Czech Republic 453 041, Hungary 368 076, Slovakia 130 682 [IOM, 2010: 6]. Apart from the above mentioned, international migrations today imply a much greater diversity of ethnic and cultural groups than ever before, and there have been changes in geographic segments in which these migrants live. The increasing migration of migrants towards urban zones is part of the general trend of moving of the world's population towards urban zones.

4. THE PROBLEM OF MIGRATION IN SOUTHEAST EUROPE

Southeast Europe has become a transit corridor for migration from a region with high unemployment and low living standards in its south and east to regions with old populations and a relatively lower unemployment rate, and high living standards in the west and north of Europe. In this context, the dual migration process that takes place in the region of Southeast Europe should be considered. Namely, after decades of economic migration of the population from this region into the developed countries of Western Europe, in the last decade it has become a significant transit area for migrants from the Middle East and North Africa.

Most countries in the region, including the Republic of Serbia, are at the same time the countries of origin of migrants, but also the transit territory for

migrants. A good example is Turkey, which has both migration segments, as a transit and as a country of origin [Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2014: 368]. At the same time, it is interesting for analysis, since its geographical position represents a natural bridge between Europe, the Middle East, Asia and Africa. The problem of irregular migration in modern Turkey became apparent after the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. The second major wave of refugees from northern Iraq splashed Turkey in 1988, when Kurds fled from the repression of Saddam Hussein. Later on, groups of refugees from Asia, Africa, the Middle East and the Caucasus followed. Turkey was not attractive as the ultimate destination for migrants because of the undeveloped economy, but due to the liberal political system it was an appropriate option as a transit country on the way to more prosperous countries of Europe [Bulatović, 2010: 368]. Turkey has become the main migration hub for transit to Western Europe, especially to Greece, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK.

The geographical position of the Balkan region has traditionally conditioned demographic changes and dynamic migration flows. Transition processes backed by political instability have led to strong emigration waves that have followed up over the past decades the migration flows dating from the 19th century. Only from the countries of the former Yugoslavia more than two million people emigrated at the end of the last and the beginning of this century, out of which most were refugees and forcibly displaced persons [Kiosev, 2010: 197]. In the period of just a few years in the early 1990s, the Balkans produced the largest migration waves in Europe since the Second World War. Out of the total population of 80 million, 10 million migrated or were displaced due to wars, ethnic cleansing, or poverty [Krsteva, et al: 2016: 166].

This is the period in which former Yugoslavia passed through the process of destruction and civil war from 1991 to 1995, which resulted in the collapse of these social communities, and the creation of new, independent, ethnically homogeneous states, with large flows of forced migration. Political elites were realizing their dreams of national states as communities based on blood and soil, encouraging, *inter alia*, large migration waves and assimilation of populations. The production of refugee waves was one of the immediate political and strategic military targets in the Balkans during the 1990s. The most drastic demographic consequences of wars in the former Yugoslavia were caused by Bosnian armed conflict where more than half of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina was displaced (2.6 million internally displaced persons, including 1.2 million refugees). Due to the war, between 300,000 and 350,000 Serbs fled from Croatia to Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Countries	Data	Year			
		2000	2005	2010	2015
Albania	Population	3089027	3011487	2913021	2880703
	Migration	76695	64739	52784	57616
Bulgaria	Population	8170172	7658972	7395599	7177991
	Migration	43360	61074	76287	102113
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Population	3766706	3781530	3722084	3535961
	Migration	82952	47272	38792	34803
Hungary	Population	1021097 1	1008706 5	1000002 3	9843028
	Migration	296957	366787	436616	449632
Macedonia	Population	2034819	2060272	2070739	2079308
	Migration	125665	127667	129701	130730
Montenegro	Population	604950	614261	619428	622159
	Migration			78507	82541
Romania	Population	2244297 1	2131968 5	2024687 1	1981548 1
	Migration	126949	145162	155982	226943

Table no. 1: Data about change in number of inhabitants and migrations for the period 2000 to 2015 for certain states [World Bank]

In 1993, when the armed conflict between the former Yugoslav nations was in full swing, there were about 2.5 million refugees and displaced persons in the region [Bobić, 2010: 212]. For migrations in the Balkans at the end of the 20th century, it is typical that, in addition to these being marked by compulsion, they were predominantly ethnic in nature, as the procedures and measures of coercion and intimidation were directed directly towards certain ethnic groups in the crisis areas. Although ethnic migrations in the Balkans ended at the beginning of the 21st century, they influenced to permanently changed image of ethnic structure of several Balkan states.

5. PERSPECTIVES OF SECURITY PROBLEMS OF SMALL COUNTRIES RELATED TO MIGRATION

All the factors causing current migration are still present. The number of residents in some African and Asian countries continues to grow, wars have become a permanent phenomenon, and social engineering takes on new forms. With the idea to cut the roots of migration at their domicile, the EU has openly blackened the African countries by threatening to deny them financial assistance and abolish trade arrangements if they did not retain refugees and receive back those who had already crossed the Mediterranean. According to

Brussels, Afghanistan will have to agree to the repatriation of all refugees whose asylum in Europe has been denied, and Afghanistan has already been requested to receive at least 80,000 of its citizens. The same was requested from Pakistan and Ethiopia. A more radical step would be the demand for some coastal states in North Africa to build mass reception centers for migrants, so the impression is that the outcome of the agreement between the EU and Turkey will largely depend on the success of the negotiations between the EU and the African countries.

In case of a failure to reach an agreement between the EU and Turkey, there is a possibility that Turkey will open borders and release three million refugees to Europe being now in Turkey. However, so far it is only an assumption that must be considered. Regardless of the outcome of an agreement between the EU and Turkey, given the number of migrants currently on the territory of Greece, as well as almost negligible number of migrants returned to Turkey, with the improvement of weather conditions, it should be expected a stronger pressure of migration flow to the borders of Serbia, primarily from the territories of Bulgaria and Macedonia. In addition, the European Union intends to intensify the return of all persons who have not received asylum in the EU in the shortest possible time. These persons should be sent to Greece from where they should be transferred to Turkey. However, knowing the situation in the relations between Greece and Turkey, and in particular their poor past cooperation in terms of migrants, it is expected that a large number of such persons will stay in the area between Greece and Serbia, with the intention of illegally returning to one of the countries of Western Europe, which will, based on the profile of persons who have not received asylum, increase security risks in the Western Balkans. On the other hand, certain deterioration of the US-Russian relations in terms of Syria is present.

The experience teaches that the dissolutive potential of the Balkan societies in the light of the emphasis on national, ethnic, and religious differences, poses a serious threat to take on primacy in relation to the progressive one, inherent to regulated countries of the modern world. That is why the particular question is interlacing of internal Balkan antagonisms with the culmination of the consequences of large external regional crises. In that case, the danger of serious destabilization rises. The situation in which, after the deterioration of the relations between Turkey and the EU (Germany), *i.e.*, the termination of the agreement on refugees, millions of people would head for along the "Balkan route", while at the same time the situation in Macedonia between Macedonians and Albanians escalates, or in case that the Albanians launch a new crisis by trying to occupy the Serbian north of Kosovo by military means, could be extremely dangerous. The situation regarding Macedonia in which, on top of everything, all the surrounding states would be involved, would be even more unfavorable. A similar danger is the opening of the "Pandora's Box" in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which would necessarily include both Croatia and Serbia, everything combined with a new and massive inflow of refugees. Such negative scenarios could indeed lead to a lasting, serious destabilization of a large part of the Balkans and to reflect on wider geo-strategic opportunities in Europe.

6. CONCLUSION

The modern world faces a large increase in migration flows, which directly complicates the structure of security issues. It is true that there have been large migration waves in the past, but they were due to the result of major wars, such as the First and the Second World War. The process of globalization in the field of economy, communication and security has led to the emergence of the phenomenon of the so-called global village, which ultimately led to the emergence of the event where the migrants increasingly do not want or cannot live in their own country or region, but are trying to go into stable and prosperous regions and states. The trouble is that it is about mass migration movements, which are partly the result of forced displacement, and partly the reasons are economic. It is clear that those persons should be provided with the conditions for a dignified life and the opportunity to exercise their right to apply for asylum, but having in mind that it is a mass movement of population that is measured in thousands at the daily level, it is difficult to create conditions for a legally valid and objective assessment of the migration motives.

The recent migration crisis has evidently shown that national interest and security are the primary motivating factors of almost all European political elites within the national framework. This is just one of the factors that indicate that the national state remains a key subject of international relations, despite all the globalist announcements of its gradual overcoming. On the contrary, the latest migration events lead to the conclusion that the national state has shown a great vitality and endurance in international politics and announce the renewal of its significance. Raising the walls, restoring national borders to long time ago erased national borders across the European Union is an obvious proof of this process.

Relations in the international community do not contribute to finding a solution to the security problems caused by migration. It is obvious that migrations and migrants present the element of "low pressure" used by certain countries. The causal relationship between migration and security, first of all in small countries, has got a new dimension. Namely, small states represent a "collateral" damage in migration processes. Migrants stay in their territories, but these countries are not interesting for them, causing the increase in the level of crime, economic costs, etc. Large states take more radical steps, which do not have a humanitarian note, and reduce their own problems. Parallel to that, they give recognition to small states for their human attitude towards migrants. From the above, it can be concluded that migration will continue to have a major share in the security situation in the EU, as well as globally in the future. The biggest burden and consequences of migration will be borne by small states.

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MACEDONIANS AND ALBANIANS: TRUST OR SECURITY DILEMMAS AMONG THE MACEDONIAN CITIZENS

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Abstract

The paper aims to assess the process of reconciliation within the Macedonian society after the 2001 conflict. It raises the following questions: what is the level of trust and the level of communication between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians? Do they share a vision for a common future? In order to answer the questions, the paper analyses the answers of the young ethnic Macedonians and young ethnic Albanians, as well as the Macedonian members of the security forces participants in 2001 conflict who responded to semi-structured interviews. Further, it analyses the answers through the prism of the existing literature on reconciliation. The analysis shows that eighteen years after the end of the conflict, relations between the two largest ethnic groups are still influenced by a host of factors, such as stereotypes, security issues, allegations of selective justice. In the concluding observations, the authors summarize the main findings of the analysis and make recommendations on how the level of trust between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians could be increased.

Keywords: Macedonians, Albanians, Macedonian society, trust, common future

1. INTRODUCTION

The paper discusses the relationships between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians after the 2001 conflict using the data collected within the research project designed (at the Faculty of Security-Skopje) to assess the impact of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) on the process of reconciliation within the Macedonian society. The research is primarily based on asynchronous qualitative semi-structured interviews via e-mail because as Ratslavova & Ratslav (2014) observe “email interviewing is of benefit of qualitative research since it is cost efficient and reduces the time required, but in-depth information can still be obtained” (p.453). Employing the three-pronged model developed by Clark (2014), it analyses whether the ICTY contributed to reconciliation in the country by examining perceptions of ethnic communities of

the work of the ICTY (justice), truth acceptance (truth) and the nature of everyday inter-ethnic relations.

This paper focuses on the inter-ethnic relations. Despite the lack of consensus among the authors (see, Bloomfield 2006; Galtung, 2001; Kelman, 2004; Skaar et al., 2005; Malley-Morrison et al., 2013) it embraces the argument (a relationship-oriented definition) that reconciliation is “a process that redesigns the relationships (Bloomfield 2003a, 12) between former enemies and aims to find out: how often do ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians communicate and where? Do they trust each other? Do they share a vision of common future? In order to answer the questions the paper analyses the data collected (within the research project mentioned above) by interviewing two categories of respondents: members of the Macedonian security forces participants in the 2001 armed conflict and young people (aged 19-28) who are not personally connected to the conflict.

The analysis reveals that the relationships between Macedonians and Albanians are still burdened by security dilemmas. An appropriate level of trust between them has not been developed yet. However, the vast majority of the respondents involved in the research think that Macedonians and Albanians have a common future and suggest different activities (top-down and bottom-up) that could improve the relationships between these two ethnic groups. The paper critically evaluates the proposed activities and the role of the ICTY and national authorities in the process of reconciliation, and attempts to explain the research results using the existing literature on reconciliation.

The paper is divided in four parts including conclusion. Part I of the paper discusses the term reconciliation. Part II and Part III describe and explain the relations between Macedonians and Albanians (frequency and type of communications; level of trust; future expectations) using the data collected by interviews (33 interviews) and the existing literature on reconciliation. Underlining the limitations of the research (paper) the conclusion summarizes the main findings of the analysis, which *inter alia* suggest as how the state could deal with the accusations of selective justice within the Macedonian society and help young ethnic Macedonians to overcome the feeling of insecurity.

2. RECONCILIATION: DEFINITION, STAGES, INSTRUMENTS

The analysis of the literature on reconciliation reveals that there is a lack of consensus among the authors of what reconciliation is. Kelman (2004) speaks about reconciliation as identity change while Bar-Tal & Bennink (2004) see reconciliation as psychological process and outcome that takes place between rival groups. They suggest that reconciliation as an outcome (achieved through a long process which encompasses psychological and structural changes) consists of mutual recognition and acceptance, invested interests and goals in developing peaceful relations, mutual trust, positive attitudes as well as sensitivity and consideration of other party's needs and interests (Bar-Tal & Bennink, 2004). According to Lederach (1997) reconciliation “is focused on building relationship

between antagonists” (p.34). He argues that this “relational dimension involves the emotional and psychological aspects of the conflict and the need to recognize past grievances and explore future interdependence” (Lederach 1997, 34) and “reconciliation as a locus creates a space for encounter by the parties, a place where the diverse but connected energies and concerns driving the conflict can meet, including the paradoxes of truth and mercy, justice and peace” Lederach (1997, 35). For Humber & Kelly (2004), reconciliation is “the process of addressing conflictual and fractured relationships and this includes a range of different activities” (p.3). Many other authors take similar position (have proposed relationship-oriented definition of reconciliation) and explain reconciliation as “a process that redesigns the relationships” (Bloomfield 2003a, 12) or “a relationship-building process” (McCandless 2001, 213).

One may agree that reconciliation is both a goal and a process – ‘from divided past to shared future’ (Bloomfield 2003a, 12) – that redesigns the relationships between antagonists. It is a long-term and broad process that takes place at different levels within a society (individual, interpersonal, communal and national – see Sarkin 2008, 26) involving a number of steps, and each of them demands changes in attitudes, conduct and institutional environment. As Bloomfield (2003a) observes this process, which is not a linear one, involves certain stages (replacing fear by non-violent coexistence; building confidence and trust; and empathy) which “do not always follow logically after each other in any set order” (Bloomfield 2003a, 19). Reconciliation must “be backed by the recognition of the essential codes of democracy” (Bloomfield (2003a, 21) and a just socio-economic order. And, although many different investments (such as educational programmes) are needed for reconciliation, the key instruments for development of peaceful coexistence, trust and empathy are: healing, truth, justice (some form of retributive or restorative justice) and reparation.

However, the concrete choices and decisions depend on the context. The existing literature on reconciliation testifies that the legacy of the past (the longer term history; the nature, scale and degree of the past violence; the depth of division in society), transition (the type of transition; the nature of the peace settlement) and the post-transition context (cross-cutting interests; the international context; culture; geography) affect the process of reconciliation. It has been well established that the appropriate model of reconciliation depends on the particular circumstances within each post-conflict country. However, both the top-down approach and the bottom-up approach are important for the long-term reconciliation and should complement each other. Public authorities, political leaders, but also civil sector, media, non-formal groups and even individuals can contribute to reconciliation in a post-conflict society.

Perceptions of Macedonians and Albanians of the role of each above mentioned actor in the process of reconciliation within the Macedonian society will be discussed below, but first we will analyze the level of trust between these ethnic communities using the data collected by interviews (conducted in the period from May till December 2018). 18 members of the Macedonian security forces agreed to

be interviewed, but only 9 of them submitted their answers. 39 young people agreed to be interviewed for the purposes of the research, but only 24 of them submitted their answers. Despite our efforts (e.g. extension of the deadline) to provide ethnic balance among the participants in the youth category, 20 of them are Macedonians and only 4 are Albanians. Due to the small number of ethnic Albanians involved in the research we cannot make general conclusions about the position of the Albanian youth on the issues under discussion in the paper. In order to increase the relevance and comparability of the results, we, also, contacted the former members of the National Liberation Army (NLA) of ethnic Albanians, participants in 2001 conflict, but they (those who we managed to contact) refused to participate in the research. Therefore, it is obvious that the research have limitations in relation to the sample size and its representativeness. However, despite these limitations, as the analysis below shows, the paper provides foundation for future research (more comprehensive one), in particularly it provides useful directions regarding the questions that need to be addressed in the future, the instrument and recruitment of research participants (respondents).

3. MACEDONIANS AND ALBANIANS: TRUST OR DISTRUST

Direct contacts and communication between different communities in a post-conflict state are important in order for the people to abandon the negative stereotypes and to understand each other (see, for instance Lederach, 1997). Therefore, the respondents involved in the research were asked whether they communicate with the members of the other ethnic community and how often. Almost all of the young respondents, ethnic Macedonians, answered that they usually contact with Albanians at the University where they study together. They assess the communication as friendly, but the majority of them pointed out that they do not have very close Albanian friends. Less than half of the respondents stated that they have some close friends ethnic Albanians with whom they communicate outside the faculty, such as in a coffee shop, on social media, in libraries and even in their homes. Unlike the young Macedonians, all ethnic Albanians involved in the research noted that they have close friends from the Macedonian ethnic community with whom they have everyday communication at work/faculty, as well as in everyday informal activities. One of the respondents added that although he is Albanian, most of his close friends are Macedonians. Members of the Macedonian security forces, participants in the 2001 conflict, also have Albanian friends. Almost everyone answered that they have friends ethnic Albanians. Most of them said that they communicate with them at work, but some of them said they communicate outside the workplace too. They stated that, despite the 2001 conflict, they have private and professional communication with persons from the Albanian ethnic community and that their relations are based on mutual respect and understanding.

However, despite some positive personal experiences, the analysis of the answers of the respondents to other questions revealed that they think that an

appropriate level of trust between ethnic Macedonians and Albanians has not been developed yet. Around half of the young Macedonians involved in the research consider that there is no trust between Macedonians and Albanians, or the level of trust is very low. The other half does not want to generalize. They believe that the issue of trust is not a matter of ethnicity because they trust the person rather than a group. For this reason, some of the respondents answered that they trust Albanians they personally know. They based their trust on positive personal experiences. As some of the respondents noted “I believe that the level of trust primarily depends on the character and personality of the individual”; “...trust does not depend on ethnicity, but it is a product of mutual cooperation and open communication between the people”. One group of respondents believes that there is a reason for the low level of trust. Some blame politics and the political manipulation of the population for the low level of trust, while others consider that prejudices and stereotypes (two respondents) or the insufficient information or misinformation about the other group, in combination with insufficient interaction (one respondent) are the main reasons for distrust.

The answers that we received from the young Albanians are also divided. Half of them responded that there is almost no confidence between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians, while other half believes that trust between them is on high level. Similarly to young Macedonians, the young Albanian respondents who answered that generally there is no trust among the members of both ethnic groups still agree that there is trust among individuals of different ethnic background who know each other personally. Those who believe that there is a certain level of trust between Macedonians and Albanians emphasized that this level can be increased, even though currently the trust is on solid level. One of the young Albanian respondents stated: “I believe that there is a lack of trust between Macedonians and Albanians in general, but I also believe that individually, between a Macedonian and an Albanian there may be more trust than between an Albanian and an Albanian or a Macedonian and a Macedonian, which I think is a strange phenomenon”.

As for members of the Macedonian security forces, more than half believe that there is no trust between Albanians and Macedonians. They consider that the parties and political elites are often the culprit for distrust, so one of the respondents pointed out: “I personally believe that without the influence of the political elites the process of reconciliation between the ordinary citizens of the two ethnic groups will be faster.” Similarly to the respondents from the youth category, members of the security forces answered that they only partially trust the acquaintances of Albanian ethnic origin.

Such results raise a number of dilemmas. The question of why an appropriate level of trust between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians has not been developed yet in the country 18 years after the conflict is particularly central. The literature (on reconciliation) review reveals that “for trust and confidence to truly develop, a post-conflict society has to put in place a minimum of functioning institutions - a non-partisan judiciary, an effective civil service and an appropriate

legislative structure”(Bloomfield 2003a, 21). Also, as Fischer (2011) concludes “security, in the sense of personal or collective safety and well-being, is a constitutive part of reconciliation” (p.417), and thus, it contributes to trust between different groups. In this context, one may agree with Kriesberg (2007) that “ethical dilemmas involving security arise when those who have committed criminal acts, or more likely ordered them, are given amnesty” (p.253). Such amnesty can also be a serious obstacle to reconciliation because (as the vast majority of authors claim) truth and justice are some of the key instruments for reconciliation.

If we apply these observations to the Macedonian case we can provide certain explanations (no final conclusions) why there is no appropriate level of trust between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians in general (despite certain positive experience on personal level). First, one may agree that the country faced and still faces serious problems (economic problems; crime and corruption; politicization of the administration; lack of political dialogue; weaknesses in the rule of law) based on the reports of the relevant national and international institutions (see for instance the US State Department Human Rights Reports concerning Macedonia and the annual reports of the Ombudsman of the Republic of Macedonia). These problems affected and still affect the functioning of the domestic institutions, and the domestic authorities should take additional measures to solve them. Second, when it comes to the issue of security and safety the research showed that unlike the young ethnic Albanians involved in the research – the majority feel safe – the majority of the young respondents, ethnic Macedonians, do not feel safe, or they feel safe in their hometown (in which almost 99% of the citizens are ethnic Macedonians) but they do not feel safe in multiethnic places. Some of them explained the feeling of insecurity by referring to the well-known interethnic incidents that occurred in the country (Kale 2011; Divo Naselje 2015). A few respondents, Macedonians, even explicitly stated that they feel uncomfortable around members of the other ethnic group (Albanians). Members of the Macedonian security forces, participants in the 2001 conflict, expressed similar positions. Only two of them (from nine) explicitly answered that they feel safe, while other either avoided to answer explicitly or stated that they do not feel safe. One of the members of the Macedonian security forces, participant in the 2001 conflict, answered that he does not feel fear but discomfort due to several reasons including: the behavior of the Albanian youth in the public transport; lack of knowledge of Macedonian and Albanian language; violation of traffic rules; use of firearms by ethnic Albanians at their family celebrations without any sanction. Members of the Macedonian security forces who do not feel safe in the country also mentioned different reasons why they feel insecure (disobedience of the law by Albanians; the treatment of the state’s institutions by Albanians; the uncivilized behavior of Albanians (one respondent); the appointment of the former commandants of (as one respondent stated) terroristic groups for advisers by the leading authority in the country). In this context, it bears noticing that one of them stated the following: “in Macedonia I do not feel safe due to constant and ineffective reforms of security services, inefficient and corrupt judiciary,

politicization of the state institutions, [the fact that] justice is not equal for everyone (we saw how the Hague cases returned to the Republic of Macedonia ended)...”.

The amnesty of the cases involving alleged crimes committed by the NLA’ members during the 2001 conflict is marked as obstacle to reconciliation and social cohesion by the Commissioner for human rights of the Council of Europe (see its 2013 report following his visit to Macedonia in 2012) and by some authors too (see for instance Frčkoski 2011, 47; Milenkovska & Remenski, 2016). One may agree that the amnesty fuels the accusations of selective justice in the country. In 2002 five cases were differed to the jurisdiction of the ICTY. The Tribunal issued an indictment only in one case and one person (member of the Macedonian security forces) was found guilty by the ICTY. As we mentioned above the Law on Amnesty was applied to all other four cases, returned to the Macedonian authorities for prosecution. Therefore, it is hardly a surprise that unlike the young Albanians – the majority think that the ICTY has achieved its goals –, the majority of the young ethnic Macedonians involved in the research think that the ICTY has not achieved its goals or it has achieved them partially. Some of them even described the Tribunal as biased and political, others as “quasi-judicial institution which is absolutely biased (one respondent) or as instrument for spreading planetary hegemony and domination of the USA and NATO (one respondent). When it comes to members of the security forces, participants in the 2001 conflict, it bears noticing that none of them has positive opinion about the ICTY. The vast majority of them describe the Tribunal as biased, and according to them it did not deliberately prosecute the crimes committed by the NLA’ members. However, despite the fact that there are close links between justice and truth, the majority of members of the Macedonian security forces think that finding out the truth about all crimes committed in 2001 conflict is not a precondition for reconciliation, or they are not sure whether it is a precondition. The majority of young Albanians also think that finding out the truth about all crimes committed in 2001 conflict is not a precondition for reconciliation, while the young Macedonians are divided regarding this issue.

It follows from the analysis above that the Macedonian authorities should take a number of steps, including hard and controversial one, to promote reconciliation. They should strengthen the capacity of the domestic institutions in order to solve the political and economic problems (particularly the crime and corruption and problems in relation to in the rule of law). Also, they should deal with the accusations of selective justice, and take activities that will help young ethnic Macedonians to overcome the feeling of insecurity. In this context, the Macedonian authorities may consider to establish mechanism for removing all persons suspected of or sentenced for violations of international humanitarian law and serious human rights violations committed during the 2001 conflict from the public institutions and the decision- making process at national and local level. The law must be applied consistently in whole state, and all illegal activities, such as use of firearms at family celebrations, must be prosecuted and punished. Finally,

the Macedonian authorities should identify the common points and interests of the different ethnic communities (such as the EU and NATO membership), because as the analysis below shows ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians have a common future.

4. MACEDONIAN SOCIETY: WHAT'S NEXT?

Post-conflict societies are marked by loss of trust, intergenerational transmission of trauma and polarization. The legacy they carry from the past, if ignored, threaten to form new waves of violence rather than coexistence (see for instance Bloomfield 2003, 15). People, also can become trapped in the past, with no vision for a common future. Therefore, we try to find out whether the Macedonian citizens of different ethnic origin (Macedonians and Albanians) share a vision for a common future by asking appropriate questions within the research. All young ethnic Macedonians (respondents), except one, responded that according to them there is a common future, or at least there is a chance for a common future for both ethnic groups. It is interesting to mention that quarter of the respondents who responded affirmatively, but simultaneously expressed some sort of skepticism, indicated (although the question did not require a culprit) that there is a chance for a common future only if politicians do not interfere. Young Albanian respondents agreed that Macedonians and Albanians have a common future, but as some of them stated it depends on “cooperation and understanding between the two ethnic groups, as well as a desire for Macedonia's progress as a common state”. On the other hand, members of the Macedonian security forces have divided views. Some of them are pessimist, very few of them are fully optimistic, while most of them consider that the common future for Macedonians and Albanians is conditioned. They mentioned various factors on which the common future depends, including: joint venture for a better future; loyalty; resolution of all misunderstandings and raising the common national and state interests over the political parties. Some of them believe that the state should take care of a common future by improving health, education, the judiciary system, the economy, protection of human rights for all citizens under equal conditions.

However, when we asked the respondents what their ethnic group and they personally can do to increase the level of trust between different communities we revealed that the vast majority of all respondents involved in the research do not perceive itself (personally) as an actor that can do something in this regard. The analysis of their answers also revealed that the majority of the respondents think that the Macedonian state institutions, media, political parties and education impact the inter-ethnic relations in the country. They perceive these actors as crucial actors that can contribute to reconciliation and common future, but some of them also mentioned civil organizations and individuals as actors that can contribute to reconciliation in the country. When it comes to political parties, it bears noticing that a significant number of the respondents think that they have negative impact on the process of reconciliation. In this context, one respondent, young Albanian

stated that “First of all, I would urgently decide that there should be no Macedonian or Albanian political party, but only a civil party ... they are the ones that divide us to ours and yours”. One member of the security force took the similar position and answered that ethnic parties should be forbidden by law.

Respondents involved in the research recognized that both top-down and bottom-up approach are important for reconciliation. They proposed different activities (including: creation of independent platforms, improvement of media literacy; television series) which can contribute to reconciliation, and as one respondent (young Albanian) suggested we must deal with division (national) in our head. Yes, we should try to remove the barriers in our head because as the existing literature testify the process of reconciliation is “ also a deep process which demands changes in our aspirations, our emotions and feelings, perhaps even our beliefs” (Bloomfield, 2006, 7).

5. CONCLUSION

The paper examined the relationships between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians eighteen years after the conflict. It aimed to find out whether they trust each other and whether they share a vision of a common future. To answer the questions, the paper first analyzed the data collected by asynchronous semi-structured interviews conducted (from May till December 2018) within the research project designed to assess the impact of the ICTY on the process of reconciliation within the Macedonian society. Then, it critically evaluated the presented data using the existing literature on reconciliation.

Despite the limitations of the research in relation to the sample size and its representativeness, the paper provided useful directions for future research, and identified certain problems than need to be addressed. Thus, it revealed that security issues, stereotypes and accusations of selective justice (amnesty of the cases returned from the ICTY) still impact the relationships between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians. They communicate with each other (mainly at the University where they study or at their workplaces), but unlike the young Albanians and members of the Macedonian security forces participants in 2001 conflict, the majority of the young Macedonians involved in the research do not have close friends ethnic Albanians. Although the vast majority of all respondents think that Macedonians and Albanians have a common future, the paper revealed that an appropriate level of trust between them has not been developed yet.

Based on the interviews, the paper suggested that the level of trust in the Macedonian society should and could be increased and the state institutions (including educational), media and political parties can contribute in this regard. The state should deal with the negative impact that political parties have on the relations between Macedonian and Albanians and encourage individuals and informal groups that they can contribute to a common future as well. Also, the Macedonian authorities should: 1) strengthen the capacity of the domestic institutions; 2) establish mechanism for removing all persons suspected of or

sentenced for violations of international humanitarian law and serious human rights violations committed during the 2001 conflict from the public institutions and the decision-making process at national and local level; 3) apply the law consistently in all parts of the state, and prosecute and punish all illegal activities, such as use of firearms at family celebrations; 4) identify the common points and interests of different ethnic communities (such as the EU and NATO membership).

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ISLAM AS A RESULT OF ISLAMIC IDEOLOGY

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Abstract

Globalization, at the planetary level, has succeeded in initiating the creation of various identities, while modifying their structure. Islamic identity enables an individual to accept his membership in Islam through a sociological, or cultural identity; through an identity that the individual defines as a strict adherence to religious and ethical practices and a political identity that implies the establishment of a comprehensive Islamic government. The complexity of this phenomenon imposes the need to know the way of spread and the influence of faith in these societies.

In this paper, the authors examine the emergence of Islam and its spread in the world, with the aim of identifying the transition of Islam from the family sphere to the public sphere of Muslim societies, or the emergence of Islamism as a political ideology that occurs in Muslim and non-Muslim societies in which there is Muslim population.

Key words: Islam, religion, faith, political identity, terrorism, ideology

Introduction

Religion often gives a person a sense of freedom, brings him/her into the most secretive sphere and defines his/her attitude towards the environment. On the other hand, religion can be abused to justify violence, war and repression.

Independently from the progress of science and technology in the world, there are still some orthodox, or at least conservative religious groups, movements and organizations that are fighting against the modern world, characterized by blindness and intense commitment to some values, as well as readiness for unconditional defense and further expansion of these values. Most of these groups, movements and organizations have existed for a long time, but in recent years, through various circumstances and events, they have become the focus of our interest.

THE EMERGENCE AND EXPANSION OF ISLAM

According to the Islamic belief, 610 years after the birth of Jesus in the cave of Hira beside Mecca, Muhammad¹⁸², a merchant who was honored as an honest man, belonging to the poor branch of the tribe of Kurejeh, was seen by the angel Gabriel who gave Muhammad the Qur'an. After receiving the Qur'an, Muhammad handed it over to his wife Hatidji, who encouraged him to continue to seek the response to the phenomenon he had experienced. Muhammad accepted his new task in life and began preaching the faith in the One and Only God. Over the years, Islam preached, interpreting the word of God - the Quran on Mecca, collecting a small number of followers¹⁸³.

In 622 Mohammad crossed the (Hijrah) from Mecca to Medina as the chief of their community divided by inter-tribal conflicts. Hijrah¹⁸⁴ for Muslims is not only a physical relocation, but also a spiritual transition from the tribal community, the community of blood, to the community of believers. Muhammad united the tribes on the Arabian Peninsula under their authority, binding them to believe in the One and Only God. The state he created was a theocracy with God as the supreme sovereign and Muhammad as Caliph - God's messenger in this world.

Muhammad died in 632, leaving behind the united Arab peninsula into a united Islamic state with Mecca as the religious and Medina as the political center. During the reign of the four Caliphs who succeeded Muhammad, the Islamic state expanded to North Africa and Europe and Central Asia. The conflict with Persia and Byzantium began with a period of Arab expansion. Jerusalem was conquered in 637, and Persia between 640 and 644. During that period, an Islamic calendar was established starting from Muhammad's Hijrah in Medina in 622¹⁸⁵. Between 644 and 656, the final version of the Qur'an with 114 surahs was formed. With the fourth Rasidon Ali (from 656 to 661), the series of the righteous Caliph ended. His tragic murder in 661 at Kufa marks the peak of religious drama and permanent breakdown in the Muslim community and civil war that led the additional divisions in Islam that have persisted to this day - division into the Shiite and Sunita¹⁸⁶.

¹⁸² Muhammad was born in about 571 AD in the city of Mecca in Arabia, a prominent tribal clan. His ancestors come from the Prophet Ishmael, the son of Abraham. His father died before he was born, an amateur when he was six years old.

¹⁸³ Kulenovic Tarik, *Political Islam*, V.B.Z. Zagreb, 2008, pp. 25-31.

¹⁸⁴ Danijel Ćosic, *Islam Questions and Answers, National Security and the Future 1-2(9)*, 2008. pp. 92-120).

¹⁸⁵ Kulenovic Tarik, *Political Islam*, V.B.Z. Zagreb, 2008, pp. 25-31.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid*, pp 25-31.

JIHAD AS A SOURCE OF ISLAMIC IDEOLOGY

Jihad is not regarded as the "sixth pillar" of Islam in Islam, although there has been a history of Islam, and today there are many theologians, lawyers, followers and groups who see this obligation as essential for the realization of the universal Islamic mission. Therefore, it is necessary to provide at least some basic information about this controversial, but extremely current Islamic institute. The sense of jihad is polemically loosening constantly, both among the Muslims themselves and in the controversy with the non-Muslims, and certainly not far from the truth of the remark of a contemporary Muslim author, that in the discussions about jihad, at least as much ink has been used as blood in the real war on Allah's path. It is precisely in view of this state of affairs that an objective consideration of jihad issues requires broad awareness, analytical caution and balance. It is best to start from the fact that it is difficult for them to recognize its original nature and meaning. However, not everything is completely opaque¹⁸⁷.

The term Jihad is derived from a trochexonian root of *ghd* that carries the idea of investing a great deal of effort, and in the broadest sense means "an effort aimed at achieving a goal." The words derived from this root appear forty-one times in the Qur'an, with six cases of special meaning, not related to the theme of jihad. Nineteen updating refers to the struggle on the path of Allah, but this fight is only expressly non-violent in just one mention. On six occasions, it is explicitly the use of force, that is, the release into battle of all available means, including weapons. In two places it is emphasized that the targets of the struggle on the path of Allah are unbelievers, with whom they should act decisively and harshly. Already based on the summarized statistics, it is clear that there are no attempts to systematically oppose the Kurdish term in the word jihad systemically with the derivatives of the *qtl* root (primarily *qitdf*), for which there is no doubt that they refer to an armed struggle, whereas, according to these interpretations, jihad was something else in its basis, the spiritual effort of self-improvement on the path of Allah, and only sporadic war, and it was purely defensive. In the period after the great Islamic conquests (from the end of the nineteenth century), referring to a famous Muhammad hadith, yet another less known tradition of uncertain authenticity, the pleas of later Muslim theologians, especially those with mystical preferences, begins to systematically develop the view of jihad as the primary spiritual effort. The Prophet, as it is, transmits, returning from a military campaign, told his companions: "We came back, here, from a small jihad, in order to devote ourselves to the greater Jihad, to the one concerning the soul." It is often called along other similar thoughts, such as "A fighter on the path of Allah is the one who fights with his own soul."¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁷ Habel Qureski, *Razumeti islam in Džihad*, Družina, 2016, pp 129-130

¹⁸⁸ Abdilaziz Mezuk et Tarifi, *Džihad*, IslamHouse.com, 2014, pp 1-1435.

There followed, then, the development of spiritualized experience and interpretation of jihad, which extends to our day, and whose credibility has recently been contributed to by some Western Islamologists, being careful not to "deepen" the treatment of jihad as a "holy war" animosity towards Islam and Muslims in the Christian hemisphere. The theories about the predominance of "greater jihad" over the minor are legitimate and a worthy part of Islamic religious and cultural heritage, especially in medieval mystical and ethical elaborations. There can be no doubt about that. Even the great Abuhamid Muhammad al-Ghazali (1058-1111) incorporated the concept of "great jihad" into his monumental theological synthesis of Islamic orthodoxy. Muslims are, therefore, in sources of Islam and in their late sharia-legal interpretation and codification imposed and regulated the obligation of armed struggle on the path of Allah against the unbelievers. In support of this certainty, there could be an abundance of unequivocal Qu'ran, Hadith and Sharia certificates, which we really do not necessarily need, since all more serious Islamic works devoted to jihad issues contain the right commented anthologies of such citations. It is easy to explain and disprove the Kurdish views on jihad at various phases of the publication, because they reflect a change of opportunity in the Islamic municipality and its relations with the non-Muslim environment, first in Mecca and then in Medina, where, legally speaking, it is considered that later provisions repeal the previous ones. It is commonly assumed that there are four groups of successive views on jihad in the Qur'an: (1) the persistence towards attacks and insults by the unbelievers and calling upon Islam by persistent persuasion; (2) taking part in the fight to defend against attack; (3) the inexplicable launch of military action, except during the holy months; (4) attacking infidels always and everywhere. As the Islamic community accelerated rapidly, and Muhammad became a military leader and statesman of expansive religious ideology with unprecedented global ambitions, Jihad was increasingly taking on the character of the obligation to participate in the "holy war" against the unbelievers, so that in that sense it would eventually be codified, although with certain fences and distinctions in details between religious-legal schools¹⁸⁹. Jihad, therefore, is defined in Islamic law as the only permissible form of war conflict, exclusively with non-Muslims, while the possibility of inter-Islamic warfare in principle is rejected. History, of course, soon started its paths, not taking too much for the Sharia idealism based on Muhammad's "best of all communities" representations. However, in cases of inter-Muslim armed conflicts, the use of the term jihad was previously avoided, but in the more rigorous Shiites that equate their version of Islam with unbelief, they also considered jihad as suspended until the emergence of a "hidden imam", the only authorized to pronounce it. In the recent times of collapse of all traditional value systems, the values of formal and legal and ethical aspects are increasingly taken into account, much more on the mobilization and propaganda potential of the "holy war", hence, for example,

¹⁸⁹ John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat - Myth or Reality*, Selezbil, Zivinice, BiH, 2001. pp.64-65

during the eight-year Iraq-Iranian conflict (1980-1988), both Saddam Hussein and Ayatollah Homeini occasionally called for jihad against the brothers by faith¹⁹⁰!

Jihad is perceived and appreciated in Islam as the highest degree of devotion, so that in one hadith, the Jihad fighters, the Mujahideen, are compared with the monks in Christianity¹⁹¹. For those who had fallen on the path of Allah, the martyrs for faith, the Shekhids, a certain paradise reward was promised, under the most favorable conditions. The obligation to respond to a call in the "holy war", which, strictly speaking, can only be sent to the Khalifa, as the head of the believers, belongs to adult and healthy men, and when the Muslim community is threatened, the circle expands. If it is an offensive jihad, in which moves are made only when there are real prospects for success, it is considered a collective obligation. This means that as many Muslims as it takes to achieve the intended goal, which in regular circumstances is practically reduced to the military and other war-trained Muslim formations, will take part in it. Most lawyers believe that before attacking non-believers, it is necessary for them to invite them to switch to Islam, thus avoiding unnecessary bloodshed, while some contest the topicality of such gesture from the time when Islam became a global fact, as it is not unknown to unbelievers there is a possibility of being brought into the family of Allah's listeners. The goal of an offensive war against the unbelievers is to defeat and under the threat of death or slavery, force the unbelievers to receive Islam, with the singular (so-called "nations with the book" - Jews, Christians, Sabees, and later on some others) procedure - they are allowed to, degraded, with the payment of the principal tax (jizz) and (non-agricultural) landings (haradža / harak), to remain in their own faith and retain their property¹⁹². If the Muslim community is attacked and threatened by a real danger, jihad becomes an individual duty of every Muslim who has to respond to in accordance with his abilities and demands of the situation. Given that Islam is doctrinally considered to be the perfect and ultimate Truth and universal religion that needs to be extended to the whole world and bring salvation to all human beings, and that jihad is the means and the path of its expansion, it is logically that the reasons for leading the "holy the war on the path of Allah " cease only when it arrives at the end of that road. Hence the impenetrable actuality of the jihad effort. There can be no lasting peace between the world of Islam and holy unrest, but only a shorter or longer truce, until the conditions for Islam prevail.

If we return to this concise statement of the main facts regarding the notion of jihad as an initial misunderstanding or disagreement about its nature between the majority of the Muslim and a considerable part of the non-Muslim authors, we think at least some basic things are clear, or they should have been. First of all, the logic and justification of jihad is possible only by moving within the Islamic world view. To non-Muslims, by nature, it must be essentially unacceptable. In a one-

¹⁹⁰ Miroljub Jevtić, *Contemporary Jihad as War*, New Book, Belgrade 1989. pp. 17-24.

¹⁹¹ Hatidza Berisha, and authors, *Jihad as Global Terrorism*, Military Work, 7/2008, Belgrade, Belgrade, pp 447-464

¹⁹² Dragan Simeunović, *Terrorism*, Faculty of Law in Belgrade, 2009. pp. 191-193.

time lecture on Jihad from 1939, the influential contemporary Indo-Pakistani theorist of radical Islamism Abu'l A'la Mawdudi (1903-1979) paradigmatically expressed the very essence of the Muslim starting point and the rationale in the discussion with Christians, and the so-called "Moderate Muslims" about the war on Allah's path.

A'la Mawdudi sees the two main causes of the lack of understanding of the nature of jihad, not only by Christians, but by some Muslims as well, in the wrong habit of understanding Islam as a religion in the conventional sense of that definition, and Muslims as a nation in the technical sense of the word. If Islam were a conventional type of religion, and the Muslims of the nation, the necessity of the existence of jihad could indeed not be justified, A'la Mawdudi claims. Everyone has the right to confess and preach his own faith in peace, and the commitment of the nation to arms is ethically acceptable only in self-defense. "But the truth is that Islam is not a name for 'religion' nor is it a Muslim name for 'nation'. In reality, Islam is a revolutionary ideology and a program that seeks to change the social order of the entire world and to arrange it in accordance with its terms and ideals. Muslims is the name of an international revolutionary party organized according to Islam to carry out its revolutionary program. And Jihad refers to the revolutionary struggle and the ultimate effort that the Islamic Party is pursuing for the stated goal". The goal, according to A'la Mawdudi, is not to enforce the will of this or that nation, as in the case of common wars, but "the sole interest of Islam is the well-being of mankind". In the pursuit of this high-level target, "Islam seeks to destroy all states and governments anywhere on the face of the earth that are opposed to the ideology and program of Islam, regardless of the state or nation in power," because "Islam seeks the Earth - not only its part, but the whole planet, "in order that" the entire humanity would benefit from ideology and charity, or, more truly, to say, Islam that is a welfare program for all humanity".

Indeed, if the question of Jihad is thus posed, why should there be any further discussion? Jihad is the only measure of its own. Not only does the meaning lose the distinction between the defensive and offensive war on the path of Allah, but, as A'la Mawdudi observes, jihad becomes both offensive and defensive at the same time, and according to the University of Damascus, Professor M.S.R. al-Bhutti, it may justifiably be considered as preventive jihad. Namely, when Muslims, who are characterized by a permanent "endemic" belligerence (for example hirdba - Al-Buti's terminological innovation), feel that the unbelievers are plotting to attack them, they legitimately attack first. In full agreement with A'la Mawdudi, one of the leading Shiite theologian authorities, Ayatollah Murtez Mutahari, responds to the transfer of Islam because of the existence of verdicts on jihad: "Usually, the absence of any law on war is emphasized as a quality of Christianity. We, for our part, say that it is precisely the character of Islam that the law of jihad is known by. If we look better, we will see that in Christianity there is no law on jihad, because in it, in fact, there is nothing. I want to say that there is no Christian structure of society, the Christian legal system and the Christian rules

according to which society should be organized, and then there is a law on jihad. Christianity is deprived of substance ... ¹⁹³”.

Polemicists from the Christian side will essentially agree with A'la Mawdudi and Mutahari's comparative insights, but from a completely different point of view. What is for Islamic apologists the unachievable advantage of Islam, for the other side it is its incurable civilization defect. "Unlike a Christian who is required to love his enemy and who can hardly find in the New Testament verses to justify the struggle and defense of the Christian community from external aggression, a Muslim finds in the Qur'an and Islamic tradition an entire corpus of perfectly clear and legalized doctrines that are dealing with the relations with non-Muslims", concluding that the ontological distinction between Islam and Christianity is reflected in the fact that "Islam is not a mere religion in the spiritual sense. Moreover, it is an ideological-political system based on the imperative of obedience across the planet and the theocratic laws, "and therefore" Islamic view of other religions, inevitably relates to the production of a geo-strategic doctrine, "according to which" the totality of non-Muslim nations, by refusing to accept the 'true religion', from the standpoint of orthodox Islam, is the enemy of the nation". It is like it was copied from A'la Mawdudi! With the difference that the fulfillment of the universal mission of Islamizing the entire planet would be the ultimate salvation for them, and for Del Val (and hundreds of millions of Christians, including laymen and atheists), the ruin of mankind. It is difficult, then, to argue that the disagreement over jihadism can only be a misunderstanding, due to the lack of awareness, as a "politically correct" attempt to present it too often in the West¹⁹⁴.

The only correct answer to the question that is repeated over and over again, whether the Jihad is a war or not, according to all available knowledge, would be: Yes, jihad is a war, moreover, a doctrinal and primarily and historically a war, with the aim of expanding, consolidating and defending Islam. It is not just a war for Muslims, nor Islam, as some tend to do, can be identified with jihad, which, too, must always be emphasized. But the war against infidels is indisputable. Here, the illustration works, as Jihad is defined in the frequently quoted doctoral dissertation of the contemporary Muslim theoretician M. Ibn Saeed al-Kaqthani, defended at the Faculty of Law in Mecca: In the language of Shari'a or religion, jihad has the meaning: to wage a war against the infidels diligently and with all its power.

The second question that seeks an answer is whether it is correct to translate the term Jihad, as it is commonly used in the West, by the term "holy war". Given that this war, based on Islamic theory and doctrine, is a war for faith, it is normal to translate it into the European languages with the term a holy war. We insist on this fact, as authors, as well as foreign authors who are trying to refute this translation of the term Jihad. According to them, jihad cannot be a sacred war, because Islam

¹⁹³ Jihad in Islam, Takvim 1412-13 / 1992, Sarajevo, 1992. pp. 66-68.

¹⁹⁴ A Part of Val, Islamism and the United States. Alliance Against Europe, Belgrade, 1998. pp 57

does not recognize the concept of a holy war. This objection is completely unfounded because it neglects (and overlooks) the fact that it is a translation of the term Jihad, and only its war components, into European languages. In the languages of the countries of the Christian tradition, the term holy war encompasses the wars that are aimed at a triumph of Christianity against non-Christians in the struggle for the establishment of civilizational values which are sought by the Christian church. These wars were holy, because they were guided in the name of the victory of Christian religion over the faith that it did not recognize. Given that the Jihad, in its warlike version, is the same, and is, in this case, aimed at the triumph of Islam, it is logical that it is translated into the European languages as a holy war."

The essence of the problem with modern Jihad is certainly not in the domain of conductive solutions, but in the real content and effects of this Islamic phenomenon. The fact that for non-Muslims every jihad is unacceptable does not require a specific explanation. What, however, is to say about the dilemmas regarding its legitimacy, which appear in today's Islamic world, and the claims that the calling on the mission and obligation of jihad by the most radical Islamist movements and organizations is an abuse of the Islamic learning? The consideration of these difficult and open questions has been elaborated, over the last decades, on hundreds of thousands of pages of scholarly debates, ideological polemics and political pamphlets - without a final answer that could be considered, at least temporarily, generally acceptable. In view of the nature of jihad, such an answer, in all likelihood, will never be possible. It all depends on the point of view, i.e. religious-civilization affiliation and the value basis.

THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE ABUSE OF ISLAM

The division between Sunni and Shiite¹⁹⁵ was practically created right after the death of the Prophet Muhammad¹⁹⁶, as a result of a dispute over the question of who was his true successor. The Sunni believed that the Islamic leader should come from the Qureshi tribe from which the Prophet himself came, while the Shiites believed that he must be exclusively a member of the Prophet's family. At that moment, the essence of the conflict was in the struggle for power, but over time, it grew into a century-old religious division¹⁹⁷.

¹⁹⁵ Kulenovic Tarik, *Political Islam*, V.B.Z. Zagreb, 2008, pp. 25-31

¹⁹⁶ Dragan Bojanic, *Wahhabism - Radical Islamic Movement, MO VS, Military Work of Spring 2010*.

¹⁹⁷ The Middle East represents a region that covers the southern and eastern parts of the Mediterranean and extends from the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea to the Persian Gulf. Iran is considered to be the eastern border. This common area includes the following countries: Cyprus, Turkey, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, UAE, Yemen, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Western Pakistan are often included in this region because of their close ethnic and religious relations with the group of Persian peoples. The relationship between Iran and the Arab states is predominantly based on religion and geographical proximity, while Kurds, the largest ethnic group in the Middle East, the Persian language branch, have no own state.

Today's political context in the Arab world draws its direct roots from the end of World War I and the fall of the Ottoman Empire. England and France received a mandate over this part of the world and practically divided the Middle East into their zones of influence. They, then, in a very arbitrary manner, determined today's borders between the Arab national states and the established local rulers, and their cartography was maintained after the end of their mandate and the end of the Second World War¹⁹⁸.

In some countries, monarchies remained in power, while in others there was a revolution and spread of the influence of Arab nationalism and secularism. This period was marked by nations and their desire to build, within the existing borders, the national identity of the Arab states.

The end of the Cold War and the respective peace agreements of Egypt and Jordan with Israel led to new divisions among the Arabs and destabilization of the entire region. Economic and social problems, rising inequalities in society and the absolutist rule of government in most countries were the main causes of the turmoil and demonstrations that marked the beginning of the so-called Arab Spring.

The protests began primarily in secularly regulated states. Demonstrations were initiated and led by young people eager for essential changes, greater rights, new opportunities, reforms in power, economy and education. However, they did not have the support outside the urban centers, nor did they possess the organization and resources to lead to any major changes. This shortage was exploited by Islamic political parties, which focused their political mobilization on their goals and soon took the lead over the demonstrators.

Initially, the most influential were the Muslim brothers with their wide network of organizations, which, with the great support of Turkey and Qatar, came to power in Egypt. In addition, at one point they were the main political alternative in Syria, Tunisia and Libya. However, their role was gradually deteriorating, with the greatest contribution to the active opposition of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states that the Muslim Brothers considered to be an existential threat to their monarchy. Although they had a lot in common - primarily the linking of Islam and politics, Saudi Arabia and the Wahhabis were opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood because their legitimacy was based on Islam, and they saw a dangerous rival in the Muslim Brothers. The resulting vacuum was soon filled with militant and extreme Sunni organizations, such as Al Qaeda and the so-called the Islamic State (ID), whose influence began to grow dizzy. The consequence was further militarization of conflicts, especially in Iraq, Syria and Libya where civil wars are being waged, but also in Egypt, Yemen and Lebanon¹⁹⁹.

In all the stated countries there are different divisions and numerous causes of conflict: the conflict between Islam and secularism, Islam and Arab nationalism, the majority and minorities, the rich and the poor, the urban and the rural, the struggle for power, economic and financial power, etc. However, the conflicts in Syria,

¹⁹⁸ UN Officer, article Conflict in the Crescent, Defense November 15, 2015

¹⁹⁹ <https://mytimes.com/topics/organisation/al-qaeda/2017/08/>; last visited 30.04.2018.

Iraq, Yemen, Bahrain and Lebanon have an increasingly religious character of the Sunni-Shi'ite conflict. On their territories, the so-called the Shiite and Sunni crescent, that is, the Sunni and Shiite population is the most mixed.

Under the influence of the Arab Spring in 2011, demonstrations against the Syrian government and President Bashar al-Assad began. Assad's family belongs to the Shi'ite Alawi sect which accounts for 12% of the population in Syria. On the opposite side are the Sunni Muslims who make up the majority of 75% of the Syrian population and the minority Kurds. Kurds inhabit parts of South East Turkey (North Kurdistan), North West Iran (Eastern Kurdistan), Northern Iraq (South Kurdistan) and Northern Syria (Western Kurdistan). The majority population in the autonomous region of Iraqi Kurdistan makes up a significant minority group in Turkey, Iran, and Syria, where they claim greater autonomy and rights. It is estimated that there are between 1.750.000 and 2.200.000 people living in Syria, while there are between 30 and 45 million in the world²⁰⁰.

After the outbreak of the civil war in Syria, the Islamic State expanded its activities, concluded an alliance with other Islamic groups and sought to create a caliph; in 2012, Al-Raqa (Syria) became the first major city under the control of Syrian rebels and IS headquarters. Due to the Islamic State conflict with another Islamist faction in Syria in 2013, Al Qaeda ordered the dismantling of the ID that refused obedience and in 2014 after the IS offensive action in Iraq they took over Mosul, Tikrit and other important cities in northern and central Iraq, which is now far in the past.

Today, a decade after the outbreak of the conflict in the Middle East, a court can be made clear about the developments in this area. Attempts by the Western powers to change the government in Syria and establish democratic power did not earn the support of the majority of the population. The role of pro-democracy forces fighting the tyrannical government is now recognized as a jihadist group aimed at forming a state under Shari'a law, modeled on Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

The Islamic State as a territory no longer exists, but it is still a major threat in this region. Due to various interests at the global level, arms support and finance by external elements will not stop. The open Kurdish issue in the region is becoming a new burning issue that places Turkey, Iraq and Syria back to the top of interest. Although they did not win full independence, the Kurds in Iraq won the status of a constituent nation from the status of a national minority.

THE RELIGIOUS CONTEXT OF ILLEGAL ABUSE OF ISLAM

Islam is not a monolithic religion and it comprises different approaches, interpretations and understandings, as well as different practices and attitudes towards other religious communities. The basic division is between the Sunni and the Shiite, which is further broken down into currents and fractions. Sunni are more

²⁰⁰ http://www.info-ks.net/vesti/svet/78982/ko-su-i-gde-zive-kurdi/2017/06_last_visited_30.04.2018

numerous and make up 85% of the total number of Muslims in the world, while Shiites are the remaining 15%²⁰¹.

The Arabic term fountain denotes the division and disputes between the Sunni and the Shiite. So far there have been five major wars between them, mostly in the early Islamic period. The Iran Revolution, the US military intervention in Iraq, and the overthrow of secular governments in many Arab countries disrupted the relative balance that existed between the two communities and there was a renewed intensification of the conflict between the Sunnis and Shiites, especially in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Bahrain.

The events in the Arab world in the last decade have led the Sunni to strengthen the influence of the Salafist, the Wahhabis and the Muslim Brothers. All of them believe in the Islamic community - the Ummah, which means they do not believe in national states. They also believe that the community should be governed by the Sharia Law. This is their common goal - to create an Islamic community governed by Sharia law, for which there will be no national borders.

Salafists who came into existence in the 19th century believe in the literal interpretation of sacred books and that Muslims should live in the way they lived in the time of Muhammad and his generation ('salah' means ancestor). However, not all Salafists are by definition militant. There are three primary schools of Salafism. One argues that Salafism should be spread through missionary work and through the educational system, the other is to establish a caliphate, but in a non-violent way, while the third school is focused on the establishment of a caliphate by violent means - jihad. Al-Qaeda, for example, ideologically belongs to the school of Salafist militant jihad²⁰².

Wahhabism was named after the extremist Muslim preacher Abd al-Wahab, who lived in the 18th century on the territory of today's Saudi Arabia. Wahab launched a movement for the purification of Islam from all innovations and deviations in relation to the period of Muhammad's life, and in that sense he is close to Salafism. The basic difference with Salafism is that the Wahhabists only believe in the violent spread of their ideas and refuse to deal with political, economic and social problems in today's Islamic communities²⁰³. The self-proclaimed Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, ideologically belongs to Wahhabism, which is the dominant form of Islam in Saudi Arabia, as well as in most Gulf countries, and is sponsored by the state.

Muslim Brothers are a transnational Islamic organization founded in Egypt in 1928. Their focus was primarily on social activities, not on political action. This, however, has changed with the so-called Arab Spring, when Muslim Brothers reoriented to political action, with the aim of taking power. Although they had significant success at the beginning, especially in Egypt in recent years, their political significance and influence have been fading. Unlike Salafists, the Muslim

²⁰¹ <https://sicttransittecnicamundi.blogspot.com/2006/10/sunni-and-shia-map.html>; last visited 30.04.2018

²⁰² <https://mytimes.com/topics/organisation/al-qaeda/2017/08>; last visited 30.04.2018.

²⁰³ Marko Škorić, Aleksej Kišjuhas, Guide to Ideology 2, AKM Zola Prints Novi Sad, 2015. pp 175.

brothers are far more pragmatic in their efforts to infiltrate and take over the existing structures of state power. They also seek to reform themselves in line with the modern world and technological development. The ruling party in Turkey (AKP), as well as the Palestinian Hamas, ideologically belong to the Muslim Brotherhood.

The Shiites believe in the Imam, the religious leader chosen by Allah himself, and this is the greatest difference with the belief of the Sunni. The Imam is a mediator between Allah and ordinary believers, and he only knows the hidden interpretations of the Quran and has the duty to transmit them to the believers. It is believed that the Imam is unmistakable and his teaching has the same religious significance as the sacred books. The Islamic Republic of Iran is the only state in which the official religion is Shiite Islam. This system is known as the Vilayat al-Fakih, which in free translation means the Spiritual Leadership, or the rule of experts of Muslim law.

CONCLUSION

The conditions for the use of violence for religious purposes are complex, interconnected and often ambiguous. The image of God influences the understanding of religious messages. If image comes to a blur, there is a misinterpretation of religion, which ultimately leads to extremism. Understanding these causes and processes that govern religious terrorism is crucial to preventing Islamic terrorism, but also all other forms of violence that are committed for religious purposes. Conflict resolution is possible only with mutual understanding and acceptance of differences of race, gender, or religion.

While Christians and Buddhists conquered the existing states, Islam was from the very beginning a state. For a Muslim country (Islamic State) means God's good religious duty every Muslim is concerned to approve that state²⁰⁴. In the case that the area inhabited by Muslims comes under non-Muslim authority, the Quran commands a move to an area under Islamic rule. In the medieval period this attitude largely determined the attitude of Muslims towards non-Muslim countries and the possibility of living there.

From the point of view of the scientific Islamology of the non-Muslim foundation, and based on the original historical and contemporary material, as well as direct insights, it could be reasonably concluded that the movements and groups which in our time conduct warlike jihad are equally legitimate (or illegitimate, depending on the general attitude according to the "holy war") as well as those of the past. The only, surely important, difference lies in the ultimate relativization of the authority to proclaim jihad and call upon weapons in the name of Allah.

Contemporary jihadists do not consider as a matter of urgency, as the Shari'ite demands, that they call upon the Khalif or Imam to fight the infidels or

²⁰⁴ <http://ikb-berlin.de/edukacija/pitanja-i-odgovori-o-islamu/132>, last visited 17.12.2018

not, and not any local or self-styled Muslim leader. On the other hand, Islamist extremists must undoubtedly be held accountable for turning the classical norms (not, of course, always and in practice) into something that is considered as undesirable exceptions, such as mass killing of civilians, large material destruction, and the like.

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THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON THE STATE'S NATIONAL SECURITY

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Abstract

Within the framework of this paper, the author scientifically determines the terms: "state security"; "National Security"; "State security"; "Security of people"; "General security" by analyzing electronic sources and reviewing domestic and foreign literature. The author will use the following methods: the analytical method, the descriptive method and the content analysis method. The author analyzes the contents of global security, by delineating the global interest and national interests, and analyzing the content of the Ideal-Political Global Security Concept, the Real-Political Concept of Global Security and the initial concept of global security. In the concluding observations, the author determines the positive and negative aspects of globalization.

The subject of research is the global interest and national interests in achieving security in contemporary global conditions.

The purpose of the research is to determine the importance of national interests and values in achieving security in contemporary global conditions.

Key words: global interest, national interests, the ideal political concept of global security, Real-Political concept of global security and the initial concept of global security.

DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO DETERMINING SECURITY

In scientific literature, in addition to the notion of security, the following terms are used: "state security"; "National Security"; "State security"; "Security of people"; "General security", etc. (Gerginova, 2015 : 31). The security of the state is an expression of its defense capabilities to protect the highest state and national values, interests and goals. It pertains to activities through which the implementation of measures and the functioning of the state are organized on legal and political grounds, in order to protect its independence, sovereignty, integrity, the constitutionally established legal order and the personal and property security of the citizens. National security means the protection of states and peoples against all forms of unarmed and armed threats, as well as the creation of favorable conditions for the realization of national values and interests. The absence of war and military conflicts alone does not ensure international peace and security. Non-

military sources, instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and environmental spheres today pose a threat to peace and security (Mijalković & Keserović, 2010 : 60).

It is necessary to differentiate the security of the state from the security of the society, emphasizing that the basic criterion for their demarcation is the sovereignty of the state compared to the identity of the society. The essence of both phenomena is existence or survival; the state that loses its sovereignty ceases to be a state, and the society that loses its identity ceases to exist as a sovereign entity. The separation of state and social security should be understood in terms of two organizational security centers, but the state remains in the epicenter of the dilemma whether it is social security or an international type of security. The state provides legitimacy and protection of society, but it is also a key link in the approach to security as a supranational phenomenon (Avramov, 2001 : 432).

State security is the application and use of methods, measures and actions of the bodies, services and political entities that prevent, disable and make harmless the holders of activities endangering the state, as well as the institutions that directly engage in the protection of the state (security services) (Mijalković & Keserović, 2010 : 86).

State security includes the prevention of so-called political crimes, detection of their preparation and warning of their perpetrators, further detection of the committed acts of this kind and the apprehension and prosecution of their perpetrators, including all types of activities and measures in order to achieve the stated goals. Depending on where the threat comes from, the security of the state is divided into external and internal, but external security may also be endangered by activities of individuals or other attacks coming from the outside. National security is defined as an activity of the national states, which, in accordance with their social opportunities in the present and in the future, and taking into account global changes and development, protect their own identity, survival and interest (Mijalković & Keserović, 2010 : 67). Security is a state in which States consider that there is no danger of a military attack, political pressure or economic coercion so that they can freely develop and advance (The 1986 OUN definition).

General security covers the protection of the personal, property, political and other rights and freedoms of man and citizen from the criminal denial of their use. Personal freedoms and rights cover the protection of the life, integrity and inviolability of the person, further inviolability of the home, the secrecy of letters and other means of communication, freedom of movement and residence and other personal, as well as political rights. Protection of property rights means the provision of the existing property-legal relations, protection of the property rights of citizens from theft, robbery and various arbitrary acquisition of property rights and any violation of the individual's property rights (Mijalković & Keserović, 2010 : 61).

Today there are multiple approaches in defining security and all are appropriate, but not sufficient to comprehensively define the notion of security. At the same time, new ideas and views are emerging as a product of the need for

comprehensive protection of the new values and spheres of social life that were not previously subject to serious protection or protection of the traditional values with new methods by new actors.

Following the end of the Cold War, the disintegration of the bipolar political environment, together with the process of globalization and interdependence that is rapidly expanding, (Gerginova, 2015 : 105) have emerged as the leading roles in the evolving changes that have strongly influenced the way of thinking and the psychology of the state stakeholders and decision-makers of the highest to the lowest level of the state and the international hierarchical structure. Also, these changes motivated the theoreticians of security studies to significantly extend the notion of security from the traditional focus, that is, the state-centric understanding of security to a new global, transnational focus where security is perceived as a complex issue that is necessarily related to the human influence of change in the global environment and the impact of global change in his behavior (Rothschild, 1995 : 53).

After the collapse of the bipolar political-military structure of the world and with the commencement of globalization processes, the old world of real politics (filled with conservative realistic understandings) is complemented by a large number of new actors who create new rules of conduct in the international community. In new international relations, the traditional understanding of power (power) through military effectiveness has been replaced by "different new dimensions of power", such as technology, communications, information, trade, and finance. All of this confirms the conclusion that the world of realpolitik is complemented by new ideas which, in terms of conservative realistic perceptions, act in an idealistic way, so that one can speak of a world of ide politics (Gwyn, 1994 : 15).

Particularly important for the determination of global security are the proposals of the Commission on Global Governance (CGG) that advocated "Global security be extended from its traditional focus and integrate the safety of people and the planet" (The Report of the Commission on Global Governance). In terms of the views presented in this Commission, the most important is that the content of security) has been expanded with content dealing with the realization of human security (individual security). Citizens' security is the first aspect of global security. Citizens' security is very important, because the state cannot be safe if its citizens are not safe. The list of military threats that is a result of post-modern humanitarian problems is being expanded (Kotovčevski, 2000 : 45). The second aspect of global security is the security of the planet. The big environmental threats deepen the ecological crisis, increasing the dangers and problems on the planetary plan. The enormous damage to the ecosystem has greatly disrupted the balance of nature, which is otherwise maintained by itself, without the influence of "developed countries".

GLOBAL INTEREST AND NATIONAL INTERESTS

In order to determine the contents of the notion of global security, it is necessary to define the notion of global interest, which we can develop on two levels: Primary - that constitutes the physical integrity of the Earth and the protection of its ecosystem and Secondary - which implies universal improvement of the conditions of life for fundamental human needs and human rights. National interests are also a significant portion of global security. Global security does not exclude legitimate national interests. Any national policy that moves outside the legitimate national interest essentially collides with the primary global interest (Kotovčevski, 2000 : 45).

Global security implies a very widespread area that is difficult to define precisely, especially when the concepts of traditional security studies exist, as well as new understandings of global security studies. We can also conclude that global security can be analyzed through three different paradigms: the ideal political, real-political and initial paradigm. From these paradigms comes the definition of global security, according to which global security represents security, determined by global interests and global threats, and covers individual, national and regional security, between which there is an ideal political and / or real political relationship between the sectors (political, military, economic, social and environmental) whose essence is mutual correcting, controlling and modeling in order to achieve peace and security of the planet and people. Global Security is a process and need for global security actors (human, state, in addition to governmental and non-governmental organizations, global alliances) through a functionalist approach and global governance to offer an adequate response to the challenges of global threats and global interests (Kotovčevski, 2000 : 45).

According to traditional security studies (TSS), according to Barry Busan's classical security theory (CSCT), the state and its security are the center of interest and study. From the security of the state, that is, from the national security, all the relations to the regional and international security spring up, but also to the security of the individual (individual security), which does not specifically participate and does not influence the creation of national security.

THE IDEAL POLITICAL CONCEPT OF GLOBAL SECURITY, THE REAL POLITICAL CONCEPT OF GLOBAL SECURITY AND THE INITIAL CONCEPT OF GLOBAL SECURITY

Global security studies determine the following security items: individual, national, regional and global security, i.e. they are completely excluded from international and trans-national security, as they are embedded in global security. If we break down the types of security in international relations according to the levels of analysis (Barry Busan) through the ideal political parameters, the only logical conclusion will be that there is only one kind of security - global security (Kotovčevski, 2000 : 47).

The ideal political concept of global security assumes that there is only global security that is determined by global threats and the global interest that covers individual, national and regional security as its subsidiaries without a large free space for action.

The real political concept of global security is similar to the traditional concept of security. Namely, national, regional and global security are autonomous systems that are interconnected across sectors: military, political, legal, economic, social and environmental.

The third concept is the initial concept of global security, which starts from the reality of individual, and national, regional and global security whose mutual relations are fundamentally different in relation to the ideal political and real political concept. Namely, the entry into the period of limited sovereignty and global threats is accepted by the fact that national security must be a subsystem of global security, but nevertheless there are areas that must be left to national security (Turek, 1999).

From the ideal policy concept to global security, global security implies individual, national and regional security, between which there is a two-way communication across sectors (political, legal, military, economic, social and environmental). Their main goal is mutual correcting, controlling and modeling, with an emphasized supremacy of global security.

In essence, the content of national security according to TSS is primarily aimed at military power, that is, the prevention of attacks from outside. However, this concept, according to the authors Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, is a very narrow approach, and for this purpose they advocate a broader (broad) approach to the study of international security.

The new concept for the study of international security is defined as "New Security Studies" (NSS) or "Critical Security Studies" (CSS) in relation to traditional security studies. The acceptance and affirmation of the new security concept is largely determined by the reality of the environmental policy, the security of beneficial and quality political changes that reflect the democratization of society and the public in the exercise of power and the intellectual propagation of an idea that requires wider horizons in the study of broader areas such as the theory of international relations, strategic studies, peace studies and conflicts, human rights, development studies, international history, etc.) (Barry, 1991: 370). From the new security concept (the broader, comprehensive approach) arises the expansion of the content from the military to the political, economic, social and ecological content. The individual, national and regional security in the presented ideal-political system are only subsystems of global security without greater free space for action, while in the second concept they are relatively autonomous and interconnected through the political, legal, military, economic, social and environmental sectors. From the previous two concepts, the "third variant" of a possible third concept emerges - "an initial concept of global security studies". This concept is closest to contemporary reality, since it fully respects the reality of individual, regional, national and global security. The relations in the "new

concept" are fundamentally different i.e. they are fundamentally different from the relations established in the idealistic and real political concept of global security.

With the deepening of the globalization processes in the modern world and with the growing threat of global threats, we can draw a conclusion that national security should be a subsystem of global security. However, this does not imply the possibility of a complete abolition of national security. Getting into the period of limited state sovereignty does not mean a complete loss of state goals and interests, and in this context, the disappearance of one of its most important pillars - the national security system. Significant areas still in full possession of national security remain in the security sphere. What is significant in this aspect of national security concerns regional security (identical approach), because it basically represents only an interface between national and global security.

When it comes to state territory, the name of the state, natural resources or the welfare of a particular state, these issues must not be resolved to the detriment of national security, that is, they represent vital national interests that are the subject of national security. However, when a particular conflict or problem at the national or regional level escalates to such a degree that it transforms into a serious global threat, then it is a global problem - a problem for the international community and it is necessary to deal with it solely on a global scale. In such specific and very dangerous situations for peace and security on a global scale, problems are resolved within the framework of global security.

This interdependence and condition of security leads us to conclude that from a theoretical and practical point of view, global security is in significant correlation with individual, national and regional security, and that global security can be analyzed through different paradigms: the ideal political and the initial paradigm. Today, the concept of global security is an expansion of security from a predominantly military field to other areas, primarily economic, energy, social and environmental security, including the security of the individual and society as a whole. It is security determined by global interests and global threats, and it covers individual, national and regional security, among which there is an ideal political and / or real political relationship between the sectors (political, legal, military, economic, social and environmental) whose essence is mutual correction, controlling and modeling in order to achieve the peace and security of the planet and people (Kotovčevski, 2000 : 47).

The development of the concept of social security is the result of the idea that the traditional concept of national security was unable to solve all the tensions that exist in modern society.

Expanding the concept of security, the issue regarding the content of the concept of social security has been raised, since society has become an important reference object of security. When it comes to society as a reference object, it should be noted that there is a clear distinction between society and the state, above all, in relation to the challenges and threats that affect their security.

When talking about social security, we have the focus of attention, in addition to society, on the various influences that can change certain values such as language, culture, religion and national identity in an unacceptable way. According to Weaver, social security covers situations that society understands as threats to its identity (Weaver et al., 1993 : 371).

The concept of social security is not completely determined in the theoretical sense. It must be gradually developed, respecting the integrity of the demands of national and ethnic groups to preserve their tradition, culture, language and customs and complementing these elements of their identity with national elements in order to establish trust and cooperation among different nations and ethnic communities in all areas of life, including security issues. Building the concept of social security also means analyzing the conditions under which a society can solve certain problems that may arise between nations, ethnic or religious groups independently, without state intervention, using only its own capacities. Such an effort will have much more success in conditions of high level of individual security and when the state allows different forms of articulation of the specific interests of the groups. Otherwise, social security would be just an idea.

GLOBAL TRIAD

From the middle of the second half of the 20th century, cooperation between European countries increased. The growth of European co-operation in Europe began with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Association, followed by the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC), the establishment of the European Community and finally the establishment of the European Union.

These developments have prompted other parts of the world to integrate. The establishment of a common European market led to the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The European Union has become the basis for joining countries. It can be said that regional trade blocks have become the pillars of global economy. Today's economy develops in three regions - Western Europe, the United States, and East Asia, especially, Japan (Kresić, 1996 : 81).

This development of the economy can be called tribalization. The existence of these three regions is clearly visible in international relations, especially in the production of expensive communications and information equipment that takes place in the North America-Europe-East Asia (Lončar, 2005). The interdependence of the United States, Western Europe and East Asia is very strong and it is obviously the core of global economy. In these frames, Europe holds the championship and the traditional cultural development, the United States possesses the dominant natural and capital goods, while Japan starts with diligence, production and technological innovation. These three parts of the world sometimes

differ politically, but when it comes to production and consumption, they are united and leading.

GLOBALIZATION ASPECTS

We can define globalization as a process of economic, political, social and cultural action at a supranational level, which changes globally the existing political, economic (economic), social and cultural relations.

In the second half of the 20th century, a new economic wave emerged, called globalization. Globalization is a linkage that transcends national governments, and aims to increase economic growth and wealth. The five dimensions of globalization: society, politics, economics, culture and the environment cannot be strictly separated from one another, they are rather connected (Gerginova, 2015).

One of the accompanying phenomena of globalization is regionalization, that is, regional integration in the world. The world is divided into three blocks: European, i.e. the European Union, Asia-Pacific, respectively ASEAN and North American, respectively NAFTA.

The deeper analysis of the essential dimensions of globalization implies the abandonment of the old way of thinking and the ideological doctrines that depart from the territorial limitations of ethno-national distinctions and indifference. This analysis takes into account that on the world stage, besides state-national actors, there are also state and non-state actors, as new subjects of global-world relations (transnational companies, transnational technological and traffic entities, various cultural and religious movements, non-governmental organizations; global and regional institutions and organizations, large-scale information systems, the Internet, global media, etc.).

One of the most important aspects of globalization is its economic aspect. Global (multinational) companies influence the flows of the world leveraging processes, and their operations involve millions of people around the world who are interconnected in spite of the great distance (so they have control over resources, capital, and technology). In this way, the economy is expanding beyond borders and it seems that there are no economic and political barriers (Lončar, 2005).

The political-legal aspect of globalization concerns the disrupted state sovereignty. A global governance process is beginning, which limits the state power so far, creating the foundations for the establishment of new supranational states. The weakening of state power is especially evident in the area of finance. (Duishin, 1998).

Internationalization and regionalization, along with globalization, are becoming challenges for today's states (Turek, 1999). New international and regional associations are created, through which the governments of the states can be pressured, as well as connections with people around the world can be established. Global politics becomes multicultural and multi-civilizational (Milardović, 1999).

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

The numerous debates about globalization are shared by politicians, economists, scientists and philosophers. Those who perceive globalization positively consider it a process that leads to social progress in all its aspects (economic-political, technological, cultural - scientific) and contributes to creating affluence. While for some, globalization signifies the integration of the world and the creation of global economy and culture, for others it denotes division and clash of civilizations.

Given that globalization is a reality, it is important for the insight and analysis to move towards a complex understanding of globalization, and to cover its various features. It is important to overcome and suppress the negative dimensions, and to maximize the use and affirmation of its positive dimensions.

The basic positive aspects of the globalization process are:

- Globalized and modernized economy demands higher level of education and qualifications of the workforce;
- Equalization of the conditions and regulations for the domestic and foreign investments;
- Improved employment opportunities;
- Foreign investments in profitable industries and industries have increased;
- Strengthened intensity of international competition;
- Investments in the necessary services and infrastructure;
- Development trends;
- Mutual enrichment and intersection of civilizations (pluralism of cultures and national identities), instead of a clash of civilizations and the abolition of national cultures, etc.
- The necessity of adding a new relation to the relationship between nature and society, since today there is a process of environmental degradation and huge depletion of natural resources, which is rapidly leading to ecological disaster.

We can determine the following as negative aspects of globalization:

- Globalization leads to the abolition of the classic notion of economic and political sovereignty;
- Globalization has caused an increase in all types of power, in particular the power of money;
- Discipline Member States in implementing decisions brought to international centers of economic and political power;
- The imposition of a model of social development, cultural patterns and a way of living in the most developed countries;

- The use of transfer pricing is particularly significant and an interesting aspect of the action of transnational companies.

One of the negative aspects of globalization is tied to the attempt of globalization to create an ideological concept - globalism, which brings universal values to the whole world. Globalism acts economically and reduces the multidimensionality of globalization to only one dimension - the economic, and all other environmental, cultural, political and social globalization aspects are cited as subordinate to the domination of the world market system.

The next negative aspect of globalization is the pandemic spread of economic crises and other disadvantages of certain areas (organized crime, terrorism) around the world. The greatest drawback is the gap between the rich and the poor world; namely, instead of globalization leading to a reduction in the gap, that gap is constantly deepening. For countries in transition, globalization is an additional challenge. There is no dilemma whether the country should be involved in the process, the question is only in which way to do it. Proper recognition of the causes, effects and the process of globalization enable the transition countries to successfully implement the transition process itself.

Globalization, in particular, accelerated its own movement, following the collapse of the socialist planned economy, which led to the domination of the liberal social concept and the dependence of post-socialist countries on the world centers of economic and political power. Globalization is the process of pluralizing the world according to the norms and rules of the game, which are based on the interests of capital and political power. For the first time in history, political waters and peoples of underdeveloped countries and the "other Europe" faced a situation that their future was given to them, and the name of that given future is transition, according to the rules imposed by the Western powers.

Observed as a whole, globalization brings along a number of positive, but also very significant negative consequences, which cause considerable resistance, primarily in the underdeveloped, but also in some developed countries. The process of globalization is difficult to stop and therefore it is left on the margins of all those countries that oppose it. Therefore, the countries that are its public critics are left to the process of globalization with the power of economic necessity. For these reasons, in a very delicate situation, the underdeveloped countries and transition countries are still left outside the international market, which means without developmental perspectives, or accepting globalization, and thus their fate is relinquished by the international power centers, which can bring them economic advantages, but can also lead to a loss of economic and political autonomy. In any case, the choice is not even easy, and the start-up result is uncertain, because there is no return from the chosen road.

On the basis of the foregoing, one can conclude that the main characteristic of globalization is the comprehensiveness of space, economy, politics, culture, population and other factors of social life on a global scale.

Attempts to globalize began after the Second World War, but this process intensified even after the end of the Cold War and the establishment of the United States as the only global force. In it, the prevailing ideology was dominated by economic liberalism, and globalization was aggressively promoted as a solution to most problems in the modern world. The advocates of globalization argue that the abolition of tariffs and other restrictions have led to the strengthening of market competition, that is, to the development of quality goods and services. It is also said that the intensification of contacts between people and states in the world will reduce the likelihood of major conflicts.

With the deepening of the globalization processes in the modern world and with the growing threat of global threats, we can draw the conclusion that national security should be a subsystem of global security. However, this does not imply the possibility of a complete abolition of national security. Getting into the period of limited state sovereignty does not mean a complete loss of state goals and interests, and in this context, the disappearance of one of its most important pillars - the national security system. Significant areas still in full possession of national security remain in the security sphere.

When it comes to state territory, the name of the state, natural resources or the welfare of a particular state, they must not be resolved to the detriment of national security, that is, they represent vital national interests that are the subject of national security. However, when a particular conflict or problem at the national or regional level escalates to such a degree that it is transformed into a serious global threat, then it is a global problem - a problem for the international community and it is necessary to deal with it solely on a global scale. In such specific and very dangerous situations for peace and security on a global scale, problems are resolved within the framework of global security.

National security will continue to be defined as an activity of national states, which, in keeping with their social opportunities in the present and in the future, taking into account global change and development, will protect their own identity, survival and interest.

The issue of social security is of great importance for the achievement of national security as it encompasses situations that society understands as threats to its identity. Social security is a matter of sustainability of traditional peculiarities of language, culture, religion, national identity and customs within acceptable conditions for development, but also "the ability of a society to survive and preserve its essential character in changing conditions and possible or real threats" (Weaver et al., 1993 : 371).

The concept of social security in the theoretical sense is not completely determined. It must be gradually developed, respecting the integrity of the demands of national and ethnic groups to preserve their tradition, culture, language and customs and complementing these elements of their identity with national elements in order to establish trust and cooperation among different nations and ethnic communities in all areas of life, including security issues.

Building the concept of social security also means analyzing the conditions under which a society can solve certain problems that may arise between nations, ethnic or religious groups independently, without state intervention, using only its own capacities. Such an effort will have much more success in conditions of high level of individual security and when the state allows different forms of articulation of the specific interests of the groups. Otherwise, social security would be just an idea.

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SOCIAL ENGINEERING IN THE CONTEXT OF CYBER SECURITY

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Abstract

Social engineering, as an art of deception, is very present in the era of globalization and it intertwines with plethora acts of unfair activities. Managing this risk is a significant security challenge. The paper analyses the social engineering as a large cyber security concern that harms productivity and efficiency of any organisation. It is intended to cover the different aspects of social engineering and should be viewed as a study which identifies social engineering hazards. In addition to the introduction given in Section 1, Section 2 defines the term social engineering, Section 3 presents the forms of social engineering, Section 4 gives the guidelines to mitigate the risk of social engineering, and the last section contains the conclusion.

Key words: social engineering, manipulation, risk, confidential information, cyber security, organization.

1.Introduction

The manipulative activities that target humans, often gain access to the system of any organization despite the different ways of established security controls and policies. This refers to the so-called social engineering and implies that access is nothing more than deception. The security gap or the hole in the “fence” is associated with the employees’ naivety which disrupts the survival of any organization. Manipulation, persuasion and framing people are hot topics nowadays. The security of any organization is linked with the challenges deriving from social engineering. The technical aspect of security has made good progress in recent years. It has been easier to make a patch of technical nature than human. For many organizations, the weakness threats to security are now the humans who are a “hole”, especially for cyber security. Defining the phenomenon of “social engineering” and the forms of its manifestation, as well as good security policies and education at different layers should minimize the occurrence of social engineering and its influence on cyber security and should improve the risk management process.

2.The phenomenon of “social engineering”

Manipulation and persuasion of people are the basis of social engineering and people are easily affected. Despite the technical aspects of cyber security where large improvements have been achieved, the same cannot be said for the human factor. While the focus of the vast majority of security efforts are on protecting computers and networks, more than 80% of cyber attacks and over 70% of those from nation states are initiated by exploiting humans, rather than computer or network security flaws. To build secure cyber systems, it is necessary to protect not only the computers and networks that make up these systems but their human users as well (Shen, n.d). So, the focus has been shifted to the employees, the victims of social engineering. There are many definitions for the term social engineering. Social engineering means getting someone to do something you want, or give you the information you want, often without the person considering the negative consequences of the action (Ablon 2015). Ablon (2015), states that since humans interact with computers and since humans can be manipulated, they are often the company's or organization's weak link. One of the goals of social engineering is obtaining confidential information. Samani and McFarland (2014: 6) define social engineering as the deliberate application of deceitful techniques designed to manipulate the victim, techniques that will result into the release of the requested information. According to Hadnagy (2011), social engineering is the act of manipulating a person to take an action that may or may not be in the “target's” best interest. This may include obtaining information, gaining access, or getting the target to take certain action. Hadnagy (2011) gives an example with doctors, psychologists and therapists. He explains the difference between a therapist and a con man. In fact, doctors, psychologists and therapists often use elements of social engineering to “manipulate” their patients to take actions that are good for them, whereas a con man uses elements of social engineering to convince his target to take actions that lead to loss for them. Even though the end game is much different, the approach may be very much the same. A psychologist may use a series of well-conceived questions to help a patient come to a conclusion that change is needed. Similarly, a con man will use well-crafted questions to move his target into a vulnerable position. Social engineering as an attack vector makes interaction with humans by manipulating them and often breaks best systems and networks security procedures in order to gain access to the confidential information. The DIGITAL GUARDIAN recently has made a review of the INFOSEC experts who discuss the phenomenon of social engineering. The article was prepared by Nate Lord. Let us see what some of the experts have said below:

- Creating a fake persona or using one's role in an improper way, is pretty popular for social engineering attacks. Social engineering is hard to prevent. That is the tough part (Peterson, 2019).
- Social engineers usually have their eyes on something bigger than their unsuspecting targets. The innocent victims are just a convenient and easy way for the cybercriminals to get to a bigger prize (Mancusi-Ungaro, 2019).

- Most of the cybercrime activity stems from massive infection campaigns that rely on mass scale social engineering (Shulman, 2019).
- Social engineering is generally used to widen an already existing breach of information. So, for example, an attacker may have certain information about the employees within a company, and he uses that information to learn something new — for instance, a password to an internal system. Professional cybercriminals extract one piece at a time, slowly earning their way in deeper to the organization (Simione, 2019).
- The weakest link in a company is still the employees that work there. Attack methods are as common as they are boring (Maxwell, 2019).
- Social engineering attacks like phishing emails and identity theft are the most common cyber threats that companies face (Murashka, 2019).

There is no unique method that will ensure complete security against a social engineering attack. The types of attacks can vary, but when individuals/employees are targeted the social engineers usually, by trick, try to get confidential information, or to get access to the network or computer system, to secretly install malicious software that will give them access to the passwords or other confidential information, as well as control over the whole network or computer system. Many employees do not realize the full value of personal data and are unsure how to protect confidential information. Any company/corporation, government, individual, or power can be destroyed due to a lack of knowledge (Evans, 2009:1). Evans (2009:12-13) states that social engineering is the exploitation of said vulnerability and there is no patch for human stupidity. It is a problem with no solution. With respect to the nature of social engineering, according to Evans, the psychological aspect of social engineering is what makes the attack, rather than the technical aspect. Peltier (2012), the author of several books on information security, highlights that the social engineer preys on the qualities of human nature, such as: the desire to be helpful, the tendency to be trusting, the fear of offending others and the tendency to cut corners. This means that the social engineering attack is powered by the psychological aspects of human behaviour. Employees in every single organization, as well in the military, who have access to valuable information, are the potential risk for that organization and they are the weakest link in the cyber security chain. The greater the number of employees in the organization, the larger the landscape of potential social engineering attack is.

3.Forms of social engineering

A social engineering attack can be targeted or opportunistic. Targeted attacks typically focus on a specific individual, whereas opportunistic attacks aim to glean information from anyone in a specific position (Samani and McFarland, 2014:6). Social engineering according to Samani and McFarland (2014:6) can be divided into two categories: hunting and farming. Hunting aims to extract information using minimal interaction with the target. Farming aims to establish a relationship

with the target and to “milk” the relationship for information over a longer period. The second dimension has the psychological aspects of social engineering attack where the attackers mislead people into doing something they want them to do. While the term social engineering is often used to describe all trickery used to manipulate people into performing actions or giving up information, the rapid development of electronic means of deception have led some security professionals to believe that social engineering should be segregated into human based and technology based components (Cheung, 2012). One of the biggest computer based social engineering techniques is Phishing. Social engineers usually send an email with a link which requires registration and creating a username and password. For easier remembering, people use the same password for all their internet accounts. So, it is necessary to consider that people always have to create unique passwords for work accounts different from other outside personal accounts and keep changing them often. Phishing attacks are typically executed through the internet which facilitates mass distribution of emails in a short time frame. In recent times, phishing activities have continued to thrive in spite of the technological measures put in place by organizations, campaigns by the target industry sectors and the advent of anti-phishing organizations (Odaro and Sanders, 2010). By specially crafted emails from false websites, the recipients most likely give out personal information. The possible indicators in the message that point to phishing could be misspelling, poor grammar, requests for immediate reaction and many inconsistencies in the message.

When we talk about social engineering attacks, the first thought is that is a corporation’s competition. Corporations mutually want to steal business secrets and confidential information. However, it should not be forgotten that the military has secrets too, in some respect even more valuable that could damage the security of the entire nation. It is an advantage to learn military secrets, tactics and plans. Social engineering attacks framework seems to be huge. On the web site SECURITY THROUGH EDUCATION there are many examples that illustrate how influence tactics were implemented to carry out social engineering attacks:

- In January 2017, the Israeli Defense Forces published a blog on their website describing an attack on their soldiers and it is all about the influence tactic known as liking. The attackers (reportedly Hamas operatives) created fake Facebook profiles of attractive young women with the goal of enticing Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers to befriend them. After building trust and rapport through messaging and photo sharing, the operative inquires if the soldier would like to video chat. To do so, he is required to install an app that is actually a virus. Once installed, the soldier’s mobile device becomes an open book. Contacts, location, apps, pictures, and files are all now accessible to Hamas operatives.
- The 2016 US presidential elections will be remembered, among other things, for spear phishing attacks that targeted high profile members of government. On March 19, 2016, Hillary Clinton’s campaign Chairman John Podesta, received an alarming email that appeared to come from

Google informing him that someone had used his password to try to access his Google account. The phishing email included a link to a spoofed Google webpage informing him to change his password. Mr. Podesta clicked the link and changed his password, or so he thought. Instead, he gave his Google password to Fancy Bear, a Russian state-sponsored cyber espionage group.

Spear phishing can be much harder to spot, because it appears to come from a trusted source and include information specific to the recipient. The trouble is that a social engineer only needs to fool one person in your organisation to gain access to your networks and data (Winder, 2018). So, who is the security weakest link? The conviction that the people are the weakest link is completely justified.

4. Mitigation of social engineering occurrences and influence

Unfortunately, humans can often be a hindrance to cyber security that is a real concern. The best security system can be punctured by poor staff practices causing catastrophic consequences. Social engineering mitigation is not as easy as ensuring hardware security (Hadnagy, 2011). Hadnagy (2011) highlights the fact that with traditional defensive security the organizations throw money into intrusion detection systems, firewalls, antivirus programs, and other solutions to maintain perimeter security. But, with social engineering no software systems exist that can be attached to employees to remain secure. Additionally, most of the organizations believe that they are safe, surrounded by their “fence” until one day somebody from the outside makes a hole in the “fence”. Suddenly, the perspective shifts and weaknesses float. Samani and McFarland (2014:17-18) highlight three categories of control that can be used to mitigate the risk of social engineering. They are: people, process, and technology. The controls, according to Samani and McFarland are not exhaustive and may not be applicable to all organizations. They are as follows:

People:

- **Provide clear boundaries:** All staff should be keenly aware of the policies regarding the release of information and have clear escalation paths should a request fall outside of their boundaries.
- **Ongoing education:** Implement a security awareness program to consistently educate employees over time. Use tools such as the McAfee Phishing Quiz to highlight specific tactics commonly used in attacks.
- **Permission to verify:** Provide staff with the confidence to challenge even seemingly innocuous requests. An example of this is to challenge people when attempting to tailgate into offices.
- **Teach the importance of information:** Even seemingly innocuous information such as telephone numbers (enabling information) can be used to stage an attack.

- **Create a no-blame culture:** The targets of social engineers are victims. Punishing specific employees who have been deceived will make all staff less likely to admit to releasing information. Once conned, they could come under the control of the social engineer, who can then use blackmail.

Process:

- **Bogus call reports:** When a suspicious activity has occurred, staff should complete a report that details the interaction. This assists investigations.
- **Informative block pages:** When employees reach a malicious web page, use a block page to inform them why they cannot proceed. This will cause them to reflect on their prior action and can help identify sources of attack.
- **Customer notification:** When callers are denied information, the organization should notify them and verify whether the caller was entitled to the information. Organizations should also consider how they communicate with customers. For example, PayPal includes guidance for users that helps identify if the emails they receive are genuine: “A real email from us will never ask for your bank account number, debit, or credit card number, etc. Also we will never ask for your full name, your account password, or the answers to your PayPal security questions in an email.”
- **Escalation route:** A clear reporting line for front-line staff to escalate any doubts they may have about interacting with potentially fraudulent messages.
- **Tiger testing:** Routinely test staff for their susceptibility to social engineering attacks over the use of multiple communication channels. This provides a tool to measure the effectiveness of training programs.

Technology:

- **Call recording:** Routinely record incoming telephone calls (while following federal and state wiretapping laws) to assist investigations.
- **Bogus lines:** Route calls that are believed to be suspicious to a monitored number.
- **Email filtering:** Remove fraudulent emails containing known and never-before seen malware.
- **Web filtering:** Block access to malicious websites and detect malware online with access to the Internet.
- **Strong authentication:** Although leveraging multifactor authentication will not eliminate the risk of users being socially engineered into giving up their authentication credentials, it will make the task more difficult for would-be attackers.

Good security policies and procedures cannot be effective unless they have been consistently applied by the employees. They contain standards and guidelines in order to mitigate the risks of social engineering attacks. These policies are even

more significant when it comes to preventing and detecting social engineering attacks (Mitnick and Simon, 2002). On the other hand, as Mitnick and Simon (2002) state, it is important to note that security policies do not last forever. As business needs change, as new security technologies come to market, and as security vulnerabilities evolve, policies need to be modified or supplemented.

Knowledge is power, it is true. In this sense, education is the best defense against most social engineering attacks (Hadnagy, 2011). Protection against social engineering attacks always starts with education and training. The education and training programs should cover all safety procedures, policies and methods in order to raise awareness of possible attacks by social engineering. To develop a successful training program, you have to understand why people are vulnerable to attacks in the first place.

The education for prevention of becoming a victim of social engineering should be focused on making the employee slow down, research the facts, delete any requests for financial information or passwords, beware of any download, reject requests for help or offers of help, set spam filters to high, don't let a link in control, know that foreign offers are fake, secure computing devices. On the other hand, Hadnagy (2011) thinks that security through education cannot be a simple catch phrase, it has to become a mission statement.

According to Mitnick and Simon (2002) the only truly effective way to mitigate the threat of social engineering is through the use of security technologies combined with security policies that set ground rules for employee behaviour and appropriate education and training for employees. Employees have to know that a click on suspicious links might unguard their log-in credentials and company confidential information. In other words, as Mitnick and Simon (2002) say, a security training program requires substantial support and the training effort needs to reach every person who has access to sensitive information or corporate computer systems. It must be an on-going process and it must be continuously revised to update personnel on emerging new threats and vulnerabilities.

5. Conclusion

Social engineering has significantly influenced cyber security and it may be only a matter of time until a social engineer targets employees at any organization or company. Doctors, psychologists and therapists often use manipulations in order for their patients to take actions that are good for them. On the other hand, manipulation and persuasion in all their forms are also much used by social engineers. As pointed out by some experts, it is easier to find a patch for a technical problem than a patch for human stupidity. There is still no complete solution to this problem.

New threats and vulnerabilities are always around us, so the concern arising from social engineering should be taken seriously. Internet has the possibility to facilitate mass distribution of emails and social engineers widely use that, so it is important to understand what indicates a fraud. Security technologies combined

with security policies are very important for the security of the organizations and coupled by proper education it is the appropriate way of social engineering mitigation. The organizations can reduce the impact of social engineering by comprehensive implementation of the categories of control (people, processes and technology). Permission to verify, teach the importance of information, informative block pages, escalation route, email filtering, Web filtering and strong authentication are some of measures that should be taken by organizations and companies.

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**MONTENEGRO'S ROAD TO ACHIEVING THE EU CHAPTER
27 STANDARDS
“THE WAY FORWARD TO REACHING THE EU CLOSING
BENCHMARKS FOR MONTENEGRO IN 2019 AND 2020”**

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ABSTRACT

The author of this paper gives an overview of the needs and challenges that Montenegro faces on the path of harmonization of its regulations with the EU acquis and the necessary practical steps-activities in the period 2019-2020 in order for the Country to reach the democratic standards of developed societies and fulfill the final benchmarks that the EU has requested in the accession process. The opening of Chapter 27 - Environment and Climate Change, on 10 December, 2018, called for a more sectoral approach to environmental protection, namely integration of environmental protection into all sectoral policies with the aim of conducting preventive actions, determining damage, ensuring shared responsibility, preserving the natural resources and achieving a more stable and sustainable development in the Country. After analyzing the relevant strategic documents and national legislation, as well as EU standards in the field of environment protection and climate change, it has become apparent that one of the most important challenges for Montenegro is the implementation and enforcement of regulations and standards, which is directly conditioned by high implementation costs. In addition, these challenges also provide the possibility of strengthening both the administrative and technical, and technological capacities to be able to use the available EU funds, benefit from the knowledge, experiences and new technologies of the developed countries and thereby have direct access to modern and new achievements/development and be part of the recognized scientific institutions in the EU and beyond. Montenegro needs to identify relevant financial mechanisms for its development demands, through available international funds and in the Country, and to create its own sustainable system for supporting activities and projects based on sustainable development postulates, thereby contributing to the lessening developmental pressures on natural resources and improving society's living standards and bestow a quality of life that will protect human health and well-being.

Key words: European Union (EU), Chapter 27, environment, sustainable development, harmonisation, implementation

1. INTRODUCTION

Being part of the democratic values of the European Union is a goal for Montenegro that will enable its society to have better regulations, high standards of the rule of law, economic and social development and better, more successful and sustainable protection and use of natural resources, which would provide the citizens with a healthy environment and better quality of life.

In December 2011, Montenegro submitted its request for membership in the EU, demonstrating readiness to devote itself to intensive reform processes that will result in Union membership. To that end, through joint work and dedication to the common good, democratic decisions are taken and challenges are met in achieving a quality and safe life of its citizens and the generations to come. In that process, the numerous EU standards portrayed in the enormous EU acquis need to be met and translated into national legislation. The EU acquis has been divided into 33 negotiating chapters, of which Montenegro temporarily closed three: Chapter 25 - Science and Research, Chapter 26 - Education and Culture and Chapter 30 - Foreign Affairs. 29 chapters have been opened, while Chapter 8 - Competition is in a negotiating position.

The Ministry of Sustainable Development and Tourism (MSDT), as the umbrella institution for Chapter 27, is continuously monitoring the implementation of the obligations stemming from the Initial Benchmark and reports on the progress to the Government and the European Commission. MSDT has recognized the importance of cross-sectoral cooperation and the necessity of cooperation between the state administration and expert and scientific institutions, civil society, the private sector and international organizations as bridges to available funds, in view of ultimately achieving the goals and obligations of Chapter 27 in the most efficient manner.

The closure of Chapter 27 will largely depend on the ability to mobilize the available EU and other international funds in the field of environment and climate change, together with the State capacity to set up sustainable financing mechanisms for environmental protection activities with a clear operational setting, stable inflow of funds and transparent project selection, to address certain environmental problems, on the one hand and / or to effectively protect and improve the state of the environment and climate change on the other.

Considering that the starting point of investment needed for achieving high standards of environmental protection by 2035 in the Country is estimated to EUR 1,429 billion, the Government has adopted the Decision on the establishment of Environmental Protection Fund (Eco-Fund), as one of the mechanisms for financing programs and projects in the field of environment and climate change. In addition, the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) is available to Montenegro as an EU candidate country, including its nine programs: four bilateral (Bosnia and Herzegovina - Montenegro, Montenegro - Albania, Montenegro - Republic of Kosovo and Serbia - Montenegro), two trilateral (Croatia - Bosnia and Herzegovina - Montenegro and Italy - Albania - Montenegro) and three

transnational programs (Danube, Mediterranean and Adriatic-Ionian). Also, significant funding sources come from international financial organizations, such as the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the Global Climate Fund (GCF), as well as in the form of a support of EU member states in the framework of bilateral cooperation.

The implementation of obligations from the Initial Benchmark document - *National Strategy for Transposition, Implementation and Enforcement of the EU Acquis for Environment and Climate Change with the Action Plan for the period 2016-2020* is conditioned by the provision of financial support, given the difficulty and complexity of environmental issues. Additionally, the Country is facing a low level of realization of obligations – necessary and foreseen actions (according to the December 2018 Progress Report it amounts to 48%), while the lack of financial resources and administrative capacities is dominant in the justification for the failure to meet the obligations. Currently, the MSDT is focusing on scanning the available financial instruments and funds for priority project activities from the Initial Benchmark.

Through a detailed analysis of the current state and needs in sub-areas of Chapter 27, an overview of available funds has been made for activities recognized as necessary for meeting the Country's priority obligations in the period 2019-2020. This process has been accompanied by the development of project concepts. The analysis and newly developed project concepts also include the ongoing projects that cannot fully achieve the planned obligations, thus requiring the implementation of additional project activities with additional financial resources and engagement of expert staff. Potential funding mechanisms are proposed for each individual project concept, and the implementation timeframe has been identified.

2. STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR CHAPTER 27 - ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE

2.1 Initial Benchmark

Montenegro adopted the *National Strategy for the Transposition, Implementation and Enforcement of the EU Legal Framework in the Field of Environment and Climate Change with the Action Plan for the period 2016-2020 (Strategy with AP)* at the Government session on 28 July 2016, which met the *Initial Benchmark*, presenting its strategic approach to transposing and implementing the EU acquis in this field.

The *Strategy with AP* is the foundation for transposing, implementing and applying the EU acquis in the field of environment and climate change, and it also includes plans for developing relevant administrative capacity and assessing the necessary financial resources. It also enables monitoring of the realization of the planned obligations and the implementation of measures within defined timeframes, as well as timely planning and provision of necessary financial and

technical assistance to the competent authorities of Montenegro from national, international and EU sources.

The economic and financial analysis of the *Strategy with AP* has shown that the total cost of aligning with EU standards by 2035 will amount to 1.42 billion euros, defining also the sources and models of financing.

The *Strategy with AP* sets forth the implementation of a total of 347 obligations regarding the transposition and implementation of the EU acquis for the period 2016-2020s. The document plans progress reporting on a quarterly basis, with four implementation reports completed by December 2017:

- July - December 2016;
- January - March 2017;
- April - June 2017;
- July 2016 - December 2017

Since the adoption of the *Strategy with the AP* at the end of December 2017, 156 commitments have been envisaged, of which 94 have been realized, which makes the implementation rate 60.26%.

The *Strategy with the AP* anticipates an annual revision of the document with the aim of adjusting the strategic obligations to the new situation, i.e. the achieved level of alignment of national regulations with the EU acquis in the field of environment and climate change.

In line with the dynamics of the negotiation process, the position of the relevant institutions was harmonized to implement the revision of the Strategy Action Plan after the adoption of the Negotiating Position for Chapter 27 and the EU Accession Program 2018-2020, thus meeting the deadlines for the fulfillment of commitments with the same and adjusted current state and the progress made in the field of environment and climate change.

The negotiated position for Chapter 27 was adopted on 8 February 2018 at the session of the Parliamentary Committee on European Integration and the Government session, while the EU Accession Program 2018-2020 was adopted on 16 February, 2018, creating conditions for the planned revision of the Action Plan in order to harmonize the implementation deadlines.

The Action Plan of the National Strategy for Transposition, Implementation and Enforcement of the EU Legal Framework for the Environment and Climate Change for the period 2018-2020 (Action Plan 2018-2020) was adopted at the Government session on 21 June 2018, and it gives a review of the key results achieved in the previous period, as well as the deadlines for the remaining obligations related to the transposition process and the implementation of the EU acquis for all ten sub-chapters, in line with the current strategic, planning and programming documents, as well as the priorities and guidelines defined by the Enlargement Strategy for the Western Balkans and the European Commission's and the Progress Report for Montenegro for 2018, including plans for strengthening the administrative capacity.

The Action Plan 2018-2020 foresees the implementation of 253 obligations (of which 131 are related to transposition and 122 to implementation) and does not recognize any commitments with an implementation deadline beyond 2020, for which the Negotiating Position required transition periods.

Action Plan 2018-2020 provides for semi-annual reporting, and thus the *First Semi-annual Report on the Implementation of the Action Plan of the National Strategy for the Transposition, Implementation and Enforcement of the EU Legal Framework in the Field of Environment and Climate Change for the period 2018-2020 for the reporting period July - December 2018* was adopted at the Government session on 27 December 2018. Accordingly, out of a total of 125 planned commitments for the period July - December 2018, 60 were realized and the level of implementation of the Action Plan 2018-2020 obligations projected for the period July - December 2018 is 48%.

2.2. Negotiating Position

The Council of Ministers of the EU decided to consider Montenegro as ready to start negotiations for Chapter 27 in March 2017 and thus formally invited the country to deliver the Negotiating Position in order to hold an Intergovernmental Conference to open the Chapter. Following the process of exchange of the draft Negotiating Position and its harmonization with the submitted comments and suggestions by the European Commission, the innovated Negotiating Position for Chapter 27 of Montenegro was adopted at the session of the Parliamentary Committee on European Integration and the session of the Government of Montenegro, after which it was submitted to the European Commission.

The Negotiating Position states that Montenegro accepts the EU acquis under Chapter 27 that is in force since 28 July 2016 and is ready to enforce its full implementation by the date of accession to the EU, with the exception and set requirements for transitional periods for full application of certain directives (Directive 2008/50 / EC on Clean Air in Europe by 31 December 2027, Directive 2008/98 / EC on Waste, by 31 December 2030, Directive 1999/31 / EC on Landfills, by 31 December 2033. Directive 94/62 / EC on Packaging and Packaging Waste by 31 December 2030; Directive 2012/19 / EU on Waste From Electrical and Electronic Equipment, by 31 December 2027; Directive 2006/66 / EC on Batteries and Accumulators and Waste Batteries and Accumulators by 31 December 2027; Directive 96/59 / EC on the Disposal of Polychlorinated Biphenyls and Polychlorinated Terphenyls (PCB / PCT) by 31 December 2025 Directive 2000/60 / EC establishing the Framework for Action of the Community in the Field of Water Policy, by 31 December 2035; Directive 2007/60 / EC on Floods, by 31 December 2024; Council Directive 91/271 / EEC on Municipal Sewage Waters, by 31 December 2035; Directive 2010/75 / EU (IED), by 1 January 2030; and Montenegro expects it to be able to use the options for the transition allocation of free emission units with the aim of modernizing the energy sector, which was provided as a possibility under Article 10 c of the proposed

revision of Directive 2003/87 / EC, which regulates the issues of the greenhouse gas emissions (EU ETS) by December 31, 2030).

2.3. Closing Benchmarks

Chapter 27 - The Environment and Climate Change, which was opened at the Intergovernmental Conference in Brussels on 10 December 2018, was followed by the submission of a Common Position of the European Union, which includes Closing Benchmarks for the closure of Chapter 27. The EU Common Position notes that Chapter 27 may be temporarily closed only when the EU agrees that the following criteria have been met:

- Montenegro continues to harmonize with the horizontal Directives and demonstrates that it will be fully prepared to ensure their effective implementation and enforcement on the day of accession.
- In terms of air quality, Montenegro has fully complied with the revised Directive on the Reduction of National Emissions of Certain Atmospheric Pollutants (NEC Directive 2016/2284/ EU). Montenegro submits an analysis of cost-effective emission control strategies for 2020 and 2030, which will serve as the basis for a final agreement between the EU and Montenegro on its emission reduction commitments in accordance with the NEC Directive. Montenegro reports annually on its emissions, in accordance with the Directive and the Convention on Transboundary Far-range Air Pollution and develops the National Air Pollution Control Program. In addition, Montenegro is improving its preparations for the implementation of the *acquis* in this area by regularly undertaking measures to reduce national air pollution, especially in areas where the EU air quality limit values have been exceeded and by developing or updating the air quality plans as provided for in the Directive on quality ambient air and cleaner air for Europe (Directive 2008/50 / EC).
- Montenegro decides on its waste management system and identifies the appropriate funding for infrastructure investments, in accordance with relevant EU legislation, including the hierarchy of waste. Montenegro establishes waste prevention programs, prepares waste management plans, and adopts measures for separate waste collection for paper, metal, plastic and glass.
- Montenegro has made significant progress in aligning with the *acquis* in the water sector, including the legislation on drinking water, and Directive 2008/56 / EC establishing a Community Framework for the Policy of Protecting the Marine Environment. Montenegro shall designate competent authorities in the field of drinking water and shall develop river basin management plans for each area of the river basin that is fully located within its territory, including the parts of the international river basin district within its territory.

- In the field of nature protection, Montenegro submits to the Commission a list of proposed sites Natura 2000, which sufficiently covers habitat types and species in accordance with the requirements of the Birds and Habitats Directive. Montenegro demonstrates the capacity to manage the Natura 2000 network, inter alia, by giving Ulcinj Salt an appropriate protection status and effectively implementing the necessary conservation measures that lead to improved conservation status.
- Montenegro continues to align with the acquis in the sectors of chemicals, noise and civil protection, and demonstrates that it will be fully prepared to ensure the implementation and application of EU requirements on the day of accession.
- Regarding climate change, Montenegro continues to align with the acquis, in particular by adopting legislation on the functioning of the European System of Emissions Trading (EU ETS), in accordance with the EU Emission Trading Directive 2003/87 / EC and its subsequent amendments. Montenegro further harmonizes the relevant by-laws on monitoring and reporting, accreditation and verification, the Union Registry, free allocation and auction. Montenegro ensures the existence of an appropriate framework for the implementation of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme in its entirety in relation to the monitoring, reporting and verification of the greenhouse gas emissions.
- Montenegro, in accordance with the Action Plan for transposition, implementation and enforcement of the EU acquis in the field of environment and climate change, significantly improves the capacities of administrative bodies at all levels, including inspection services, further improves the coordination of work and demonstrates that all appropriate administrative structures and adequate training will be in place at the right time before the accession in order to facilitate the implementation and application of the acquis in all sectors of this Chapter.

3. Legal framework

Following the adoption of the *Strategy with AP*, the activities of the institutions in charge of Chapter 27 were focused on transposing the European acquis into national legislation in all 10 sub-areas, in order to create a legal basis for its quality implementation and enforcement.

The existing national legal framework in the field of environment and climate change was of satisfactory quality, while the transposition of the EU acquis has been further improved and adapted in line with European legislation and standards. National harmonization activities with European legislation are still ongoing in the Country, and bearing in mind the character of the EU acquis that is constantly changing and improving, this process can be characterized as continuous and will remain even after gaining full membership in the EU.

In the period from July 2016 to the end of January 2019, Montenegro adopted a number of regulations, a total of 78, among which most in the field of chemicals and waste management:

- Horizontal legislation - 3 regulations
- Air quality - 3 regulations
- Waste management - 12 regulations
- Water quality - 7 regulations
- Nature protection - 7 regulations
- Industrial pollution - 4 regulations
- Chemicals - 33 regulations
- Noise - 1 regulation
- Civil protection - 1 regulation
- Climate change - 7 regulations

4. AVAILABLE FINANCIAL MECHANISM

Currently, as a candidate country, various financial mechanisms are available to Montenegro in fulfilling the obligations set out in the Chapter 27 negotiations, such as: Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), EU Programs (Bilateral and Trilateral Cooperation, Interreg Programs), international financial mechanisms, such as the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the Green Climate Fund (GCF), WWF as well as bilateral support from developed EU Member States, which provide funding and support to candidate countries in the Western Balkans for the environmental protection and the fight against climate change.

In addition to the afore-stated financial mechanisms, there are other sources of funding that are more readily available (e.g. donors) and are most often intended for the public or civil sector rather than state institutions. Regardless of the available financial mechanisms, Montenegro must build and use its own mechanisms and resources, and provide through the state budget funds for its obligation to close Chapter 27 and thus enable its implementation. In accordance with the recommendations for the implementation of the obligations under Chapter 27 and the need to establish domestic sources of funding for the necessary activities, the Government of Montenegro has adopted the Decision on the Establishment of the Environmental Protection Fund (Eco-Fund) at a session held on 22 November 2018, which was envisaged by the Law on the Environment ("Official Gazette of Montenegro", No. 52/16). The decision defined the status of the Fund as a limited liability company, the bodies of the company and their powers, share capital, financing and use of funds.

The task of the Environmental Protection Fund (Eco-Fund) is to provide funds for the implementation of projects, which aim to preserve all components of the environment and rational use of natural resources as basic conditions for sustainable development. Through its activities, the Eco-Fund will contribute to the

realization of the strategic vision of Montenegro as an ecological state, which will enable citizens to achieve the basic right to a clean and healthy environment. The basis for the functioning of the Environmental Protection Fund is the funds for its financing, which are provided from the budget of Montenegro, from eco-fees, domestic and foreign donations and loans, and other forms of financing, which is regulated by the Law on the Environment.

5. CONCRETE STEPS FOR MEETING THE CLOSING BENCHMARKS FOR CHAPTER 27 - ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE

In order to achieve the Closing Benchmarks for Montenegro's Chapter 27, concrete steps for the period 2019-2020 were recognized and developed in the form of fifteen draft projects. Each concept of the draft project, in addition to the background and content analyses, recognized a potential financial mechanism for its implementation. It is important to note that the sub-chapter on nature protection stands out with the largest number of concrete steps - project proposals, reflecting the need to significantly improve the current situation in this area in order to respect both international and national standards and create a sound environmental protection system with relevant and comparable data and a high level of knowledge and awareness of the ways of sustainable use and environmental protection.

The following activities are steps that need to be taken in the period 2019-2020 with the intention of bringing Montenegro closer to international standards in the field of environmental protection and climate change:

1. HORIZONTAL LEGISLATION
 - a. Establishing a National Geoportal
2. AIR QUALITY
 - a. Strengthening the implementation of Directive (EU) 2016/2284 on the reduction of emissions of certain pollutants at the national level
3. WASTE MANAGEMENT
 - a. Transposition of the EU acquis on waste management
 - b. Building and strengthening capacities in the field of waste management in Montenegro
4. NATURE PROTECTION
 - a. Support to the ratification and entry into force of Nagoya protocol for access and distribution of benefits
 - b. Establishing a framework for managing invasive species
 - c. Strengthening national capacities for the application of CITES regulations, the Directive on the importation into Member States of skins of certain seal pups and products derived therefrom
 - d. Establishment of the Natura 2000 network
 - e. Network of marine protected areas in coastal and deep waters and deep-sea inventory
 - f. Revision of the existing and definition of new protected areas in the coastal zone of Montenegro

5. INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION

- a. Establish a pollutant registry (PRTR) with a database

6. NOISE

- a. Development of strategic noise maps for main roads

7. CHEMICALS

- a. Establish a register of chemicals and biocidal products in accordance with REACH and BPR regulations

8. CLIMATE CHANGE

- a. Establishment of a legal framework for the implementation of regulations in the field of climate change
- b. Revision of the National Strategy in the field of climate change by 2030 and nationally established contribution to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.

6. CONCLUSION:

The Strategy for the Western Balkans (2018)²⁰⁵ recognizes Montenegro as the leader in the region within the accession process to the EU. The opening of Chapter 27 at the Intergovernmental Conference in Brussels on 10 December 2018 sets out the *Closing Benchmarks* that have a priority in the implementation. Therefore, the responsible and dedicated approach to the implementation of the remaining obligations under Chapter 27 will be the focus of all activities of the Ministry of Sustainable Development and Tourism in the forthcoming period, with intensive work on harmonizing national legislation with EU regulations and creating conditions for its full implementation.

In coherence with the previous results and achieved progress, as well as with the obligations planned for the forthcoming period, and relying on the *Closing Benchmarks*, whereof Montenegro is expected to make the most significant progress, strong inter-institutional cooperation at all levels and an integrated sector approach, priority areas are identified as **Waste Management, Nature Protection and Climate Change**.

Since the EU *acquis* has not yet been completely transposed in the aforementioned areas and an effective framework has not been created for its full implementation, it is necessary to focus on the finalization of the process of transferring the *acquis* into national legislation and strengthening the implementation system, as this has been recognized by the 2018 Progress Report. The creation of a harmonized legal framework is a prerequisite for the quality implementation and application of the European *acquis* under Chapter 27, which will further lead to the preservation of the environment and its improvement. Bearing in mind that Chapter 27 - Environment and Climate Change is one of the most difficult, most demanding, costly and most complex negotiating chapters that

²⁰⁵ https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/communication-credible-enlargement-perspective-western-balkans_en.pdf

covers environmental issues, biodiversity conservation and human health, it is necessary to define the priority projects, including realistic deadlines for their implementation, in order to meet the requirements of the *Closing Benchmarks*. Taking over more than 200 key legal acts of the EU should be followed by the provision and establishment of sustainable financial mechanisms, strengthening of the administrative capacity at all levels, and strengthening the cooperation between state administration and expert and scientific institutions, civil society, the private sector and international organizations as bridges to available funds, in order to ensure effective monitoring of the European *acquis* and its full implementation. The EU funding mechanisms, as well as the available mechanisms in the framework of bilateral/multilateral cooperation, have been identified as sources of project implementation. As part of the EC recommendations for the implementation of the obligations under Chapter 27 and strengthening the Country's internal capacity to finance the obligations that follow, the role of the Environmental Protection Fund (for which a Decision on its establishment was adopted on 22 December 2018 pursuant to the Law on the Environment) is perceived as vital and should become a significant internal mechanism for financing activities that will contribute to environmental protection and sustainable resource management and use. The submission of draft projects to other financial mechanisms will, if necessary, be aligned with the new and/or planned activities of the MSDT to mobilize international financial support.

Currently, as a candidate country, the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), international financial mechanisms such as the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the Green Climate Fund (GCF) are available to Montenegro in order to fulfill the obligations under the implementation of Chapter 27, as well as bilateral support from developed EU member states, which provide funding and support to candidate countries in the Western Balkans for environmental protection and the fight against climate change (Sweden, Norway, Finland, Austria, Germany, etc.).

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SECURITISATION OF TERRORISM IN EUROPE IN THE ELECTION PROCESS

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Terrorism is the most serious form of political violence against humanity and has persisted throughout centuries. Neither terrorism nor the terrorist attacks that Europe had seen are historically new concepts. The religion-motivated terrorism that emerged with the September 11 attacks (Al-Qaeda, IS, etc.), which uses Islamic religion as a source of legitimacy, is actually only a different type of the terrorism that Europe had already fought against. The ways to combat this new type of terrorism naturally manifest themselves in different forms than the previous ones. It is evident that the ways to combat this new type of terrorism take place in different forms. On the other hand, a noteworthy element in this fight against terrorism is the securitization of the concept of terrorism discursively, especially by the policy makers. Religious-oriented terrorist attacks in recent years, particularly in the center of the election processes in European countries, have led to much more securitization of the threat of terrorism. However, this speech is an act that prevents the fight against terrorism, since terrorism is already benefiting from such discourse. This situation leads to a mutual, ongoing negative construction process for both sides. The aim of this study is to examine the discourse of the political elites in Europe during the election periods just after a terrorist attack and to demonstrate the process of mutual construction, considering that terrorism aims to scare a thousand people by killing one person and this construction process could be used as a source of motivation for terrorist organizations. This paper is a theoretical analysis since terrorism in and of itself cannot be fully understood without a reference to its establishment in the related official discourse. It is necessary to carry out this theoretical reading in order to make the measures taken against terrorism effective.

Keywords: *Europe, Election process, terrorism, securitization, nationalism.*

INTRODUCTION

Terrorism is the most serious form of political violence against humanity and has persisted throughout centuries. Neither terrorism nor the terrorist attacks that Europe had seen are historically new concepts. With the 9/11 US attacks and the subsequent al-Qaeda attacks in Europe, the concept of terrorism, which Europe struggled against for years, evolved and continued to threaten Europe in different ways, such as the IS in the aftermath. The threat of terrorism, which has become a global problem at that point, has been sometimes considered as a domestic security threat within the European states. The main aim of this study is to reveal how the phenomenon of terrorism, which has actually turned into a global security threat, has been accepted as a domestic issue under the conditions of European countries. The method of this study, on the other hand, is to examine the discourse of the political elites in Europe during the election periods just after a terrorist attack and to demonstrate the process of mutual construction since terrorism aims to scare a thousand people by killing one person and this construction process could be used as a source of motivation for terrorist organizations. In this case, it is possible to talk about two levels of analysis in this paper. The first one is the globalization of the concept of terrorism after 9/11, and the second is the formation of a mutual construction process between the terrorist organizations and state leaders by reducing the threat of the global terrorism phenomenon to a domestic level in order to consolidate the positions of the leaders in certain periods.

In this context, in the first part of the study, some conceptual definitions will be given to explain how this mutual acceptance and construction process takes place. After examining the concepts of security and terrorism, especially by using the securitization and macro securitization concepts, we will try to demonstrate how the same threat of terrorism is mutually constructed both globally and domestically.

In the second part, we will explain how the political elites use the so-called "fear factor" in an attempt to gain more votes during the election process. Several types of fear, starting from the shock of terrorist attacks to the threat of a nuclear war, can serve as a useful tool for political parties during an election campaign in the race to attract larger number of votes. For that purpose, the subject of analysis will be the election campaigns in several European countries where terrorist attacks took place just before the election process. Such events were the starting point for building a political platform with which the political parties ran their campaign in order to win more votes in the elections.

SOME CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

The concept of security is a concept which has existed in humankind. To survive against the threats is one of the most important things from the beginning of man to the present. Security is a concept that covers all the conditions necessary to sustain daily life. The term security is directly related to the phenomenon of peace and it is seen as a value and a purpose of movement that requires extraordinary measures for the actors like nation-states, supra-states or non-states

(Brauch, 2008). Therefore, the concept of security can be defined in several ways in different disciplines or from different perspectives within the same discipline. These different perceptions have revealed different security approaches in the discipline of International Relations.

In this discipline, security has been defined through state-centered paradigms for many years because of the influence of the Cold War. However, by the end of the Cold War, the understanding of the concept of security has started to change and the focus of security began to shift from the state to the individual. Baldwin (1997) reformulated the definition of security and defined it as “lack of threats to acquired values” which is based on the preservation and maintenance of the existing values. In Baldwin's foresight, the reference object is defined by the nation-state as an individual, ethnic and religious groups, the society, and the international system. In addition, he carefully outlined the acquired values such as political autonomy, territorial integrity or continuity of state identity. This shows that although state security is not a negligible phenomenon in the international system, it is considered that immigration, epidemics, social security, political, economic and ecological security sectors have highly functional characteristics (Baldwin, 1997).

The most important representatives of this new understanding of security are Jaap de Wilde, Ole Waever and Barry Buzan who are the theoreticians of the Copenhagen School. According to the Copenhagen School, the concept of security is actually used in every phase of everyday life (Demiray & İşcan, 2008). According to this point of view, this concept is used in a spectrum extending from the security of a single person to the security of the world and even to the universe and is basically directly related by existence. People, states and societies may have security against each other and nature (Poku & Graham, 1998). Copenhagen School removed the state oriented definition of security and expanded security into five dimensions: military, political, economic, societal and environmental. At the same time, they broadened the concept of security and examined it on various levels of analysis, such as international, regional, national, domestic, group or individual. In addition, the Copenhagen School proposed the concept of “Securitization” which could be basically defined as constructing something as an existential threat to a referent object that entails taking extraordinary or emergency measures against that “new” threat.

According to Buzan et.al (1998), the formation of a security issue (i.e., securitized) takes place when “an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object (traditionally, but not necessarily, the state, incorporating government, territory, and society.” An existential threat may occur in principle in anything that can threaten the security of a referent object. That may likely include biological weapons, nuclear weapons, cyber-attacks, climate change, transnational crime, and many other forces. In essence, a securitizing actor can attempt to frame anything as a referent object (i.e., state sovereignty, national identity, social groups, health and physical welfare, [a strategic part of the] environment, and so on). Following the construction of a security threat, we then

see the emergence of the justification of the use of extraordinary measures in order to properly deal with them (Romaniuk & Webb, 2015). Thus, any phenomenon considered and accepted as a security issue-which can be assessed in a wide range of perceived and presented threats, from another state to a different cultural phenomenon or a different religious organization - will be utilized for dealing with the "normal limits of the political procedure", with the determination and acknowledgment that "urgent measures" are required. Here, the "acceptance" refers to the social acceptance of such detection. However, this acceptance in society is largely related to the presentation of the concept as a threat, rather than the conscious recognition of the presented threat. To open it, when a case/concept is presented as a security issue, a -source of threat or an agent of threat, the target of the threat- the listeners (public opinion) need to assess this issue in such a way that will enable the dominant state actors to cross the normal limits of the political procedure. In this way, however, issues that have not previously been linked to security can become the objects of security-related policies; in other words, they can be "securitized" (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, Security: Anew Frame Work for Analysis, 1998).

The most important security threat of modern age is terrorism and it is also a controversial issue in international security discipline. It is a concept that maintains its presence in each period of international relations, and also takes its place among the new threats defined against the security of nation state in this era. Throughout history, terrorism has always had very different meanings. The most important reason for this is that the concept of terrorism is related with both politics and violence. So, terrorism could be defined basically as "*politically motivated violence*". However, the situation is not as simple as this. There are nearly two hundred different definitions²⁰⁶ of terrorism and too many parameters that have affected the conceptualization of terrorism (Schmid & Jongman, 2017)(Weinberg, Pedahzur, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2004).

Buzan and Wæver (2009) defined macro securitization by using the GWoT as, "speak[s] to referent objects higher than those at the middle level (for example, 'universal religions or political ideologies; one or more of the primary institutions of international society) and which aim to incorporate and coordinate multiple lower level securitizations". From this perspective, the most powerful and longest macro securitization was the Cold War period. Both the Soviet Union and the US used universal principles to affect the domestic audiences, but also much wider international audiences. Macro securitization follows the same rules that govern other securitizations: "identification of an existential threat to a valued referent object and call for extraordinary measures with the key difference lying in the scale of their existence. The US used macro securitization of GWoT and by operating in this way it could follow through its interests, especially in the Middle East (Buzan

²⁰⁶For detailed information and different definitions of terrorism Thackrah, John. R. (2004), *Dictionary of Terrorism*, Routledge:NewYork.

& Waever, *Macrosecuritisation and Security Constellations: Reconsidering Scale in Securitisation Theory*, 2009).

As Buzan and Waever mentioned, it is obvious that after the 9/11 attacks, the US led to macro securitization of terrorism. Terrorism is actually a concept that exists throughout history. European states, especially in the 20th century, have fought against many different terrorist organizations, but until the 9/11 attacks, the threat of terrorism had not acquired a global dimension. The most important factor here is the attacks were presented to the audience (both domestic and international) by the US as attacks undertaken against the common and universal "values" of the US and the western world rather than against the US itself. In the next period, the attacks in Europe, which consolidated this discourse of the US, have made the concept of terrorism an important fear factor in Europe. On the other hand, European states combating the threat of terrorism at the international level started to use this concept of macro securitization at a domestic level and even to some extent accepted the phenomenon as an issue of micro level securitization. Examples of the transfer of the fear of terrorism from a macro to the domestic level have become evident especially during the election periods in some countries that will be examined in the next section.

SECURITIZATION OF TERRORISM IN THE ELECTION PROCESS

The undertone of fear can distort and even define the political agenda in an election campaign. Several types of fear, starting from the shock of terrorist attacks to the threat of a nuclear war, can serve as a useful tool for political parties during an election campaign in the race to attract larger number of votes. According to Sales, environments fraught with constant threats cause fear and change in the behavior and psychology of people, resulting in an increased affinity towards authoritarianism, i.e. totalitarianism (Sales, 1973). McCann (1997) also argues that presidential candidates have a greater chance of success in the elections in those environments in which there are repeatedly threats to the population. The use of rhetoric for raising nationalism in the campaign gives people hope that he/she is the right candidate to solve their security and prosperity problems. (McCann, 1997) "strong" regimes or regimes that have selected "authoritarian" leaders exclusively strive to rearrange the social, political, and economic order in accordance with the politics or religious ideology they represent. Therefore, their goal is to mobilize a larger number of people in that pursuit and demonstrate utter intolerance to every individual who disagrees with their goals, policies, and means through which the regime strives to accomplish those goals. In order to maintain their power, such regimes must establish a one-party state, secret police, propaganda and media that are under direct control of the government, and must constantly commit terrorist acts against political opponents or a certain category of people in order to spread fear among the population by infusing the "fear factor." (Joseph Robins, Lance Hunter, Gredd R. Murray, 2013)

The hypothesis we have to answer is "*What kind of an impact do terrorist acts have during election processes?*"

THE CASE OF THE “UK”

A striking example that proves that democracy does not look as vulnerable as it might seem to someone in the world of terrorism is the case of Theresa May. One of the ten main reasons for her failure is the terrorist attacks that took place in London and Manchester during the election campaign. (Alex Hunt & Brian Wheeler, 2017) Although the idea of British Prime Minister Theresa May was to schedule an election in order to strengthen her position (following the example of authoritarianism), ahead of the Brexit talks, as a result of the fear of division in Westminster, the plan had a tremendous counter effect. From the moment of official scheduling to the day of the election, two major terrorist attacks took place that completely shifted the course of the election campaign of the two political parties. Chronologically, the first terrorist attack took place on 22 May, 2017, while the second terrorist attack took place ten days later, on 3 June of the same year. In both terrorist attacks, 34 people lost their lives while 237 were injured.

The election campaign was focused on security and counter-terrorism policy instead on Brexit. However, to make the controversy even worse, right after the terrorist attack in London incumbent British Prime Minister Theresa May announced a plan to combat terrorism. In essence, this decision as a result of the “fear factor” was supposed to reap benefits in the domestic policy because she had a clear opportunity to correct and justify her capabilities as the current Prime Minister. Why? - Since not so long ago in 2010, at the time when the incumbent Prime Minister was an interior Minister, she abolished the control orders that restricted the movement of jihadist suspects (M. Koschyk and A. Noll, 2017).

That “fear factor” matrix in the election program was also used by her opponent of the left-wing Labour Party, Jeremy Corbyn, who was also a supporter of the Irish Republican Army. During the pre-election campaign, not only did his party oppose the right of police to shoot terrorists, but also supported the idea of negotiating with terrorists. Another piece of evidence that terrorist acts completely change the election program and rhetoric is the terrorist attack during a music concert in the Manchester Arena. Namely, it was precisely this event that led Laborite Corbyn to declare and advocate an increase in the number of police forces on the streets of Great Britain in the event of his victory in the elections (Adam, 2017).

It may look like a pure coincidence, but a terrorist attack took place on 16 June, 2016, just eight days before the Brexit referendum in Great Britain, when Thomas Mair killed MP Jo Cox. UK authorities classify this attack as an act of terrorism.

THE CASE WITH THE CATALAN INDEPENDENCE REFERENDUM

The Parliament of Catalonia, where the Catalan independence movement has the majority of seats in parliament, passed a law aimed at formalizing plans for holding an independence referendum. With the potential “yes” in the referendum, Catalonia would be declared a republic and the regional president will become

president of the Republic, Catalan citizenship will not require a relinquishment of Spanish nationality, and Catalan and Spanish will be the official languages in Catalonia.

The referendum was held on 1 October, 2017. Out of the 5,313,564 registered voters, 2,286,217 turned out to vote in the referendum. Percentage-wise, that is 43.03% of the total number of voters. According to the regulations of the Parliament of Catalonia, a successful referendum does not require a specific turnout. Out of the total number of voters, 2,044,038 voted for independent Catalonia which is 92.01%. (Guardian, 2017) In 2014, Catalonia held a non-binding independence referendum which had a turnout of 2.2 million out of a total of 5.4 million registered voters, and about 80% voted for independence. Compared to the Catalan regional elections in 2015, the turnout was 4,130,196 out of a total of 5,510,853 registered voters or about 74.95%. In comparison with the referendum turnout, the turnout for the regional elections was far greater (Guardian, 2017). But, the 2017 referendum was preceded by a series of terrorist attacks. Namely, on 16 August 2017, there was a massive explosion at a house in Alcanar, killing one woman and injuring six people. The very next day, on the renowned street Las Ramblas in Barcelona, a group of terrorists committed a terrorist attack ramming a van into a crowd of people, killing 13 people and injuring hundreds of others. The next day a car was driven into a crowd of pedestrians in the city of Cambrils, killing one civilian and injuring six others. Despite the series of terrorist attacks, the turnout in the independence referendum was far below the voter turnout in the Catalan regional elections. It is another proof that democratic societies are not vulnerable to terrorism.

THE CASE of TURKEY

An interesting case for analysis is the case of Turkey, which according to many analysts is transforming from a democratic into a totalitarian regime.

Statistical data from the election cycles in Turkey in the last fifteen years, especially the results of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), are particularly interesting.

Table 1: Statistics result of General elections in Turkey (Institute, 2015)

	AKP	CHP	MHP	Others
2002	363	178	/	9
2007	341	112	71	26
2011	327	135	53	35
June 2015	258	132	80	80
November 2015	317	134	40	59

According to the statistical data, the election results of the June 2015 parliamentary elections seriously destabilized the power of the Justice and Development Party jeopardizing their political plans. The question then arises: Which factor was at

play between the last two parliamentary cycles in order for the number of parliamentary seats won by the Justice and Development Party to increase by 59 in just under four months?

Table 2: Dates of terrorist attacks between both election processes

<i>Date</i>	<i>Attack</i>
5 June 2015	<i>5 people were killed and 400 people injured in the bomb attack that took place in the election rally of the HDP in Diyarbakır.</i>
7 June 2015	GENERAL ELECTION
20 July 2015	<i>34 dead and 103 people injured is the result of the suicide attack against “socialist youth association federation” which was set to go from Sanlıurfa to Kobane.</i>
2 August 2015	<i>2 Turkish soldiers were killed in an attack committed with a truck full of 2 tons of explosives in Ağrı’sdoğu Beyazıt.</i>
10 August 2015	<i>The police headquarters in Sultanbeyli was attacked by a bomb vehicle at night. In the morning during the examination, unidentified attackers opened fire, 1 member of the police lost his life. HPG claimed the attack</i>
22 August 2015	<i>4 people were injured in an attack committed by a car loaded with bombs targeting a gendarmerie headquarters in the town of Van. The attack was claimed by HPG.</i>
6 September 2015	<i>16 Turkish soldiers were killed and 6 others were injured in Sırnak’ Syuksekova. HPG claimed the attack.</i>
10 October 2015	<i>103 people were killed while 238 people were injured in the deadliest terrorist bombing carried out by a suicide bomber(journos, 2017)</i>
1 November 2015	GENERAL ELECTION

This turn of events leads us to a single conclusion. The “fear factor” that creates terrorism can have an effect on the results of the electoral process. Why? - According to the number of people who voted for this Party in the two election cycles, it won 18,867,411 votes in the June 2015 Parliamentary elections with a turnout of 47,507,467 voters, and 23,681,926 votes in the November 2015 Parliamentary elections with a turnout of 48,537,695 voters. (Institute, 2015) This means that terrorism and the fear it causes can be the “push factor” for the population to decide whom to vote for, influencing the outcome of elections. In this context, the public regarded the Justice and Development Party as a party with great power, influence, and determination to tackle Turkey’s numerous challenges, especially those related to terrorism. In addition, shortly before the constitutional referendum in Turkey held on 16 April 2017, there were two terrorist attacks that killed 5 people.(staff, 2017)

AS A CONCLUSION

The unstable security situation is an additional factor for both political party supporters and neutral voters to opt for the political party that will strive to

establish a secure environment in which economic and social development will take place. In order to gain more votes during electoral cycles, political parties have built their political programs on the basis of an unstable security situation, promising more measures to overcome security threats.

In conclusion, when we look at the cases, it can be said that there is a relationship or dual construction process between terrorist attacks and “strong” regimes. Specifically, terrorist attacks create “fear” in population and this fear makes the leaders of “strong” regimes or regimes that have selected “authoritarian” leaders much more powerful. In this way it can be easier to “securitize” the terrorist threats. When we look at the discourses of political elites, we generally see that political elites use these attacks for inciting both the “fear factor” and nationalistic feelings among the population. It is acceptable and fully true that terrorism is one of main security threats against a state but, we also have to think to what extent is it an “existential” threat to a state?

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REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA AND THE MIGRANT CRISIS: HISTORY AND PERSPECTIVES

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Abstract

The European continent and the world are facing the most massive migrant crisis since the end of World War II. In order to see the consequences, it is necessary to analyze the reasons caused by the migrant crisis. The reasons are numerous: social, economic, continuous conflicts and war primarily in the countries of the Middle East, organized crime, religious extremism, terrorism, and many others. The beginning of the migrant crisis is associated with revolutions which arose in 2011 in the Middle East, known as the "Arab Spring" and intensified with the wars in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Libya, etc. The European Union and Southeast Europe faced a number of challenges which required urgent measures for protecting these countries from the migrant crisis. The war in Syria began in 2011 and even then a large number of Syrian people moved to some nearby states and camps in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and Egypt. The consequences of the migrant crisis most affected the security of the states in Europe. The European Union was not sufficiently prepared for preventing the emerging situation. The Republic of Slovenia, starting from 2015 onwards, continuously prevents migration waves, including all state, governmental, and non-governmental organizations, taking a number of measures and activities for preventing all kinds of threats and consequences which caused the migrant crisis.

The above mentioned indicators will be analyzed through some numerical indicators: the number of migrants per year, the number of asylum seekers per year and asylum seekers which were rejected annually, as well as the total number of migrants who have transited through this country. The results obtained through the analysis of the numerical indicators will be presented in tables, graphs, and with the scientific method of pearson correlation coefficient, we will see the dependence among the numerical indicators and from all this, we will give the recommendations and conclusion of this scientific paper.

Key words: migrant crisis, crisis management, leadership, prevention, integration strategy

1. INTRODUCTION

The migration crisis from the second half of 2014 was one of the biggest challenges for the Republic of Slovenia in its recent history. The research of this paper covers the chronology of events, the key moments of the crisis, reactions of official authorities, the work of institutions, the foreign policy and activity of the government at the level of the European Council, regional initiatives, party's debate in the country, personalities and behavior of the government and the opposition, and finally, future activities and decisions. In the Republic of Slovenia, Slovenian political elite saw the migrant crisis as a security issue and focuses on this aspect of the issue. Analyzing the Slovenian case, a distinction should be made between the Balkans and the Western migrant routes. The first route basically affects the Republic of Slovenia very little and passes along the line: Turkey-Greece-Macedonia-Serbia-Hungary-Austria. Turning it into a new road becomes redirecting the "human flows" in west direction as a result of the closure of the Hungarian border. In that sense, we can also talk about certain phases of the migrant crisis in terms of geopolitical dimensions. Slovenia is not only a part of the route from South Eastern Europe; it is also a part of the western migrant routes with its main corridor, Italy.

The migrant crisis has a negative effect on the economies of the countries, affects the demographic structure, and has the capacity to jeopardize security of the countries of the European Union and Southeast Europe. As a consequence of the migration crisis, the security problem was most explicit, reflecting the real picture of the European Union that is not sufficiently prepared to organize and oppose the emerging problems. On the contrary of disadvantages, states organized individually, each in their own way, which also created difficulties for the mutual relations between certain neighboring countries, as in the case of the Republic of Slovenia. This paper gives statistical information related to migration flows across the territory of the Republic of Slovenia and the legal changes that were adopted in order to adjust the situation in which Slovenia finds specific measures for implementation of the resolution for migration problems. Most of the data are obtained through the International Organization for Migration, the United Nations Migrant Crisis Portal, the Statistical Center of the European Union Commission, and other international organizations and centers. Uncontrolled inflow of illegal migrants in 2014 and 2015 in EU, regardless of the measures taken and the legal constraints made, concessions on that issue and the issue of border control and security was positioned in the focus of protecting the national interests of certain countries. Therefore, the internal security of some countries today is related to migration, which from their uncontrolled influx has an impact on security and the economic and political situation in the country. It can be argued that migrant crisis not only reached the gates of the Republic of Slovenia and the EU, but also took all

over this with its comprehensive risks. The crisis seems to have never been as present as it is today, with a large influx of migrants from the Middle East whose ultimate destination is the European Union. What is evident is that the member states and the EU institutions have acknowledged their underestimated problems with migration, which as a phenomenon brings security risks. In addition, strengthening and control of the external borders of the European Union, especially in its southern borders, has not been achieved. The circumstances in resolving the crisis was the lack of joint treatment of the European countries, and taking concrete political views on this issue.

According to the European Commission estimates, more than 65 million people worldwide are currently displaced due to a crisis, violence, or natural disasters²⁰⁷. Only in 2015 more than one million people fled to Europe to avoid violence or poverty. The European Commission responded to this situation by adopting the European Agenda for Migration, outlining the measures and instruments which must be taken at the level of the EU and national level²⁰⁸.

As to the war in Iraq, there are no precise data on the number of migrants, but it is estimated that about 2 million Iraqis fled to the neighboring countries and about 2.5 million remained internally displaced in Iraq. Of those who fled to neighboring countries, about 1 million people went to Syria and about 500,000 to Jordan²⁰⁹. The conflict began in March 2011 and the first exodus of the population from Syria began immediately after the start of the conflict. At the beginning of 2012 the conflict in Syria intensified and the displacement also rapidly increased. Strong artillery rocketing increased the number of refugees and internally displaced persons²¹⁰. Since the middle of 2012 the Syrian migrant crisis has steadily increased, rising 10 times in the next 12 months. According to UN estimates, by October 2012 around 30,000 people were killed²¹¹; nearly 400,000 Syrians fled to neighboring countries and there were about 1.2 million internally displaced people²¹². According to UNHCR estimates given in early September 2013, about one million migrants left Syria during the first two years of the crisis and another one million left the country in the last six months²¹³. People were massively displaced during the war crimes which took place on the ground, as well as severe

²⁰⁷ International organization for migration (IOM). World migration report 2018, UN migration agency, 2017, 22.

²⁰⁸ http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agendamigration/background-information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf.

²⁰⁹ Wehrey, F., Kaye, D. D., Watkins, J., Martini, J., & Guffey, R. A. (2010). *The Iraq Effect: The Middle East after the Iraq War*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand. pp.95-97.

²¹⁰ Dr.Simon Adams. (March 2015). Failure to Protect: Syria and the UN Security Council.Occasional Paper Series No.5.Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. pp. 28 - 32.

²¹¹ Project of International migration organization (IOM). Migrant fatalities worldwide <http://missingmigrants.iom.int/latest-global-figures>

²¹² Roland Popp.(November 2012). The Syrian Civil War: Between escalation and intervention. CSS Analysis in Security Policy.No124. Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich, 1-4.

²¹³ Elizabeth Ferris. Kemal Kirisci. Salman Shaikh. (18 September 2013). Syrian Crisis: Massive Displacement, Dire Needs and Shortage of Solutions, 65-70.

violations of the international humanitarian law that included liquidation, arbitrary arrest and detention, unlawful attacks on civilians, raids, attacks on protected objects, robberies, destruction of property and other monstrous activities. Military actions destroyed economy and ravaged the basic living conditions, so the demand of the basic living conditions became one of the reasons for migration²¹⁴.

The first major increasing flow of migrants on the territory of Slovenia was recorded at the end of September 2015. After Hungary's decision to close the borders in October 2015, Slovenia was hit by a second, much larger migrant wave. During that period, migration flows were significantly directed towards Slovenia, which became the main transit point for thousands of migrants which wanted to continue their journey in Western Europe. The second migrant wave ordered mobilization of the entire national security system and the humanitarian organizations for intensive international cooperation. This type of threat should be understood as a broader framework which can include humanitarian disasters, economic challenges, occurrences of resource and energy shortages, social and cultural misunderstandings and problems, and inability to integrate migrants into the new societies.

2. THE IMPACT OF THE MIGRANT CRISIS ON THE REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA

Illegal migration is on the European Council agenda from the second half of 2013. After the fall of the regime in Libya, the Mediterranean route indirectly targeted the Republic of Slovenia as a member of the EU, bordering with the most affected country - Italy, as well as the Black Sea states through the Adriatic Sea. Opening of the second route in the summer 2015 through the Balkans brought the issue of migration to the agenda of the country. The Republic of Slovenia fell in the middle of two migration processes, which moved along the western and the eastern verticals to north. This affects all its neighbors: Italy, Hungary, Austria, and Croatia. While the Mediterranean route is distant, the Balkan was rapidly approaching the borders of the country.

At the end of June 2015 the flow of people across the Balkans began to grow dramatically. This was from a huge number of migrants which have moved from Turkey. The inability of the states to tackle the problem forced German government to open-door policy headed by Chancellor Angela Merkel. In the southeastern Slovenian city of Postajna there is a Migrant Accommodation Center with a capacity of 2000 people and additional 3000 in tents. The Law of Human Trafficking is relatively restrictive, with fines ranging from 2000 to 4500 Euros and up to 5 years of imprisonment. Adopted by the Slovenian Government in July 2015, the three-step action plan includes a scenario for migration, housing, logistics and police response. Hungary declares its absence of a European solution. At the same time, tensions between Germany and Visegrad Group were a problem of

²¹⁴ Gucturk, Y. (2015). War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity in Syria. *Insight Turkey*, 17(1), 27.

raising the migrant crisis. Slovenians were aware that eventual closure of the Hungarian border would divert the flow to Croatia and Slovenia. After a government meeting on 28.08.2015 it was announced that the country was ready with an Action plan for a larger influx of people. Authorities monitor and analyze the situation of migration with humanitarian organizations and were ready to participate in redistribution of migrants according to the quota of the European Commission. The Prime Minister Cesar was running a campaign against "*building walls*" in Europe.

A turning point for Slovenia's inclusion in the migration crisis was the decision of the Hungarian government for closing the Hungarian-Serbian border after the construction of a fence in 16.09.2015. In a few days, the migration flow was redirected to Croatia where the authorities pass through Croatian-Hungarian border, which was also closed two weeks later with a fence. The country becomes a part of the pan-European migration crisis. According to some data from the Slovenian Ministry of Interior, until 19th of September 2015, 1 500 migrants entered the country. From the beginning, Slovenia was not an ultimate destination, but it was a transit point on the path of migrants from Turkey to Western Europe, mainly Germany and Sweden²¹⁵. The first attempt for solving the problem together with the Croatian authorities was on 17.09.2015, when the interior ministers of the two countries met. The government has decided to restore border control with Hungary after capturing groups transported from there to Slovenia, but returned under the readmission agreement between Ljubljana and Budapest. For the first time since its accession of Schengen Agreement, Slovenia has undertaken similar measures. The European Commission was familiar with this step.

It should be noted that the Slovenian government is embarking on a crisis with pan-European approach, an emphasis on acceptance and a tolerant attitude towards migrants. This position is a subject for review after large groups enter the country. There are several reasons for this change. First, in September 2015 it became clear that each side along the route will try to convey the problem until it reaches the main destination - Germany. Secondly, drafting a common position of EU for delaying threatens the security of small countries. The pressure was concentrated in two points of the border with Croatian capital city Zagreb: Obrezje and Rigonce villages in the Brezice municipality. The number of migrants was bigger and was moving in two directions: Ljubljana and Maribor, in order to continue towards the Austrian border. The number of arrivals started to increase enormously and on 22.09.2015, 3598 migrants were registered on the Slovenian border. The majority of migrants were young men from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq, about 1/3 are from unknown origin and most of them wanted to take a permanent asylum in Germany²¹⁶. Slovenia has faced a problem which other countries have along the route - communication and identification of arrival. The country does not have enough translators to prove the exact age, identity or country

²¹⁵ Asylum Information database (AIDA). Country report Slovenia, European council, 2018, 15-17.

²¹⁶ <https://geopolitica.eu/aktualno/2765-sloveniia-i-migrantskata-kriza-2015-2016>

of origin of the migrants. Even in Macedonia 60% of the migrants were reported as "unknown nationality". Authorities were gradually starting to lose control of the situation. The crisis was already completely dominated and takes full control of the institutions. Slovenian government is making efforts to pay international attention for solving the migration issues. When Hungary decided to raise fences on the border with Slovenia without a notice from the activities of the Hungarian authorities, a negative reaction from Ljubljana was caused. Later, the meeting between the two ministers of the countries shows convergence of the position for cooperation and management of the migration crisis. From this moment, cooperation between Hungarian and Slovenian authorities in the context of what is happening can be defined as solved. In October 2015 was the peak of the crisis, with about 25,000 people in Slovenia at the end of the month. The Government was unprepared for this migrant influx. Expectations for a common European solution were not justified. It turned that each country must deal with the situation itself. Migrants arrived from neighboring Croatia by trains, buses, and on foot. The pressure on Cairo office was increased to three lines: opposition, public opinion, and human rights organizations. The leader of the main opposition force - MOF, Janez Jansa insisted on finding a quick solution and raising a fence with the Croatian border, following the example of Hungary. The public opinion was against migrant arrivals, noticing that they are for clean and ordered society, the disorder from migrants was shock. The problem with the migrants in Slovenia was equated with the issue of the national security. On 18th October 2015 authorities set a limit on the arrival of migrants from Croatia to 2,500 people per day. Zagreb claimed to accept 5,000 people.

State Secretary Sheffield announced that Slovenia cannot accept more migrants because of the restriction to 1500 entries in Austria. The Defense of President Borut Pahor decision is also announcing that his country will pass as many passengers as they can be accepted by Austria. The border was abolished three days later from external pressure on the country.

Legislative changes have been adopted in the parliament which gave limited military authorization (stopping and retaining migrants) in order to resolve the migrant crisis. Arguments for making decision are for supporting the physical exhaustion of police officers who have been working for more than a month without rest in extremely difficult and dangerous conditions for the health of the police officers. The data from the European Border Service "*Frontex*" for the last half of 2015 and the first half of 2016 estimated that over 465 thousand migrants have transited trough Slovenia. For the country, this is a huge number of people and presents a serious challenge. Slovenian government considers its handling of migration crisis as its top priority. Prime Minister Cerar said that the migration crisis will be the leading theme of international politics in the years to come. At beginning of 2016 Slovenian authorities largely overcame mechanisms for controlling the flow of migrants with police supported from the Army and border patrols from the Schengen countries.

The Republic of Slovenia does not support the position of Hungary and Visegrad Group which are against the quotas for allocation of migrants within European Union²¹⁷. She has consistently supported European Commission's decision for transit migrants from Italy and Greece. Slovenia is the first country which participates in implementation of EU-Turkey agreement on exchange of migrants. The first large wave of migrants which transited through the Republic of Slovenia was recorded in September 2015. Following Hungary's decision to close the border in October 2015, Slovenia has reached another large wave of migrants. During this time the migration waves turned strongly through the territory of the Republic of Slovenia, which became the main point of transit for thousands of migrants which wanted to continue their journey to Western Europe. The second wave of migrants demanded activation of the entire national security system, humanitarian organizations, and extensive international cooperation.

After the first migration wave Slovenia became a transit migration country, offered assistance, accommodation, and implementation of procedures required by the Slovenian and European legislation for migrants to continue their journey in countries which are their destination. The second migration wave, which involved almost a half million migrants, hit Slovenia on 16th October 2015 (after Hungary's decision to close its borders) and continued until 8th March 2016 (until the decision to close "*The Balkan Route*").

On a daily basis between 8,000 and 9,000 migrants arrived and their number sometimes surpassed 10,000 per day²¹⁸. For example, on 21st October 2015 almost 13,000 migrants entered Slovenia. After 4th November 2015 the migrant flows decreased (a boat strike in Greece) and stabilized at 6,000 to 7,000 migrants per day. At the end of November 2015 the number of migrants dropped from 2,000 to 3,000 migrants a day²¹⁹.

Table 1: *Migrants entering and leaving Slovenia during 01.10.2015 - 30.03.2016*²²⁰

PERIOD	ENTER	EXIT
October	116.627	98.981
November	164.313	170.387
December	96.607	96.575
January	62.785	62.796
February	34.795	33.666

²¹⁷ Willemijn Tiekstra. The future of the European migration system: unlikely partners?, July 2018, Netherlands Institute for International Relations-Clingendael, 2 - 5.

²¹⁸ Official site of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Slovenia from June 2016

²¹⁹ UNICEF. Refugee and Migrant Crisis in Europe. Humanitarian Situation Report 26, 2018, 3-4.

²²⁰ Official site of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Slovenia from June 2016

March	1.607	1.528
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The structure of migrants during the second migration wave from October 2015 to March 2016 is with this percentage: men: 48.7%, women and children: 51.3%²²¹.

Table 2: Division of migrants by the country of origin:

Syria	45%
Afghanistan	30%
Iraq	17%
Others	7%
Pakistan	1%

Table 3: Migrants accommodated in Aliens Center (AC) and Center for Asylum (CA)

LOCATION	Number of persons
Center for Asylum (CA) in Ljubljana	170
Accompanying capacity of CA-Ljubljana	69
Accompanying capacity of CA in Logatec	49
Outside the Asylum Center	9
Displaced	13
Center for Foreigners (CF) in Postojna	40
TOTAL	350

The number of persons seeking for international protection in Slovenia increased significantly: from 17 applicants in January 2016 to 270 in February 2016, significantly exceeding accommodation facilities of the Asylum Center. For this reason, Slovenian Government decided to open two additional facilities, a Shelter Center in Ljubljana and a Training Center for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief in Logatec²²².

As part of the Eastern Mediterranean Migration road, from 01.10.2015 to 06.03.2016, a total of 473,850 migrants entered Slovenia, most of them traveling to other countries in Northern and Western Europe. The number of international

²²¹ Ministry of the Interior, Statistics, available in Slovenian at: http://www.mnz.gov.si/mnz_zavaj/tujci_v_sloveniji/statistika/

²²² Official site of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Slovenia from June 2016

protection applications filed in Slovenia has increased since 2015 to 1476 asylum requests made during 2017, while in the first half of 2018, 1430 applications were submitted. The majority of asylum seekers in Slovenia in June 2018 were citizens of Pakistan, Algeria, Afghanistan, Morocco, Syria, Iran, Turkey, and Iraq. Slovenia also has a significant population of former refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina which have permanent residence permits²²³. According to detailed research from the European international organization for migration, the initial destinations of migrants from the Middle East and the African continent, is Europe through the following destinations: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, and Spain. The statistical data indicate that the big number of migrants who have transited through the territory of the Republic of Slovenia is mostly from Italy, and a small number through the Corridor: Cyprus-Greece-Macedonia-Kosovo-Serbia-Croatia-Slovenia²²⁴. The leading corridor through Cyprus is the main starting point for migrants coming from the African continent and the Middle East. More precisely, migrants from: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan and other countries from this region through the Republic of Turkey, mostly through the Corridor Cyprus transits in Greece and a small part in the Republic of Bulgaria. The large migrant wave from the Republic of Greece transits through Macedonia-Kosovo-Serbia-Hungary-Austria-Germany and other European countries. Cyprus is the main corridor for countries from the African continent such as: Egypt, Libya, Sudan, Algeria, Chad, and other countries in this region. Beside Cyprus, other major corridors for transiting migrants from the African continent are: Malta for transit to Italy, and Spain for transit to France.

Table 4: *Transit of migrants through the corridor Italy from 2015 to 20.03.2019*²²⁵

Year	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Total
Corridor Italy	153 842	181 436	119 369	23 370	398	478 415

Table 5: *Transit of migrants through the corridor Greece from 2015 to 20.03.2019*²²⁶

Year	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Total
Corridor Greece	857 363	176 906	35 052	50 215	6451	1 125 987

²²³ Data for migrants leaving the country are available from 20 October 2015 and therefore the total number of foreigners leaving Slovenia listed in the table cannot be compared with the total number of foreigners entering Slovenia.

²²⁴ International organization for migration (IOM). Mixed migration flows in the Mediterranean, 2018, 30-32.

²²⁵ UN Operational portal for Refugee situation (<https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/location/5179>), accessed on 10. 04.2019.

²²⁶ UN Operational portal for Refugee situation (<https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/location/5179>), accessed on 10. 04.2019.

According to the detailed statistics of the European international organization for migration, the UN official portal for Migration situation, the Statistical Center for Analysis of Migration of the European Commission of EU (Analytical Center for European migration), as well as other relevant international organizations and institutions, we can conclude that through the Corridor Italy shown in Table 4, about 65% of the migrants transit through the Republic of Slovenia, while from the Corridor Greece shown in Table 5 about 35% of the migrants transit through the Republic of Slovenia. Then, if we make a chart for the Republic of Slovenia through percentage shares of the abovementioned corridors, we get an overview of a total number of migrants who have transited through the Republic of Slovenia by years, as well as the total number of migrants who have transited from 2015 till now, shown in Table 6.


Table 6: *Transit of migrants across the Republic of Slovenia from 2015 to 20.03.2019*²²⁷

Year	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Total
<i>Corridor Italy</i>	99 997	117 933	77 590	15 191	259	310 970
<i>Corridor Greece</i>	300 077	61 917	12 268	17 575	2258	394 095
Total	400 074	179 850	89 858	32 766	2517	705 065

Table 7: *Statistical calculations for Pearson coefficient of relation*

Year (X)	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Total
<i>Number of migrants (Y)</i>	400 074	179 850	89 858	32 766	2517	705 065

²²⁷ UN Operational portal for Refugee situation (<https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/location/5179>), accessed on 10. 04.2019



Result and Calculation

$$\begin{array}{l}
 X \\
 \sum = 10085 \\
 \sum(X - M_x)^2 = SS_x \\
 Y \text{ Values} \\
 \text{Mean} = 141013 \\
 X \\
 N = 5 \\
 R \text{ Calculation} \\
 \text{Meta Numerics (cross-check)}
 \end{array}
 \quad
 \begin{array}{l}
 \text{Values} \\
 \text{Mean} = 2017 \\
 = 10 \\
 \sum = 705065 \\
 \sum(Y - M_y)^2 = SS_y = 102136303340 \\
 Y \\
 \text{Combined} \\
 \sum(X - M_x)(Y - M_y) = -942198 \\
 r = \frac{\sum((X - M_x)(Y - M_x))}{\sqrt{((SS_x)(SS_y))}} = -0.9323 \\
 \mathbf{r = -0.9323}
 \end{array}$$

The value of R is -0.9323. This is a strong negative correlation, which means that high X variable scores go with low Y variable scores. The value of the coefficient of determination is $R^2 = 0.8692$. The result for the Pearson coefficient $R = -0.9323$, shows us that the independent variable (X) implies previous time period, actually years in inverse proportionality or negative correlation with the dependent variable (Y) which represents the number of migrants who have transited through the territory of the Republic of Slovenia during the past years. From this, we can conclude that from 2015 to 2019 the number of migrants who have transited through Slovenia has been steadily decreasing because of the effective measures of the international community, the European Commission and the states, by setting appropriate route for the movement of migrants, regular patrolling of the national and international military-police forces, placement of wire fences along the borders and other measures and activities.

Table 8: Migrants with temporary residence in Slovenia from 2015 to 20.03.2019

Year	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Total
Transit through Slovenia	101 120	35 834	13898	6623	617	158 092

Finally, we can conclude that from **2015** to **20.03.2019** a total number of **705 065** migrants transited through the territory of the Republic of Slovenia, from which **158 092** had temporary residence in the Republic of Slovenia.

Table 9: Number of migrants which applied for asylum in Slovenia between 2017 and 2019 by countries of origin²²⁸:

State	2017	2018	2019	total
Algeria	30%	28%	20%	26% = 839
Morocco	14%	15%	46%	25% = 807
Syria	4%	-/-	8%	4% = 129
Pakistan	18%	21%	12%	17% = 549
Afghanistan	12%	8%	8%	9.3% = 300
Western Balkan	12%	18%	-/-	10% = 323
Iraq	5%	5%	3%	4.3% = 140
Others	5%	5%	3%	4.3% = 140
Total	1476²²⁹	1430	321	3227

3. RESPONSE OF THE REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA IN DEALING WITH MIGRANT CRISES

Slovenian authorities have actively monitored the situation in the region, since it was expected that the migration wave could come to Slovenia. Therefore, intensive preparations for possible arrival on a large number of migrants started in May 2015, resulting in adoption of a plan by the Government in July 2015²³⁰. Since the beginning of September 2015 authorities met local communities (the ones that suffered greater migration waves and were affected by the measures for dealing mass arrivals). Assistance and cooperation in the coming months were crucial for successful management of the migration flow. Cooperation with humanitarian and non-governmental organizations was also important. A task force was assigned for preparing possible mass arrival of migrants. They were responsible for logistics, food, basic health care, transportation (accommodation or shelters) and placement of migrants. For the mass migration waves, additional forces and assets were needed, including auxiliary police officers. Members of the Association of

²²⁸ UN Operational portal for Refugee situation (<https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/location/5179>), accessed on 02.04.2019

²²⁹ Asylum Information database (AIDA). Country report Slovenia, European council, 2018, 7-8.

²³⁰ Contingency Plan of the Republic of Slovenia for providing accommodation and care in case of increased number of applicants for international protection specifies scenario and goals as well as necessary measures, organs, and systems for responding to emergency. Measures and participation of the relevant bodies are defined depending on the scope of increasing the number of applicants.

Slovenian Officers, the Union of War Veterans of Slovenia, as well as the firefighters (mostly for logistic support) were also included.

Necessary support was also a demand from the wider international community. In October 2015 the Ministry of Public Administration requested civil servants for volunteer and help in the work in the accommodation centers. Employees of the Civil Protection and Disaster Relief Service and members of the Civil Protection Service had duty-checks at the centers²³¹. In November 2015 the long-term unemployed persons could temporarily be employed as assistants in the accommodation and reception centers. An average of 450 members from the Civil Protection Service and members of humanitarian organizations and volunteers provide care for migrants every day, and also 500-1000 police officers and about 460 soldiers were responsible for accepting migrants. In the reception centers, Police, Civil Protection Service and humanitarian organizations provided basic care (food, water, and clothing) and first aid. In those locations, Police checked the status of each individual depending on whether they applied for international protection or not and whether they could be returned to their country or not. According to this, the migrants were relocated to:

- Asylum Centers (applicants for international protection);
- Aliens Centers (migrants who were waiting to return to their neighbors or their country);
- Accommodation centers (migrants who have not applied for asylum, but cannot return to their country).

The measure, designated as support for reception facilities, was set up to handle and manage the mass arrival of third-country nationals on the Slovenian Schengen border, which was active between 20 September 2015 and 31 March 2016 and mobilized regular police in the reception centers along the Slovenian Schengen border with Croatia. The measure entitled establishing new and managing the existing accommodation facilities for dealing with mass arrival of third-country nationals on the Slovenian Schengen border.

The measure also included transport of migrants from the reception centers along the Slovenian Schengen border to accommodation facilities in interior. On 16th October 2015 the government adopted a decision on temporary control of the internal borders with Hungary, which began on 17th October 2015 and was extended for another 20 days. On the basis of a previously prepared plan, temporary technical barriers began to be set on 11th November 2015 for protection of the external Schengen border. The government, with help of the Army, set up a wire fence around 177 kilometers from the border with Croatia. Barriers were set up based on a risk assessment and for certain vulnerable parts of the border where an increased pressure from migrants' wave was expected. The Government of the Republic of Slovenia has undertaken a number of measures since 2015 till now for strengthening of the external border control by limiting organized migration while

²³¹ WB, ICPDPCM, ISDR, ARSCPDR, UNOCHA. The Structure, Role and Mandate of Civil Protection in Disaster Risk Reduction for South Eastern Europe, 2008, 25-33.

border police consistently rejected all migrants who do not meet the requirements for entry in the Republic of Slovenia. Entry was permitted only for persons who expressed their intent to apply for international protection in Germany, Austria, or Slovenia. Each migrant was considered individually. Entry on humanitarian grounds was allowed for persons who do not come from security countries of origin, whose nationality is undisputed, and whose trip was previously registered through the Balkan route.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs continues with the implementation of integration programs which have shown to be successful (comprehensive assistance in integration, Slovenian language courses, psychosocial assistance, etc.), which were implemented from non-governmental and other organizations in the local communities. Cooperation continued on a bilateral level (with countries of the Western Balkan migration route) and on multilateral levels, between ministers, police directors, operational level and among ambassadors. Working meetings in Slovenia and other countries facing migration crisis were organized. During the biggest migration wave, logistical problems emerged and they were eliminated through international cooperation on different levels. Activities which followed were implemented in a coordinated way. On 4th May 2016 a new Law for International Protection was adopted²³². The main objective was the implementation of EU law in national legislation (the 2013/32 / EU Directive and 2013/33 / EU Directive), which set out the standards in procedures for granting international protection as well as the rights and duties of applicants for international protection. The law also defines the details in the application of Dublin Regulation and EURODAC Regulation²³³.

In accordance with the abovementioned, the existing level of rights for applicants for international protection is retained and persons who received international protection were provided with the minimum standards which EU Members must take into account in accordance with the EU law. Persons who received international protection for their inclusion in the Slovenian society, Law redefines the terms and conditions for right to compensation for private accommodation: right to compensation for private accommodation is limited to 18 months, with the possibility for extension of another 18 months if the person who is receiving international protection attends 80% of the classes in the Slovenian language course in the first 18 months²³⁴. Amendment adopted in November 2015 has increased age limit of auxiliary police officers to 60 years, which means that possibility for mobilizing police officers who were retired in the previous years were still sufficiently qualified to carry out tasks of auxiliary police. The current migrant crisis and other similar events really require involvement of trained

²³² Law on International Protection (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 22/2016)

²³³ Directive 2013/32 /EU of European Parliament and Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and suppressing international protection; Directive 2013/33 / EU of European Parliament and Council of 26 June 2013 laying down the standards for acceptance of applicants for international protection.

²³⁴ Law for Defense on Republic of Slovenia (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 95/15).

auxiliary police²³⁵. The new Law allows the National Assembly to decide with a two-thirds majority vote from present Government representatives for using Slovenian army in cooperating with the police in protection of the national border. Army may use special authorities in accordance with the Law on Police²³⁶. The mobilization of the Slovenian army for assisting the police in protecting the national border is taking place in two phases.

The Government decision for cooperation of the Slovenian Army with the police forces prepares a plan for cooperation which specifies the area in which the army will engage, and the manner of cooperation between police officers and the army. If government makes a decision for mobilizing members of the army without police authorities, this means that their cooperation is limited on logistical support, monitoring, and informing police. In the second stage, if security circumstances require it, the Government will propose to the National Assembly for deciding when the members of Army can use their police authorization. The National Assembly approved all the authorizations of the Army in the period until the end of May 2016. However, law contains two time limits: such authorization may only be applied in a period in which they are necessary to carry out relevant tasks and that period may not be longer than three months.

4. CONCLUSION

Numerous crises and conflicts in the Middle East have resulted in the emergence of many migrants in the current decade. The crisis and the war on the territories of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria led the Middle East in condition which can be defined as a humanitarian catastrophe. The reasons which led the migrant crisis are different: escape from the war and suffering, search for a better life, non-functional states and escaping from various forms of radical terrorism. It is estimated that in 2000 there were about 150 million migrants in the world, ten years later in 2010 - 214 million and in 2050 the number of migrants is projected on 405 millions.

With the increasing number of migrants who are coming mostly from Syria and Afghanistan, the EU member states and the EU candidate countries from Southeast Europe have faced the biggest crisis in Europe's recent history. The migrant wave towards EU in 2015 has triggered more serious challenges in terms of operational functionality. Crisis has also triggered serious dilemmas and internal divisions between the member states, both in terms of integration approach towards migrants which have already arrived and necessary instruments for closing active transit routes and preventing new mass migrations and asylum claims on the territory of EU and SEE countries including the Republic of Slovenia.

In March 2016 the so-called "Balkan Route" was officially closed for migrants. With coordinated action of the countries from Southeast Europe,

²³⁵ Law on Amendments for Law on Organizing and Acting of Police (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 86/15)

²³⁶ Law for Defense on Republic of Slovenia (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 95/15).

migration waves in the region were reduced in a significantly short period of time. In addition, the "return" of many migrants from European Union countries was implemented with the so-called "*Migrant Pact*" between the EU and Turkey. As a consequence of heavily criticized agreement for a short time there was a little hope for the region of Southeast Europe to recover rapidly from turbulent events, but also this disrupted EU members to find a way and to agree for quota on distribution of migrants. With the proposal of the Republic of Germany and later this was accepted from economically more developed countries which are members of the European Union, a maximum 1%²³⁷ of the total population of the EU Member States and their partners can receive migrants who seek a permanent asylum or later citizenship in the countries where they have requested and were granted with permanent residence²³⁸. In the time of the biggest migrant wave an agreement was reached with the Republic of Turkey as initial and main transit base for most migrants; the ultimate goal of the agreement was to ensure effective resolution of the crisis. The EU agreement with the Republic of Turkey is significant from several aspects:

- Providing protection in accordance with the international legal norms for migrants;
- Distinction of people with a migrant status;
- Determination of coordinated action in direction of closing migration routes;
- Integration of arriving migrants, return of those who are not subject of protection in accordance with the principles of migrant status or pose a security risk;
- Dislocation of migrants from Greece to Turkey and prevention from a new wave on migrants in the Republic of Turkey. In order to eliminate the causes of the crisis, EU and Turkey have committed to a common approach for security stabilization and post-conflict peace building in Syria. In this way, EU manifested determination for a serious and comprehensive response for the most serious crisis in the past period. Successful resolution of the crisis will be determined with fulfillment of all commitments from the above mentioned agreement.

Undeniable fact is that the migrants will still come from Turkey to Greek islands from where they travel by boat to land. Greek government has great difficulty in managing the situation and is trying to secure sufficient housing. Since the beginning of 2019 some 60,000 migrants have arrived in Greece. The migration route across the Mediterranean to Italy is again intensified. Competent authorities in the Republic of Slovenia carefully monitor the situation and assess to potential risks in order to take appropriate measures and to intensify cooperation in exchange of information about possible threats.

²³⁷ Many EU countries say "no" to immigration quotas, June 2015. <https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/many-eu-countries-say-no-to-immigration-quotas/>

²³⁸ EUROSTAT. Migration and migrant population statistics, 2019-2020, 10-12.

For example, during January 2019 there were 321 migrants and asylum seekers accommodated in different facilities in the Republic of Slovenia. This represents a 21% increase compared to 266 reported in the previous month. The number is 64% more than 208 reported at the end of January 2018, and 20% more than 267 reported at the end of January 2017²³⁹. The policy of the Republic of Slovenia has consistently followed the European agenda. In fact, the Republic of Slovenia proposes initiatives which are shared with other parties involved in accordance with the regulations of the European Union members.

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SECURITY SYSTEM REFORMS, GENDER INCLUSION AND CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT

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Abstract

States aspiring to democratic governance and strong economies require capable administrative and political structures. A key element is a well governed security sector, which comprises the civil, political and security institutions responsible for protecting the state and the communities within it. Security sector reform (SSR) is a term that came on the stage after the end of the bipolar world or as it is widely known as the Cold War. After some time a new term “human security” was introduced mostly by international development organizations which meant to take into consideration not only the need of the state, but also the communities living in the state during the reforming process. SSR is a tool for conflict prevention, peace building and development.

After the introduction of the history of SSR and security actors, this paper deals with the conditions and challenges of the SSR implementation in developing countries, transitional, post-conflict and developed countries, the benefits of reform, gender inclusion and civilian oversight of Security Sector Reform. In addition, it brings on the table women participation in the police services in some countries in South East Europe and some data on women participation in the military around the world, but at the same time, it provides two practical examples of security sector reform in Serbia and Kosovo from a post-conflict situation with the direct involvement of the author of the paper. It closes with a conclusion of the research and its main findings.

Key words: Security sector reform (SSR), gender inclusion, civilian oversight, challenges, country context, gender, community policing, gender based violence, etc.

1. Introduction

Security is a concept that has been interpreted in different ways. It has historically been understood to mean the security of the state. Recently, the more people-centered concept of ‘human security’ has emerged which considers a new range of threats and emphasizes that poverty, illness and human rights violations kill far more people than wars. However, ‘human security’ is a very broad concept and can be seen as synonymous with ‘development’.

Although this is related to the security of states, it is possible to enhance state security without improving the human security of poor communities living within those borders. Focusing on the physical insecurity of poor people requires the promotion of capable and accountable states that deliver security and justice for all citizens, including the poor. In practice this means understanding ‘drivers’ of insecurity at local, national and regional levels, supporting security and justice sector reform programs, enhancing social cohesion and inclusion, and promoting women’s empowerment. (GSDRC, 2013:p.9)

The framework for security sector reform (SSR) emerged in 1999 after international development actors observed from examples in South Africa, Indonesia and countries in Eastern Europe that national security and its components were considered crucial in a state recovering from conflict or an authoritarian regime. SSR is considered an instrument of international development aid; and attaining good SSG is seen by practitioners as a conflict prevention tool and as a post-conflict stabilizer. Reportedly, the increasing number of civil wars led development actors to look at the problem of insecurity from the perspective of good governance. The conclusion was that the security sector should adhere to the same rules of good governance as any other public service to curb conflict and violence.²⁴⁰

The breakup of the bipolar world also created space for issues such as governance, poverty reduction and conflict prevention to enter the development and security assistance agendas of OECD²⁴¹ countries. This, in turn, enabled development donors to begin to discuss the linkages between security and development, and the appropriate role of development assistance in strengthening security in developing and transition countries. It also allowed for some modification in security assistance policies and saw the beginning of a dialogue between development and security donors. (Mark Sedra, 2010:p.31)

Given that much of SSR policy development took place within the OECD framework — and was adopted later by the EU and the UN — discussions fell initially within the “conflict, peace and development” agenda, concerned with stopping conflicts and preventing their recurrence. Later, they shifted into the new “fragile states” agenda. As NATO and the European Union (EU) made adherence to the principles of democratic civil–military relations a condition for membership, candidate countries had an enormous incentive to begin to apply these principles.

On the other side of the Atlantic, in North America and in the US in particular, the trajectory of SSR thinking has been fundamentally different. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, DC, led to a disproportionate militarization of US foreign assistance to respond robustly to terrorism, not only in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also in Central Asia, for instance. Indeed, the “war on terror” has had a fundamental impact on how SSR could be operationalized globally.

²⁴⁰https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_sector_governance_and_reform

²⁴¹<http://www.oecd.org/about/>

There is even a growing difference of opinions surrounding the name of the concept — security sector reform, security system reform, security sector transformation, and security and justice reform are used interchangeably by practitioners and experts alike.

The SSR model is built upon a set of core principles or norms emanating from the Western liberal democratic tradition. To understand SSR, it is critical to recognize its Western liberal pedigree and its intrinsic links to wider processes of democratization and liberal peace-building.

Security Sector Reform is the set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. The overall objective is to provide these services in a way that promotes an effective and legitimate public service that is transparent, accountable to civilian authority, and responsive to the needs of the public.(USAID, 2009: p.3)

Security from disorder, crime and violence is fundamental for reducing poverty and achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)²⁴² — and, more broadly, for sustainable economic, social and political development. According to the 2005 Human Development Report, “violent conflict is one of the surest and fastest routes to the bottom of the HDI (Human Development Index) table — and one of the strongest indicators for a protracted stay there”. Since the early 1990s, developing countries have accounted for over half of all armed conflicts — almost 40% of which occurred on the African continent. Over the same period, crime and armed violence in countries throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, Central Asia and the Balkans are believed to have escalated, contributing to heightened real and perceived insecurity for literally millions of people. (OECD, 2007: p.20)

Understanding who provides security and justice is central to SSR. The reality in most countries is that these services are delivered by a large number of actors. Some are state agencies and services, but some are likely to be non-state actors. Although the state has an irreducible role in justice and security provision, effective reform across the system requires working with a broad spectrum of actors.

Security Sector includes:

Core security actors: armed forces; police service; gendarmeries; paramilitary forces; presidential guards; intelligence and security services (both military and civilian); coast guards; border guards; customs authorities; and reserve or local security units (civil defense forces, national guards, militias);

Management and oversight bodies: the executive, national security advisory bodies, legislative and legislative select committees; ministries of defense, internal affairs, foreign affairs; customary and traditional authorities; financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget officers, financial audit and planning units); and civil society (civilian review boards and public complaints commissions);

²⁴²https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Development_Goals

Justice and the rule of law: judiciary and justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; human rights commissions and ombudsmen; and customary and traditional justice systems;

Non-statutory security forces: liberation armies, guerrilla armies, private security companies, political party militias.

2. Conditions for reforms

There are many factors that will influence the security sector reforms depending on the country context. Since its inception as a concept, the main factor remains the political will. If there is no political interest at all in reforms, progress in SSR cannot be imposed from outside. In this case, it is better to supply no assistance at all to state agencies than to support the wrong people. While implementing the SSR, there are always two sides to consider, the country that undertakes the reforms and the donor country that is supporting the recipient country for a number of reasons, such as the lack of financial means.

There is always a danger that too much pressure on reform will provoke violence. In Iraq, for example, the United States dissolved Saddam Hussein's security apparatus in 2004. The immediate result was that entire units of the army went underground to fight the new government and destabilize the country, with some degree of success, as revisited in summer 2014. (Eckhard 2016: p.44)

Security system reform and the international assistance to support it are inherently political processes. The ways in which justice and security are provided and governed by state and non-state institutions underpin the country's balance of power. Security system reform has an explicitly political objective — to ensure that security and justice are provided in a manner consistent with democratic norms, human rights principles and the rule of law.

3. Challenges of Reforms

Reform processes in a post-conflict or transition state inevitably create winners and losers as they challenge vested interests and existing power relationships. Justice and security reform is therefore best approached as a governance issue and not simply as a technical activity. Ideal preconditions for reform rarely exist. Keen awareness of the dilemmas and risks involved in providing security system assistance is required on a case-by-case basis.

The challenge of SSR – and what separates it from other development sectors, such as education, health, or energy – is that the reform of security institutions is inseparable from the changes in a country's political system, that is, its division of powers.

SSR means changing control over the use of force, which in many countries stands as the most important resource for political power. Change always produces winners and losers. For elites in the judiciary, intelligence services, police, and armed forces, the loss of power can involve great economic and personal risks,

especially if, for example, a democratic transformation leads them to be called to account for human rights violations or corruption. Access to the state monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force secures power; loss of the same might result in extreme economic and social disadvantage (including for family members) and sometimes even the difference between life and death (section 3.5). (Eckhard, 2016: p.43)

Experience has shown that SSR programs often tend to exclude certain institutions, such as those dealing with justice; donors tend to focus their engagement on one or two sub-sectors. This undermines the adoption of a comprehensive approach, and fragmentation of the system can prevent the establishment of a cohesive national policy framework. Similarly, fiscal sustainability issues tend to be ignored, and standard public finance management approaches are rarely included in SSR programs. Security and justice institutions are often seen as separate from the public sector, subject to different pay scales and with different processes, rules and regulations. It is important that state institutions within the security system be recognized as part of the broader public sector and integrated into initiatives aimed at public sector reform —including those addressing financial management, procurement, audit and human resource management. (OECD, 2007: p.24)

One of the key political risks is resistance to reform, because SSR potentially challenges vested interests, roles and power relationships. Resistance to reforms may manifest itself in different forms; three key sources are: Political, Institutional/organizational and Individual.

Resisters are defending their interests (material, cultural, political), or those of their organization or group, as they understand them. An administrative judicial clerk, for example, may fear the implementation of an automated case management system for various reasons, such as loss of income from bribery or fear of losing employment due to a lack of requisite skills. Paramilitary (bone police) units within the police may fear the loss of power if the government’s approach to policing changes from law enforcement to a service delivery model. And the military may resist SSR if a key element is the transfer of responsibility for internal security to the police. The following table shows the weak and strong factors of reform in developing, transitional, post-conflict and developed countries.

Table 1	Security Sector Reforms in Different Context			
	Developing countries	Transitional countries	Post-conflict countries	Developed countries
Key criteria	Level of economic development	Nature of political system.	Specific security situation	Political will
Key challenge	Development deficit.	Democratic deficit.	Security and democratic	Political will At

s	Excessive military spending; poorly managed/governed security sector leads to ineffective provision of security, thereby diverting scarce resources from development.	Oversized, over-resourced military-industrial complex; strong state, but weak civil society institutions; deficiencies in implementing SSR policies.	deficits. Government and civil society institutions collapsed; displaced populations; privatization of security; possibly pockets of armed resistance; abundance of small arms and anti-personnel mines.	times, relatively oversized, over resourced armed forces
Possibilities for conducting SSR	Mixed (depending on political commitment to reform, strength of state institutions, role and state of security forces, regional security environment, donor approach to SSR, etc.)	Rather good (strong state institutions, professional security forces, broader democratization process), even better if external incentives available (e.g. accession to EU or NATO).	Rather poor (weak and contested state institutions, privatization of security, dependence on peace support/intervention forces).	Mixed (depending on the political commitment to reform, and the relative strength of the military industrial complex); strong state institutions and CSO community, but great distance between the two.
	Developing countries	Transitional countries	Post-conflict countries	Developed countries
General reform process	Transition from underdeveloped to developed economy	Transition from authoritarian to democratic system	Transition from violent conflict to peace	Responding to a change in the security environment

Nature of external involvement	Development assistance coupled with political conditionality	Accession to multilateral institutions as incentive for reform	Military intervention /occupation; mostly UN-led peace support operations	Usually none
Key external actors	Development/financial actors: multilateral donors (e.g. OECD, UNDP, World Bank); bilateral donors; non-state actors	Security actors: international (e.g. EU, NATO, OSCE); governments; non-state actors (e.g. international NGOs, private military companies)	Security actors: intervention forces; peacekeeping forces under international auspices; non state actors (e.g. private military companies)	Usually none

Source: Kristin Valasek: Security Sector Reform and Gender, 2008

4. Benefits of Reforms

Security System Reform goes in line with Security Sector Governance (SSG). Good SSG means applying the principles of good governance to a state's security sector. Good SSG is based on the idea that the security sector should be held to the same high standards of public service delivery as other public sector service providers.

Since the 1990s, a number of multilateral and regional organizations have been involved in setting the accepted norms and standards of good SSG, including the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD) Development Assistance Committee, the European Union (EU), the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and agencies of the UN system.

The principles of good SSG are as follows.

Accountability: there are clear expectations for security provision, and independent authorities oversee whether these expectations are met and impose sanctions if they are not met;

Transparency: information is freely available and accessible to those who will be affected by decisions and their implementation;

Rule of law: all persons and institutions, including the state, are subject to laws that are known publicly, enforced impartially and consistent with international and national human rights norms and standards;

Participation: all men and women of all backgrounds have the opportunity to participate in decision-making and service provision on a free, equitable and inclusive basis, either directly or through legitimate representative institutions;

Responsiveness: institutions are sensitive to the different security needs of all parts of the population and perform their missions in the spirit of a culture of service;

Effectiveness: institutions fulfill their respective roles, responsibilities and missions to a high professional standard;

Efficiency: institutions make the best possible use of public resources in fulfilling their respective roles, responsibilities and missions. (Geneva: DCAF, 2015: p.3)

SSR can do many things when given the appropriate time and resources: it can expand the sovereignty of the state by imbuing it with a monopoly over the use of force; it can create an enabling environment for development and democratization; it can expand oversight, transparency and accountability within security institutions; and it can help reduce corruption, abuses of power, economic mismanagement and impunity within the security and justice spheres.

5. Gender and Security Reform

Gender equality and the promotion of equal rights and responsibilities between women and men in creating and maintaining secure environments for all, intersect with SSR at the heart of the security–development nexus. For donors and those participating in SSR, gender concerns matter both for policy and practice. Differences between men and women, such as physical strength combined with the different socio-cultural norms that surround women’s sexuality and social roles in many contexts, influence women’s perceptions of security and insecurity. (OECD, 2007: p.246)

Security is cited as a priority concern by the poorest and most marginalized ones. Insecurity affects these groups in unique ways, and security decisions are often taken without prior consideration of their particular needs and priorities. In particular, very few women (and organizations representing women’s interests) enter into debates and discussions surrounding the security sector. The security sector affects women and children in different ways, particularly when public security diminishes and security forces become predatory. It is therefore imperative that SSR attends to the security needs of the most vulnerable groups in society including women, children, indigenous groups and other communities who are discriminated against or socially or politically excluded.

Moreover, as has been widely noted, women and men experience security and insecurity in different ways, as do girls and boys. In this way, including gender analysis in SSR planning acts as a tool for ensuring that meaningful security is

available to meet the needs of different groups of people — men, women, girls and boys.

Two complementary strategies can be used to integrate gender issues – the particular needs and roles of men, women, boys and girls – into SSR and security institutions: gender mainstreaming and promoting the equal participation of men and women. These strategies can be applied both to the SSR process itself (e.g. by ensuring gender training for personnel responsible for SSR policy and planning) and to the institutions undergoing SSR (e.g. by including gender training for new recruits as part of a police reform process) (Valasek, 2008: p.4)

The integration of gender issues into SSR processes, in addition to being mandated by international and regional laws and instruments, enhances local ownership, effective service delivery, and oversight and accountability. Women’s organizations may be security providers, for example, providing shelter and support to female and male victims of torture, or domestic or sexual violence.

Increasing the participation of women in oversight bodies, such as the parliament, the executive and the judiciary helps to ensure that they are – and are perceived to be – representative, which can increase public confidence and responsiveness of oversight to the concerns of all citizens.

These days we see more and more women integrated in parliaments, the judiciary, border management, the army and the police, which contributes to more secure environment for everyone as it takes into account their specific need of what constitutes safety to them. Most of the people in their everyday life, regardless of gender, come mostly into contact with the police forces, and in the last couple of years there has been an increased presence of women in the police services around the world. The section below presents some data from South East European Countries.

Table 2 Participation of Women in the Police Services in some South East European Countries

Country	Total	Uniformed Staff	Civilian Staff
Albania	10.07%	6.5%	51.5%
BiH	13%		
Bulgaria	19.9%	9.6%	84.4%
Croatia	29.9%	17.5%	79.5%
Moldova	16.4%	14.4%	63.7%
Montenegro	8.7%		
Serbia	22.3%	19.2%	79.6%
FYR of Macedonia	12.7%	12%	15.5%

Source: Women in Police Services in South East Europe – SEESAC 2015²⁴³

The same situation applies in many armies of different countries in the world. Depending on the state context, women participate from 3% in India up to

²⁴³<http://www.seesac.org/f/docs/Gender-and-Security/Women-in-Police-Services-in-South-East-Europe-.pdf>

30% in Eritrea, whereas in the rest of the countries they account for approximately 15%, as in: France, Norway, Russia, Swedish, Ukraine and the United Kingdom.²⁴⁴

6. The Contribution of Civil Society

Oversight mechanisms should be designed to provide checks and balances that prevent abuses of power and ensure that institutions operate efficiently and effectively, while respecting the rule of law. There are at least six interdependent pillars of oversight and control:

1. Internal Control;
2. Executive Control;
3. Parliamentary Oversight;
4. Judicial Review;
5. Independent Bodies;
6. Civil Society Oversight. (DCAF, 2015: p.18)

The term ‘civil society’ is often used with imprecision, but is generally understood to encompass areas of activity that take place outside of both the state and the market. It includes a wide range of actors through which citizens can articulate their views and priorities – including non-governmental organizations, grassroots organizations, professional organizations, religious groups, labor organizations and the media.

However, there is little substantive discussion of how civil society actors can influence decisions on security and defense involving the military, police, intelligence services and the judiciary.

Some argue that the role of civil society is little understood by the military and defense sectors, which have traditionally been resistant to public input. Others state that civil society does not have either the necessary expertise or interest needed to provide an informed input into what is uniquely recognized as a policy area. Therefore, a major objective of SSR is to make the sector more democratic and accountable to citizens and communities, and more responsive to their needs. (GSDRC, 2013: p.14)

Civil society plays a doubly important role in SSR processes. First, local civil society organizations like the media, universities, and think tanks play crucial parts in civilian, societal control of the security sector (and government). Internationally, civil society NGOs offer a form of SSR support whose primary objective is not the security of the state, but the security of the population. Women’s organizations have been credited with playing a critical role in the consolidation of democracy in many states because of their capacity to represent and advocate for a group that has been traditionally excluded or marginalized from the political, social and economic structures.

Through these links to accountability, voice/participation and democratic culture, civil society and a free press are strongly associated with democracy. If

²⁴⁴https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women_in_the_military_by_country

SSR is fundamentally about establishing democratic, accountable governance over the safety, security and justice sectors, the engagement of civil society becomes both relevant and necessary. In modern societies, the very existence of civil society and a free press is premised on the state's respect for fundamental freedoms, in particular, the freedom of citizens to associate, to form organizations and to express their views and impart information and ideas through the media. These fundamental rights provide safeguards against an all-powerful state.

CSOs have essentially been assigned a service delivery role; major Western donors expect CSOs — together with the private sector — to step in for a state that is unable to provide key services in education, health, housing and social welfare. Similarly, donors also often possess the leverage to create space for indigenous CSOs in contexts where the political and security elite view them as rivals for funding and public influence.

The media are the main channel to help raise public awareness on security and justice issues and ensure local buy-in. Their reports and analysis often shape how the public perceive and understand these issues. In many countries, the media are underdeveloped, and journalists lack the capacity and knowledge to cover security and justice issues effectively. CSOs can play an important role in helping to develop these skills; developing the capacity of CSOs to effectively engage with the media can be an important area for assistance.

Co-operation between national authorities, police and civil society is essential on issues such as monitoring hate crimes, countering human trafficking, preventing and combating transnational threats (such as terrorism and cybercrime), monitoring peaceful assemblies, and building mutual understanding and trust between police, minorities and marginalized communities. (OSCE, 2016: p.22)

7. Practical Examples of Security Reform

Example 1. OSCE MEPE and Community Policing Projects in the south of Serbia

Context

After the withdrawal of Milosevic army and police from Kosovo in 1999, a follow-up armed conflict occurred in 2000 in south Serbia in three municipalities inhabited by ethnic Albanians in Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja, internationally known as the region of Presevo Valley, which is situated along the border with Kosovo. The two sides involved in the conflict were: the Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac (Ushtria Çlirimtare për Preshevë, Medvegjë dhe Bujanoc aka UÇPMB) and the Yugoslav Security Forces. The international community was involved to bring peace in the region.

One of the organizations that contributed mostly to establish peace after the conflict was the OSCE Mission to Serbia. In order to establish trust between the ethnic Albanians and state security forces, the OSCE, together with the country political leadership and ethnic Albanians representatives, decided to reform the police sector

in the three municipalities in order to be more representative of the different ethnicities, named as an inclusion of Multi-Ethnic Police Element or MEPE. Additionally, a Community Policing project was introduced by the OSCE as a confidence-building measure.

Impact

As a conflict prevention measure, MEPE eased the ethnic tension with mixed police patrols in the area. Members of MEPE were former members of UÇPMB, provided that they were not involved in crimes. The Community Policing Project developed a partnership between the police service and the public through Citizen Advisory Groups (CAG). CAGs were composed of different communities representatives, such as the civil society, religious leaders, heads of villages and the media, where the common problems of safety were discussed and solved in cooperation with the police. The meetings were held every three months and were open to the public, but they could be organized according to the needs of a specific situation²⁴⁵.



Citizen Advisory Group (CAG) meeting held in the village of Konçul in 2005, former stronghold of UÇPMB fighters. Participants: MEPE Police, OSCE, Head of Village, villagers and Media.

²⁴⁵For deeper insight about the OSCE role and reform of the police sector in the south of Serbia and the Balkans region visit these websites:

<https://www.osce.org/serbia/32993?download=true>

<https://polis.osce.org/manual-community-policing>

<https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/34540/MultiethnicxPolicexReformxinxSouthernxSerbia.pdf?sequence=1>

https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/25548/CORE_Working_Paper_14.pdf

Example 2. UNKT Joint Programme on Domestic Violence in Kosovo

Context

The UNKT Joint Programme on Domestic Violence in Kosovo was formulated by the UN Gender-Based Violence (GBV) Task Force, composed of UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, UN Women and OHCHR, under the overall responsibility and guidance of the UN Development Coordinator, through an inclusive and participatory process. The consultations focused on assessing and validating key areas to be addressed to sustain the implementation of the National Strategy and Action Plan against Domestic Violence (NSAPDV) 2011-2014, in view of the gaps and challenges identified in addressing GBV in Kosovo and which could be supported by a UNKT Joint Programme on GBV.

The Joint GBV Programme was also designed to contribute to the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325(2000) on Women, Peace and Security. Alongside the progress in the recovery of Kosovo since the aftermath of the 1999 conflict, a high prevalence of domestic violence (DV) remained a concern in Kosovo, similarly to other post-conflict societies. Consultations indicated that women who were subjected to rape and sexual violence during the 1999 conflict have yet to receive justice, and there are cases where survivors of rape experience further suffer in the form of exclusion and stigmatization by their own families and communities.

Impact

The Program was piloted in three municipalities: Gjilan/Gnjilane, Gjakova/Djakovica and Dragash/Dragas²⁴⁶. It was a holistic approach to the problem of Domestic Violence working with all institutions, such as: the Mayor's Office, the police, the judiciary, the Prosecutor's Office, the Social Welfare Center, the Regional Employment Bureau, the civil society, the media, private companies etc. As a result, the municipality of Gjilan obtained a 5 (five) year 2013-2018 Municipal Strategy on tackling the issue of Domestic Violence with Costing; Coordination Mechanism composed of 13 municipal institutions (the police, the judiciary, the health care institution, etc.) and 3 NGOs, including a shelter for domestic violence victims. Prior to that, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between 16 actors in the presence of the UN Development Coordinator for Kosovo with clear terms of references. The work of the Coordination Mechanism was lead by a local coordinator. The awareness of citizens in relation to domestic violence was very high followed by reporting cases, which was a sign that domestic violence is no longer a taboo topic in Kosovo society. The same situation happened in two other pilot municipalities. The Program was replicated in 4 (four) municipalities in the north of Kosovo composed of minorities.²⁴⁷

²⁴⁶http://www.ks.undp.org/content/kosovo/en/home/operations/projects/poverty_reduction/un-joint-programme-on-domestic-violence-in-kosovo.html

²⁴⁷<http://unkt.org/2018/03/29/un-joint-efforts-combat-prevent-domestic-violence/>



Ceremony on the occasion of the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women, 25 November 2014 in Gjilan/Gnjilane²⁴⁸ and a regular meeting of the Coordination Mechanism against Domestic Violence composed of 13 municipal institutions.

8. Conclusion

Security Sector Reform is a complex process that requires the involvement of many stakeholders starting from the local, national and international level. The main precondition for SSR in any context is the political will of those in power. One of the key political risks is resistance to reform, because SSR potentially challenges vested interests, roles and power relationships. What works and what does not is often a question of the specific case.

Experience shows that SSR is a long-term process and that it is effective when internally driven.

The role of the international community is primarily to support and facilitate. In some post-conflict and fragile state contexts, external actors may initially be required to take more of a leading role to help recognize the security situation. But the focus should be on building the capacity of local actors to take on the leadership role as soon as possible.

An SSR process can take a generation, and different international actors may provide support during different phases of the process. For example, one assistance program could focus on building a dialogue on security and justice development, another support a national SSR assessment, and another support implementation. With such long-term goals, it is essential that the process (and thus the programs of support) be consistently reviewed, and fine-tuned and redirected when necessary.

SSR is a tool for conflict prevention, peacebuilding and development taking into consideration the input of the women and most vulnerable segments of society. However, given the sensitive role of the security system in society, there is a risk that if assistance programs are not carefully targeted they could inadvertently exacerbate tensions. For example, increasing the operational capacity of law

²⁴⁸<http://www.ks.undp.org/content/kosovo/en/home/presscenter/articles/2014/11/25/addressing-domestic-violence-in-kosovo.html>

enforcement agencies without improving their governance could fuel repression. And targeting programs in one part of the country in a divided society could reinforce ethnic divisions and marginalization of the disadvantaged groups.

But, the efforts to reform the security sector only constitute SSR if they enhance both accountability and effectiveness within a framework of civilian, democratic control, rule of law and respect for the human rights of all individuals.

Civil society, especially women organizations, can and should play an important role in encouraging the state to fulfill its responsibilities, in a transparent, accountable and gender balanced manner throughout the security sector. Possibilities for civil society involvement vary according to context and are dependent upon the overall state of democratic governance in that particular context. There are both internal and external challenges to civil society involvement in the security sector. Internal challenges include a lack of expertise and confidence or unwillingness to engage. External problems include government suspicion and donor policies that give inadequate attention to strengthening democratic governance.

The situation from the field has proved that in carrying out SSR it is better to have a holistic approach than to be concentrated only on one or two institutions which will give partial results.

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